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Police education and police 
science in Europe
Editorial introduction to the conference collection volume
János Fehérváry & Detlef Nogala
In this volume, the reader will find a selected collection 
of papers that were presented at the Annual European 
Police Research and Science Conferences, organised 
by the European Police College (CEPOL) – since July 
2016 called the European Union Agency for Law 
Enforcement Training – during the period of the 
years 2006 to 2012 (1). This publication continues the 
ongoing endeavours of the European Police College 
to foster the documentation of discussions, new ideas 
and issues raised in regard to the understanding of the 
police as an institution, and policing as an activity in a 
European and wider context (2).
The CEPOL Research and Science Conferences have, 
over a decade, contributed significantly to achieving 
one of the agency’s dedicated tasks: to disseminate 
research findings and good practice among senior 
police officers in Europe. Even in the digital age, live 
conferences appear to be still the most generative 
forums for sharing insights, launching new ideas, or 
finding intellectual inspiration. 
(1) Contributions collected here originate from the conferences 
organised in Bramshill 2006 (United Kingdom), Münster 2007 
(Germany), Traiskirchen 2008 (Austria), Amsterdam 2009 (The 
Netherlands), Oslo 2010 (Norway) and Lyon 2012 (France).
(2) See for example Fehérváry et al. (2006), Jaschke et al. (2009), 
Fehérváry (2011), Honkonen (2011), Nogala et al. (forthcoming), 
as well as the European Police Science and Research Bulletin, pub-
lished by CEPOL and available from the agency’s website. Short 
summary reports on all CEPOL R&S conferences can be found 
in the Science and research section of CEPOL’s public website 
(www.cepol.europa.eu).
In the past (that is until 2011), access to the CEPOL 
conferences was administratively restricted and the 
number of participants thus limited. By the same token, 
a good number of the presented scientific outcomes 
and opinions were not more widely shared.
The editors of the volume — who were also the 
respective organisers of the covered conference events 
— hold the opinion that the collection contributions 
deserve a broader reception and discussion, even 
when they were presented some time ago and might 
be considered as ‘dated’ by some. Good justifiable 
reasons for a retrospective publication from the editors’ 
perspective are:
 § senior police officers, police students, students 
of the police and police researchers as well as the 
interested general public in Europe should have the 
chance to read these papers and to work with them: 
according to the Bologna Process — meanwhile 
implemented in national police training of most 
EU Member States — the permanent inclusion of 
insights and findings of police research and science 
into law enforcement training activities is considered 
crucial for their quality;
 § the speed of development of police science in 
Europe is rather slow, if compared e.g. with the 
natural sciences: the main topics on the agenda 
are persistent and theoretical concepts appear 
occasionally reloaded from earlier stages of 
disciplinary evolution, still carrying currency. Several 
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of the insights and thoughts offered here are as 
relevant now as they were when first presented;
 § even if some empirical results have become 
outdated, or in the event that the theoretical 
discussion has advanced, there is still good reason 
to document the concerns and debates of the 
recent past.
The editors of this volume trust that this publication 
will encourage further interest in the professional, 
scholarly and public discussion about good police 
and good policing in Europe, and hope that it will 
be a positive stimulus for enhancing exchange and 
cooperation between police training, police research 
and police practice, generating potential new interest 
in the agency’s forthcoming research and science 
conferences.
Police Science in the context of the 
European Police College
Around 2006, ten years ago, an international CEPOL 
expert group was in the middle of a deep discussion 
on police science matters from a European perspective 
and came up with a working definition of police 
science. According to this definition, ‘police science’ 
is a relatively young academic discipline with a 
growing international scientific community in Europe 
(see Jaschke et al. 2009). However, there are good 
opportunities and hope for fruitful development 
when we see its dynamic growth during the last 
two decades. Further progress is expected — and 
certainly necessary. In order to promote this process, 
scientists and researchers conducting their studies 
and research in the wide field of police science have 
to come together in their scientific community, 
despite their diverse, multi-disciplinary backgrounds, 
approaches, experience or languages. They must 
form an international network of research institutions 
(units) and scientists, since different joint activities by 
members of the professional and scholarly network are 
essential to ensure the future progress of police science. 
This may and will help in solving the many theoretical 
and practical challenges of finding wider acceptance 
from politicians, practitioners and scientists from other 
academic fields, doing research in the very wide and 
complex topic of police and policing. The community 
also can help to promote new ideas, approaches or 
research questions which will contribute to establishing 
a better understanding about the research topics of 
this young academic discipline for actors in policing 
and, particularly, in the police.
A vital tool for strengthening the scientific police 
science community is gathering scientists and 
researchers that are active at police training institutions 
in conferences, symposia, workshops, meetings or 
editorial teams for scientific journals.
The working definition of police science referred to 
above has been the foundation for the design of all the 
CEPOL Research and Science Conferences with regard 
to the content. However, without doubt, we have 
seen some dynamic development in the academic 
discussion of police science and research since 2006 
— not at least because of the progress of the Bologna 
Process in the area of police training in Europe (3). 
However, the essential background of this development 
can be seen in the fact that policing becomes more 
and more complex, increasingly international, linked 
with other fields of society and diverse regarding the 
actors or active providers. This development, and 
changes in policing environments, offer the reason 
and opportunity for closer scientific considerations of 
policing and the police. Against the backdrop of these 
developments it has become obvious that efforts 
to suit the objectively increasing needs for scientific 
analyses of the conditions and reality of policing are a 
consequent response in this situation. Police research 
and researchers — regardless if inside or outside of 
police or governmental institutions — are undeniably 
confronted with these contemporary and emerging 
challenges and are seeking to provide findings and 
results for police training and police practices. There 
is a slow but steady sense among leading police 
management that scientific research can and will help 
to meet these challenges in a proper and effective way 
— often avoiding expensive wrong decisions.
(3) See for example the findings of Ferreira et al. (2011) and Konze 
et al. (2015).
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CEPOL Research and Science Conferences
Since its inception in 2001 one of CEPOL’s central tasks 
has been the promotion of international cooperation 
in the field of research and science by dissemination 
of good practice and research findings. This remit 
continued after its transfer to a European agency 
in 2006. In implementation of this task the Swedish 
National Police Academy in Solna organised, under 
the auspices of CEPOL, a first general seminar for 
police research and science in 2001. The year after, 
the Dutch Police Education and Knowledge Centre 
(LSOP) organised, in cooperation with CEPOL, a 
pilot conference in Apeldoorn. A major topic of this 
conference was ‘European Police Science — bridging 
the gap’. Based on the encouraging experience from 
the Solna and Apeldoorn events, CEPOL has put 
the CEPOL European Police Research and Science 
Conference on the annual working programme as an 
‘annual flagship event’ since 2003 (see Table 1).
The major aim of these conferences is the dissemination 
of current research findings and information about 
research projects and the improvement of cooperation 
of the involved police colleges in the field of police 
research and science, as well as building up a meeting 
platform for senior police officers, police trainers and 
researchers. Behind this aim is the idea that CEPOL will 
be able to raise the overall profile of police science 
in Europe by bringing together various stakeholders 
from the police science community with senior officers 
who are open to and interested in police research and 
science. This opportunity for meeting and discussing 
research findings and projects in relation to police 
practice is seen as a contribution and challenge towards 
bridging the gap between operational policing and 
academic research.
Esteemed academic researchers and senior police 
professionals from various European countries were 
invited to the conferences as keynote speakers on 
the specific main topics, as well as experts for panel 
discussions and workshops. In order to overcome 
national or professional bias, or ignorance of any sort, 
the organisers encouraged diversity in the scientific 
and pragmatic approaches of dealing with the main 
topics and accepted differences in the quality of the 
keynote addresses in favour of embracing as wide a 
European dimension as possible.
When organising the conferences, the conference 
managers favoured certain types of contributors and 
contributions, those with an emphasis on, or interest 
in, promoting:
 § interchange between theory, practice and training 
of police and policing;
 § a constructive exchange between different 
scientific approaches and the demands of police 
practitioners on equal and mutual terms;
 § the idea of a European dimension and the idea of a 
European police science;
 § initiation and inspiration of further (comparative or 
joint) research activities.
Similar if not the same criteria were applied in the 
collection of this volume.
Table 1 
CEPOL Research and Science Conferences 2003-2012
Year Organising Country/College Main Topic
2003 Sweden Swedish Police Academy in Solna 
Interplay between research — education — practice
2004
Czech Republic 
Czech Republic Police Academy in Prague
Development of police sciences and transfer of 
knowledge into police education, training and practice — 
interconnections: science — training — practice
2005
Portugal 
Instituto Superior de Polícia Judiciária e Ciências Criminais in 
Lisbon
Scientific research and assessment of police recruiting, 
training, learning and evaluation methodologies and 
techniques
2006 United KingdomCENTREX in Bramshill
Policing public order
10
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Year Organising Country/College Main Topic
2007 GermanyGerman Police University in Münster 
A European approach to Police Science
2008 AustriaAustrian Sicherheitsakademie in Traiskirchen (Vienna)
Comparative policing research from a European perspective: 
with a focus on organised crime
2009
Netherlands
Police Academy of the Netherlands 
Badhoevedorp (Amsterdam)
Future policing in Europe: a shared agenda for research
2010 NorwayNorwegian Police University College in Oslo
Practical research and research practice — Police Science 
into a new decade
2011
Spain
Gabinete de Estudios de Seguridad Interior of the Spanish 
Ministry of the Interior in Madrid
Cybersecurity, cybercrime and social networks
2012 FranceÉcole Nationale Supérieure de la Police in St Cyr au Mont D’Or
Police Science in Europe. Projects, progress, projections
About this collection volume
There were, of course, more presentations and 
papers given during the five conference events than 
documented here in the volume at hand. The selection 
applied by the organisers is due to a mix of substance 
and the availability of contributions: not all of them 
were at publishing level, and some were not meant to 
be published in full paper format. In addition, English 
was not the native language of all presenters and the 
routine of writing scientific articles varies accordingly. 
Thus the reader will note clear differences in the level of 
sophistication in vocabulary, style or rigorous structure 
of the argument.
However, in respect of the editors’ ambition to collect 
— in their view — outstanding and noteworthy 
contributions, as well as presenting a variety of different 
perspectives, approaches and research methods from 
different European countries, regions and institutions, 
this publication demonstrates the potentiality of police 
science with a European dimension, fed and supported 
by professional experience and reflection, as well as by 
intellectual rigour and scholarship.
Instead of arranging the 31 contributions in 
chronological order, in line with the year of original 
presentation at the conferences, the editors opted 
to group the articles in topical clusters (4). Within the 
individual chapters, the papers are sorted from more 
theoretical approaches or generalist positions to more 
(4) The year of original presentation will be indicated by the con-
ference venue and year on the starting page of the respective 
articles.
applied viewpoints, where possible. The introductions 
by the editors to the specific chapters provide a 
summary of what the respective chapter is about and 
what the reader can expect.
The first chapter Police research and science, 
addresses the cardinal issues of the development and 
applicability of police science vis-a-vis the demands 
and challenges of the routines of daily police business 
as well as police training and education. The papers 
by Pieter W. Tops, Monica den Boer, Bernhard Welten 
& and Auke van Dijk (all Netherlands) and Christian 
Mouhanna (France) shed some light on the space 
created by the partially rivalling logics of management, 
institutional governance and scientific search for 
facts and truth, where one can find tension, as well as 
innovation and mutual inspiration. Peter Neyroud (UK) 
argues for a pragmatic way forward in order to avoid 
the shortcomings and dilemmas of the past from a 
British perspective.
The second chapter features contributions centring 
on Comparative approaches to progressing police 
studies, if not police science. The articles by Sebastian 
Roché (France), Cyrille Fijnaut (Netherlands) and 
Gabriele Jacobs, Kate Horton and P. Saskia Bayerl (all 
Netherlands) highlight the importance and usefulness 
of international comparison as an instrument of police 
research for acquiring facts as well as practical and 
theoretical knowledge about contemporary police 
and policing.
Strategies and perspectives are the focus of the 
contributions to Chapter 3 written by (once again) 
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Cyrille Fijnaut (Netherlands), Jean-Paul Brodeur 
(Canada), Didier Bigo (France), Sirpa Virta (Finland) and 
Michiel Holtackers (Netherlands). Those papers deal 
with police and policing strategies seen from scientific 
perspectives, and their implementation by politics and 
in police practice.
The contributions by Sophie Body-Gendrot (France), 
Rob Mawby (United Kingdom) and three co-authored 
papers — Wouter Stol, Helene I. Gundhus, Siv Rundhove 
and Karianne Rönning (Netherlands and Norway); 
Matthew L. Long, Laurence Allison and Michael 
McManus (all United Kingdom); Thierry Delpeuch and 
Thomas Scheffer (France, Germany) focus on practical 
police challenges as central topics for research projects 
in Chapter 4 Practical police problems and applied 
science.
Organised crime meets research is the subject of the 
papers in Chapter 5. Hans-Jörg Albrecht (Germany), 
László Salgó (Europol/Hungary), Michael Levi (United 
Kingdom), Tamara Schotte (Europol) and Didier 
Bigo, Hager Ben Jaffel (France) and James Sheptycki 
(Canada) look carefully at various aspects of organised 
crime and the respective challenges for police research 
regarding strategic, political and practical handling of 
this international crime complex.
The sixth chapter Contemporary and emerging 
challenges of policing collects papers highlighting 
familiar and novel problem areas of policing in Europe, 
as well as some innovative perspectives with which to 
tackle them (Sabine Vogt, Germany). Those challenges 
may be caused by institutional and organisational 
changes (Peter Neyroud, United Kingdom; Tore 
Björgo, Norway; Graham Hooper, United Kingdom) 
or triggered by seismic shifts towards digital societies 
(Tatjana Tropina, Germany and another joint paper 
by P. Saskia Bayerl, Gabriele Jacobs and Kate Horton, 
Netherlands).
The concluding final contribution is a paper by 
Nick Fyfe (United Kingdom) based on his concluding 
keynote address at the conference in Lyon 2012, which 
in the view of the editors conceptually sums up almost 
perfectly the most relevant issues raised and the 
underlying discursive currents that were shaping the 
discussions and disputes between practicing police 
officers, police educators and police scientists or 
scholars during all CEPOL European Police Research and 
Science Conferences. At the same time, he formulates 
an outlook on the direction that police science and 
police research could take in Europe in the future.
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Chapter I: Police Science  
and Research — Introduction
Hans-Gerd Jaschke
Police science and research was and still is the core 
topic and the background of the annual CEPOL 
research and science conferences. Since the first ideas 
came up more than ten years ago, basic questions 
took the floor again and again: Do the police need 
science? What kind of science and research, what can 
be called ‘applied science’? What do we know about 
the relationships between the world of policing and 
the world of researchers? What are shared values and 
what are differences between the EU Member States 
related to police research? The idea of ‘police science’ 
was promoted and an international working group 
worked out some ideas within three years. The results 
were presented at the CEPOL science and research 
conference 2006 in Bramshill, a book publication 
followed shortly afterwards. The following meetings 
focused on selected leading topics, but they also 
discussed the main basic problems of police science.
This chapter presents five contributions within a time 
frame of five years: from 2007 to 2012. They all deal with 
knowledge and information and the way the police are 
working with these resources. All authors are engaged 
experts in the field of police science and research, but 
they take different positions, ranging from a sceptical 
view on police managers´  willingness to cooperate with 
researchers up to successful experiences of practical 
teamwork.
Pieter Tops opens with a reflection on knowledge on the 
one hand and action on the other. The presumption is 
that daily police work in a ‘frontline organisation’ (Tops) is 
driven by the need for action and reaction, both of them 
immediately after the case has occurred. Thus, police 
officers are action-orientated. Generally, reflection and 
contemplation are the skills of a researcher’s working 
environment, whereas the officers’ professional 
attitudes are much more activity orientated. On the 
other hand, a detective is ‘a researcher’ as well — he 
or she combines different sources of knowledge and 
information to solve the problem. Following Tops it can 
be said that the nature of police work is both, action and 
research orientation. This leads to the performance level 
as an important and neglected field of police research: 
‘In brief, police research is characterised by a tension 
between knowledge kills action and knowledge skills 
action. The big challenge is to keep balance’.
Monica den Boer highlights communication within the 
‘narrative’ police organisation as a brilliant focus for the 
reflection of police practice, education, and research. 
Police research is key to policing, because well-trained 
and educated officers might be able to develop the 
organisation. In the police education field research 
enables students to apply rigid methodological 
standards, to analyse problems better and draw 
conclusions. Den Boer then draws attention to the 
research infrastructure, where a lot of things remain to 
be worked out: there is a lack of research environments, 
and only little cross-border cooperation in the field of 
police research. Networking between police academies, 
police agencies, industry partners, and governmental 
and non-governmental organisations could be 
improved. Den Boer’s perspective is an optimistic one, 
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which believes in cooperation possibilities and the 
willingness of researchers, police managers and other 
players in the field to cooperate.
Christian Mouhanna throws a spanner in the works. 
His outlook is a pessimistic one. He insists on ongoing 
mistrust and tensions between police managers and 
researchers when discussing the French case. His 
starting point is the myth of the police as a homogenous, 
top-down orientated organisation. Police managers 
believe deeply in this model, although the reality 
does not follow. Police research in the field, which 
discovers that processes are not top-down driven but, 
to some extent, out of control, may destroy the myth 
of the homogenous organisation. This is the fear of the 
managers and this is why they mistrust intellectuals, a 
group which is above all much less part of the hierarchy 
and free to criticise the police and which is, from that 
point of view, a certain risk for the police management 
and the myth of the homogenous organisation. Police 
managers tend ‘to reject those who pretend to have 
a more accurate view, and especially when they have 
relevant analysis. That is why researchers are blamed and 
denigrated’. After studying Mouhanna’s article, which 
offers a deep view inside the complicated structure 
of research knowledge and police leadership, many 
doubts remain: what about constructive cooperation 
between the police and police research, between 
managers and intellectuals?
Bernhard Welten and Auke van Dijk give an example of 
a very fresh and surprising cooperation between the 
Amsterdam-Amstelland police force and researchers 
in the ‘Juxta’ project. Cooperation was built up with 
academics from unusual backgrounds: no lawyers, no 
criminologists, no administration experts, but people 
coming from anthropology, philosophy, artificial 
intelligence, art or experimental psychology. The police 
force wanted to have a look inside the organisation 
from a ‘strange’ perspective in order to open up new 
discoveries. Welten and van Dijk describe Juxta as a big 
success. The researchers named many blind spots that 
the officers did not notice in their daily practice. They 
contributed to opening the minds of the officers and 
instigated many critical reflections. From the police point 
of view, the authors emphasise ‘an intimate relationship 
with the academic world (which) is necessary for 
problem solving in a rapidly changing world’.
How does this obviously constructive cooperation 
experience between Dutch police managers and 
researchers fit into Mouhanna’s sceptical view of mistrust? 
Comparing the Amsterdam-Amstelland experience 
with Mouhanna’s doubtful, but comprehensible view, 
offers further questions for discussion: Is Juxta a very 
single Dutch experience, or can it be generalised? Are 
Mouhanna’s reflections limited to France or must they 
be taken into account generally?
Peter Neyroud argues from a British point of view; 
that changing conditions in the development of 
economy, society and politics are driving a much 
more systematic approach. The financial crisis and 
massive cost cuts forced the police to restructure 
policing, police training and the way the police make 
use of research. Neyroud identifies a historical situation 
where the police relationship with science and research 
needs a radical change. The founding of the new 
‘College of Policing’ in the UK in 2012 should create ‘a 
new partnership relationship with higher education’: 
police training concludes more education items, the 
establishment of police universities in some countries 
indicates the adoption of scientific and research issues 
into professional police education. Neyroud sees the 
discussion about the professionalisation of policing at 
the moment ‘to test the development of a full-blown 
professional model — qualification, accreditation, 
registration and continuous professional development 
— not just for the senior ranks, but for all those working 
in policing’.
In summary, some major research dimensions remain 
open for further discussion. The role of knowledge 
in practical police performances needs an empirical 
approach (Tops). The process of setting up research 
infrastructures is on the political agenda, and the 
relationships between police, research and education 
remain on the research agenda (den Boer and Neyroud). 
Last but not least, we find plausible arguments that deny 
the willingness of police managers to cooperate with 
researchers looking inside the organisation (Mouhanna) 
and at the same time we take note of a remarkable 
Dutch experience, which gives evidence of a successful 
cooperation between management and researchers 
(Welten/van Dijk), an issue for further discussion. Maybe 
Tops hits on a main point: he believes that the police 
‘has only relatively recently opened itself to more 
knowledge-based approaches and reflective processes’.
15
Knowledge (s)kills action —  a shared agenda for comparative research on and with the police
Knowledge (s)kills action —  
a shared agenda for comparative 
research on and with the police
Pieter W. Tops
The Netherlands
(2009 Conference in Bad Hoevedorp)
The value and meaning of knowledge for 
policing
Some three years ago now, I joined the Police Academy 
of the Netherlands to further develop its knowledge 
and research function. Crucial questions for me were: 
What is the relationship between the police and 
knowledge? What are effective research strategies in 
the police world? How can we improve our knowledge 
about the police as a frontline organisation?
First of all, in essence, the police are a knowledge 
organisation. Police officers are continually occupied 
collecting, arranging and assessing knowledge, whether 
it is related to the investigation of a crime scene, taking 
a statement or bringing to light fraudulent financial 
transactions. It’s a question of looking for reliable 
knowledge, aimed at establishing the truth. This must 
ultimately be able to stand the test of public and legal 
scrutiny. In this sense, police work has a lot in common 
with empirical scientific research. A detective is a 
researcher. At the same time, there is a rather ambiguous 
relationship with knowledge in the police world. As 
police organisation, you need knowledge if you are to 
take action and be successful. But knowledge certainly 
does not always make it easier to act. Knowledge 
is certainly not always practical. It can also lead to 
more doubts, to more uncertainty, to the enforced 
acceptance of multiplicity and ambiguity. It has been 
said that ‘knowledge kills action’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998) and 
this statement clarifies why the relationship between 
the police and knowledge must be a complicated one.
So what is to be done? In my experience as researcher, 
I have rediscovered the meaning of action and 
interaction studies in recent years (Kensen and Tops, 
2005). This research takes place very close to the real 
world. You put yourself in the shoes of those you 
are studying, empathising with their questions and 
problems. A certain level of engagement is appropriate, 
without becoming totally involved. The impact of the 
researcher on what happens is not eliminated as much 
as possible, rather made firm and explicit. The researcher 
talks back and advises, and not only at the end of the 
study in the form of a report, but during the research 
process. In my experience, this not only increases the 
practical, but also the theoretical significance of the 
study. Nothing is perhaps as practical as a good theory, 
as the saying goes, but nor is anything as theoretical as 
a good practice (Zouridis, 2003). These are observations 
which coincide with current opinions on the character 
of knowledge and knowledge production (Leijnse, 
2002). Knowledge is seen here less and less as a ‘stock 
quantity’, as a commodity you can acquire and store 
and then distribute or apply in bits. Instead, knowledge 
is a ‘flow quantity’, which forms in processes in which 
production, distribution and application take place 
simultaneously. Knowledge forms primarily in learning 
processes and in practical activities. As a result, the 
age-old distinction between fundamental and applied 
knowledge becomes blurred.
In this approach, tacit knowledge is very important, 
the unexpressed knowledge that is present in skilled 
and professional action, whilst the actor is unaware of 
it or unable to describe it accurately. In a recent study, 
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conducted in the Netherlands, it turned out that, in 
contrast to common belief, police officers on the ground 
often have a relatively high capacity to learn (Beerepoot 
et al., 2007). At least, people say that they learn a lot 
informally, but we still know little about exactly what 
and how. When reading this report, I was constantly 
reminded of the famous case from the management 
literature about the maintenance engineers at Rank 
Xerox. Every morning, they sat together for half an 
hour drinking coffee, before they set off to the different 
firms to check the copiers. In an attempt by the 
management to increase efficiency, the half hour for 
coffee was scrapped and the engineers went straight 
off to their clients. In this way, it turned out that the 
board had managed to destroy the most important 
collective learning opportunity in the organisation. 
Whilst enjoying a cup of coffee, football was not the 
only topic of conversation, but also experiences and 
questions relating to work (Seely Brown and Solomon 
Gray, 1995). I suspect that we should also be looking for 
such moments in the police. That is not a haphazard 
affair. The briefings and debriefings, for example, by no 
means always qualify as a true exchange of experience. 
Apparently, you have to go further and deeper into 
the police organisation. Observe precisely what police 
officers do, rather than what we think they do. It is very 
important to unveil this secret of police learning, both 
theoretically and practically; it increases our insight into 
how the police functions as a frontline organisation and 
it helps us to improve its quality in practical terms.
This research can only be made successful if the 
police officers on the ground are also convinced of 
its usefulness. Interaction studies can then be an 
extremely useful research strategy. It is a line of research 
that we have to develop further within the police in 
the coming years. However, I do not wish to be at all 
dogmatic or narrow-minded on this point. Different 
types of research must be able to coexist, side by side. 
A few years ago, I looked into what kind of knowledge 
people operating in cities need, for the Dutch 
Knowledge Centre for Larger Towns and Cities (KCGS, 
2002). We arrived at three types. First of all, inspiring 
and interpretive stories about what is involved in the 
reality of urban trends. Anecdotes help you to gain 
insight and to know how to relate to it; stories, which 
also supply the language and the terms that make this 
possible and which provide the inspiration for change 
and innovation. Secondly, figures and time sequences; 
presenting factual material in a clear and orderly 
manner, so that it becomes obvious in which area of 
development we find ourselves and what, if anything, 
is unusual about it — facts and figures, knowing what’s 
going on and being able to draw conclusions from this. 
Thirdly, recognisable theories in the form of reflection 
on all the assumptions and starting points which are at 
the root of everyday operations. Did we base our action 
on the right assumptions? Did we overlook important 
things? Are we up to date in our analyses? Did we make 
the right connections? The international dimension is 
also important here.
Police research in context
A lot of police research has been conducted in the past 
decades, by many different researchers in many different 
countries. We certainly not start from scratch. But where 
exactly do we stand in police research? Historical 
comparative research on police research has been 
done in recent years and I would like to mention two 
thorough studies: Insights on police by Paul Ponsaers 
and colleagues (2009) and Perspectives of Police 
Science in Europe, by del Barrio Romero and colleagues 
(2007). This latter study was actually commissioned by 
CEPOL. These two studies give an important insight into 
the field of police research. Several conclusions may be 
drawn from this.
1) Thematic diversity is enormous. One way to look at it 
would be to state that it is rich and diverse. Another 
way is to describe the field as lacking in focus and 
cohesion.
2) This lack of focus and cohesion is not only visible 
using an international perspective, but even within 
a country the field of police research is ‘split’; there is 
diversion on topics and communities.
3) Between countries this effect is even more 
pronounced, there is little international cooperation.
4) Due to all the effects mentioned before, comparative 
research has only been done sporadically.
5) More focus and cohesion can be reached by 
collaboratively working on a research agenda.
6) Another topic concerns the difficult field of practically 
orientated research. I will explain more about this 
subject later on.
7) Police and research do not naturally ‘bond’. The 
police is characterised by a reactive and practically 
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orientated culture, which has only relatively recently 
opened itself up to more knowledge-based 
approaches and reflective processes. Police research 
is now becoming ever more ‘normal’ and accepted. 
But what effects does this ‘scientification’ ultimately 
have on policing and the police organisation?
Strategic questions for police research
Before I go into the research topics themselves, I would 
like to point out three important issues we have to deal 
with in police research. These issues concern ‘knowledge 
kills action’, the political dilemma of ‘intelligent police’ 
and the development of Pasteur’s Quadrant.
Strategic issue: knowledge (s)kills action
It was Nietzsche who said ‘knowledge kills action’. 
Merely having a lot of potentially conflicting knowledge 
may ultimately destroy swift handling and action. 
This seems to be a dilemma, especially for the police 
organisation, which traditionally is known for its action-
orientated culture. Policemen and women are action-
orientated, they are usually not trained to be very 
reflective. The ambition is to go from ‘knowledge kills 
action’ to ‘knowledge skills action’. Only one has letter 
changed in spelling, but it makes a huge difference to 
the meaning. How do we get from ‘kills’ to ‘skills’? This 
does not seem to be a trivial question. To begin with, 
it is important to acknowledge the plurality of the term 
‘knowledge’. Tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge 
are two completely different types of knowledge that 
need to be distinguished. Learning how to quickly 
unarm a robber is mainly tacit or procedural knowledge; 
remembering what went right and wrong when one 
first unarmed a robber concerns explicit knowledge. 
Both types of knowledge are indispensable for good 
police practice.
Knowledge perhaps kills action when the two are not 
combined properly. An example: a team of police officers 
had to do their annual training. They were briefed that 
a certain suspect should be arrested. When they walked 
round the building, someone tried to attack the team, 
a person who did not match the description of the 
suspect. They just let him go and were a bit shocked, 
overwhelmed. They had stopped to think about the 
instructions and description, without turning to their 
skills of arresting a suspicious person. Police work indeed 
is dynamic in this sense: sometimes procedures and 
reflexes are in order, sometimes deliberate thinking is 
appropriate. Police officers need to be able to constantly 
switch between these modes.
Strategic issue: the politician’s dilemma
Another strategic issue concerns what I call the 
intelligent police dilemma for politics. A knowledge-
based police is also an intelligent police. Does politics 
really want the police to be smart? In essence, the police 
constitute a potential dangerous force. How dangerous 
does politics consider the police to be when the police 
are actually doing an intelligent job? What happens if 
the police actually question certain ideas or actions? 
How reliable do politicians consider the police to be, 
when they have a sharp and professional opinion of 
their own? On the other hand: what is more dangerous 
in our complex society: a police that is intelligent, or a 
police that is not? Related to this question one might ask 
whether politics knows how to manage the police as an 
intelligent power.
Strategic issue: Pasteur’s Quadrant
In general there are three ideal types of relationship 
between theory and practice (Stokes, 1997). 1. All theory, 
no practice (Bohr). 2. All practice, no theory (Edison). 3. 
Practice and theory combined (Pasteur). We hold the 
following view on police research: it should contribute 
to the scientific base, or in other words it should help 
develop theory. At the same time, society should benefit 
from the knowledge that is produced. It should help 
develop police practice. This combination of practical 
orientation and theoretical rigour is Pasteur’s quadrant. 
This type of research is also called use-inspired basic 
research. It bridges the gap between basic and applied 
research, which is a tough field. For example, it asks for a 
specific type of methodology. Together with a number 
of universities of applied sciences, the Police Academy 
of the Netherlands is working on this specific topic.
Research topics for discussion
The Dutch police are working on a strategic agenda. 
Strategic topics for the coming years will at least entail 
the following subjects: performance, positioning, and 
authority and force. The research will be conducted with 
a predominant focus on related subjects. I will go into 
more detail in the following paragraphs. The research 
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topics are associated with actual questions and remarks 
made by police officers of all ranks.
Performance
A lot of research questions can be classified as related 
to police performance. The first question to raise is: how 
do we judge performance? When can we say the police 
are doing a good job? This is a complex question, which 
has been simplified too much in recent years by means 
of measurable performance indicators. And although 
research has shown that the effects of this simplification 
have not been disastrous, there is by no means an 
endurable foundation for adequate judgement of police 
performance. How can we judge police performance? 
I will discuss a couple of important factors. First of all, 
this has to do with the complex relationship between 
objective data or information and subjective feelings 
and experiences. In objective terms, the level of violence 
in society has decreased in the past century. However, 
both collective and individual sensitivity for violence 
seem to have increased. Second, there is a civilian 
need that does not match the ever-increasing rational, 
functional and technology-driven ‘modern’ type of 
safety and security. This need concerns confidence, 
trust and feelings of safety. The systemic approach of 
security problems will never give an answer to these 
needs. Civilians worry about values and norms and 
this sheds a different light on police performance. We 
need to investigate what type of measures this yields 
in terms of efficiency, effect, integrity and legitimacy. 
Despite subjective feelings and experiences, there are 
some difficult problems for the police that directly 
relate to its performance. For instance, only about 20 
% of Dutch crime is actually solved. This does not help 
build confidence and trust in the police. Another issue 
concerns the quality of information exchange, both 
within the police organisation and between the police 
and partner organisations. An example is complaints 
about the poor quality of official police reports. It should 
be possible to organise an improvement here.
Positioning
Safety and security are by no means exclusive police 
tasks. On the contrary, the police increasingly cooperate 
with partners; a phenomenon which has been labelled 
‘policing without the police’. This means the police 
need to think about its position within the policing 
field. The police have an important function within 
many networks and police roles sometimes differ: from 
signalling and advising to organising connections by 
programme management. Sometimes the police have 
a leading role, sometimes a role in the background. It is 
necessary for the police to choose a strategic position: 
be flexible and keep track of relevant partners, intervene 
where necessary, by signalling and advising or more 
actively on account of core police tasks. However, 
choosing a position requires good insight in the core 
being or soul of the police. The unique information 
position that the police has in society is an important 
aspect, but also the right to use force.
Authority and force
Our societies are changing significantly. There is 
growing differentiation and pluralism, due to migration, 
globalisation and strong economical fluctuations. An 
unbearable pluralism seems to be developing, which 
is perceived as a threat, especially for people with low 
education and underdeveloped social capital. For them, 
populist politics offer a way out, which seems to make the 
world less complex and more bearable. This development 
yields tension, and the police are in the middle of it. 
Especially the police’s authority should not be questioned, 
but this increasingly does seem to be the case. This has 
partly to do with the behaviour of individual police officers. 
They sometimes do not show professional discipline and 
superiority, which needs to be trained and coached. 
But it is also related to the way in which people see the 
police. Often the police are considered to be one of the 
rescue organisations (together with the fire brigade and 
ambulance service). Giving help to those in need is indeed 
an important part of policing, but the police are in the first 
place an organisation which helps create a recognisable 
and accepted societal order. This is and will remain an 
essential task of the police, especially in times of (financial) 
insecurity, political changes and societal dissatisfaction. 
This task also asks for authority and distance. The police 
are not always your best friend. Relationships with civilians 
need to be open, but not symmetrical. One of the 
questions is whether the police are still able to responsibly 
use force in situations that require this force.
Round up
In brief, police research is characterised by a tension 
between knowledge kills action and knowledge 
skills action. The big challenge is to keep balance. 
Classic dilemmas concerning research and science 
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are inevitably touched upon when it comes to police 
research: the relationship with power and authority, 
the relationship with practice and the design of the 
research itself. This is important not only with respect 
to the themes and research content, but also for the 
development of proper scientific research.
The author would like to thank Dr Annika Smit for her 
help in this undertaking.
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The value of knowledge and research in 
police organisations (1)
Police organisations are traditionally rather ‘narrative’ in 
nature, to the extent that experience and knowledge 
is often transferred through individual stories (Trujillo 
& Dionosopoulos, 1987; Waddington, 1999: 288; 
Wilson, 2000; Vlek, 2012) (2). The legendary coffee 
break functions as a bridge between the individual 
and the collective. It helps to understand and to 
frame experiences at work. A narrative organisation 
also implies that practical wisdom remains pocketed 
in corners of the police organisations and that 
they are not disseminated. The institutionalisation 
of police knowledge helps to transform wisdom 
beyond the subjective level, and it allows for a more 
systematic transfer of knowledge between individual 
professionals, organisations, agencies and nations.
However, noble as this strategy may sound, the 
relationship between the police organisation, police 
education and police research does not occur to be 
a straightforward one. Why would this be? There may 
be several reasons, most of which have adopted the 
status of perpetual myths. It is often claimed that 
police officers don’t read, and if they read, they are 
(1) Academic Dean of the Master of Science in Policing, Police 
Academy of the Netherlands and Canterbury Christ Church Uni-
versity (UK). The views in this text may not represent the official 
views of the institutions of employment at the time of writing.
(2) See for instance Connie Fletcher, ‘Listening to Narratives: The 
Dynamics of Capturing Police Experience’,  
http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/mauwal/comm477/Listening 
%20to %20narratives.pdf; accessed 18 December 2012.
either forced to do so or they take recourse to light 
and short reading material. It is also claimed that police 
officers are generally defensive and that they are not 
interested in the outcome of research. In addition, 
police organisations are regarded as introverted 
bureaucracies that are unwilling to critically reflect 
on their own organisation. Police can be extremely 
unreceptive of research, which may be due to the 
fact that many police officers have no experience 
with research. Vice versa, it is often claimed that 
police researchers have no practical experience with, 
and appreciation of, genuine police work. Hence, the 
question is very much whether there is a gap between 
police practice, education and research, and if so, how 
it can be addressed or resolved. This article seeks 
to contribute to the discussion about the future of 
European police research in connection with practice 
and education.
Police research is key to policing
There is a clear need to link research and higher 
education in the European Area of Policing. Police 
agencies are learning organisations which face a 
growing complexity. In their security environments, 
police organisations witness a rapid development of 
technology and surveillance. At the same time, society 
is changing to the extent that traditional mechanisms 
of social control have eroded. Police agencies are 
public services organisations whose performance 
is under the continuous gaze of society and media. 
Police professionals often engage in a specialist activity 
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but remain potentially exposed to extremely diverse 
circumstances in which they are requested to respond 
flexibly and intelligently. In order to maintain high 
levels of professionalism, police organisations have to 
build and share knowledge. Police research helps to 
develop police organisations and practices, by offering 
accrued data and analysis on trends and developments 
in law, politics, society and technology. Moreover, 
police organisations can look into the mirror more 
easily when they enlarge their comparative insight into 
national and international systems of policing.
They have to adapt to new circumstances, which 
may even involve profound transformations in 
terms of governance, legal framework, authority and 
accountability. The rapid globalisation and the vast 
expansion of the private security market demands 
from public police organisations that they engage in 
multi-agency cooperation. While public police lose 
their monopoly and face more competition, they 
are pressed to show their strength and added value. 
Moreover, austerity measures may lead to insufficient 
capacity and underinvestment in specialist resources. 
The changing economy of policing which results from 
this multi-faceted context leads to new accountability 
and governance arrangements.
Hence, new demands are placed upon police 
organisations, for instance in the sphere of strategic 
problem-solving. This would be the worst time to cut 
down on investment in higher police education and 
research as there is a need for academically trained 
police professionals with skills, competencies and 
knowledge to coordinate offer strategic advice to 
police leadership. The delivery of informed judgement 
is a crucial task for highly educated police professionals. 
Hence, we find ourselves in a situation where life-long 
learning demands on police professionals have to be 
combined with the Bologna requirements, which are 
currently not yet achievable in every EU Member State.
Police research is key to police education
Police research is not merely relevant for police agencies 
and their partner organisations, but principally also to 
police knowledge and police education. Through the 
application of rigid methodological and theoretical 
frameworks, police research may contribute to the 
valorisation of police practices. Moreover, by means of 
codification and building a canon of police, knowledge 
can be more systematically transferred between 
individuals and organisations, and it can be more 
evenly distributed and disseminated, ensuring the 
access to knowledge by all police individuals. Police 
research can help to bring forward police education 
through curricular development and the development 
of educational materials. In the past, police research 
has already helped tremendously to bring police 
training and education on a higher plane. Furthermore, 
police researchers who are active in police educational 
environments can provide teaching, supervision and 
assessment and they may provide an active input to 
accreditation processes. Police students may be able 
to learn more in a research-orientated environment 
as they are challenged to address questions for which 
no ready answer has yet been provided. A research-
driven environment tickles their curiosity and prompts 
them to engage in an intellectually stimulating debate, 
culminating in research-based analysis of police-
related issues. The following quotation is particularly 
instructive in this regard:
‘All students have a right to learn in an environment 
that provides the opportunity to fully develop their 
knowledge, understanding and skills. A learning 
environment informed by research provides learners 
with an understanding of knowledge creation (the 
research process and research methods) and its 
application (in economic, social, health and global 
contexts). It also stimulates key skills of critical analysis, 
respect for evidence and informed decision-making. We 
feel that a research-informed environment to stimulate 
the development of knowledge and skills is appropriate 
to all levels of student learning in higher education. 
(TQEF, 2006-2009; HEFCE, 2006).’
A research-informed environment is thus seen as a 
stimulation of the development of knowledge and 
skills at all levels of student learning in higher education. 
Police research in an international-comparative 
environment presents a particular logistic, cultural 
and linguistic challenge, but this may be overcome 
when it is combined with e-learning and e-discussion 
platforms (virtual learning environments).
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Police research is an ongoing practice
The text above seems to suggest that we currently 
do not have an international infrastructure for the 
systematic linkage between police practice, (higher) 
education and research. In part, this may be true, as 
there is currently no integrated accredited Master in 
Policing or a PhD-programme in the European Union. 
However, there are sustainable forms of cooperation 
between police organisations, police academies 
and universities, even on an international level. The 
current infrastructure is still primarily national and 
mono-sectoral, to the extent that different security 
organisations (e.g. police, customs, special investigators, 
border officials, prosecution agencies) don’t mingle 
very well. Hence, several programmes remain limited 
to police participants only. The CEPOL Police Exchange 
Programme (3) offers a promising perspective for 
reciprocal police knowledge exchange as it allows 
police officers to spend some weeks in a foreign police 
force. The European Police Exchange Programme 
seeks to contribute to mobility and exchange of police 
professionals, to establish a common police knowledge 
across different fields of interest, to facilitate the sharing 
of good practices at EU level, to contribute to the 
sharing of a European police identity and to encourage 
mutual learning and networking. Research experts 
may also be eligible to take part in the European Police 
Exchange Programme, for instance when they are 
active in fields like community policing, radicalisation, 
financial crime and the management of major events. 
CEPOL’s liaison programme aims at closer cooperation 
with European agencies, which is currently done 
through study visits (e.g. Europol, OLAF etc.)
Throughout Europe, there appears to be considerable 
variety in police higher education (see e.g. Pagon et 
al. 1996), as well as the possibility for police officers 
to enter a PhD-Programme. The Police Academy of 
the Netherlands runs a PhD-programme on police 
research, which allows professionals from a different 
academic background the possibility to conduct a 
multi-annual research project under the supervision 
of a lecturer from the Police Academy in cooperation 
with a university professor. The Scottish Institute of 
(3) See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/poli-
cies/pdf/expro_faq_s_en.pdf; accessed 18 December 2012.
Policing Research (SIPR) (4) offers different academic 
trajectories, ranging from MSc theses, to PhD positions, 
practitioner fellowships and post-doctoral research. In 
Australia, the Australian Research Council Centre of 
Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS) (5) opens its 
doors for academically involved police practitioners 
(called ‘pracademics’ or ‘embedded cops’), who are 
highly qualified and who act as ambassadors for the 
linkage between the academic community and the 
police organisation. The ‘embedded (research) cop’ is 
involved in research activities on a day-to-day basis 
within a university environment.
It is generally considered essential to gradually 
build a cohort of ‘pracademics’ in order to stimulate 
systematic exchange of knowledge about procedural, 
methodological and thematic issues. Another model 
of practitioner involvement in police research is 
provided by internships for academics within police 
organisations and police academies; they can be 
involved in performing research as well as teaching. 
Weisburd and Neyroud (2011: 1) advocate a model 
which brings universities into police centres and 
which encourages the police to take ownership of 
research. Yet another but complementary model is the 
establishment of fellowships for practitioners at police 
and security academies, which allows professionals 
with an academic background to dedicate research 
time to a specific issue. Furthermore, in order to 
stimulate research participation from police agencies, 
some Member States have institutionalised a grant 
competition (e.g. SIPR and the Dutch Commissie 
Politie en Wetenschap). More generally, it is considered 
essential to nourish a lively interaction between 
practitioners and the research community. This can 
also be done by connecting Master’s of Science in 
Policing students more closely with the community 
of Police PhD-scholars, for instance along the lines 
of graduate schools, which can stimulate mutual 
learning. Although there is currently a strong move 
within the academic world to establish graduate 
(4) See http://www.sipr.ac.uk/research/index.php; accessed 19 
December 2012.
(5) See http://www.ceps.edu.au/home; accessed 19 December 
2012.
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schools (6), within the police environment they seem 
less evident as there is growing evidence of a decrease 
of educational requirements for frontline officers. In 
any case, there is an obvious need to link research 
and higher education more closely, and this does not 
merely require to train the trainers, but also to actively 
build a stimulating environment for teachers at police 
academies to acquire an academic degree or PhD if 
they have not done so already. These initiatives have 
to be supported by visionary and strong academic 
leadership at the police academies. Efforts to build 
a feasible and internationally vibrant community of 
police scholars also require the expansion of nodes of 
cooperation and exchange. This can be developed on 
a European scale but can even ‘go global’ by means of 
EU-partnership programmes (ENP).
Police research is about delivery and 
diversity
At the moment, police research is incredibly diverse as 
it is performed by a wide variety of scholars, ranging 
from university professors to Master’s students who 
conduct a research project for the purpose of their 
thesis. The leading principle is that intellectual rigour 
should not be compromised, and that theoretical 
and methodological requirements should always be 
complied with. Research ethics play an important 
role in all academic undertakings, but within the 
police research environment it may even take a more 
prominent position given the often sensitive nature 
of the research projects and the privileged access of 
police researchers to confidential data (7).
Except for aiming at a better understanding of policing 
through appreciative inquiry and how policing 
can be improved, innovative police scholarship 
can contribute to de-mystification and a testing of 
academic insights. In this context, the emphasis lies 
strongly on the validation and valorisation of existing 
(6) See for instance the Australian Graduate School of Policing 
and Security, which includes programmes for doctor of police 
leadership, doctor of policing and security, several Master pro-
grammes, graduate diplomas as well as a bachelor programme;  
http://www.csu.edu.au/faculty/arts/agsps/courses; accessed 19 
December 2012.
(7) See for instance Maurice Punch, `Police and Ethics in Qualitative 
Research`,  
http://www.sfu.ca/~decaste/867fall08/867pdfs/hand-
book_83-104.pdf; accessed 20 December 2012
police knowledge. Police research can be supported 
by an interdisciplinary approach, with a balanced mix 
of legal, sociological, economic and psychological 
perspectives. Cross-disciplinary research may literally 
be able to cross borders with a focus on police science. 
In a diverse police research environment, multiple 
research projects should be welcomed, ranging from 
policy-orientated to theory-based, and from short-
term to longitudinal research projects. There is a need 
for more empirical field research, which may generate 
inside perspectives.
What are additional conditions for building a 
relevant research-based body of knowledge? Police 
organisations demand the production of ‘usable stuff’, 
which generates the need for practical applications, for 
instance through evidence-based research. Neyroud 
and Weisburd (2011: 3) argue that the evidence-based 
model for developing practices and policies has not (yet) 
been developed widely by police agencies. Arguments 
and recommendations can be evidence-based but still 
not be adopted because policing is a very politicised 
field of activity. Neyroud and Weisburd also argue that 
vice versa, policing strategies are implemented with 
little reference to research evidence. Hence, despite 
attempts to overcome this gap, there are considerable 
challenges to interlink research and policing in a more 
systematic fashion. In other sectors, like industry, 
medicine or nursing, research enjoys a much higher 
priority and more budget is reserved for this purpose. 
The findings of police research should be disseminated 
not merely in the form of books and journals, but also 
directly by means of communication in class as well as 
by Internet and social media. Research findings may 
need to be translated in a language which is fit for 
certain audiences. The minimum objective should be 
to trigger attention, interaction and discussion about 
the research findings, also (and most importantly) with 
a wider community of citizens.
What should the future focus of police research be? 
The map of police research projects already looks 
incredibly rich and diverse. Several areas of interest 
have been charted, certainly within the higher 
police education environment. These topics include 
the history of policing, cybercrime, bio-terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings, forensics, cross-border 
policing, ethics and human rights. However, higher 
police education (graduate schools, Master’s and 
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Bachelor’s programmes) could be supported more 
systematically and directly by an international 
community of policing scholars. As for international 
policing, more comparative research (8) is required 
which is transferred into police educational material 
and more research with a focus on cross-border 
policing practices in Europe could be undertaken as 
well (e.g. Spapens, 2010). Relatively uncharted police 
research areas include police-media relations (however, 
see e.g. Denef et al., 2011); the ergonomics of new 
police technologies; the ways in which precautionary 
policing is undertaken, e.g. by means of pro-active 
surveillance powers; the emergence of hybrid policing, 
e.g. blurring police and military mandates and the shift 
to paramilitary policing (Easton et al. 2010); public and 
private policing (privatisation); intelligence-led policing 
applications in the realms of public order management; 
and equity of policing (the distribution and delivery of 
public policing services across the EU).
Police research requires investment from a variety of 
partners, such as police academies and police agencies, 
security and industry partners, governmental agencies 
and non-governmental organisations. Between these 
partners and stakeholders, trustworthy and sustainable 
relationships need to be established. To allow police 
research to flourish, it requires nutrition from academic 
leadership. Academic support and sound facilities for 
international police research could become a focus of 
all national police academies in the EU Member States. 
In order to facilitate academic access and mutual 
learning it is adamant that — in addition to the library 
facilities in police academies — a European-wide 
digital repository for (international) police research 
is available, which involves input from the wider 
community of police scholars and which should take 
an inclusive approach. Also junior scholars such as 
Master’s students and PhD students should be invited 
to take part in a digital academic environment, once 
their academic output has been screened and formally 
approved. Except for the investment in horizontal and 
multilateral forms of research cooperation, there could 
also be an EU-wide investment in international police 
partnerships.
(8) However, see COMPOSITE: Comparative Police Studies in the EU; 
http://www.rsm.nl/about-rsm/news/detail/2741-compos-
ite-comparative-police-studies-in-the-eu/; accessed 20 Decem-
ber 2012.
Research findings should not remain hidden from the 
educational community: bridges can be constructed 
by inviting academic scholars to share their findings 
and experiences in intensive police research seminars, 
for instance in the form of summer schools. Moreover, 
on a European scale, competitions may be launched 
for individual and institutional police research grants. 
These undertakings should be assisted and coordinated 
by a (virtual) support office for international police 
research projects. Whilst keeping an open mind for 
a diversity of research topics, an EU police research 
strategy could become part of the successor to the 
Stockholm Programme and could be aligned with the 
shaping and implementation of the EU policy cycle on 
serious and organised crime (9).
Concluding notes
Police research may contribute to innovative solutions 
that are more cost effective and efficient. Furthermore, 
police research facilitates quick strategic advice and 
responses from police leaders, as they have access 
to readily available data, e.g. on crime statistics and 
patterns. Police research may also contribute to the 
standardisation and uniformity of practices across a 
jurisdiction; this may avoid fragmentation and enhances 
equity of justice. Above, it has been argued that there is 
a need for quick results as well as longitudinal research. 
In order to establish an academic environment of 
sharing and pooling, police researchers ought to 
be encouraged to share and communicate their 
findings before data are published in peer-reviewed 
environments. The sharing of research findings is very 
important, which gives a key role to libraries and virtual 
learning centres. In the field of police research, there is 
a need for role models. In this light, it is encouraging 
that an increasing number of police chiefs have 
acquired an academic degree and an understanding 
of the academic rationale. Principally, police research 
provides the basis for a rational choice concerning 
future options for the development of police services.
Despite the high relevance of police research for 
police organisations, academic environments should 
(9) Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the 
creation and implementation of a EU policy cycle for organised 
and serious crime, 3034d Justice and Home Affairs Council 
Meeting, Brussels, 8 and 9 November 2010.
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be maximally alert about the potentially dramatic 
impact of austerity measures and budget cuts within 
the Member States. Police research cooperation in 
the EU, with a rigid emphasis on shared learning and 
innovation, is a promising way to join efforts and to 
keep abreast of budget cuts which could potentially 
undermine and destroy a cautiously built research 
infrastructure. In order to achieve this, it is important that 
police researchers think hard about a European-wide 
alignment between the academic research agenda 
and the policy agenda. This may lead to sustainable 
commitment at the European level: a collaborative 
effort focused on strategy, finance and management 
may help to transform competitive agendas into 
cooperative ones. In order to achieve this, it is crucial 
to overcome logistic, linguistic and cultural thresholds. 
Whilst academic neutrality may be an illusion in the face 
of the power of governments who are really in charge, 
it is vital to pursue integrity and independence in using 
the evidence when performing police research. This 
is why some scholars would prefer police research to 
be conducted in an academic environment. However, 
confident and well-networked police academies that 
have institutionalised partnerships with universities 
may well be capable of nourishing and producing 
high-quality police research.
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Colliding views of police reality — 
science vs. politics of policing
Christian Mouhanna
France
(2007 Conference in Münster)
If social sciences have become increasingly interested 
in policing matters during the last three decades, there 
is little doubt that differences of opinion remain within 
the police forces about the usefulness of sociology. 
There has been undoubtedly an open-mindedness 
among police officers and police commissioners, but 
many actual examples show that there is no guarantee: 
in some countries, the cooperation between social 
sciences and police forces is now on the decline, 
while paradoxically more scholars are working on 
these topics. ‘Law and order’ orientated policing has 
become much more popular, and as a result policing 
is today more politicised and contested (Newburn, 
2008). The prevailing view that focuses on efficiency 
and voluntarism tends to replace a more scientific 
approach.
Based mainly on the French case, this paper would like 
to shed some light on the persistence of mistrust and 
even fear of researchers among police forces, especially 
at the highest level. Our purpose is not to judge police 
chiefs and politicians in charge of policing, it is to try 
to understand why this gap still remains whereas 
sociology for the police and sociology of the police 
(Manning & Yursza Warfield, 2009) have produced a 
lot of results for years. That will lead us to examine the 
idea of the police officer considered as a ‘knowledge 
worker’ (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).
To meet this challenge, it is essential to consider not 
only the police officers’ point of view, but also the 
researchers’. The hardest challenge of the researcher 
who has undertaken fieldwork within the police is 
the chiefs’ reluctance to accept the results, especially 
when they point out issues that the chiefs don’t 
want highlighted. Among the criticisms that these 
chiefs, and also the politicians who are in charge of 
policing and security matters, address to researchers, 
intellectualism is likely one of the most used. As for 
them, research is useless, researchers don’t have a 
realistic representation of daily concrete problems that 
the police officers have to deal with. Scholars are said to 
be naïve and unrealistic (1), or their work is described as 
too complex to be useful for action. Sometimes, they 
are even suspected of being accomplices of offenders 
when they try to explain the reasons for crime and 
when they criticise the policies of law and order. Their 
empathy towards offenders is regarded as a form of 
complicity or weakness.
If it would be wrong to say that all researchers are far 
from being naïve or unrealistic, the total rejection of 
research in some crucial situations or in some police 
forces raises questions, especially when these researches 
are founded on field work. In regard to this point, I will 
try to explain why intellectuals are not welcome by the 
chiefs and politicians in charge of policing strategies 
and security policies. I want especially to shed light on 
the current idea of an opposition between the world 
of managers and practitioners who are supposed to 
live in reality and the world of social scientists, who are 
said to live among books and theories. This will lead 
(1) For example, Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister of the Interior, in January 
2006, two months after the French riots in the suburbs.
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us to examine more carefully the question of tension 
between theory and practice inside police forces.
As was underlined in many works (Barrio Romero et 
al., 2009), there are two main different ways to face 
the question of police science and the ‘science of 
policing a society’. The first can be called theoretical 
and top down, and the second is based on a pragmatic 
approach. These two ways divide both police chiefs 
and scholars. We will now examine what characterises 
each of these ways.
The police force as a homogenous 
organisation: the common myth
The first way of speaking about police science and 
about policing a society refers to a general theory, 
which considers government and police administration 
as the source of power in the police force. Polices forces 
are used to increase and maintain the state’s strength 
(Weber, 1971). This way of thinking puts the stress on 
the homogenous character of police forces and it 
considers the police as a tool for the government. 
This top-down organisation is supposed to follow the 
rules and the orders set by the hierarchy. In this view, 
the top management of police forces is supposed to 
detain all information. Police chiefs are expected to 
elaborate general planning and strategies in order to 
solve the problems they have identified. In this kind 
of organisation, there is allegedly no place for a police 
officer’s discretion: his first quality is to obey and to 
implement orders.
In this kind of organisation, elites are the ones who know 
how to solve problems (Mosca, 1884). When they use the 
police force to improve citizens’ welfare and safety, they 
do it in a top-down way. Police officers are considered 
as simple performers who only have to implement the 
guidelines, which have been handed down by their 
chiefs. They are neither supposed to negotiate with the 
citizen nor to adapt themselves to the citizens’ demands. 
In this technocracy, there is no place for a real exchange, 
a dialogue with the people or with society, because the 
principles of management of the police forces are based 
upon hierarchy and centralisation.
Our point is not to discuss whether this idealistic 
system really exists or not. The main point here is to put 
the stress on the beliefs. We want to underline that, in 
countries like France, the senior officials and the police 
top management are the ones who are the most likely 
to believe in the efficiency of this kind of organisation. 
The structures of the police forces are based on this 
model, which puts the stress on the protection of 
the state more than on the security of the citizens 
(Monjardet, 1996).
This way of thinking led up to what was traditionally 
called ‘scientific management’ in the industry (Taylor, 
1911). It underlines the division of labour between 
technocrats, who elaborate how to work, and the 
practitioners, who are supposed to follow the rules. 
In this view, a police officer’s discretion (Black, 1980) 
is either ignored by the chiefs or is banished: law and 
departmental services spend a lot of time trying to limit 
or eliminate discretion, something common in every 
bureaucratic system (Crozier, 1963). Today, scientific 
management is essentially based on the development 
of technology. Through new technologies, like GPS, 
direct reporting, recorded interventions and CCTV, 
some public sector managers and political authorities 
are convinced that they have the power to better 
control police officers. In doing so they also think that 
they could now be able to better control the whole of 
society through these technologies, and that control 
over the police forces will help them to do so. The 
main principle of this peculiar view is that the police 
officer could be used as a tool for applying pressure 
on citizens. The main idea —temptation — is to 
control society through different mechanisms, such as 
laws, technology and police forces but without a real 
partnership between the civil servants and the public. 
One of the risks of the fascination for technology is that 
the citizens become less and less a partner, not even a 
client: they could simply be considered as a thing to be 
managed. In fact, through technology, the aim of some 
police authorities could be to reinforce a centralised 
and hierarchical approach that fits some elites 
(Nogala, 1995). This illusion of better control through 
technology has to be underlined, because it could lead 
to preventing police organisations from maintaining or 
developing their relationship with the public.
Even if this idea of control is based upon new 
technology, it must be underlined that it is not really 
a new strategy. Looking at the history of police forces, 
there are many examples of this belief in technology as 
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an illusory answer to all problems of control. Besides, 
technology is often used to reproduce old practices 
and to justify old habits (Manning, 2008). And as far 
as the bad practices are concerned, technology is 
one means that allows police officers to avoid contact 
and direct interaction with people if they don’t want 
to be involved in logic of public service. CCTV is used 
to replace police patrols in the streets. Police files 
have replaced human contact to supply information. 
In the technocratic managers’ eyes, whether they 
are top-level chiefs or politicians, this weakening of 
links between street police officers and the public 
reinforces the principle of hierarchy and their own 
power. In contrast, when the hierarchy allows police 
officers to manage direct contact with citizens, police 
priorities are set by the public and the police officer 
is accountable for them. But there is still a tension 
between top-down management and openness 
to public demand. In every bureaucracy, if the client 
— or the citizen — is the ‘reason’ that justified the 
existence of this bureaucracy, after a while the client 
becomes inconvenient, and a source of disturbance 
(Crozier, ibid). This is especially the case for police forces 
in a centralised system. From the managers’ view, 
public demand often prevents police officers from 
following their own plans. Therefore anything that 
promotes internal logic and ‘protects’ the managers 
from unexpected events is welcomed. Technology 
is a useful tool for reinforcing this domination, but 
‘communication’ is another.
In a bureaucratic organisation, communication is 
not an interaction or an exchange, it is a one-way 
communication used to convince people that the 
managers’ view is the right one, even if reality is quite 
different. The goal is the same: to strengthen the top-
down strategy and to avoid any perturbation that 
could weaken the managers’ plans. In the case of 
police forces, communication has often played a part 
in the construction of a myth, that of an omniscient 
police force, able to control everything and to solve 
any problem (Brodeur, 1984). Technology, like CCTV 
and files, whatever their actual effectiveness, also 
participate in the construction of this myth. And the 
technocrats are the first to believe themselves in these 
myths they have participated in building. By contrast, 
street-level police officers, who have to cope with real 
problems, are less likely to believe this myth than the 
chiefs who are far from local concerns and looking 
at the work from ‘above’. And the more the police 
organisation is centralised, the more the chiefs are likely 
to have bureaucratic management strategies based on 
their belief in their omnipotent power. The paradox 
is that even if they say they have everything under 
control, they always need more troops, more laws and 
more technologies to reinforce this control. Hence 
they are always asking for more resources. Managers 
and politicians in charge of the police face a dilemma. 
On the one hand, they have to demonstrate the power 
of the police in order to fortify their own power. But 
on the other, they are permanently looking for more 
resources in order to better control the police, which 
leads them to realise that their power is in fact more 
symbolic than real, even if it is more or less efficient. 
But communication helps them to create a ‘curtain’ 
that prevents the public from discovering the truth: the 
king is often naked.
In reality, these types of senior officials are not the only 
one who believe in an omniscient and omnipotent 
police force. Many scholars have been convinced of 
the same belief. It was not only the case of conservative 
professors who wanted to preserve this image of the 
police, which is useful to maintain and establish order, 
but also, more surprisingly, the case of many leftist 
scientists.
Critical scholars and the power of the 
police: a critic that reinforces the myth
Like police forces, scholars are far from being a 
homogeneous group. Some researchers, especially in 
such disciplines as law or political science, are likely to 
defend the pattern of a powerful police force, because 
they focus their attention on the legal and formal 
aspect of its work and of its organisation. But many 
scientists working in social sciences, in spite of their 
critical positions against the police, have also spoken 
of police forces based on this image of an omnipotent 
power. Their goal was to denounce it, but paradoxically 
the critics have participated in strengthening the myth.
Especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, a vast 
majority of scholars were involved in diverse 
movements that protested against the political use 
of police forces. Although they were denouncing the 
politicians and police chiefs who were trying to control 
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society through their use of the police, they were 
sharing the same view: a powerful police force, able 
to impose its rules on the population. Of course, unlike 
the heads of the police forces, these intellectuals were 
not in favour of this type of society. These scientists 
had a different goal: they wanted to save democracy 
from this power, because they thought that the police 
were a threat to the rule of law. But by denouncing the 
use of the police and the strength of their actions in 
a Marxist or Foucauldian perspective, i.e. a tool used 
to maintain the power of the state and to preserve 
social order (Foucault, 1978), they unintentionally 
provided credibility to the image of a police force able 
to control the whole of society. In countries like France 
or Germany, many scientists, especially sociologists, 
have been involved in movements that reject the 
police. Paradoxically, whenever they have denounced 
the power of the government, based on their use of 
the police, they reinforced the politicians’ and senior 
officials’ views.
Why have all these leftist scientists been so naïve? It 
would be very interesting to develop this point, but 
it is not our main concern here. Many explanations 
could be taken into account. Ideologies were more 
important during these periods than today. Many 
scientists were involved in direct and concrete actions, 
such as demonstrations or street fights, where they 
were directly confronted with police officers. For 
example, the riots of May 1968 in France were a 
concrete illustration of this fight. The police force was 
on one side of the barricades and on the other side, 
social science students. For them, the police were a 
bad thing that they refused to study. It was a ‘dirty’ 
topic (Monjardet, 1996).
But one result at least is important to us: their political 
and ideological positions against the principle of a 
police force prevented them from properly studying 
police officers’ work like they were studying the 
workers in big firms or other professions. In many 
European countries, no researchers even considered 
working in the police field for fear of rejection by 
peers. But, ironically, such attitudes were not a problem 
for the technocracy, which was fighting against 
these leftist movements, because at that time these 
discourses were not questioning common beliefs, i.e. 
their monopoly on police control. And even if these 
movements were violent and threatening, in fact these 
scientists reinforced the image of the police as a tool 
for social control. Both parties, the technocracy and 
social scientists, were enemies, but they shared the 
same vision of a police force: powerful, homogenous 
and a pillar for the state.
The scientific revolution of the 1980s
But things have changed. Inspired by scholarship in 
the United States and Great Britain, a more pragmatic 
approach was developed with the social sciences 
during the 1970s and especially during the 1980s in 
Western Europe (Ponsaers et al., 2009). By overcoming 
the traditional reluctance of social sciences, a growing 
number of scientists began to face these questions. 
Concrete fieldworks have discovered police practices, 
far from being so law-abiding than expected. They 
studied police organisation as a bureaucracy; with 
bureaucratic fragmentation, its own habits, formal 
hierarchy and use of street-level discretion. They 
understood that a police force is a system with its 
own rules, with conflicts inside and with practitioners 
who do not always respect official orders. Others 
social scientists focused their attention on the police’s 
interaction with the public, observing that in many 
situations, the police officer on the street is bound to 
negotiate in order to maintain peace, to enforce the 
law or to preserve his/her own security. The main idea 
is that police officers have power, but not all the power. 
And that it is very hard to control their work.
Since the 1980s, the police force has been 
demythologised. For many social scientists, especially 
those involved in fieldwork, police forces are no more a 
mere subject of respect or hate, but a ‘normal’ topic for 
research in social sciences. As in some countries, this 
evolution may have produced a peaceful and fruitful 
situation, with rich interactions between police forces 
and researchers. But tensions often remain. Researchers 
are not always welcomed. The results of their studies 
are ignored or rejected, even if the street-level police 
officers and the operational level chiefs agree with 
the results, and even if some managers recognise 
their relevance. Sometimes, some governments even 
decide to forbid this kind of work. Thus, there currently 
(2012) is no fieldwork access for researchers.
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When the researcher uses a pragmatic approach to 
reveal dysfunctions and pernicious effects, he/she is 
confronted by police managers, who consider policing 
to be their exclusive prerogative and area of expertise. 
They protect their prerogatives by keeping researchers 
away from policing matters. Patrol officers can also 
reject research outcomes, as it comes from ‘outsiders’ 
who are seen as non-specialist. For many, their view 
on their work is narrow-minded because they want 
to protect themselves: other people’s expectations 
are not taken into account in their work, but they 
refuse to recognise it. As in other corporations, there 
are police officers who forget that they are not alone 
in society: they have to work for the people, and they 
have to work with the people. This proposal is more 
or less accepted among police officers. Even if many 
agree, some are reluctant to subscribe to this idea 
because they don’t share the vision of the police as 
a public service that answers to — and is paid for by 
— the citizens, and because this ‘intrusion’ into their 
organisation is unbearable for them. But all police 
officers have to keep in mind that they are only one 
actor in a large system where the different types 
of population, with various views about the same 
environment, are also part of the system. When they 
forget this main point, they weaken their own power. 
Why? The police officers’ efficiency relies not only on 
their own capabilities, but also on their ability to build 
a strategy in which many partners have a place. That is 
why a police officer needs new knowledge, especially 
in social sciences, in order to face complex societies. 
Real progress is not to consider the public as a thing 
to be managed, but as a partner (bad or good) with 
whom police officers must work in order to produce 
collective security. Otherwise, the lack of partnership 
produces collective insecurity. To avoid this drift, social 
sciences can be helpful. It is relatively easy to convince 
many police officers in the field that they can benefit 
from the results of research in order to improve their 
efficiency and facilitate their work.
One problem when using this strategy is that 
politicians in charge of police matters and police 
chiefs may feel that they are in competition with the 
researchers, because the latter propose strategies, 
which are different from the top-down model. When 
the researcher provides analyses of society and the 
police officers’ work from a different point of view than 
the chiefs, he/she could destroy their legitimacy. The 
scientists often risk revealing their lack of real power. 
When we presented the results of our first study on the 
French Gendarmerie, some captains were really afraid 
of the discovery that they had no real power over their 
troops (Mouhanna, 2001).
That is why these chiefs have to learn how to use 
research to reinforce their legitimacy. History shows 
us that this dialectic between the top-down approach 
and the pragmatic one still persists. The pragmatic 
way is undoubtedly more efficient, but it means more 
disagreement with police forces, with the practitioners 
and especially the chiefs, because it asks them 
questions that they don’t want to acknowledge. And 
from my own experience, the problem is not so much 
between researchers and practitioners, but rather 
between field researchers and technocrats.
One other problem created by this empirical way 
of doing research into police matters deals with the 
question of myths. We noted that one source of a 
police officer’s power is based on the belief that the 
police have a lot of power, more than actually exists. As 
we have underlined, this myth was reinforced through 
ideological leftist discourses against the police. But 
research based on fieldwork has often destroyed this 
myth by telling the ‘truth’, or simply by describing the 
limits of police action.
Why the barrier remains between 
research and managers
Therefore, even though social sciences have made 
a lot of progress in their knowledge of police work, 
police strategies and police efficiency, police chiefs’ 
mistrust is still present. One argument often used to 
criticise academic work is based on the idea of an 
opposition between the world of the managers and 
practitioners, who are supposed to live in reality, and 
the world of the social scientists, who are said to live in 
their books and in theory. And it is obvious that they 
are right as far as some scholars’ work is concerned. 
However, now research is often carried out differently. 
More and more scholars are doing fieldwork; they are 
trying to understand the organisation of police forces 
and the police officers’ work from inside. Thus this kind 
of opposition between the intellectuals’ view and the 
practitioners’ (i.e. police officers) is less and less relevant.
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By pointing out this opposition, some police force 
managers try to protect their position. They feel that 
they are in competition with the social scientists 
because the latter reveal a world that doesn’t fit with 
their own paradigm and that could weaken their power. 
Let us examine the top-down managers’ view and how 
they present things when they are interviewed for the 
first time about their organisation. When the researcher 
who enters this field asks the chiefs to describe their 
work, they praise the virtues of their own system. In 
their mind, it is characterised by a strong hierarchy and 
servants who obey. They claim that police officers are 
following the rules. They assert that the structures are 
efficient, even if the chiefs recognise that some of their 
officers are lazy people. There is good cooperation 
between police officers, whatever their positions. The 
goals of the organisation are clear, there are definite 
priorities. There is no problem of information among 
the members of the organisation.
The reality that social scientists discover while doing 
fieldwork within the police does not meet this 
idealised representation. The top-down logic is not 
always respected. Many police officers, especially 
when they are street-level officers, are not ready to 
obey or even to follow the rules, because they have 
to face concrete situations. Risks, fear, weariness and 
doubt oppose orders. Sometimes, the chiefs don’t 
have enough experience to give good answers to the 
real problems that their subordinates are facing. The 
rules are not relevant at every moment, and are often 
inadequate. Police discretion is precisely based on a 
police officer’s ability to adapt the rules to the reality. As 
far as cooperation is concerned, it is not rare to observe 
a lack of communication between police officers in the 
same police district, or even in the same police station. 
There are conflicts inside police organisations as there 
are everywhere else. In fact, the goals of the police 
forces are not as clear. Police officers have to deal with 
too many priorities: orders from the managers and 
chiefs, public demands and their own interests. And 
they take all these elements into account when they 
act. After all, things are far from the ideal described by 
the managers, especially when these managers have a 
‘political’ interpretation of the police officer’s role, and 
no experience based on the work.
Of course, all members of a police force know about 
these problems, even if they prefer to avoid speaking 
about them in front of outsiders. In other words, they 
deny the reality. And they reject those who pretend 
to have a more accurate view, and especially when 
they have relevant analysis. That is why researchers 
are blamed and denigrated. As noted by D. Monjardet 
(Monjardet, 2008): ‘researchers are criticised for 
being irresponsible, meaning “not under control”. A 
researcher is free to criticise the institutions and this 
is an unbearable risk for people representing these 
institutions so they “protect” themselves from that 
risk by accusing researchers of being irresponsible.’ 
Therefore the core issue is not about truth or reality 
(provided by research outcomes) but is about the 
control of information and the preservation of the 
myth (of a ‘good functional police’). The more a 
researcher studies the real functioning of police forces 
the more he/she represents a (political) threat for the 
police hierarchy: more than if he/she only analyses the 
philosophy of the police, for instance. (Brodeur, 2001).
Are police chiefs convinced by their 
myths?
Dealing with the question of reality, there is a crucial 
point: do police chiefs really believe in their official 
reports that describe an ideal organisation, from the 
point of view of the writer, or do they only pretend 
to describe reality? In other words, when the senior 
officials and the police chiefs react to researchers’ 
analysis with aggressiveness, is it because these 
analyses are not compatible with their own view and 
generate a cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957)? Or 
conversely can police chiefs accept that the researchers 
reveal some of their ‘strategies’ that can be seen as 
some kind of manipulation?
A well-known example can illustrate this point: 
police statistics. Many actors (the mass media, many 
politicians and some police chiefs) consider that these 
statistics describe reality. If that were the case, the 
question would be: what kind of reality do the statistics 
describe? They don’t give relevant information about 
the reality of crime (Matelly & Mouhanna, 2007). Firstly, 
because many crimes are not reported to police 
forces. Secondly, statistics don’t give good information 
about police activity, because police officers do many 
things that are not entered in the statistics files. As a 
social scientist, the most important question is to 
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consider the statistics as a social construction, to ask 
why an organisation produces these statistics and to 
understand who is responsible for their production (2).
But the problem is then: are police managers and 
the police officers in charge of these statistics ready 
to question these official figures? It is very hard and 
very courageous to accept criticism. That is why many 
groups prefer not to allow researchers to study them. 
They don’t want their view of the world to be upset. In 
order to act without too many ethical questions or too 
much complexity, managers often prefer to ignore the 
results or information that do not match their opinions. 
And it is easy to discredit researchers in order to avoid 
being held responsible. This concern, i.e. protecting 
their own view and their own practices, explains why 
there is such strong corporatism within police forces. 
Like others who belong to professions that fear public 
opinion, police officers often refuse to be confronted by 
certain realities, because it may oblige them to change 
their practices. For instance, statistics can be used to 
show that crime is decreasing, and that the clearance 
rate is increasing, even if people still feel afraid of crime. 
In France, in some poor suburbs, the crime rate was 
seen as decreasing because the local police station 
was closed at the beginning of the Sarkozy era (Matelly 
& Mouhanna, ibid). The police officers were happy 
because they disliked working in hostile areas and the 
government was happy because of the good statistics, 
which were shown to the mass media.
As a sociologist, when we tried to give more 
information about the police strategies and their 
pernicious effects in the poor suburbs, only a few 
police force managers were ready to hear the results 
of the research. In France, after the riots of 2005, the 
demand for more police presence and also for a 
different kind of policing in these poor areas was not 
heard by the top management. They preferred to refer 
to the good statistics and maintain satisfaction. And 
the hate against police officers is increasing, putting 
more pressure on local officers.
When social scientists try to help people to be more 
realistic, they are often rejected, because the cost is too 
heavy for the practitioner, who will need to do more 
work to answer all the questions raised by the scholar. 
(2) This reservation should also apply to statistics compiled by 
social scientists.
For the managers, as we have already seen, things are 
worse, because their relevance is questioned. They 
mainly prefer to adopt a short-term view, and to leave 
the problem for the next manager. They are not ready 
to accept that their politics could cause pernicious 
effects, what could weaken them. Some of them have 
built their careers on their ability to announce a new 
policy, even if the concrete effects can be discussed.
That is why social sciences are often not accepted, 
especially when announcing the failure of a new 
policy. Following the old tradition, the messenger of 
bad news must be killed. The results of social sciences 
are often rejected, not because they are too complex 
or useless, but because they reveal things that nobody 
wants to hear.
Another important question refers to the relationship 
between policing and politics (L’Heuillet, 2001). 
Policing is not only a profession, or a science, it is also 
a main political issue. In some countries, the police 
has become a tool in politicians’ hands. Security is 
used in order to win an election. The new problem 
is that the results of social science research could be 
in competition with official communications because 
of the gap between official policies and the concrete 
results of these policies (Monjardet & Ocqueteau, 
2005). That is why in some countries, research on the 
police is not allowed.
But in this case, police officers and police managers are 
sometimes trapped by politics and of communication: 
When they are a tool for political strategies without 
real evaluation of the impact of the policies, they are 
also the first ones who have to face the real problem. 
For example, they have to deal with the consequences 
of a ‘zero tolerance’ policy, which generates a break in 
the link with the population and therefore makes them 
feel more rejected by the inhabitants of poor suburbs. 
Even if it is not easy to integrate the results of social 
sciences into police work, it is often fruitful for a long-
term view. That is why police practitioners and police 
managers have to build knowledge with the help of 
social sciences, among others, in order to participate 
in a public debate, not only with a corporatist view, 
but with an expertise that integrates different points 
of view. To do so, police officers and police managers 
need an outside view, outside of their organisation, 
and outside of their own country.
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The present paper refers mainly to the situation in 
France at the beginning of the 21st century. If it would 
be irrelevant to generalise from this peculiar situation, 
it has to be said that the tensions between the 
scientists doing fieldwork and the managers always 
remains, more or less among the different countries 
(Barrio Romero et al., 2009; Ponsaers & al., 2009). In 
many countries, the openness of police forces to 
research is still fragile and is possibly at stake if they 
feel threatened by the results. That is why building a 
European network of researchers seems to be essential 
and the dissemination of knowledge should be 
organised. But the most important thing should be 
to create a ‘European right to investigate’, i.e. the right 
to carry out research inside police forces. Of course, 
some services have good reason to close their doors. 
But in some countries, the secrecy is more a tool used 
to protect the comfort of the corporation than a real 
need.
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A brave police force deserves 
courageous academics
Bernard Welten
Auke J. van Dijk
The Netherlands
(2009 Conference in Bad Hoevedorp)
Science and policing in a fast-changing 
world
Science and policing used to be far apart. Policing 
was (and of course to a great extent still is) primarily 
about crime fighting and safer neighbourhoods, while 
academic research is about theoretically explaining 
things we do not yet understand. In the past, policing 
used to be only mildly interesting from an academic 
perspective: the police had some well-defined tasks 
(primarily enforcing the law) in a relatively stable 
world. However, technological and societal change 
has accelerated considerably in the second half of the 
twentieth century and this process does not seem 
to slow down, now or in the foreseeable future. If 
we compare the concerns and operations of police 
forces today with those just a decade ago, a totally 
new world of policing has emerged. The programme 
of this conference is a good indication, with issues like 
fundamental shifts in the function and organisation of 
policing, policing cyberspace, radicalisation, techno-
policing, knowledge-led policing, private policing and 
dealing with diversity.
These issues have in common that dealing with them 
in an adequate fashion presupposes understanding 
technological and societal change. At the same 
time a police force is not a research institution and 
there is always an urgent need to act in the face of 
current societal problems. Hence, I would argue that 
an intimate relationship with the academic world is 
necessary for problem solving in a rapidly changing 
world. We need to be aware of what is happening 
around us and we need to be innovative, while at the 
same time the pressure to achieve concrete results is 
rising. And — perhaps most importantly — we need to 
organise critical reflection on our ideas and operations 
to prevent us from taking a wrong turn and sticking to 
it for too long. In an information and network society 
a police force cannot wait for directions from others 
about what to do. We are supposed to know what is 
needed to realise the expectations that rest on our 
shoulders.
Academic research and policing: history 
and current state of affairs
As a police officer I first learned to appreciate the 
value of academic research as a consequence of my 
relationship with the Technical University in Delft. This 
resulted in hiring a group of people who are untypical 
for the police force and who still play an important 
role in our force with regard to technological 
development and intelligence-led policing. Today, 
a lot of strange characters are contributing to security 
in the Amsterdam-Amstelland police force, and 
(senior) officers regard it as necessary and normal to 
constantly educate themselves in connection with 
various universities. Luckily, the love of the police 
for science was not a one-way street. Science and 
scientists also discovered policing as a worthwhile 
subject. Police science has developed into a mature 
field with a growing number of students and 
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valuable publications. And the Dutch police — the 
combined 25 Dutch regional police forces — has truly 
become a ‘reflective organisation’ with a common 
vision (published in 2005 under the title The Police in 
Evolution) and a shared strategy agenda containing 
the leading themes for policing for the years to come. 
The relationship between science and the police is also 
very visible at the level of the different police forces. To 
illustrate this point I will explain the way we organised 
this in the Amsterdam-Amstelland police force.
Science in the Amsterdam-Amstelland 
police force
On a strategic level we constructed a ‘think tank’ with 
a direct functional relationship with the top echelons 
of the organisation. We named the think-tank the 
Agora, referring to the (market) places in the old Greek 
city-states where matters of public importance were 
discussed freely and critically. The Agora is explicitly 
meant to be a critical forum and is supposed to 
contradict especially the Chief Constable whenever 
necessary. As you will understand, contradicting me is 
never necessary, but putting all jokes aside I honestly 
would recommend every Chief Constable or senior 
manager in a police force to organise his or her own 
independent countervailing power. At the Agora 
different insights and actors come together, starting 
of course with relevant research outside or within the 
police force. The themes of the strategic agenda of 
the Dutch police play a prominent role in structuring 
and further developing knowledge at the Agora. In 
addition, there is a solid working relationship with the 
Bureau of Management Information and Research of 
our police force: data are used to turn our strategic (and 
operational) decisions into information-based decisions, 
and research is performed to ensure that it is also based 
on field knowledge. The Agora is also the connection to 
the national and international academic community and 
more specifically to our ‘joint ventures’ with universities.
Three chairs and related research
First, we participate in a Chair at Leuven University 
(Flanders, Belgium) under the title Knowledge discovery 
from databases Amsterdam-Amstelland police force. 
As the title suggests, this concerns advanced data 
mining technology in order to utilise our data more 
effectively. In general, police forces have an enormous 
amount of potentially very interesting data which are 
only used when needed to conduct our primary task. 
However, these data are hardly used to understand 
the phenomena we are dealing with, while — as I said 
earlier — understanding the world and its consequences 
for police strategy and operations is crucial.
Second, together with the city of Amsterdam we 
participate in a Chair of the VU University of Amsterdam 
under the title Security and Citizenship. The fact that we 
cooperate with the city of Amsterdam in this chair is 
very important. As you can imagine, both the city and 
the police force share the ambition of making the city 
a safer place to live in, but the organisational logic to 
do so can be different. Both parties agreed that by 
funding this Chair they seek to be enlightened by 
and confronted with insights that might not be very 
welcome from an organisational perspective, but that 
do contribute to the increase of social security.
Example of valuable research
To give an example: in defining strategic priority 
objectives there is of course close cooperation 
between the police force and the administration. Data 
play in important role in this, and there is a combined 
committee where the data are analysed to facilitate 
the identification, selection and strategic formulation 
of priorities. Prior to this, we had the intuition that the 
analysis of the data amounted to looking towards the 
future in the rear-view mirror: using data about what 
has happened to set future priorities. The research 
group Security and Citizenship was asked to look 
at what was — as it were — behind the data: which 
mechanisms are at work? They came up with the idea 
not to analyse crime figures but to research crime-
inducing factors. This led to a map of Amsterdam 
showing where to expect a future rise of crime and 
which factors might be responsible for fluctuations in 
crime and public order in different areas. Depending 
on which factors were important with regard to which 
issues and areas, recommendations for the strategy 
and operations of both the police force and the 
administration could be made. Because the Chair — 
although financed by the city and the police force — 
is independent, the results (some of which were not 
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supportive of the views of the police or the city) could 
be made public and attracted a lot of attention in 
the media. This makes it harder to ignore the results, 
also the results that might contradict current policy. 
Science can function as a necessary — although not 
always welcome — impulse for critical reflection.
Third, in collaboration with the Police Academy of The 
Netherlands we are now working on organising a third 
Chair with the assignment to determine what the 
necessary and sufficient conditions are for research to 
have an impact on day-to-day policing. We believe this 
necessitates the development of a specific methodology, 
a specific way of doing research. Although we have no 
doubts about the value of scientific research, a lot of 
research has no impact on policing, even in some cases 
where it is evident that it should have consequences for 
our operations. The aim of this third Chair is to further 
strengthen productive relations between the academic 
world and the police sector, especially with regard to 
concrete police operations.
Blind spots and science: Juxta
Except for these structural relationships with science 
it is sometimes necessary to come up with derailing 
initiatives that make critical reflection unavoidable. 
One of these initiatives was meant to strengthen 
the countervailing power of the aforementioned 
Agora. We called it Juxta — derived from the word 
juxtaposition — and one of the participants has given 
a poster session on this conference today. We invited 
twelve young and bright academics to come and work 
for us over an eighteen-month period to show us our 
blind spots. We selected them from approximately 
three hundred candidates on the basis of a critical 
essay on the aforementioned vision document The 
Police in Evolution. We selected people with for the 
police unusual backgrounds, so no one had studied 
law, criminology or administrative science. Instead 
they specialised in anthropology, media, philosophy, 
artificial intelligence, Arabic language and culture, 
experimental psychology or art.
They had a very intensive introduction programme 
within the police force, they were confronted with 
all aspects of our organisation and work. They joined 
officers on the beat, participated in investigations and 
talked to all sections of the organisation on all levels. 
We gave them the explicit assignment to contradict 
and surprise us, to show us where we were wrong, and 
to annoy us. And, they lived up to their promise! The 
sessions with the Juxtas — as we lovingly called them — 
were always intensive and I constantly had to fight the 
urge to defend myself. It led to new perspectives and in 
the end also to twelve thought-provoking end products, 
mainly in the form of publications but also other media.
Their influence did not stay limited to the top of the 
organisation. We made sure that everybody in the force 
knew what Juxta was about, and people in the force 
were very interested in the concept and of course in the 
insights of the Juxtas. Various Juxtas had considerable 
influence on diverse issues such as neighbourhood 
policing, integrity policy or the use of specific 
information in dealing with victims. They opened up 
a hotline that every officer in the force could phone 
when he or she had a ‘wicked problem’, a lot of people 
called and were without exception impressed by the 
contribution of the Juxtas. It further strengthened the 
idea that science and police work are a happy marriage 
and that it pays to let outsiders take a look inside your 
organisation. But most importantly, to quote Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, ‘a mind, once stretched by a new 
idea, never returns to its original dimensions’. Although 
we did not intend to recruit people for more than this 
project, more than half of the Juxtas currently work in 
our police force in regular positions.
And although Juxta was a one-off project, the ‘spirit’ 
of Juxta has not disappeared. Research and critical 
reflection has proliferated in the force, for example 
with regard to the aforementioned strategic themes. 
Explorations on these themes are performed by teams 
composed of a diverse range of people within the 
force who seek explicit interaction with ‘outsiders’ from 
the academic community or elsewhere.
What have we learned?
What have we learned from Juxta? That we do have 
blind spots, that indeed it is important to focus 
on future-orientated police themes and that even 
if you do so, you still run the risk of lagging behind. 
We also learned how important it is to bring in new 
and diverse perspectives, that important issues are 
38
European Police Science and Research Bulletin · Special Conference Issue Nr. 2
mostly complex issues, and that you need to combine 
research with ‘learning by doing’. But perhaps most 
importantly, we learned how fruitful it is when people 
dare to speak up, when they tell you how it is because 
they have thought about it, read about it, and studied 
it intensively. On some sensitive subjects the Juxta’s 
ran into a lot of opposition, but they stayed loyal to 
their intention to show how it is from the perspective 
of an academic outsider. Sometimes this called for 
considerable commitment and courage, but in the end 
none of them regretted the investment.
An urgent appeal
This brings me to an appeal I would like to make to 
police officers and scientists. As should be clear from 
my exposé, science is of crucial importance for current 
and future policing and senior and chief police officers 
are advised to facilitate strengthening the relationship 
with science in every way they can. Be brave and do not 
worry: the truth will hurt you. For the relationship to be 
productive, however, scientists should also be willing 
to stand up for what they believe. In a world of all-
important images and fast-changing hypes scientists 
should be willing to forcefully defend the outcomes of 
their research, both within the police force, but also in 
the public debate. Of course I am aware that in post-
modern times scientific truth has become illusive, and 
that academics are in the position to question the 
validity of their own findings, and that most of the time 
they are very hesitant to issue policy recommendations. 
The problem is however, if they do not do it, who will? 
And I am of the opinion that, although the scientific 
truth has become illusive, nonsense is still nonsense. 
If you are in science and run into nonsensical policies: 
please take a stand and speak up! A brave police force 
deserves courageous academics.
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Introduction
The advancement of policing by using scientific 
methods has been a central interest for CEPOL — 
the European College of Policing — for a number 
of years (CEPOL, 2006). Quite early in its life, CEPOL 
commissioned a group of European police officers 
and academics to explore the potential for a European 
approach to police science. This was an important 
initiative and reflected the fact that much of the 
scientific inquiry into policing that has achieved 
international prominence has been carried out in 
the United States or other Anglo-Saxon countries. An 
examination of the George Mason University ‘Matrix’ 
(Lum et al., 2011) listing of high-quality studies into 
policing will confirm that impression.
Yet, as those commissioning the CEPOL study well 
understood, applied science offers one of the most 
promising ways to improve policing (Weisburd and 
Neyroud, 2011). 50 years or more of detailed study of 
policing have produced a body of knowledge about 
how to police effectively, which is all too frequently 
unknown to the very practitioners who are best placed 
to use it. Yet, police forces across Europe are under huge 
pressure to deliver better performance with reduced 
resources. With these pressures in mind, Neyroud 
and Sherman (forthcoming) have argued that a more 
scientific approach to policing is central to building and 
sustaining police legitimacy in the future. They have 
suggested that ‘police legitimacy may be established 
not just on the basis of effectiveness under the rule of 
law, but on a demonstrated mastery of a complex body 
of knowledge generated by scientific methods of testing 
and analysis’ (Neyroud and Sherman, forthcoming: 1).
However, as the ‘Review of Police Training and 
Leadership’ (in England and Wales) reported (Neyroud, 
2011), police training, whether in the UK or more 
widely in Europe and elsewhere in the developed and 
developing world, does not yet, generally, embrace 
a model of scientific education which would enable 
the police to build a strong science base into the 
existing experience-based practice. As Hanak and 
Hofinger (2006) had already shown, few police forces 
around Europe had embedded scientific approaches 
in their decision-making or their education. The review 
recommended the development of an approach 
that links learning with practice along the lines of 
a teaching hospital where the clinical practitioners 
provide teaching and link what they teach with their 
own practice (Neyroud, 2011).
There is both the opportunity and the necessity 
for a radical change in the police relationship with 
science and the scientific, academic relationship with 
the police. This article will explore both why this is 
an opportune moment for such a change, how the 
police should seize the opportunity and what a more 
scientific approach might look like. It will conclude 
with some reflections on the implications for police 
education and for pan-European institutions such as 
CEPOL.
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A challenging time for policing?
First of all it is necessary to examine why this might 
be a particularly challenging time for police services 
and why the police might need to consider radical 
change to respond and rebuild their legitimacy. For 
many police chiefs in the developed world it seems 
strange and ironic that police forces have come under 
such scrutiny in the last few years. After years of rising 
crime through the 1970s and 1980s, crime has been 
falling in the Western democracies. At the beginning 
of 2013, London and New York published recorded 
homicide rates that were last seen in the 1970s when 
the populations were lower and the wider demands 
on the police from serious crime and terrorism were 
considerably fewer. As Police Chiefs and the Coalition 
government in the UK have recently asserted, crime 
is falling and the public’s confidence in the police has 
been rising. Figures from across many jurisdictions in 
Europe and North America would be widely similar.
Despite this, most countries in those jurisdictions have 
embarked on major transformations of their police. 
In England and Wales, since the Conservative-Liberal 
Democratic Coalition came to power in 2010, there has 
been the ‘most radical change programme’ since Sir 
Robert Peel founded the modern police force in the 
19th century. Police numbers have been cut, police 
pay and conditions and police budgets slashed and 
proposals to change the totemic single point of entry 
recruitment have been published. But England and 
Wales is not alone: in Scotland, a new National Police 
has been introduced; in Norway, the fallout from 
22 July 2011 has seen not just the removal of the police 
commissioner but the emergence of a radical change 
programme; in Sweden, there has been a wide-
ranging programme to create a new national force; the 
Netherlands has changed from a model based on local 
forces in favour of a national force; across the Atlantic, 
Canada has commissioned the Canadian Academy of 
Sciences to explore options for reform.
Part of this rapid shift to reform can be explained 
by the need to reduce the cost of policing at a time 
when governments have had to face unprecedented 
reductions in tax revenues and pressures to reduce to 
public spending. Fogelsong and Gascon (2010) showed 
how United States’ policing had effectively priced itself 
out of the market, presenting cash-strapped mayors 
and states with little alternative but to cut police 
numbers and, in many cases, to challenge police pay 
and conditions.
However, another part of the reason appears to be that 
police have failed to convince the public and politicians 
of the link between policing and the decline in crime. 
Hence, with crime continuing to fall and tax revenues 
under pressure to sustain healthcare and education 
and to pay for the subsidies underpinning the failed 
financial sector, politicians have turned on the police 
and started questioning what the public are getting 
for their money. They have also, either at local level in 
the case of Police and Crime Commissioners in England 
and Wales or in Scotland, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
changed the shape of police accountability to a more 
direct, intrusive political oversight. This new ‘calculative 
and contractual’ oversight (Reiner, 2013) provides 
a major shift from the more indirect, ex post facto 
models of accounting for actions. Politicians, to draw 
a parallel with a police interview, have moved from 
a passive role observing behind the remote glass 
screens and have put themselves firmly at the table, 
directing the interview.
Even the most well-rehearsed ‘miracles’ have not 
prevented critical inquiry. In January 2013, the New York 
Times published an article about the crime drop in New 
York (Tierney, 2013). Tierney documents how the scale 
and extent of New York’s crime drop has generated 
a debate with much heat and little light between 
those who see the crime falls as a result of wider social 
factors and those who connect at least a major part of 
it to the actions of the police department. The debate 
is important because New York’s crime drop has been 
both dramatic and the arguments about its causes 
highly influential in setting the terms of the debates 
about policing beyond New York. The continuing 
interest of the British Prime Minister David Cameron 
in the former Commissioner of New York, Bill Bratton, 
as a potential Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police (a major driver of the proposal to change the 
eligibility rules to allow ‘foreign chiefs’ (Home Office, 
2013)) is undoubtedly connected with the perception 
that Bratton’s brief two-year reign as Commissioner 
precipitated the crime drop.
However, in contrast to many such analyses, Tierney 
goes beyond the standard dialectic between critics and 
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supporters of the New York Police Department (NYPD). 
Instead, his main focus is on the work of scholars who 
have worked closely with police departments to test 
and refine strategies such as ‘hot-spot’ policing and 
targeted police stop and search. The article highlights 
a number of key points about this research, which has 
now been replicated and systematically reviewed; 
it was developed as a partnership between police 
leaders and university-based academics and has been 
shown to have a strong cost-benefit when applied as 
a tool for tackling priority crimes.
Tierney clearly illustrates why this is an important and 
opportune moment for the police to adopt a new 
approach to science. His argument, set out through the 
voices of those key scholars, is that police are in danger 
of losing an argument about their effectiveness by not 
engaging with the evidence about their own practice.
An opportune moment for change?
After more than 50 years of research, the evidence 
about police practice has been transformed. Some of 
the early work set out to test the validity of the 1950s 
‘professional model’ advanced by police chiefs like 
O.W. Wilson. Wilson (1950) had described a system of 
policing much influenced by scientific management 
and the idea of deterrence, in which the police should 
concentrate their efforts on general patrol strategies, 
responding rapidly to calls and investigating crimes 
and trying to bring as many offenders to court and 
punishment as possible. These arguments were 
substantially undermined by a series of studies 
that showed that general patrol strategies had very 
little impact on crime (Kelling et al., 1974 and Police 
Foundation, 1981), rapid response provided little 
preventative benefit and the police contribution to 
detecting crimes was marginal and subordinate to 
that of victims and witnesses (Greenwood et al., 1977). 
Yet Wilson’s model of policing has remained highly 
influential, both with police leaders and politicians. The 
recent election literature from the Police and Crime 
Commissioner candidates in England and Wales and 
many of the elected Commissioners Police and Crime 
plans suggest that the old professional model, with 
its intuitive causal reasoning, is embraced by many 
PCCs — this is the old professional model, but new 
populist democracy.
In contrast, since those early studies, there is now 
a substantial body of work demonstrating how police 
can be more effective by deploying focused strategies, 
which have been thoroughly tested by experimental 
designs. Moreover, this body of work has now been 
systematically brought together and is available on 
websites such as the George Mason University’s 
‘Matrix’ site (Lum et al., 2011). The Campbell Crime 
and Justice Group, an international group of scholars 
who are linked through the Campbell Collaboration, 
has been publishing a series of systematic reviews 
of these studies, which have, in turn, been published 
in Europe by bodies such as the Swedish Crime 
Prevention Centre. Indeed, the Campbell Collaboration 
is hosted in Norway and supported by the Norwegian 
government. There is, alongside this, the emergence of 
what Cynthia Lum, who leads the work on the Matrix at 
George Mason, has called ‘translational criminology’ or 
a systematic and determined attempt to understand 
how to translate the lessons of more than a hundred 
key studies into real practice and real outcomes on the 
ground in policing.
A new professional model?
A new professional model of policing based on the 
firmer ground of the evidence involves a very different 
approach to O.W.Wilson’s model. David Weisburd, one 
of the key researchers has summarised the approach 
as follows:
 § Police should focus efforts on high activity places 
and people. Such targeted strategies do not cause 
displacement, which is not inevitable at the micro- 
or meso- level when police focus their efforts.
 § Police will increase their effectiveness with proactive 
problem solving (over simply focused approaches).
 § Police should go beyond traditional approaches, like 
using law enforcement and arrest (Weisburd, 2012).
The most recent Campbell reviews (Gill et al., 2012) 
have also highlighted that whilst community-policing 
approaches, which are almost universally advocated 
by police chiefs and politicians alike, will not deliver 
crime reductions, they will improve confidence and 
enhance legitimacy.
The nature and style of policing that emerges from 
the evidence challenges many embedded practices in 
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policing and many views fondly held by the public and 
politicians. Moreover, the dissonance between historic 
practices and effective outcomes is such that it highlights 
the need for police to be much more systematic about 
testing their practice. As Weisburd and Neyroud (2011) 
have argued, such testing is neither routinely carried out, 
nor necessarily welcomed by police chiefs. There is not 
yet a scientific culture in policing to complement the 
strong emphasis on experiential learning and a tradition 
of socialisation and training in the organisation which 
is heavily orientated towards learning by doing and by 
copying inherited practices (Chan, 2003).
The emergence of a new professional 
education
However, there is substantial evidence that change is 
taking place. In December 2012, the UK government 
set up the College of Policing in response to the 
recommendations of the Neyroud Review of Police 
Leadership and Training (2011). In contrast to previous 
‘colleges’ of policing, the new one is intended to be 
a professional body, rather than a training body, 
charged with registering practitioners, setting the 
qualification structure, accrediting programmes and 
developing the knowledge base of policing through 
research. The college is committed to building a new 
partnership relationship with higher education.
A new relationship between police training and higher 
education is also very evident across a number of 
jurisdictions both in Europe and outside. National police 
colleges in a number of countries have changed from 
training establishments to universities, with several 
maturing to full university status and the award of 
Doctorates. Equally, some police forces, such as New 
South Wales in Australia, have externalised their initial 
training to universities — in their case Charles Sturt 
University. In Scotland, through the Scottish Institute 
for Policing Research, the Scottish police and Scottish 
universities have built a partnership for advancing 
knowledge about policing. A similar partnership — the 
Centre for Excellence in Policing (CEPS) — has developed 
in Australia.
There are some emerging features of this new 
landscape of police education that give some 
encouragement that, in the midst of largely top-down 
reforms of structure, pay and budgets, driven by 
austerity, real change is beginning to happen to the 
‘profession’ of policing:
 § the educational qualifications and pre-qualification 
requirements for joining the police service are 
changing and becoming more stretching and more 
formalised at around Level 4 or the first level of 
higher education;
 § the traditional basis of the training around 
knowledge of the law and some practical skills is 
being challenged by a new requirement for police 
officers to understand and be able to interpret the 
research relevant to their practice (Neyroud, 2011);
 § police training is shifting to one of two 
models: a partnership with higher education; 
a transformation of existing infrastructure into 
a higher education institution.
There are a number of issues that this change throws 
up. Operational credibility is critical to policing. It is, as 
Neyroud (2011) suggested, important to the legitimacy 
of senior people in leading their subordinates. There is 
also widespread cultural resistance to the substitution 
of higher education-based knowledge for craft and 
experience-based knowledge. This resistance is not 
confined to the police service. In the UK, there have been 
similar strains felt in the nursing profession after the 
introduction of a mandatory degree-level qualification 
for nursing practice. There have been regular stories 
in the British media about nurses being too educated 
to care. The stories prompted the Royal College of 
Nursing to commission a review of the approach. The 
subsequent report of the Willis Commission (2012) 
comprehensively rebutted the criticisms of the higher 
education approach and reaffirmed that nurses could 
only be effective in their practice if their caring skills 
were supported by scientific knowledge. The Neyroud 
Review made a similar case for policing.
Creating the new profession?
It is not easy to change policing. Although it is 
a relatively new occupation in its modern form — no 
more than 200 years old, it has developed a strong 
culture and traditions, within the framework of 
national or local governance. Many studies of police 
have concluded that little fundamental change has 
resulted from the many attempts at reform over the 
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last 25 years. Peter Manning observed, ‘… reforms have 
had little operational or structural impact in spite of 
the widespread publicity and funding that they have 
generated’ (Manning, 2012: xvii). He included reforms 
such as community policing and Compstat amongst 
those he analysed. He suggested that the reason 
for failure to make lasting change is that the reforms 
were not systematic and were largely top-down. Their 
impact on the frontline and the real work of policing 
was, therefore, in his view, necessarily limited.
However, there are a number of new ingredients to 
the reforms of police currently being pushed forward. 
The financial crisis is driving a much more systematic 
approach. Whether it is the Coalition’s approach in 
England and Wales, the new Scottish force, the new 
Dutch National force or the new Swedish force, the 
political drive has been to make policing both more 
financially sustainable and more effective. This has 
pushed structural change to make a more efficient 
structure in almost all jurisdictions apart from England 
and Wales and closer democratic oversight.
But there has been a debate about the 
professionalisation of the police service, which has 
provided an opportunity to reconsider recruitment, 
education, training and promotion systems. In England 
and Wales, this has produced an opportunity, following 
the Neyroud Review, to test the development of 
a full-blown professional model — qualification, 
accreditation, registration and continuous professional 
development — not just for the senior ranks, but 
for all those working in policing. Whether this will 
produce a template for others to draw from remains 
to be seen. It is early days because the College of 
Policing is in its infancy. The first steps are, however, 
promising. The first Chair of the Board of the new 
body is a distinguished academic and educator, a Vice 
Chancellor of a major higher education institution. 
The first Chief Executive is a chief constable with an 
established reputation for sponsoring experimental 
research. Its membership has already been agreed to 
span not just a small group of senior officers at the top 
but the whole workforce, which is, itself, a major change 
for a police service that has traditionally been split 
into frontline, middle management and chief officer 
groupings. In order to engender real reform, the new 
professionalism in policing has to be a professionalism 
of the whole workforce. Only through such a wholesale 
commitment will this wave of police reform overcome 
the weaknesses that Manning has identified in every 
previous attempt.
Finally, for CEPOL, this emerging new professionalism 
offers an opportunity to migrate from a network of 
training colleges to a catalyst for translation of research 
and new approaches to training and education across 
Europe. A mission centred on encouraging the testing 
of practice, sharing the best evidence and ensuring 
access to the best tools for supporting police officers 
would make CEPOL a key driver of change in European 
policing.
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approaches — introduction
János Fehérváry
The comparative approach as a distinctive way 
of analysing and explaining social and political 
developments is an important instrument for police 
research of researching the police and policing, in 
particular in the relationship between police forces and 
other institutions charged with police tasks on the one 
side and society and politics on the other side. In times 
of increasing Europeanisation, the internationalisation 
and globalisation of police tasks, subjects, networks and 
instruments, systematic and scientific comparison is an 
essential tool for generating knowledge and developing 
best practice models and strengthening cooperation.
The authors of the following three contributions in this 
chapter use different research designs in comparing 
different police systems and policing processes and 
instruments in Europe (and beyond). They show 
variations in the application of the comparative 
approach according to their perspectives and interests.
Sebastian Roché’s bold and ambitious essay picks 
up from a central point of discussion argued in the 
first chapter: what is the police, and what is or what 
shall police science be? Starting with a historical 
review of the conceptual development of the key 
terms, and in critical reference to the ‘major thinking 
tide’ of the ‘evidence-based’ approach, Roché 
aims to progress our understanding of police (and 
police science in particular), by applying a strictly 
comparative, taxonomic perspective to the object 
of interest: police. By discarding attempts to 
discover the essential meaning of ‘police’ by start 
of definition, he instead favours approximation 
through systematic comparison of the multifaceted 
manifestations of police organisations. Consistent 
with his methodological taxonomic approach, ‘police 
forms’, ‘morphologies’ and ‘ecosystems’ are introduced 
as central methodological notions. ‘Polity’, ‘doctrines’ 
and ‘accountabilities’ are further chief analytical 
tools, rather rooted in political than life sciences. 
In the subsequent, largely empirical part of the 
contribution, the author strives to demonstrate the 
potential merits of his approach by applying his 
proposed methodology to a sample of six countries 
of diverse size and stark variations in the configuration 
of their innate police forms (France, India, Spain, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States). The reader 
is taken along an extended exercise of categorisation, 
comparison and analysis, resulting in some noteworthy 
insights and discoveries — a possibly blatant, but 
often neglected one is that, seen from a European, 
international or even global level, there is such an 
astonishing variety and diversity of existing ‘police forms’, 
that for having a serious debate about ‘the police’, may 
be every discussion should start from second thoughts. 
Taking a consequent comparative-phenomenological 
position and looking at police forces as ‘organised life 
forms’ is certainly a fresh, non-orthodox path towards 
an advanced understanding of police forces and their 
actions. Of course a lot of questions are raised in the 
course of the argument, and Roché is the first to admit 
from the outset that his is a long way. Nevertheless, 
this is certainly a distinct approach in police science 
and noteworthy not least as a complementary 
building block of theory in the face of more traditional 
essentialist contributions.
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Cyrille Fijnaut exemplifies the comparative approach 
by placing it within a historical context. He describes 
the background, analyses the situation and explains 
the relevance of a comparative approach in police 
research for policing in Europe as such and in 
particular for police cooperation. He shows that the 
history of police/policing in different countries in 
Europe had a strong impact on the development of 
police/policing in other countries or parts of Europe. 
Although in all European countries many reforms of 
the police system and organisation took place during 
the last two centuries you can still find police models 
in several European countries with roots in past history 
(e.g. the model of the French Gendarmerie). He states 
that ‘… in a European context, policing has never 
been just a national issue, because it always had been 
influenced highly by developments in other states.’ He 
reveals that these developments had a major influence 
on cross-border policing, cross-border cooperation 
and the harmonisation of policing in Europe. 
In the second part he deals with some aspects of the 
ongoing development in cross-border cooperation. 
In particular, he attaches great importance to the 
influential role of conventions. He describes the 
development of cooperation in specific areas of 
policing (e.g. cooperation of traffic police — TISPOL) 
and special police operation forces — ATLAS) 
and in a European region (Euroregio Maas-Rhine). 
In the third part he presents a brief future perspective 
on the Lisbon Treaty (signed by the EU Member States 
on 13 December 2007, and entered into force on 
1 December 2009) and on the report of the ‘High Level 
Advisory Group on the Future of EU Home affairs policies’ 
(17 January 2008) and their impact in the field of police 
cooperation. In the final part of his paper he gives 
an analysis of the current situation of comparative 
research in Europe — with different obstacles — and 
he proposes some ways to facilitate it.
The third paper in this chapter by Gabriele Jacobs, 
Kate Horton and P. Saskia Bayerl presents the central 
ideas, the used methods, the project structure and the 
outcomes of a long-term and complex comparative 
research project. COMPOSITE (Comparative Police 
Studies in the EU) unites researchers and practitioners 
from 10 European countries and 15 institutions to 
research complex issues regarding organisational 
changes in police. The research is carried out by a team 
of researchers belonging to different cultural areas 
and different disciplines operating as an international 
network. The added value of this network-method 
for police science is an achievement of a better 
understanding of cross-national phenomena in the 
field of police and policing. It can help to learn from 
each other with a view to convergence, common 
concepts and harmonisation (e.g. of training, police 
strategies methods, communication, equipment). 
The COMPOSITE project can be seen as a serious effort 
to overcome the situation described by Fijnaut in the 
first paper of this chapter where he deplores: ‘there is 
no coherent, consistent, long-term building of a body 
of knowledge about what is going on in the field of 
policing in Europe and particularly related to cross-
border police cooperation.’
Together all three papers demonstrate the distinct 
theoretical relevance and practical value of comparative 
research for the development of police and policing 
in Europe and particularly of police cooperation in 
Europe and beyond.
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Conceptual clarification and taxonomy for comparing 
police systems
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Recently, a revival in police science is observed in 
several parts of the world. I say a revival since police 
science was born in the early 18th century in France 
and in Germany. French police commissioner Nicolas 
Delamare (see Napoli, 2003) as well as Germany thinkers 
called ‘caméralistes’ developed that notion. In fact, with 
contemporary vocabulary, is would be labeled ‘political 
science’ or ‘government science’. Police science of that 
time was one of population, religion, roadways, trade, 
agriculture and finances. But also it also was one of 
happiness of the public (félicité publique). Early in the 
20th century an academic journal was published 
under the name ‘Police Science’. ‘The application of 
science to the detection of crime’ (Goddard, 1932: 165). 
It started to be published by Northwestern University 
in 1930 but almost disappeared two years after. The 
American Journal of Police Science (1) was absorbed by 
the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology as soon 
as 1932. There was apparently not enough interest for 
police science in the academic arena to render the 
journal sustainable. Police Science as distinct from 
penal law and criminology will resurface in the Journal 
of Police Science and Administration in 1973 (Kaminsky, 
1995: 20).
More recently, in the United States soon followed by 
Britain, academics have raised the prospect of a new 
age of policing that would be based on knowledge and 
systematic use of evidence for deciding what is the right 
thing to do for police services (among early committed 
academics and organisations in the UK see for instance 
(1) http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journal-
Code=amerjpoliscie2.
the seminal work of Sherman et al., 1997, the work of 
the Campbell collaboration and works sponsored 
by the Home Office in the UK). David Weisburd and 
Peter Neyroud (2011) spoke of a new paradigm. In 
Latin America, police science is being recognised as 
an important goal for the government of Colombia 
and an international conference was organised on 
this very topic in 2011 together with the launch of an 
international network by the police academy of Bogota. 
In Europe, CEPOL has not spared its efforts to popularise 
the notion of police science by publishing reports as 
of 2007 (Jaschke et alii, 2007, printing a bulletin (CEPOL 
European Police Science and Research Bulletin) and 
organising a conference in Lyon in 2012.
Introduction: science and police
In the late 20th century and early 21st century, the 
term ‘police science’ as used by the administration and 
academia has a more restricted sense than in the early 
18th century. It is very much focused on public order 
and public safety (that continental Europeans tend to 
name ‘public security’ although the word safety also 
exists in languages derived from Latin). This science 
would be a kind of engineering science that would 
help police to be efficient and display efficacy in their 
methods.
Still, there is no shared definition of police science. 
What exactly is police science? Should it be limited to 
the engineering of police methods and organisation? 
And how could progress towards science in policing 
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be made when we have no definition of the police 
themselves, of the object or subject of the science? 
What are the police? Are they just the ones that claim 
‘we are the police’ in a given country at a given time, 
as typically do public national forces in continental 
Europe? This really seems a very empirical and 
conceptually week definition of police that might 
not be sufficient for establishing them as an object or 
subject of a science.
Police definition has been and still is very much debated 
since Bittner tried to unify ‘police’ through the use 
of physical force (1978). But is it a good idea to try to 
define in a monist way ‘something’ which is extremely 
multifaceted, variable even when considered in one 
country only and even more across countries? For 
example, J-P Brodeur has highlighted the dual nature 
of police as a secret organisation on the one hand, 
and a public one on the other (1983). Discovering the 
unity of something that happens to be or because it is 
called with a similar name (police, polis, policia) seems 
rather a utopian idea to me. It is striking that police 
needs an s as in polices — more in certain countries 
than others though, that the notions of police network, 
plural policing or policing web has emerged. The word 
policing (which does not exist in Spanish or French) blurs 
more than it brings a solution. What is the definitive 
connection between issuing a ticket for unlawful 
parking, investigating human trafficking and spying on 
other governments? Were Reiss and Bordua (1967) not 
right when they concluded that policing cannot be 
the same for the various groups constituting a society, 
that law enforcement is socially biased? What if police 
is not, never was and never will be ‘one thing’? What 
if the quest for the essence of police was misleading 
from the start? What if, on the contrary, what matters 
for understanding police is who installs the police as an 
organisation with special operational powers? And how 
is the police (whatever its names and functions) tied to 
its environment?
We are not even attempting here to propose a new 
substantial definition of police or to suggest a new 
theory of police. We rather try to come with some 
elements of methodology for understanding how 
organisations whose names are police do develop 
themselves and display various profiles across national 
contexts (without being able to rigorously decide 
which should be included in a review since that would 
entail having a definition for that purpose).
In this chapter, we contend that there are two main 
avenues in police science: ‘science for the police’ 
and ‘science of the police’, the latter being today 
an orphan of the efforts of the scientific community 
despite its critical importance. We also support the 
view that a police science cannot be established 
without a cross-national approach that constitutes 
the precondition for understanding what ‘police’ are. 
We believe that such an effort should be conceptually 
guided. In fact, as many scholars have already noted, 
each country has such idiosyncratic conditions that 
it proves theoretically very risky to generalise on the 
basis of a few cases of forces, a fortiori if studied in 
the same country or in the same cultural area. Most 
of the production of knowledge is centred on local 
studies or national studies and is very rarely about the 
comparison of ‘police’ in different national settings, 
although exceptions exist, specifically the notorious 
David Bayley (1975, 1979, 1985).
Forging a comparative methodology for studying 
‘police’ requires scholars to discuss and perhaps agree 
about the key notions that can guide empirical works 
and to develop names for and measures of the various 
dimensions that constitute ‘police’. This also necessitates 
gathering observations about those ‘objects’, to invent 
a taxonomy and populate it with ‘police forms’ so that 
we can compare them like early taxidermists used to 
compare birds or butterflies through their physical 
features (weight, length, size of eyes), and, possibly, 
link those to their behavioural patterns. We would 
need to agree about how to describe police forces. 
Such observations by naturalists paved the way for 
the theory of evolution of life forms and I believe 
that police science cannot be consolidated without 
a description of ‘police forms’. A taxonomy of police 
ecosystems would also be very useful (the institutions 
with which police interact).
The description and comparison of police forces and 
their environment rests in its infancy at present and 
it will take long before it reaches adulthood. Our 
contribution in this chapter is therefore modest and 
proposes to remind of some of the challenges of 
undertaking a systematic comparative approach to 
police, to introduce the notions and definitions that 
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we believe are indispensable, and to illustrate our 
approach based on some examples of how definitions 
and the related measurement of aspects of police 
forces and their environment can be used based on 
case studies.
In order to compare policing, we assume that an 
emphasis must be placed on the links that unite ‘police’ 
and their environments, both social and political. And 
we contend that such links have structuring effects on 
the work of the police. We think of those links as defined 
by three broad notions: the polity, the doctrines and 
the oversight mechanisms.
Such a perspective certainly contains an academic aim 
of producing knowledge. In addition, it permits offering 
public authorities that are in charge of policing a new 
view on the administrative organisations that they are 
commanding and controlling (in centralised states) or 
managing (in decentralised polities).
Science for the police or science of the 
police?
After the 18th century view that confounded police 
science with government science was abandoned, 
the more vivid definition of police science rests with 
the ‘evidence-based’ approach. Based on a medical 
metaphor, its proponents offer a more professional 
view on policing in the classic sense of a value-free 
orientation and a decision about what works and what 
doesn’t that stems from the observation of actual 
policing practices with rigorous methodology. The 
medical inspiration is overtly claimed by some of the 
most famous pundits (Sherman in his 1998 lecture at 
the police foundation; for criticisms see among others 
Thatcher) and perspire when reading the compilation 
of quantitative meta analyses (for a recent example, 
see police legitimacy: Mazerolle, Bennett, Sargeant, 
Manning, 2013). It certainly constitutes an important 
current in criminology, with its journals, think tanks 
and intellectual leaders. We do not intend to discuss 
the principles that lay beyond such an endeavour 
(such as: what are the implications of a more efficient 
police which are not in themselves a neutral factor 
in a just society? or to what extent can the police be 
confounded with medicine?). Every major thinking tide 
has its critics.
Our main and only point here is that the evidence-
based approach is an engineering kind of science. 
Contrary to critical criminology, is does not express 
outrage vis-à-vis police racism. It rather tries to measure 
the existence of bias in policing and compares the 
effect of training curricula on the importance of ethnic 
imbalance during stop and search. It does not portray 
private property as a theft (as did Joseph Proudon, ‘La 
propriété, c’est le vol’, a French 19th century intellectual), 
but rather tries to determine if a 5 % increase of street 
patrols reduces (and to what extent) the frequency of 
burglaries in experimental neighbourhood compared 
to control ones.
Evidence-based science has not yet focused much on 
organisational features of police forces. Perhaps the 
COMPSTAT study is a borderline one since it touches 
on police interventions and police organisation (e.g.. 
Willis, Mastrofski, Weisburd, 2007). Evidence-based 
science is first and foremost a science for the police. It 
is for the benefit of police chiefs and of police forces. 
And possibly for the benefit of those overseeing the 
police. It would be unfair to deny that citizens might 
indirectly enjoy those benefits as well, for example it 
they are less often burgled after more efficient methods 
are implemented. Science for the police is meant to be 
an applied form of science. It has a normative nature 
in the sense that it is meant to say what is good and 
what should be done (or what shouldn’t). In any case, 
what is learned is meant to cause a change for a better 
functioning police not a better understanding of why 
police services change (or don’t), what policing means 
and how police organisations develop, grow in size 
and gain more advantages and resources for their 
constituent units and police officers.
But should evidence-based science be restricted to 
science for the police? Another avenue is also possible, 
which is distinct but does not oppose the first one.
Science of the police would mean studying police forms 
in their environment in order to better understand their 
development and their behaviour, for example how 
those forms compete for survival and interact with their 
environment (for accessing more resources or for other 
purposes). Three subjects are central to the science of the 
police: police forms development over time in different 
settings, police acquisition of resources (an organism 
needs to feed itself in order to survive) and police 
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determination by their environment. The links between 
police development and political development began 
to be comparatively studied by Bayley (1975) almost 
forty years ago, but he had few followers.
It is not a normative approach in its essence, but it would 
be unfair to conceal that it can be used in a normative 
framework (in fact, it is within such a framework that 
I started to be interested in the taxonomy of forces, when 
my responsibility was to measure the distance between 
a given police force and international standards of 
democratic policing, whatever this means). The police 
are usually not interested in the science of the police, 
with notable exceptions of course, since a police chief 
is interested in ‘doing better’ in a given situation and 
in a given organisational environment. Explanations of 
how and why a force will change over time is not part 
of his/her primary concerns, at least in the countries in 
which I worked. Reckless politicians might be interested 
in the science of the police, and interested to the point 
that it is not taking too many odds in order to change 
a police force.
I explained that science of the police is not to be 
confused with science for the police. However, 
systematic and rigorous observation can be mobilised 
for the benefit of science for the police as well as for 
science of the police. There are benefits to studying 
the programmes in order to decide rigorously on ‘what 
works’. However, equally important is to look at system 
level. There are some isolated articles advising to do so 
(for example in relation to the juvenile justice systems, 
see Smith, 2005). More generally, for the purpose 
of understanding police-related changes, it will be 
beneficial to observe the links to the system in which 
a form develops itself.
Comparative study of police forms: 
challenges ahead
There are a number of technical roadblocks in getting 
to the destination outlined in the introduction. And 
these obstacles are, we believe, even more obvious 
when adopting a comparative approach since the 
definition of a multifaceted organisation, police, cannot 
only be found in one of its actual manifestations. What 
police are cannot be taken for granted in a comparative 
perspective. The differences stand out and show their 
true colours.
The first difficulty resides in the absence of shared 
definition of what ‘police’ could be. It has been 
observed by historians or sociologists that their forms 
vary historically and geographically. They can be 
diffuse in nature or vested in a specialised profession 
or corps, with a mix of public and private services 
(the balance between these two varies from country 
to country, Johnston, 1999). The professionals can be 
civilian or military, as in countries with a gendarmerie 
or even pure military forces carrying out internal 
security duties. The forces can be local, regional, or 
national, or a mix of all these. In some countries internal 
security and external security are mixed together, 
as in eastern Turkey, which often happens when the 
borders are not fully secured or when some nations 
claim cultural recognition across state borders. In this 
case, the gendarmerie fights terrorism as an army 
and undertakes more civilian policing of rural places. 
The missions consisting of prevention, deterrence, 
detection of crime and protection of public institutions 
are organised differently in almost every state. These 
are just examples of how complex finding a definition 
can be.
Missions of police forms, often subsumed under the 
term ‘safety’ or ‘security’ are diverse and changing over 
time. Every attempt to count them ends up with lists 
of more than a dozen tasks (Bordua, Reiss: 1966: 78). 
There is a need for categorising them. For example, 
sociologist Dominique Monjardet (1996) proposed 
differentiating between ‘police of sovereignty’, ‘high 
judicial police’ and ‘police of quietness’ meaning the 
daily policing work based on the French case study. 
Such endeavours do not provide a definition, but 
help to depict the complexity of police of which 
shape, organisation and functioning display important 
differences.
There are two widespread definitions of the police. The 
more popular element of definition by the ‘legitimate 
use of physical force’ as did Bittner (1970: 131) or Bayley 
in the third volume of The Enclyclopedia of Crime and 
Justice (1983: 1120), is not fully convincing. Canadian 
sociologist Paul Brodeur (1994, 2011) denied in detail 
that such a notion could be sufficient or even valid for 
specifying what police can be. Let us simply add to the 
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discussion that in authoritarian regimes, the police do 
not use force for maintaining order and security since 
the purpose of police in such cases is to create a sense 
of insecurity in the public. In addition, it must be said 
that the use of force is not necessarily perceived as 
legitimate by the public, as we witnessed recently 
during the Arab Spring in Tunisia or in Egypt. Other 
scholars insisted on their capacity to define exceptions 
in the maintenance of order (Manning, 2010: 80).
According to me, the best starting point remains the 
work of Bayley, but not when he relates police and the 
use of force, rather when he takes a larger view. He sees 
the police as a corps that is instituted by an authority 
(Bailey, 1985), which clearly opposes the police as a force 
that established itself as a power, as the army does 
in some countries. It might be because he adopted 
a comparative point of view deterring him from 
choosing too restricted a definition. The police serve 
a higher power. In democracies, that power is meant 
to be the people, in autocratic regimes the President 
or the king. Bayley reached this very stimulating 
conclusion long after the French revolutionaries 
drafted their Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen in 1789, which arrives to the exact same 
conclusion although it is stated in a normative fashion. 
Article 4 states that: ‘La garantie des droits de l’Homme 
et du Citoyen nécessite une force publique: cette force 
est donc instituée pour l’avantage de tous, et non pour 
l’utilité particulière de ceux auxquels elle est confiée’ 
(The guarantee of the rights of man and of the citizen 
requires a public force: that force is instituted for the 
benefits of all, and not for the particular benefit of 
those to whom it is entrusted). This article encapsulates 
the general principles of a democratic police: they are 
set up for servicing the people and protecting their 
rights.
Bayley’s emphasis for defining the police is on the link 
of forces with a superior authority. This authority could 
be the people or the government, be it democratic 
or tyrannical. It is the environment of police. Based 
on that premise, I propose that understanding the 
different types of police forms is precisely that: to make 
sense of the links that unite a force or a series of forces 
to their social and political environment. Manning 
(2010) implicitly followed the same path, however he 
focused on what the police do when he tried to give 
a definition of police as dealing with ‘exceptions’ that 
is in relation with the dependence to their superior 
authority (2). What Bayley indicated is the ‘intermediary 
role of the police’. Police have a broker function both 
for inputs and outputs of the political system. This 
is why it is so important to theorise the link of the 
police to their environments. The affiliation of police 
forces to government, a critical element of police — 
government relations, has not yet been systematically 
analysed, neither at state level nor, and even less, in 
a comparative fashion.
Years ago, political scientists D. Easton and J. Dennis 
stated that the police are marginal to the heart of 
political science works and lack a serious analysis of 
their function in political systems (1969: 210). Since then, 
some authors have started to collate monographs on 
aspects of these relationships, but without a clear 
conceptual framework (Bear, Murray, 2007) or limited 
to one country without proper intellectual equipment 
for comparative research (Loubet del Bayle, 1992, 2006). 
Research has been centred on a few English speaking 
countries and termed ethnocentric and chauvinistic by 
British and American academics themselves (Mawby, 
1989, introduction). The quest for an analysis of their 
functions in political systems appears still unfinished. 
I believe that it is a critical element for science of the 
police.
At this point, we propose limiting ourselves to 
observing some public forces, i.e. forces that are set up 
by a higher authority, in a selection of countries with 
two objectives in mind: to determine and measure 
their main characteristics, their mutual relationships 
and their relationships with their environment. The 
reason for including the characteristics of the forces in 
the review of the dimensions of their relationships with 
their environment is that those characteristics possibly 
shape that relationhip, at least in part.
From an empirical point of view, there is no database 
gathering characteristics of the police forces in 
different states, even in democratic regimes. Certain 
(2) The police as an organization in Anglo-American societies, 
constituted of many diverse agencies, are authoritatively coordi-
nated, legitimate organizations. They stand ready to apply force 
up and including fatal force in politically defined territories. They 
seek to sustain politically defined order and ordering via track-
ing, surveillance and arrest. As such, they require compliance to 
command from lower personnel and citizens and the ability to 
proceed by exception’ (2010: 79-80).
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organisms as OSCE offer partial descriptions of the 
missions of the forces, but they are usually based on 
the legal definition in a given country and are not 
systematic across countries. We state that such a cross-
national description necessitates prior identification 
of what exactly should be measured in police forms, 
what criteria are preferred in order to measure and 
compare forms (the measurements and the units of 
measurements). This is why concepts are indispensable 
for a comparative science of the police.
Methodology
How to navigate the many challenges along the journey 
to comparative police science? We clearly don’t have 
a full answer to that question and our ambition here is 
only to propose concepts and illustrate that they can 
be useful. For the purpose of comparing police forms, 
a few concepts are needed.
We propose four basic concepts based on a first work 
to gather descriptors of police oversight mechanisms 
(Roché et al., 2010) and on a work on key notions for 
reengineering a police system (Roché, 2011) both 
prepared in the framework of international technical 
assistance for security sector reform.
We assume that police forms evolve inside a social and 
institutional environment. It is constituted of civilian 
government, the army (in some countries the army 
is a branch of the state together with the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary), of civil society and 
of other actors (independent authorities or NMIs, the 
media for example). We intend to describe the traits 
of police forms (the characteristics of the entities, 
forces or services that do policing) and the nature 
of the links of police forms to their environment. For 
example, when British police chiefs talk about police 
independence, what does it mean and how can this 
be conceptualised and measured (how independent 
and from what?) so that Britain can be compared to 
other countries?
Selection of reference countries
The scope and complexity of the work is such that 
we would like to trial our approach on a limited set 
of states and with simple indicators for assessing the 
existence of the links. It is beyond our capacity to 
include all states or even a rigorous sample of states 
since we don’t have a hypothesis for designing such 
a sample. We will select contrasted case studies, with 
enough distance between them to allow observation 
of various traits and organising principles.
The principle guiding us for inclusion of case studies is 
diversity: diversity, as far as the polity is concerned, but 
also as far as the police system features are concerned. 
We know that there are different types of polities and 
police systems as well, and we intend to account for 
some of the diversity of both polities and police forms.
We have combined four criteria: size (population) and 
type of state (federal and unitary), fragmentation and 
type of forces. The state may be:
 § a symmetrical or asymmetrical federation, a unitary 
state;
 § a large or small state as measured by population 
and geographical squared mileage;
 § characterised by very fragmented police systems or 
with more unified police systems (the fragmentation 
of a system is indicated by the division of the 
number of forces by the resident population of 
a nation state);
 § characterised by police forces only, or with police 
combined with gendarmerie (a mixed system often 
called a ‘dual system’).
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Table 1 
Countries included in the study
Population  
(in millions)
Polity Name of member unit Fragmentation of 
police system
Military status police 
force (Gendarmerie)
India 1 115 Symetrical federalism
State
(28) Moderate No
Spain 46 Asymmetrical federalism
Autonomia
(17+2 cities) Low
Yes
(Yes)
Switzerland 7.7 Symmetrical federalism
Canton
(26) High
No
(Yes)*
USA 308 Symmetrical federalism
State
(50) Very high No
France 67 Unitary State(1) Very low
Yes
(Yes)
Turkey 75 Unitary State(1) Very low
Yes
(Yes)
* A gendarmerie is found in Switzerland, but its status is not military.
We will also make reference to other systems, the 
United Kingdom or Nigeria for example, when needed. 
Our ambition in this paper is not to be as systematic 
as we should be, but has to be limited at this stage to 
provide examples that are a source of inspiration for 
designing a comparative approach.
Federal systems are very heterogeneous. The United 
States is a large country (9 million km2, 308 million 
inhabitants). It is a symmetrical federal system with 
a very fragmented police system without a police force 
with a military status. Switzerland is also a symmetrical 
federation, but substantially smaller (41 000 km2, 7.7 
million inhabitants), with a high fragmentation of police. 
There is a force named the gendarmerie, but without 
a military status. India is a vast state (3.2 million km2, 
1.2 billion inhabitants) and a symmetrical federation 
with a system that is moderately fragmented and 
without a gendarmerie. Spain is a middle-sized nation 
(505 000 km2, 47 million inhabitants), an asymmetrical 
federation with centralised police forces, a civilian 
and a military-status police. France has approximately 
the same size (550 000 km2, 66 million inhabitants) 
but with a unitary state and centralised police forces, 
a civilian and a military-status police. Finally, Turkey is in 
the same category as France (783 000 km2, 75 million 
inhabitants) with a unitary state and centralised police 
forces, a civilian and a military-status police. Turkey has 
adopted an administrative system that is rooted in the 
French tradition.
As we will see below, this very general description 
doesn’t render justice to the differences between 
the most comparable countries. Police forces are 
structured (and operate) differently in different 
countries even if those countries live under the same 
type of political order. For example, federalism doesn’t 
entail a well-determined and specific type of police 
system. When one refers to a ‘federal police force’ it is 
done so in order to point at the type of police force, not 
at the arrangement of the police system itself. Federal 
forces are mobilised within their jurisdiction, which is 
usually given by the nature of the crime committed (for 
example a crime against a federal official) or the place 
where it is committed (for example federal buildings 
or the federal state of Mexico City of Washington D.C.).
The five concepts for comparing police
The work below draws on previous empirical and 
conceptual efforts (Roché 2011, 2013). In order to 
describe the main distinctive features of police systems 
that can be found around the world, and to determine 
how they compare to one another, we propose that it 
is necessary to look at:
 § ‘police forms’: the traits of a police form are size, 
means for connecting them to the political system 
by ministerial affiliation for example, and police 
operational powers in particular remit (national, 
local jurisdiction);
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In addition, one needs to study four aspects:
 § polity or structure of political powers: type of 
regime, distribution of powers to the various levels 
of government (federal, state, region, municipalities) 
and the de facto power of organisations (for example 
of the military in policing work);
 § police ecosystem, or the mutual relationships of all 
police forms at the nation level;
 § police doctrines (operational strategy for implemen-
ting a policing policy);
 § police accountability mechanisms, which are also 
very diverse (political accountability, performance 
management, inspection).
The reason for selecting those four dimensions is that 
firstly they are critical for designing the relationships 
of police forms with their environment and secondly 
that they seem to be empirically independent bricks or 
elementary elements that can be combined to define 
‘what the police are’ in a given place at a given time. 
We contend that ‘what the police are’ can be defined 
by the relationships of each form with their instituting 
or monitoring authorities. The four types of bricks are 
different in nature:
 § For a given type of polity, various traits of police 
forms can be found. The architecture of a police 
system is not given by the polity: centralised police 
forms can be found in federal polities; civilian or 
military status police forms can be found within the 
boundaries of the EU.
 § Even in lookalike police forms (let’s say centralised 
forces with a military status), substantial differences 
in doctrines can be found.
 § Doctrines with similar aims are found in contrasting 
polities, and in various police forms (large or small, 
central or local).
 § The degree of centralisation of a form (and possibly 
of a system) is not only tied to the institutional 
architecture but to managerial strategies of the 
governments.
 § The nature and modalities of the oversight over 
police forms is not dictated by the architecture of 
the polity or the degree of decentralisation.
 § Furthermore, it is for example possible to change 
the oversight mechanisms without impacting the 
polity or the traits of police forms or the doctrine.
Comparing police: measurements of 
morphology in selected states
We will now provide a definition for each of the four 
core notions. They all are multidimensional and require 
therefore to identify their main dimensions. We will 
provide examples of measurement for each dimension.
Police forms, police ecosystem
A police system is composed of multiple police forms, 
which together comprise the totality of agencies 
explicitly and exclusively (in the sense that policing is 
their sole or dominant mission) tasked with maintaining 
internal public security and order. These forces may or 
may not be linked together operationally or in terms of 
control by higher civilian authorities.
The notion of police form is useful since it doesn’t 
fully overlap with the legally defined notion of police 
force or policing agency or police service. Legal 
definitions are usually taken for granted by academics. 
An illustration can be drawn from France. The police of 
Paris are a central state one. They do not exist legally 
as a force since there are only two national forces in 
France, the Paris police being part of the national 
police. However, based on empirical observation and 
not on law, it is observed that Paris police are a force as 
such. It has independent command and control, and 
internal oversight, as well as other features of a national 
force (including its intelligence services). We use the 
notion of police form as a generic term for describing 
the observed reality.
What distinguishes a police system from its constituent 
units? Police forms are the basic unit of observation 
in our methodology. A police force exists if a set 
of agents (whose function is defined) that operate 
within an organisation with a line of command and 
control, and in a geographical jurisdiction. It generally 
has a mechanism for controlling and sanctioning the 
agents, even if rudimentary. Forces report to the public 
authorities in charge of the police (police authorities). 
Often forces undertake various types of missions. They 
can be, for example, very specialised, or of private or 
public nature (or of mixed nature), legal or illegal, civilian 
or military etc. Thus, we can say that a nation’s police 
system is a set of police forms plus the relationships 
among all the constituent police forces within a given 
territory.
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As we express above, there is no shared definition of 
a police force, and even if we use the one by Bayley, it 
does not solve the problem in full. Now, we propose to 
discuss traits of the police forms. More precision is often 
needed, for example we could decide that police forces 
shall be distinct from armed forces in that the former 
are assigned with the mission of maintaining internal 
public order and order. However, in various countries 
this is not fully the case. Interestingly, police forces are 
rarely defined in the national laws. In addition, there 
often are few published analyses in undemocratic 
regimes or even in regimes in transition. For public 
forms, elements contributing to the definition of the 
civilian versus the military nature of a force such as the 
ministerial affiliation, the employer of agents and the 
missions, are sometimes specified more precisely in 
democratic regimes.
We believe that the morphology of the forces should 
be determined. How can the police forms be described 
with a limited number of traits which themselves will 
be quantified?
There is a very large number of organisational traits for 
each police form and each of these is multidimensional, 
for example the opposition between the military 
versus civilian status of forms. At system level, one can 
see two traditions in Europe, the Anglo-Saxon, built 
against the French model, where public forces are 
of civilian nature since such countries excluded the 
possibility of having a gendarmerie. This tradition is 
reflected in international norms and standards where 
a clear division is sought between the role of the army 
(defence) and the police (internal public order and 
security).
Based on our small sample, we found that several 
countries have a gendarmerie: France, Spain, 
Switzerland and Turkey. But, clearly, looking only at 
the tag that is put on the force does not suffice to 
grasp its nature. At force level, at least two dimensions 
must be taken into account for defining the degree 
of militarisation: the militarisation of the status of 
the personnel and the militarisation as stemming 
from ministerial affiliation. As can be seen in Table 1, 
Switzerland has a gendarmerie, however its personnel 
are fully civilian and it is affiliated to a civilian 
governmental body. This means that the gendarmerie 
in this country is in fact a police force that is identical 
in all means with a civilian one. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the Turkish Jandarma is found. This force is 
composed of soldiers (and conscripts), commanded by 
a land force general, and it is affiliated to the general 
Chief of Staff (a military entity which does not report to 
the Ministry of Defence). It is the most militarised force 
in our sample. In the middle are gendarmeries made 
of gendarmes that are distinctly trained against other 
armies (land forces in particular) and that are affiliated 
to the Ministry of the Interior in Spain and France 
both in functional and organisational terms, and of 
Italy where the Carabinieri are functionally under the 
Ministry of the Interior but not organizationally. Their 
resources are provided by the Ministry of Defence, but 
the command and control line lies with the Ministry of 
the Interior.
We are here primarily concerned with the public 
subsystem and its structural features. When observing 
a force, we leave aside the external control, the content 
of the training processes, the management as far 
as performance and ‘value for money’ is concerned 
and limit ourselves to reference to the traits of each 
forms. We only include here the appointments and 
revocations of the top heads of forces since they are an 
internal feature of the form, despite the fact that it is set 
up by the political environment.
In order to properly compare the forms, we need to 
use a series of measurements of characteristics. We 
need to establish a taxonomy of police forms, similar 
to catagorising life forms in the sea for example. 
Some are very big in size, some are small, some are 
solitary and others, social fish. Fish live in the sea with 
other animals that also can ‘swim’ alike them, without 
being fish, for example dolphins. And biologists can 
differentiate between fish and dolphins because of 
certain criteria, such as the respiratory system.
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Features of forms and of ecosystems: the 
challenge of description
One of the first challenges of social scientists in the 
current state of knowledge is simply to describe ‘what 
we see’. We observe that there are a very large number 
of important organisational traits in police forms 
and police systems. And, when studying them, we 
found that each trait is multidimensional (see below 
the example of militarisation). Comparing forms and 
systems implies that we are able to identify those traits 
and build an index or scale for measuring each of them 
(for example a militarisation score). A table of core 
features or fundamental features of police traits needs 
to be designed and tested.
The main features of forms are listed in Table 1. This 
table is composed of very frequently discussed 
elements in the police literature. It is by no means a final 
list of fundamental traits of police forms. I propose that 
there are seven core traits, and that each of them is 
multidimensional. Those traits for each form are:
 § Status (military versus civilian)
 § Nature (public or private)
 § Shape and characteristic of the top levels of the 
hierarchy by which the form is attached to its political 
environment (the hook or attachment point)
 § Shape of the command and inspection system, which 
is a kind of nervous system of the form
 § Size of the force
 § Centralisation
 § Jurisdiction
 § Professionalisation (literacy, specificity of training).
I understand that many other elements could be 
added and I am geared here with including as few 
traits as possible. For example, an important element 
to be added is how a form feeds itself and reproduces 
itself and I contend that the limbs or organs that equip 
forms are critically important to be integrated.
I agree with Bayley when he observed that some 
commonplace notions such as centralisation or 
decentralisation are not very useful for comparative 
purposes of governance (1979: 219). A decentralised 
force like the NYPD can in effect be larger in size than the 
centralised force of a small country, with less inhabitants. 
Another example can be used to illustrate the problem. 
Some countries, like France, have a centralised police 
system in which a very large force is independent from 
the two main and centralised ones (the national police 
and the gendarmerie), namely the police of Paris. But is 
the police of Paris a centralised or decentralised force? 
There is no answer to that question because of the 
flawed conceptual framework for asking it. However, until 
such notions are replaced, we are tied to using them.
The main features of a system can be described with 
a combination of measures of the forces as displayed in 
the table below. I cannot discuss all the difficulties that are 
related to the use of notions and related measurements. 
My focus is now to insist that features can be observed 
and measured at force level or a police-system level, and 
that the two levels should be carefully differentiated. 
For example, a force can be more or less militarised. But 
then, a police system is more militarised when both the 
affiliation and status of forces are military, but also when 
the size of the military police forces is bigger than the 
civilian units.
As another example, we can look at the fragmentation 
of systems and compare the United States and France, 
two of the most opposed police systems. In France 
there are a national police, a gendarmerie and a Paris 
police force (totalling 230 000 personnel) as well as 3 030 
municipal forces with only 13 098 personnel (3) (two 
thirds of municipal authorities do not authorise their 
agents to bear arms) for 66 million inhabitants. In the 
United States we find 17 800 forces for a population of 
312 million. The fragmentation index can be computed 
as the number of armed forms divided by the size of the 
resident population. This method shows that the United 
States has a ratio per 1 million population of 57 forces 
and France of 15.
(3) See the ‘ Information report ’ by the joint mission of the French 
Senate and Parliamentary Assembly. Mercier Michel (2000), Pour 
une république territoriale: l’unité dans la diversité, Rapport 
d’information 447 Tome 1 (1999-2000) — Mission Commune 
D’information.
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Table 2 
Example of traits and measurements of police forms and of police systems
Force Level System Level Example of the indicator  at system level
Status:  
civilian/military
Degree of militarisation of 
a force Militarisation of the system
Score of a country based on all 
dimensions measuring militarisation
Nature:  
public/private
Degree of public control on 
a force
Share of public forces in the 
total number of agents
Ratio of public versus private agents 
in a country
Attachment point (hook)  
to political environment
General director, 
Commander with fixed-term 
mandate (or not)
Number of hooks, existence of 
notions of political neutrality, 
political independence
Proportion of hooks under civilian 
authority
Existence of control and 
command line
Hierarchy and inspection 
system are functional
Proportion of forces which 
have a functional hierarchy and 
inspection
The head of the force can appoint or 
revoke an agent (staffing of central 
inspection divided by total staff)
Size/ Fragmentation Number of agents and/or budget of force
Number of forces
Coordination mechanisms
Number of forces per 10 million 
population (see graph)
Centralisation
Degree to which a force 
reports to the central 
powers
Degree to which forces/agents 
are mainly affiliated to the 
central powers
Percentage of public agents that 
operate in forces mainly affiliated to 
the central powers
Powers 
(operational)
Degree to which a force 
possesses powers
Balance of powers between 
forces
% of agents without powers in force 
A compared to force B
Jurisdiction (geographical 
operational power)
Geographical and criminal 
based Gendarmeries’ 
natural habitat is 
countryside
Preeminence of a force, mutual 
geographic exclusion
Percentage of the population in 
jurisdiction of a force
Professionalisation
Proportion of agents with 
education and proper 
training
Share of agents that are 
specifically recruited and 
trained for policing duties
Literacy of agents, presence 
of conscripts, specific training 
curriculum
I have asserted that each trait is multidimensional. 
For the purpose of clarity, I will now take the example 
of militariness (the degree to which a police form 
is militarised). A first proxy of militariness is the use 
of a label, most often ‘gendarmerie’, a French word 
meaning armed men. However, such labels cannot 
be trusted at face value. In fact, some forces like the ‘ 
‘Gendarmerie Royale du Canada’ only include the word 
gendarmerie in French, and not in English (its name 
being the Royal Canadian Mounted Police). Which 
name should be used in that case for the purpose 
of classification of the form? More importantly, the 
gendarmeries of Switzerland, Turkey and the southern 
European countries (France, Italy, Spain) appear to have 
little in common when compared on a systematic 
basis. Firstly, the affiliation of the form has to be 
assessed, together with the status of the personnel 
and the legal procedures guiding the work of the 
agents as well as the legal liability of agents. Those 
variables can be represented in a two dimensional 
space (Graph 1): one refers the affiliation of the force, 
the other to the status of the agents. The two most 
opposed forces are Switzerland and Turkey (Jandarma). 
In Switzerland, the name gendarmerie is the only link 
to militariness. In fact, the form is affiliated to civilian 
non-army bureaucrats, answering to elected politicians 
and composed of civilian agents bound by civilian 
(non-military) procedures and codes. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the Turkish Jandarma is the fourth 
army of the country, it is affiliated to the general chief 
of staff who is acting as the head of a constitutional 
power and does not answer to the Minister of Defence. 
The gendarmerie protects borders, fights a domestic 
war against the terrorist organisation PKK, and does 
rural police work at the same time. It operates under 
military codes of procedures and the agents are 
liable to military courts. In the middle, the continental 
European forces are found: the personnel has retained 
a military status (for working hours, pensions) but is 
placed under civilian rules and procedures as well as 
administrative and political civilian authority which 
makes them ‘civilian police forces’. They are integrated 
in the Ministry of the Interior (to a varying degree 
though) rather than the Ministry of Defence.
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Analysts such as Llorente (2006) have noticed the 
changing ministerial affiliations of the police — 
between defence and interior — in Latin America 
and suggested that such changes have an important 
impact on the degree of militarisation of the police. It 
is likely that the ministerial affiliation is important, but 
that the locus of control is equally so (what is a form 
hooked to). If the internal security sector for a large part 
is in the hands of soldiers instead of politicians, as it is 
the case for example in Turkey with the gendarmerie, 
the evolution of the police system and police doctrines 
will probably be much slower. Ministerial affiliation can 
be only formal, and not imply a real civilian locus of 
control.
Comparing police: relation to their 
environment
Each police form has features of its own and is 
developing in relation with other forms, larger of small, 
of various statuses. All these forms are themselves part 
of a larger ecosystem which structure is politically 
determined.
I propose to divide the relationships of police forms 
to their environment between the social environment 
and the political environment. Most often, the political 
environment defines the relationship of the police with 
its social environment through different principles, as 
stated in legal documents (constitution, police laws, 
police doctrines, police ethics guides). These principles 
embody national traditions that can be substantially 
distinct even among democracies. There is also a set of 
mechanisms that permit civil society to be heard: direct 
election of police chiefs, of authorities to which chiefs 
are accountable; consultative mechanism for example. 
However, the social environment can influence the 
political spheres, mostly via elections in fully-fledged 
democracies or even in delegative democracies 
(O’Donnel, 1994).
Polity, power relations and police
The authorities that institute police forms are doing so 
based on legal provisions in core legislations or based 
on power relations (de facto exercise of power). It should 
be noted that not only legal authorities establish police 
forms.
The police forms are instituted by and report to 
a higher authority that can be monopolistic. However, 
sometimes in a given territory various authorities 
compete with one another. This can be observed 
in countries were rivalry occurs between civilian 
authority and military ones, for example in Egypt or 
in Turkey. There can be competition between civilians 
groups in unstable environments but also in stable 
ones, like in Spain between the central and local levels. 
The case of the United States where police chiefs can 
challenge mayors and run for election there is another 
type of competition which has not been studied 
comparatively. In France, such a possibility is explicitly 
ruled out by law since a line is drawn between the 
work of administrations and forces and the political 
sphere: a former police officer cannot run for any 
elected mandate in a municipality over which he/she 
had jurisdiction during the previous years.
Since the police are established by superior authorities, 
the political framework of a country might be an 
important element in understanding the development 
of police forms. What defines the polity of a country? 
A polity is usually defined as a civil order, the form of 
government of a social organisation. It is generally 
accepted that there are three forms of government 
structure: unitary governments, confederations, 
federations (approximately 24/200 states). In unitary 
states and even more in strictly unitary ones all power 
resides in the central government. Conversely, in 
federations sovereignty is constitutionally divided 
between a central governing authority and constituent 
political units (often states or provinces).
How much determination of the nature of police forms 
and of police systems stems from the constitution that 
set up the polity? The constitution has two potential 
main effects on police since it decides:
1. the limits within which police forces will exercise 
their operational powers, and the limitations that 
shall be put on the police forces;
2. the allocation of competences to the different 
governmental levels (what level is in charge of what 
kind of police).
A constitution often starts with listing the fundamental 
rights, the freedom and liberties that no state 
organisation and in particular the police can jeopardise 
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through its actions and procedures. The importance 
given in constitutions to these rights and the inclusion 
(or not) of all human beings is critical since the highest 
courts will eventually refer to it. If not guaranteed at 
the constitutional level, the freedom and liberties 
might lack the necessary legal support for their 
full enforcement. Those rights will act as a guiding 
principle for all public services, including the police 
forces. And since police powers and police actions are 
by definition limitative of liberties, the impact of those 
guarantees is decisive for police forces.
With regard to the mission of the policing forces, the 
constitution of Spain, dating back to 1978, clearly 
assigns a duty of protecting the citizens and their 
rights to the national police and the Guardia Civil, the 
two national forces. In fact, security is defined as an 
‘exclusive competence’ of the central state by the core 
document. A strong emphasis is put on the rule of law 
and the disciplinary system for the national forces.
The United States’ constitution is also a short document. 
It does not mention the criminal justice system or the 
police. It only mentions that the judicial power rests in 
a Supreme Court that has the power of judicial review. 
Many important phrases and terms in the constitution 
that govern law and criminal justice are written in 
a general and often imprecise language that has no 
specific meaning until placed in a social context. The 
central principle is that the government, despite all its 
powers, cannot enter people’s private spheres without 
a compelling and verifiable justification.
However, those guarantees do not constitute 
a distinctive feature of federal states when compared 
against unitary ones. A unitary state like France 
has a declaration of human rights in addition to its 
constitution so that the document has the highest 
value in the legal system. Moreover, the protection of 
basic rights doesn’t correspond to a shape in police 
organisations. Are there specifications about police 
forms in constitutions?
It is possible, but rarely observed, that the constitution 
also assigns duties and responsibilities to the public 
policing forces. In Spain, the recent constitution (1978) 
requires such provisions to be elaborated in detail in 
an organic law. The organic law (a law ranked between 
the constitution and regular acts of Parliament) 
organises in detail the duties and responsibilities of the 
national forces, their ministerial affiliation, the rights 
of the agents working in the force. All forces, whether 
they have a civilian (national police) or military status 
(Guardia Civil), are housed by, and accountable to, the 
Ministry of the Interior. As a consequence, neither the 
Ministry of Defence nor the army can have a role in 
internal security.
What the constitution systematically does is the 
‘distribution of competences’ or ‘distribution of police 
powers’. It means that the legislation declares what 
authority is legally entrusted with the competence of 
establishing police forces, developing police forms. 
The multi-level organisation of police competence 
and powers is specific to federal systems when unitary 
states recognise only one owner of such power.
In all our case studies, the distribution of police powers 
is established by the constitution. Distribution is often 
but not always presented in lists of competences. Let’s 
take a number of examples. In the case of India, there are 
three lists. The first specifies the power (competence) 
of the union, the second of the states and the last 
one — the shared power. Such a list exists also for 
the United States. The ‘delegated powers’ are those 
delegated specifically to the national government.
The Indian constitution lists the powers (competence) 
and functions of the central government and state 
governments. Three lists are distinguished: the Central 
List, the State List and the Concurrent List. According to 
Article 246 of the constitution, parliament has exclusive 
power to make laws regarding matters enumerated 
in list one. State legislatures have exclusive power to 
make laws for the state regarding any of the matters 
in list two. Both parliament and state legislature can 
make laws on subjects specified in list three. However, 
primacy is given to Central Government (Union) 
laws over state laws. This clearly indicates that the 
Union Government has supremacy over the state 
governments in matters related to legislation. Experts 
note that this supremacy exists not only in legislative 
powers but in administrative and financial matters 
also (Ramakantan, 2008: 2). The predominance of 
national laws (whenever national and state legislation 
overlap) or national bodies (whenever federal and state 
supreme courts disagree) is not specific to India and 
applies to Switzerland for example. However, more 
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counterweights are found in Switzerland, the cantons 
being protected against an ‘over-legislation’ by the 
confederation.
Switzerland vests the administration of justice in the 
member units (cantons) but the legal penal framework 
(penal code, penal procedure) in the federation. The 
cantons can establish their own police forces as they 
wish as long as they comply with federal regulations, 
including the penal code. The country has no formal 
list of police competences and regulates the division of 
competences between the federal and the local level 
using the so-called ‘principle of subsidiarity’ (Articles 
3 and 5 of the Federal Constitution). According to 
this principle, all powers not explicitly assigned to the 
federal level belong automatically to the local level. 
This translates into the existence of a single list defining 
crimes dealt with by the federal police. These crimes in 
Switzerland are defined by law, not the constitution. All 
other crimes are assigned to the cantonal police.
There is no list of competences in the Spanish 
constitution. Instead, there is a list of police powers 
to be distributed between the two national forces. 
Distribution of competences is based on agreements 
between the central government and the member 
units on an ad hoc basis. The reason explaining this 
situation stems from the fact that the constitution 
establishes a balance of police competence that is 
clearly favourable to the central level since policing is 
defined as ‘an exclusive duty’ of the central government. 
However, it does not clearly discard an involvement of 
other public forces in internal security. Based on this 
possibility, some member units (called ‘autonomies’) 
have set up their own forces (see the section below).
An opposite situation is found in the United States 
where the balance of competence is clearly favourable 
to the local level. There are federal duties related to 
policing, but those are far more limited than state 
and local ones. The maintenance of peace, conduct of 
orderly elections and prosecution of unlawful actions 
are all state responsibilities, pursuant to the states’ 
primary job of exercising police power and maintaining 
law and order.
In Switzerland, the balance of policing competencies 
clearly favours the local level as well. Federal 
responsibilities are mostly limited to terrorism and 
organised crime. There is no uniformed police at the 
federal level, thus public order and investigation of 
crimes is entirely distributed to cantons. Cantons 
can themselves further devolve policing powers 
to municipalities, which is the case in a majority of 
cantons.
In summary, the constitutions seem to offer only 
a few criteria, not for deciding police forms but for 
distributing police powers. It seems that constitutions 
do not shape in all respects the police forms and police 
system of a country. And, a closer look into police forms 
within different countries displays how little influence 
a constitution has on police forms.
Polity and police forms
In section two we introduced a number of traits 
for characterising a police form, and also a police 
ecosystem. We can now empirically investigate the 
relationship between polities (federal versus unitary) 
and police systems in order to better understand if the 
former determines the latter. There are various reasons 
to be dubious of any determinations. Firstly, virtually 
no precise rule concerning the establishment of the 
police system can be found in constitutions since 
neither federal nor unitary systems were invented for 
the purpose of providing ‘good policing’. Secondly, 
local conditions affect the development of police 
systems after police powers are distributed.
After competences are vested in a level of government, 
organisation of police forms lies within the concerned 
authority. Very often, four levels are observed: the 
federal, the member unit (state, canton, autonomia) and 
the municipal one for cities and a territorial unit for the 
countryside (sheriff in the United States, gendarmerie 
in Spain). In each nation, those levels of government 
have their own specific domestic dynamics, which can 
be influenced by elements as distinct as a democratic 
revolution, external violent threats, or aspiration 
of a people towards more sovereignty as in social 
movement for autonomy of regions of a state.
We noticed that the organisation of public police forces 
cannot be deducted from the overall polity. I will only 
provide examples of diversity that are found, while 
accepting the fact that further research is needed 
based on a larger sample.
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For example, there are two central forces with shared 
ministerial affiliation in Spain. Both the National Police 
and the Guardia Civil (a policing force with a military 
nature) are under the authority of the central Ministry 
of the Interior. Those forces operate throughout the 
country at all administrative levels and constitute the 
main forces on the ground despite the fact that the 
constituent units of Spain have their own government. 
This kind of distribution of police powers is usually 
found in unitary states, as in France or Italy. In fact, in 
federations like Germany no such locally operating 
national forces exist. And they cannot be found in 
India, Switzerland or the United States.
Some countries have an extremely fragmented police 
system, while others tend to have only two main forces 
or even sometimes one. Usually, unitary states have 
less policing forces. However, Nigeria, a federal state, 
has one single national police operating throughout 
the country (4). Among democratic states, almost none 
have only one force that operates throughout the 
country for all purposes.
Even within federal states, a lot of variation can be 
found. India represents a mixed example: police force 
there is a national, but policing is also divided into 
as many forces as there are states and directed by 
the Ministry of the Interior of the member units (not 
the central government). The Union Government 
establishes its own distinct forces in line with the 
powers bestowed by the constitution.
In other words, it is not possible to determine how 
a police system is organized simply by taking into 
account the federal or unitary nature of the polity. 
Over time, the police forms develop while the levels 
of governments also evolve in their mutual relations. 
What do we find if we try to depict the panorama at 
a given time? At one end of the spectrum, one can find 
countries like the United States and Switzerland. Their 
political system and their police system are extremely 
fragmented. At the other end of the spectrum, one can 
find a quasi federal state like Spain and a unitary one 
as France with two forces accounting for more than 
90 % of all police personnel operating in the country. 
Of course, when comparing countries the size of the 
forces is negatively correlated with their number.
(4) See: www.cleen.org/policing. %20driver %20of %20change.pdf.
Even within a federal polity, the police system can 
be more or less decentralised. Decentralisation is the 
process of dispersing decision-making governance 
closer to the people and citizen (Dubois, Fattore, 2009). 
Political decentralisation aims to give citizens or their 
elected representatives more power in public decision-
making. Is it found that both unitary and federal polities 
can be more or less decentralised. A more centralised 
system is meant to be more homogeneous and a more 
decentralised system is geared towards heterogeneity. 
Again, decentralisation is a multidimensional notion.
When it comes to decentralisation of police forms, 
a number of indicators should be taken into 
consideration:
 § are the recruitment and appointment of local police 
chiefs decided nationaly or locally?
 § are police staff dependent on federal, constituent 
units (state, canton etc.), or municipal levels of 
government?
 § is police training standardised over the national 
territory?
 § are the various laws and regulations related to 
police (penal code, standards for ethics, discipline as 
previously listed, Roché, 2011: 43; box 5) unified at 
central level?
A national force is a force which responds to the 
central authorities with jurisdiction over the entire 
country concerning the majority of crimes that can be 
committed. Most countries do not have such a force. 
However, nations can take steps towards a more 
homogeneous police service by establishing a police 
corps (recruited and managed, even if not operating 
under the authority of a central government) or police 
standards for selection and training.
No such national force is found in the United States. 
There is not even a definition of a federal police peace 
officer. Similarly, in Switzerland, there is no national 
force of this kind. Since 2003 the police profession 
has been recognised on a federal level with the 
introduction of a federal certification and unified basic 
training. Municipal police generally receive a shorter 
non-federally sanctioned training (3 months) which is 
provided in various local police schools. Four training 
centres are to replace the old cantonal police schools 
and training will be standardised. However, the 
current system remains largely fragmented. There is 
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no higher- level police academy in Switzerland which 
could be compared to the Police Leadership Academy 
of Münster in Germany for instance. All recruitment/
training is done locally by cantonal police forces 
or municipal forces. On the contrary, there are two 
national forces in Spain (nationally recruited, trained, 
appointed and managed, for all ranks of the force).
In India, an intermediate situation is found: the ‘All 
India Service’, i.e. the Indian Police Service is recruited, 
trained and managed by the central government and 
provides senior officers to the State Police Forces. It is 
not a national force in the Spanish sense (a national 
service operating at all ranks locally and under the 
direction of the central government). However, there 
is a national body of police chiefs and middle-rank 
managers.
We have elaborated the following chart by comparing 
a quantitative indicator, the ‘percentage of police agents 
that belong to the central level’. Not all are federal 
police, since in India such a notion is not in use. In Spain, 
the police and Guardia Civil also are central forms, but 
not federal with the attached division of powers.
Simply put, we find that the proportion of central or 
federal forces can vary vastly from 10 % in the United 
States to 100 % in Nigeria. Federalism can shelter police 
forms that are very local or very central. In addition, 
we found very large or small forces, the smallest being 
usually local forms and the largest, national ones (rather 
than federal ones).
Figure 1. Polity and percentage 
of forces operating under 
central government
Additionally, a large variety of forms in terms of their 
nature were observed: some countries have forces 
with a military status (gendarmerie in Spain), or 
without a military status (gendarmerie in Switzerland); 
others have armed forces (Central Police Organisations 
in India) whose status is opposed to civilian state 
police; finally only non-military forces are found in the 
United States.
We have not reviewed all the main traits of police 
forms. However, based on our overview, be it of local 
or central nature, of size, or of nature we find to say the 
least vast variations in police forms. Given these facts, it 
would be difficult to contend that police organisation 
stems from polity.
Polity and police systems
After observing variations at the forms level, we will 
now briefly do so at police-system level. We propose 
here to dividing the police systems into three types: 
centralised, decentralised and distributive. These are 
ideal types.
The below table indicates, for a selection of states, the 
main levels of government that have police powers 
(measured by the number of agents in the forces). It 
displays the level of government that recruits local 
police chiefs: in the United States or Switzerland they 
are recruited locally, in other states centrally or in 
a mixed way (Spain). The jurisdiction of police chiefs 
is presented on the last line, being one of the most 
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important of police operational powers. Two patterns 
are visible: the nations for which municipal-level 
chiefs have municipal jurisdiction and those for which 
local chiefs have a larger jurisdiction. This is because 
the form was established at a higher level than the 
municipality (the central government of a constituent 
unit of the federal government).
Table 3 
Appointment and jurisdiction of police chiefs operating locally in selected states
USA India Spain France Switzerland
Main level Municipal State National/Autonomias Central Canton
Chief recruited Municipal Federal National/Autonomias Central Canton
Chief jurisdiction Municipal State Autonomias Province Canton
We use a chart to represent three ideal types. The 
centralised type is the most obvious. In the centralised 
system, the central forces are the most prominent 
forms (bigger in size, with the largest power for 
investigating). The appointment of police chiefs is 
done at the central level. The ‘hook’ of each force is 
unique, and the force meant to be administered from 
the center. The French police system falls into the first 
category, as does the Nigerian police system. In France, 
the local chief answers to the central director and is 
locally in a position to instruct any municipal force: 
there is an imbalance of power to the benefit of the 
locally appointed national chief of police.
Challenge	of	descrip1on	of	networks	&	
systems	
Na#onal	
appointment	
at	local	level	
Local	
appointment	
at	local	level	
Figure 2. Ideal types  
of networks representing 
police ecosystems: centralized, 
decentralized, and distributive.
The decentralised model is an intermediate situation. 
Local chiefs of forces are appointed by national 
authorities, as is the case in India. Alternatively, local 
chiefs can be appointed locally. Or, such a system can 
be a mix of the two solutions, as observed in Spain: 
there are national police chiefs operating locally 
(the local heads of police and Guardia Civil that have 
national jurisdiction) coexisting with local police 
chiefs operating locally (the local heads of the police 
forces of autonomias and municipalities). In the mixed 
decentralised model, there is no hierarchical link 
between the national chief operating locally and local 
chief operating locally.
Finally, the last model is the distributive one, which 
as an ideal type has no centre. All local chiefs are 
appointed locally. The United States and Swiss case 
studies are probably the closest to the ideal type. 
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A proliferation of agencies can be found, and the 
various forms are independent from one another (in 
terms of status, training, communication system and 
hierarchy). However, they are free to cooperate or 
compete for innovation for example.
Conceptual conclusions about the polity and the 
police
This basic attempt of a comparative approach leads 
me to propose a number of conceptual operations.
Firstly, ‘police powers’ is a polysomic notion. The 
terminology should draw a line between the notion of 
power to establish a police form and the operational 
powers of a police form. We will use ‘police powers’ 
for the power to set up a form of a higher authority 
and ‘operation police powers’ in reference to the 
powers that a given form can use when carrying out 
operations. For example, a government can establish 
various police forms with distinct police operational 
powers for each.
Secondly, another distinction based on the above needs 
to be introduced. It relates to the polity and police forms:
 § distribution of powers entails more or less 
competence for levels of governments, and is distinct 
from decentralisation of police forms as organisations;
 § the form and degree of decentralisation of a police 
system does not automatically stem from a federal 
versus unitary arrangement.
Although not systematically studied, I think that this 
distinction was well perceived by Bayley when he 
wrote ‘British liberty does not depend, and never 
has depended, upon any particular form of police 
organisation’ or ‘We do not accept that the criterion 
of a police state is whether a country’s police force 
is national rather than local — if that were the test, 
Belgium, Denmark and Sweden should be described 
as police states’ (1985: 212).
In countries where the state is a national entity (unitary 
states) and the police an arm of the central state, it is 
often believed that the nature of the police is to be 
confounded with the nature of the state. Comparing 
countries obviously unveils the fact that the ‘nature 
of the state’ or polity does not allow prediction of 
the specification of police forms and the organisation 
of the police forces, the police system. The notion of 
distribution of powers relates to the role of various 
levels of government as defined by law. The description 
of police forms belongs to the sociology of police that 
clearly indicates how the form can develop in multiple 
different ways.
It seems to me that each country is a syncretism 
that combines three elements into a unique police 
construction:
 § distribution of police competences to the different 
levels of governments;
 § policing operational powers given to each force or 
service;
 § the hook: codifications of police — government 
relations for operations (neutrality, independence);
 § a more or less centralised organisation of policing 
forces, with a possible territorial division of powers 
among forces (a central force working at the local 
level or a central force working at the central level 
for example).
Figure 3. A police system in a country  
is based on four core elements
Finally, we suggest that the architecture of a police 
system derives from a combination of these two 
basic elements: elements ‘external’ to the police form 
(for example, the vision of ‘big government’ as good 
or bad, or a competition between different levels of 
government), and internal elements to the police 
form (for example, the defence of the interest of the 
agents of which the force is made by professional 
organisation).
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In Section 6, we did not include any reference to 
the power relations between the police form and 
its environment. It seems that further research is 
needed on that important aspect. Contrary to the 
‘principal agent theory’ which takes a normative 
stance, empirical evidence suggests that police forms 
influence governments in many ways. Two major 
avenues for research could be:
1. the study of police forms as issues at stake for 
superior authorities (for example do civilian 
authorities and military authorities compete for the 
provision of policing?);
2. police dependence vis-à-vis superior authorities.
The dependence (understood as a mutual relationship) 
between the government and the police seems of 
particular importance. A number of practices tend to 
insulate the police from politicians (for example the 
notion of ‘operational autonomy’, which does not 
exist in France or Turkey), but also the characteristics 
of the office of ‘chief of police’ (which can be held by 
professionals for a fixed term mandate as in the example 
of Chile after being appointed by civilian authorities, 
see Frey, 2013). The right to unionise probably strongly 
impacts the dependence (although members of police 
also find indirect ways of influencing governments, 
through associations of retired personal for example). 
Finally, countries where a neo-corporatist model 
prevails at local or central level could well shape the 
dependence specifically in the sense of the exclusion 
of the clients or users of police from the definition of 
police resources or police priorities. In such countries, 
the police are institutionally given a stronger voice than 
the public, as exemplified by the French case study.
Accountability and doctrines
Our initial intuition is that a police form development is 
dependent on relations with its environment. The major 
elements that we identify are the polity and possibly 
the structural arrangement that define government — 
police relations (dependence, neo-corporatism), but 
also the police doctrines that tend to gear police 
chiefs towards the needs of local communities and the 
accountability procedures and mechanisms.
Again, we state that such notions are independent 
basic bricks defining what police actually are and 
deliver: doctrines are meant to guide the day-to-day 
work, be a continuation of legal orientations turned 
into strategic choices (not to be confused with daily 
rules and procedures), and accountability procedures 
and mechanisms are the formal links that police forms 
have with the diversity of oversight bodies, be they 
executive branches of government, legislature, the 
magistracy, non-majoritarian institutions and other 
administrative bodies.
In this chapter I will only briefly deal with these two 
important issues, which are subjects of their own and 
have attracted a lot of interest from academics. I will 
try to indicate ideal types and examples more than 
provide a comprehensive view of such complex issues.
Police doctrines
Police doctrines as such are neither determined by 
the type of polity, nor by the type of police system. 
However, doctrines and implementations can also 
shape the relationship with the environment. And they 
can explain some traits of police forms since the police 
have to adapt in order to undertake to new functions 
(for example by establishing new organs, new 
departments, new communication lines) or expand 
existing ones. They can even modify how their natural 
habitat (for example when using small neighbourhood 
police stations).
In contemporary police reforms, the principal 
innovation often resides in the introduction of 
a concept of public security, a paradigm that goes 
beyond the traditional view centred on police 
efficiency as measured by clear-up rates or arrest rates. 
New police doctrines have been produced in order to 
meet this challenge.
Police doctrines are meant to contribute to democratic 
policing or the good governance of the police system. 
However, a police doctrine is a dimension of study that 
should not be considered independently of the type of 
police system and the type of polity.
The police system is made up of the forces operating 
in a given country. Not all its constituent forces 
necessarily have the same doctrine. For example, the 
Chicago police department and the Los Angeles police 
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department have different policing policy orientations 
and doctrines.
Across different countries with different polities and 
different police systems, similar police doctrines can 
be found. For example, many governments (central 
or local) have decided to implement community-
orientated policing doctrines (CoP) or proximity 
policing (PP), the former is mostly found in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, but also in Latin 
America countries, the latter in continental Europe.
Police doctrines are rarely studied in a comparative 
way. There are some attempts to compare them across 
American cities (Skogan, 2006), but not systematically 
across nations. The best example is the most world 
famous doctrine is ‘community policing’ or ‘community 
orientated policing’. When comparing countries the 
differences in meaning and practical implementation 
of a doctrine are striking. In addition, the names used 
are not identical: some refer to ‘community’ (the United 
States) and some to neighbourhood (the UK in the last 
decade), some to proximity (France, Spain Switzerland, 
for the French case study see Roché, 2005).
Operational elements in community policing have 
been compared by some scholars (see Sherman 
and Milton 1973, Tuffin et al. 2006 for examples and 
a review as well as useful summary tables provided 
by Mackenzie, Henry, 2009). However, we are more 
interested in the links to their environment. Two core 
elements in community policing are the consultation 
of civil society and the setting up of partnership of 
police forms with various institutions (depending 
on the mayors’ office, schools, NGOs and municipal 
police — in countries where the police is centralised — 
or others).
The extent to which doctrines will affect the police 
forms can sometimes be inferred from their very 
name. In Turkey, the law establishing it in 2009 was 
labelled ‘police supported by the community’ and not 
‘community-orientated policing’, which means that 
the objective of the law is to strengthen the police, not 
the opposite. Continental European forces do not refer 
to communities but to proximity, as the communities 
do not have legal existence and are perceived as 
a challenge to the central state, which is in that case 
the entity that establishes the police and implements 
the new doctrine.
The dimensions of community policing should be 
identified and compared systematically. We identify 
a series of them: new positions are created, new organs 
(high-visibility patrols for example), or the police 
organs are reengineered (as in France in 1997, all police 
departments were modified at the local level), police 
habitat is changed (with new small and more accessible 
stations). Some of these organs are mixed in nature 
(half police, half something else) and their meaning 
depends on the partnership coordination mechanism. 
In fact, since the police are mainly municipal in the 
United States, coordination implicitly means a job to 
be done by the mayor. Not so in continental Europe 
where the traits of police forms are different: they 
are big forms, most often centralised. Coordination 
doesn’t mean that the police service will operationally 
coordinate with another service, but that the entities 
establishing the forces will have to cooperate (the 
mayor as a police authority, the head of an Autonomia 
(region) in Spain, the governor that represents the state 
locally and others).
The size of the organs for police accountability to local 
civil society would be very interesting to compare. For 
some forms, the organs can be limited because the 
main police form operating locally belongs to the local 
superior authority, as in the United States or, on the 
contrary, because they are reluctant to report to those 
authorities, as in France (non-municipal police are 
reluctant to report to mayors even if proximity policing 
requires them to do so).
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Table 4 
Relations with environment of police forms entailed by community policing
Origin Existence / Importance  of the doctrine
New police traits  
(functions, habitat)
Partnership coordination 
mechanism
Accountability of police 
to civil society/locally 
elected leaders
USA Local Yes/Locally defined PR officerLocal police stations Mayor’s office To the mayor
UK MIxed Yes/Strong (official national doctrine)
High-visibility patrols
Local police stations Police Commissioner
To police authority (now 
PCC)
France Central No/Weak Local police stations Mayor with Governor (préfet)
Weak (information from 
the mayor)
Turkey Central No/Weak PR officer Police chief of province None
Spain Central Yes/Strong (official national doctrine) Local police stations Mayor with Governor Locally elected leaders
Accountability
Accountability is an additional very complex, debated, 
not agreed upon notion (Mulgan 2011). It has gained 
substantial grounds in the last decade and has pervaded 
police research as well, very often on a normative basis. 
Proper accountability is understood in development 
agencies as a proxy for ‘good governance’.
Accountability of police usually means very different 
things. It can be about the liability of agents; the fact 
that any police personal whatever his/her status can 
be brought before a penal court. The management 
of complaints can be very important in that respect 
and some studies have set criteria for assessing its 
performance (Stenning, 2000).
Accountability of police also means that the 
government-elected or appointed office in charge 
of the police (be it the mayor of the Minister of the 
Interior, or any other) can be asked to explain himself/
herself before parliament. This notion of accountability 
in fact refers to accountability not so much of the 
police but of the political office instructing the police: 
the holder of police power as defined by law. There has 
been some comparative assessment of parliamentary 
oversight, but not specific to oversight of the internal 
forces. Criteria have been defined and qualitatively 
assessed in order to rate the quality of parliament 
control (Bertelsmann Stiftung (5)).
Accountability is used in relation to the authorities that 
verify that the tools and mechanisms used by police 
(5) See http://www.sgi-network.org/index.php?page=indicator_
quali&indicator=M11_3.
are legal: the police are accountable for what they 
do as a department, as a form as a whole. Here what 
is overseen is in fact the usage of ‘operational police 
powers’ to use the terms that we have proposed. Very 
often, continental European countries have vested 
such power of holding police accountable to non-
majoritarian institutions, to ombudsmen or defenders 
of rights. These guarantee that the rights of citizens are 
preserved when in contact with an administration. It 
is administrative external and independent oversight.
Accountability is also a term that can integrate the 
command and control line, the means available to 
the chief of police for ensuring that his/her policy 
is properly implemented. Here accountability is an 
internal procedure carried out by audit or inspection 
departments. It pertains to administrative and internal 
oversight.
Finally, accountability also means value for money and 
efficiency of every agent and of a force as a whole. Courts 
of accounts or managerial units carry out such duties.
Accountability rules can have a major impact on 
police forms since they decide which resources are 
available to police (conditionality resources), and they 
impose new processes and new bureaus within police 
forms. I am limiting myself to two objectives in this 
chapter: presenting a comparative classification of 
administrative oversight mechanisms and presenting 
two opposite ideal types for political accountability of 
police forms (France and the UK).
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Administrative oversight can be of an internal or external 
nature, the appointment procedures can open doors 
to non-police members or not, and might be more or 
less authoritative, i.e. be constitutionalised or not, with 
parliamental consultation for the appointment of a head, 
reporting to parliament rather than only to a higher level 
of a police form, have more or less powers (for example to 
obtain documents, to recommend changes), and finally 
might be more or less independent from the police (it 
may have to ask specialised police services to investigate 
certain matters or even have its own investigation teams, 
therefore increasing independence from police personal 
and services).
I propose to place the oversight bodies in a two 
dimensional space, one being the opposition between 
pure police and pure civil society oversight, and the other 
the opposition between strong and weak authoritative 
bodies. The UK emerges among four countries as the 
one case study with the stronger investigative body, 
which might be surprising given the criticism addressed 
domestically to the IPCC. The IPCC combines the 
authority to investigate cases of police misconduct by 
its own team and is not only composed of police staff. 
Noteworthy, in the inspectorate of police forces since 
October 1993, following the Citizen’s Charter principle 
that Inspectorates should include a ‘lay element’, 
two HM Inspectors were appointed from non-police 
backgrounds. And it has a ‘parliamentary dimension’ 
with the approval of the head of the inspectorate.
At the other end of the spectrum we find the case of 
Turkey. ‘Human rights boards’ accept complaints about 
violations of all types of human rights in all sectors 
(health, education, police for example). Their members 
can be laymen (non police) but those local boards 
are internal to the Ministry of the Interior and chaired 
by governors. In addition they have very limited 
capacity. Being local boards in a centralised system 
makes them weak entities. In 2013, a ‘defender of 
rights was established’ but is not routinely functional 
at the moment. Internal investigations are carried out 
by a police board. Parliament is not consulted for the 
appointment of its head and it only comprises police 
or Ministry of Interior personnel.
France and Spain are intermediate cases in which 
defenders of civil rights are constitutional bodies 
(in France only since 2012), but without authority to 
investigate cases by themselves. The inspectorate 
system of police is not open to non-police members. 
Only the inspectorate of administration (IGA) includes 
some high-level civil servants who are not police but 
still appointed government officials who depend on 
politicians for their career. Parliament appoints the head 
of the defenders of the people in Spain which provides 
him/her additional independence from the executive 
branch, but not in France where the President of the 
Republic appoints him/her.
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Figure 4. Two dimensions of 
oversight in selected states
69
Police science: science of the police or science for the police?
Let’s now briefly consider political accountability. 
Europe, France and the UK have the most opposed 
police systems. When looking at the traits of forces 
we find numerous small ones in the UK, and few large 
ones in France, the political hook (or attachment point) 
is local in one country, national in the other, the nature 
of forces are 100 % civilian police across the channel 
and 50 % military according to the status of personnel 
in the continental case study, while the notion of 
operational independence does not exist in France 
where police work is very politicised along national 
political lines.
The following figure simplifies the French political 
accountability system. It is a centralised system that is 
naturally steered from the centre in order to report to 
the Minister of the Interior.
A classic military, top-down type of command and 
control line is found. Priorities are set in Paris for the 
entire country and transmitted locally in provinces by 
the governor or Préfet who represent the executive 
branch of the government and therefore the police 
and gendarmerie. The managerial system (targets, 
indicators and bonus for agents of units) is decided 
and run from Paris in the ‘General directorates’ of Police 
and Gendarmerie. There is limited external evaluation 
of performance by the court of account (value for 
money). Local needs are not systematically assessed 
and collecting them is not a legal requirement for police 
forces at the local level. In summary, the police forms 
are large national entities reporting to an appointed 
minister, often not a Member of Parliament before 
he/she is appointed by the President of the Republic. 
Citizens are unable to exercise control locally on police 
outputs since the appointed provincial chief of police 
reports to the appointed Préfet, who reports to the 
appointed general director, who himself reports to the 
Minister of the Interior, an appointed official. Election 
is only used for the designation of the President of 
the Republic, where police issues are presented in 
a ‘package’ during electoral campaigns and discussed 
along political lines and not so much in terms of locally 
serving the citizens.0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In the UK, the system of political accountability to 
citizens has an opposite structure as summarised 
in the next figure. The forces are subject to the 
oversight of the central government mainly through 
financial and managerial mechanisms (as opposed to 
hierarchical control and command lines, as found in 
France). Although a vivid debate exists in the UK about 
centralisation as a trend, comparatively speaking the 
UK system is by far less centralised and has renewed 
the local accountability mechanisms on the one hand 
(via the election of Police and Crime Commissioners) 
as well as client orientation of the forces by using 
a managerial model on the other hand.
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What characterises the UK model when compared to 
the French one is first of all the existence of dozens 
of regional medium size which makes them by 
definition local forces, and second the existence of 
a series of mechanisms for local accountability: each 
of the forms having to report to the elected Police 
and Crime Commissioners, who are bound by law to 
record people’s priorities. They are assessed about 
their performance in servicing citizens by independent 
organisations (for example surveying victims 
after a visit to the police station), and by instilling 
competition and interforce ratings. Another specificity 
introduced recently is the ‘competition for the market’. 
Competition for a market refers to the struggle of the 
central government to create a new market. Private 
firms can compete in that market in order to increase 
accountability to the citizens served as clients.
Basically, the UK model of accountability is based on 
local election and local competition to satisfy the 
customer (across forces and for running forces). The 
French model is structured around the accountability 
of the President of the Republic during national 
election times.
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Figure 6. An example of 
client-orientated and locally 
accountable forces: the case of 
the UK
Summary of the conceptual tools 
introduced for a science of the police
The development of a science of police forces requires, 
in my view, studying police forms as ‘organised 
life forms’ in their environment. It is a science of the 
development of the forms as part of a larger police 
system and political system. It is important to look for 
the determinants of the evolution of forces through 
observation of the modification of the morphology 
of the police forms. At present, there is no consensus 
about what are the police or even what is a police 
force. And no attempt has been made to establish 
the concepts for describing the police as a life form 
(its organs, its nervous system or information system 
and other traits) and to define how measurements of 
a form and its organs can be ensured (size, shape or 
other traits). An interesting attempt could be to build 
a taxonomy of police forms and additional taxonomies 
of some their organs (at police form level), but also of 
police systems (at society level).
Since public police forms need to breath and feed 
themselves, they have to rely on their institutional 
environment for providing such resources. I believe 
that these links to the institutional environments 
are of utmost importance, and in countries where 
the relationships with civil society have been 
institutionalised, the links to civil society also become 
critical for police forms.
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In fact, police forms cannot obtain such resources by 
themselves if they are not allowed to sell commodities 
on the market (which still is the case despite the 
introduction of neoliberalism recipes in policing and 
the fiscal restraint following the financial crisis of 2008). 
By definition public forms are established by superior 
authorities that have the responsibility to provide air 
and food to the forms and their constituent cells. Such 
superior authorities can of course alternatively decide 
an amputation of some organs or to downsize the 
overall police form when their resources are stretched.
Figure 7 summarises a number of conceptual 
distinctions that I have used. First of all, I propose to 
identify ‘police forms’ in various social settings. What 
is and is not a police form is subject to debates by 
academics or even governments and international 
organisations. The police forms must have various 
organs to be eligible to be reckoned as such: a head 
that reports to the superior authority that established 
them, a nervous system (even at embryonic stage) for 
ensuring transportation of information through the 
form as chain of command and an inspection system 
for example, a number of organs. Identified police 
forms should be clustered along their measurable 
traits: are they civilian, military, big, small and how is 
the hook to the political system designed?
The development of police forms could be explained 
by relationships to their environment. One of the 
difficulties is in drawing a line between the form and its 
environment. For example, where does the form end? 
Is the head of the force only a piece of the police form 
or also an element of the larger political authority?
Notwithstanding this difficulty, I propose to utilize 
concepts for pointing at four critical elements that 
could shape police forms: power relations, police 
system, police doctrine, police accountability. Each of 
them is independent of the three other ones. These 
basic bricks are combined in each nation to build 
police forces and to shape policing.
The first one is ‘polity and power relations’, referring to 
rules that are used for distributing ‘police powers’, the 
power to set up a force, in the sense of the legitimacy 
or ability to establish police forms. I have referred to 
them as ‘superior authorities’; the authorities that can 
establish a police form or the directorate or other office 
to which the authority to run a force was delegated. 
In democracies, the constitutions indicate such rules, 
but reality has to be observed by empirical research to 
understand whether such basic legal rules are actually 
at the core of the setting up of forces. I believe that 
the type of regime of relationship between police 
forms and superior authorities should be studied and 
integrated into the picture although I don’t offer any 
solution for doing so at this stage. I underlined the 
difference between distribution of powers and the 
organisation of police forms, for example regarding 
the degree of decentralisation of a force that can 
substantially vary within a given type of polity.
The second notion is police system. In a given country, 
many police forms can be found, each with their own 
specific traits. When observed at the national level, all 
these forms together and the relationships that unite 
them constitute the police system. Additional elements 
are needed for understanding the homogeneity of 
a police system, such as the existence of a recognised 
status for agents, national laws or communication 
system for example. Various ideal types of police system 
exist: the centralised one (sometimes unified and 
centralised, with one force only run from the centre), the 
mixed one and the distributive one, which is acentric 
and made of forms that do not have hierarchical 
relationship among them. France is very centralised, 
Switzerland closer to the distributive ideal type. I did 
not include any reference to the private enterprises 
selling their goods on the market, and this should 
clearly be done in future research since such agencies 
can be as large, or even larger, than public forms in the 
United States or in South Africa for example.
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Figure 7. Four concepts for comparing police forms across nations
Police Forms:  
Key traits
Police system:  
relations among forms,  
traits at national level
Police Doctrine
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Polity, power relations:  
distribution of  
police powers
I used the term of police doctrine as the third concept 
needed for comparing police forms. Various forms 
in different contexts are sometimes compelled 
to introduce apparently comparable doctrines or 
organisation rules in line with international principles. 
It has not been studied systematically what doctrines 
with similar names actually include and how they are 
implemented, even in homogeneous political areas 
such as the EU. However, in our view doctrines clearly 
depart from the institutional arrangements (polity), or 
structure of the national system (police system). They 
also contribute to shaping a police department.
Finally, accountability is one of the many ill-defined 
notions that I have used. And, as for most of them I am 
suggesting breaking it down into measurable dimensions. 
I paid specific attention to political accountability in the 
sense of accountability to citizens. As governments 
can introduce market-like mechanisms for enhancing 
accountability to citizen needs alongside electoral ones, 
the circumscription of political accountability itself is 
not easy to ensure. However, accountability seems to 
impact the development of police forms. Certainly 
that does not alter the number of public forms (as this 
is dependent on the distribution of police powers). 
However, accountability entails the development of 
new bureaus, procedures and circulation of information. 
And in some countries administrative accountability 
provokes the birth of hybrid forms, such as when two 
police forms have to share their inspectorate system 
or their back office resources. I suspect that the 
accountability rules encapsulate a number of elements 
that are critical for comparing police forms since they 
are dealing with police legitimacy before the public and 
the allocation of resources.
Police science needs to address the challenge of 
simultaneously comparing the four dimensions that 
shape police organisation and work. Focusing on one 
only, for example the doctrine of community policing, 
can be very misleading since the dynamics behind such 
an introduction and implementation will be driven by 
the structure of the police system and accountability 
of police forms.
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Comparative research in the field  
of policing: a few historical notes
The French blueprint for policing in Europe
Going back to the 18th century, it is quite amazing 
to see how the police force in Paris, and later on the 
police force in Vienna, were blueprints or models 
for policing big cities all over Europe. For example 
the French Gendarmerie — built up step by step in 
the 18th century and harmonised and pushed up to 
a national level during the French Revolution — it is 
important to know that in Napoleonic times this force 
was introduced all over Western and Central Europe 
(Fijnaut, 2002). That’s to say that quite harmonised 
policing systems came into existence all over Europe 
at that time. Many states had split up their police 
into, on the one hand, civilian city police forces under 
the chairmanship of a police commissioner and on 
the other hand more military police forces like the 
gendarmerie. This evolution was quite important in 
the framework of police cooperation (Emsley, 1999).
Those interested in the problem of banditry in 
Europe — the forerunner of organised crime at 
the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th 
century — know that exactly those police forces 
that were based on the gendarmerie concept could 
cooperate across borders quite smoothly, because 
they were all based on the same military concept, used 
the same organisational structures and functioned 
in similar ways operationally. This is why they could 
rather easily defeat the international, cross-border, 
professional criminal networks that operated in Europe 
as early as the 18th century. Exactly that harmonisation 
that took place in the field of policing as a result of 
the Napoleonic wars was in the end one of the most 
important developments to deal with cross-border 
crime in Europe (Egmond, 1986).
And if one looks at the history of policing in Europe in 
the 19th and 20th centuries — I wrote my Ph.D. thesis 
on the political history of policing in Europe, taking 
into account the developments in the UK, Germany, 
Austria, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, at Leuven 
University in Belgium — then it becomes clear that the 
national police systems interacted actively and to some 
extent borrowed from each other in order to improve 
their own structures and their own operations. I can 
give you a few examples to remind you of this quite 
interesting aspect of the history of policing in Europe.
One example relates to the French model that was 
disputed after the Napoleonic wars — it was seen 
as an oppressive, authoritarian form of policing. This 
is the reason why the new Metropolitan Police Force 
of London, established in 1829 and 1830, was seen as 
a very good alternative to the more autocratic, military, 
oppressive policing in France. After 1830 many police 
forces in big cities in Europe copied the London model. 
They did so in Amsterdam, in some German cities and 
later on even in Paris in some respect (Fijnaut, 1979).
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The role of Germany and Austria  
in European policing
And as far as the 20th century is concerned, everybody 
involved in police research, and particularly in 
comparative analysis, should know that the Weimar 
police had to deal with huge challenges, in several 
ways far greater and more complicated than the 
challenges we face today on a European level, and that 
this was the reason why this police force became such 
a modern, professional police force. Police officers from 
all over Europe came to Berlin to see how one should 
organise a qualified police force. The literature about 
the international police exhibitions of 1925 and 1926 
in Germany demonstrates how police in Europe came 
together to exchange ideas and practices and to learn 
about each other. The police of the Weimar Republic 
was seen as a model for policing in Europe (Liang, 1970; 
Bessel, 1991; Meershoek, 2007, 178-181).
But not only policing as such in countries like Germany, 
Austria or France had a major impact on cross-border 
policing in the European context. We should not forget 
that there were two other driving forces behind cross-
border comparison and implementation of new forms 
of policing.
The first one I would like to mention are important 
treaties. For example, the treaty on the containment of 
white slavery from the beginning of the 20th century 
stimulated the establishment of special units in police 
forces all over Europe, and to some extent all over the 
world, to deal with trafficking of women. All in all, such 
international treaties were an important influence 
(Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006).
Secondly, one should remember that the 
establishment of Interpol in 1923 at the initiative of 
Polizeipräsident Schober, chief constable of Vienna, 
has reinforced harmonisation in policing in Europe as 
well. Because if one wants to cooperate in a smooth 
and effective manner, this presupposes to some 
extent the harmonisation and standardisation of 
policing in Member States. When looking at the 
history of the national units that are currently linked 
to Europol for example, one would see that Interpol 
was not only the first institution that opened national 
offices in the Member States, but also the idea that 
you should harmonize the ways in which police 
systems are organised in order to further their mutual 
cooperation — at least in those areas that are very 
important for more and closer cross-border operations 
(Jager, 2006, 255-338; Deflem, 2002, 124-152; Marabuto, 
1935).
Take, for example, the issue of car theft, which was 
a problem of considerable proportions already in 
the 1920s. Interpol stipulated that all over Europe 
police forces should establish car theft units in order 
to be able to cooperate much easier, faster and more 
effectively across borders. In short: there was a lot 
more cross-border cooperation and harmonisation 
on an operational level happening before WWII than 
many people are aware of.
The important impact of the UK and 
 the United States
After WWII, policing in the UK became very influential, 
notably with regard to policing in continental Europe. 
When analysing the history of the Metropolitan Police 
of London and its impact in many fields of policing 
in continental Europe — e.g. women policing, traffic 
policing, community policing — one would easily 
come to the conclusion that this particular police force 
has greatly influenced policing in continental Europe in 
the second half of the 20th century.
And from the 1960s on we see a huge impact from the 
United States on policing in continental Europe. From 
the moment the federal government of the United 
States stated that policing should be an important part 
of American foreign policy — it actually developed 
a foreign police policy — police forces in Europe were 
influenced immediately by this decision. I will give two 
examples.
‘New’ undercover policing was developed in the United 
States in the 1950s and 1960s to deal with organised 
crime and organised drug trafficking in particular. The 
federal police services later on introduced undercover 
policing ‘American style’ all over Europe. They pushed 
authorities in many European states to adapt the 
powers and operational tactics of their police and 
judicial bodies to the forms of undercover policing 
developed in the United States (Nadelmann, 1993, 
189-250).
Another example is that of community policing, 
developed in the 1960s in the United States: how 
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to deal with neighbourhoods where sections of 
the population are in conflict with one another or 
oppose the government? How to deal with such 
neighbourhoods in terms of policing? In many 
European countries (e.g. the Scandinavian countries, 
the Netherlands and Belgium) the notions of 
community policing or neighbourhood policing were 
very influential (Fijnaut, 2007, 863-879).
The lack of historical knowledge  
in everyday policing
For the rest, it’s amazing that we don’t know much 
about all this. In a European context, policing has never 
just been a national issue, because it had always been 
influenced highly by developments in other states that 
belonged to what we nowadays call the Council of 
Europe or the EU. We did not write about it, however, 
and we did no research about it. I can give you just one 
example, a Dutch example.
In the Netherlands, three historians and I wrote a four-
volume book on the history of the Dutch police in the 
19th and 20th century a few years ago. Many leading 
police officers in the Netherlands have no idea about 
its history. They only know about policing from their 
own experiences. History is something that people 
are reminded of when police chiefs leave or new 
police headquarters are opened. But if one takes an 
in-depth look at the mechanisms and dynamics of 
policing in a long-term, historical perspective, one 
can easily see — in the Dutch case, for example — 
how influential ‘Europe’ has been on policing in the 
Netherlands (Fijnaut, 2008a).
The concrete example is the reorganisation of the 
Rotterdam police force that took place at the end of the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Rotterdam 
was a booming harbour city in those days, but still 
had an old-fashioned 18th-century police force. This 
force couldn’t deal with the challenges that this city 
presented to policing. The local authorities appointed 
a young mayor from a neighbouring municipality, 
H. Voormolen, 34-years old and a former member of 
the army in the Dutch Indies, as chief constable. They 
assigned him with the task of building a new police 
force in Rotterdam. To that end, they provided him with 
a budget to travel around in Europe in order to find out 
what was then the pinnacle of policing. He travelled 
to the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Austria and 
the Scandinavian countries, where he particularly paid 
attention to policing in harbour cities. Finally, he came 
up with a blueprint for the new Rotterdam police force 
he envisioned and got permission from the Rotterdam 
authorities to implement this European standardised 
blueprint for policing in Rotterdam. This, in my view, 
is a wonderful example of how European policing has 
been at times in the 19th and 20th centuries (Fijnaut, 
2007, 291-305).
Two remarkable American studies
An interesting point in this context is the literature 
on policing in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries; 
one can find a few exceptional pieces of comparative 
research on police forces and on the impact that 
international developments have had on policing 
practice in Europe. I refer to a wonderful book that 
perhaps only researchers know. Just before WW1, the 
New York police authorities came to the conclusion that 
they should modernise their police force completely. 
They couldn’t find any good examples on which to 
model their system in the United States so they sent 
Raymond B. Fosdick, the former Commissioner of 
Accounts for the city of New York, to Europe to look at 
how policing was organised in the UK and a number of 
continental states.
In 1916, Fosdick published a wonderful book, European 
Police Systems, one of the first good examples of 
comparative research on policing in Europe. In 
this book we see how the police was organised in 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and in 
the UK, and what similarities and differences existed 
between them, and what, according to Fosdick, would 
be the best way of organising the New York City Police 
Department (Fosdick 1916).
Those interested in what happened in the transatlantic 
interchange of views and practices in the field of 
undercover policing in the 1960s and 1970s, should 
read the wonderful book Cops Across Borders, written by 
E. Nadelmann (1993). He was one of the few researchers 
in the United States who could get access to members 
of the FBI and DEA. Nadelman demonstrates in terms 
of comparison how important and how influential 
the American foreign policing policy has been on a.o. 
undercover policing in Europe.
This brings me to my second point.
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Ongoing developments in cross-border 
police cooperation
A serious lack of in-depth comparative research
There is an enormous necessity for comparative police 
research in Europe looking at the development of 
cross-border police cooperation. If one compares the 
quantity of research vis-à-vis the developments in 
policing and particularly in police cooperation, there is 
a huge gap. Of course, there is research comparing the 
police of the Netherlands and Belgium for example, or 
the police of France and police in the UK (Fijnaut, 1992). 
And research has been done into specific aspects 
of policing, for example on how to contain football 
hooligans or how to deal with community policing, or 
traffic policing. But that’s just bits and pieces. There is 
no coherent, consistent, long-term building of a body 
of knowledge about what is going on in the field of 
policing in Europe and particularly related to cross-
border police cooperation.
The influential role of conventions
That is why I first of all would like to underline that if 
states want to further develop cross-border police 
cooperation in Europe, they should know each other 
much better than is the case these days. And why is it 
so important to develop comparative analysis? If one 
looks at this question from the perspective of cross-
border and international police cooperation then one 
sees that cooperation has increased enormously in 
the last 10 to 15 years. In the 1970s and 1980s police 
cooperation in Europe was quite limited; it was — 
generally speaking — more incidental. But these days 
it has become a component of mainstream policing in 
Europe.
Talking with police officers in the 1980s in the 
Netherlands and in Belgium as well as in Germany and 
France revealed that they did not like treaties. They 
were afraid that treaties would limit their discretionary 
power to deal with each other across borders. I always 
criticised this view, because this was an old-fashioned 
view, in my opinion. If you saw what was happening in 
the framework of the EU it was clear that one would 
need more or less formal agreements in order to further 
cross-border policing. And if you look at the related 
conventions at the EU level—I am referring to the 
Schengen Implementation Convention, the Europol 
Convention, the Mutual Assistance Convention and 
the Prüm Treaty — it is amazing that in 20 years time 
many possibilities to cooperate in a formal, legitimate 
manner have been realised, thanks to all these treaties 
(Berthelet, 2009; Möllers and Van Ooyen, 2009; Fijnaut, 
2010).
The necessity of using these possibilities is quite 
clear. Most organised crime in Europe relates to the 
delivery of goods and services on the black market — 
it may be trafficking in stolen art, trafficking of stolen 
cars, trafficking of women — it is all about moving 
people, services and goods across borders. That is the 
main problem of organised crime in the EU. It makes 
it quite understandable why criminal investigation 
has become more and more cross-border, because 
serious crime has gained a much more of international 
dimension than in the past (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2006).
It is not only organised crime; however, that is a driving 
force behind much more police cooperation. Also 
public order topics play a role here: football hooliganism 
in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France 
also gained an increasingly transnational dimension; 
Dutch police officers from time to time operate on 
Belgian, French or German territory and vice versa 
(Adang and Cuvelier, 2001; Della Porta, Peterson and 
Reiter, 2006; Adang and Brown, 2008; Tsoukala, 2009). 
And terrorism has equally furthered cross-border 
policing to some extent (Friedrichs, 2008).
The developments in the Euroregion Meuse-Rhine
However, one should not only look at what is going 
on at the EU level. When visiting border areas in 
Member States, one can see even more progressive 
and influential developments in this field. Over the past 
five years I have done a lot of research with colleagues 
from Tilburg University and Leuven University on police 
and judicial cooperation in the area of Maastricht (the 
Netherlands), Aachen (Germany) and Liège (Lüttich) 
(Belgium), the so-called Euroregion Meuse-Rhine — 
one of the most densely populated areas in the 
European Union (Fijnaut and Spapens, 2005). When 
looking at how not only police cooperation but also 
judicial cooperation has developed in that area, it is 
quite amazing to see how the authorities in this area 
try to deal with common problems by organising 
cooperation at a much higher level than would have 
been possible at an EU level (Fijnaut and Spapens, 2010).
79
Reinforcing the European dimension of comparative police research
Public prosecutors in this area, for example, have built 
a special bureau and cooperate closely when it comes 
to handling requests for mutual assistance or when 
it comes to priorities in criminal investigations and 
prosecution. The police authorities have established 
a police cooperation centre in Heerlen — like one set 
up before in Kehl (Germany) to facilitate cooperation 
between Germany and France—where Dutch, Belgian 
and German police officers work together in the 
same one room. These officers have access to police 
databases in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands 
at the same time and have an intranet at their disposal 
so that they can easily exchange relevant information 
from their national databases. And these days many 
operational police officers call ‘Heerlen’ to get the real-
time information they need to do their jobs on the 
streets of Maastricht, Aachen or Liège (Lüttich).
Therefore — in order to understand what’s going on 
in the field of police cooperation — it’s not enough to 
look at what’s going on at the EU level, but to look at 
developments in these border areas as well.
Important developments in specific areas  
of policing
I would also like to pay some attention to forms of 
specific police cooperation that have been established 
in the EU. Just look at the research literature. Most 
of it is spent on treaties and agreements on police 
cooperation in general. It disregards to a large extent 
police cooperation in border areas, and pays no 
attention at all to police cooperation in specific areas. 
I will give you two examples.
The core business of the EU is the free market — which 
means that we have abolished control at the internal 
borders to facilitate the free flow of capital, services, 
goods and people. That includes that important traffic 
corridors have come into existence. Who’s policing the 
European motorways, rivers and airways? However, 
they make up the infrastructure of the whole internal 
market. Therefore it is very important to know how 
policing on these corridors, and of course in the 
harbours and at the airports, is taking place.
Over the past few years, some police officers have 
established the European Traffic Police Network 
(TISPOL) in order to connect traffic police departments 
all over the EU to improve policing these corridors. This 
is a very important development, not only with regard 
to traffic safety in these corridors, but also in relation 
to e.g. trafficking women: they are also transported 
via these corridors. So, if one wants to deal with the 
trafficking of women one should, indeed, take into 
account the red light districts in Amsterdam, Brussels or 
Frankfurt, but also what’s going on in these European 
corridors (Hellemons, 2010).
Another example is the ATLAS initiative. The special 
police forces of the Member States cooperate under 
the umbrella of this acronym. However, it is infrequently 
referenced. I wrote a report for the Dutch government 
a few years ago about the restructuring of the special 
units in the Dutch police. To do this, I found that one 
should keep in mind that the Dutch units in some cases 
should be able to cooperate closely with their German, 
Belgian, French and British counterparts. I visited these 
countries to have a look at how their special forces 
are organised and under what conditions they could 
cooperate operationally. The ATLAS framework is very 
helpful in facilitating the exchange of information about 
equipment, strategy and tactics. It’s no surprise that 
the related forces have common exercises on Dutch 
territory, for example (Fijnaut, 2004; Council, 2008).
The possible impact of the Lisbon Treaty
If one takes these examples and looks at what is going 
on in the EU in general it is rather clear that I should 
also spend a few minutes on the Lisbon Treaty and on 
the reports of the Future Groups. Of course, we still 
have to wait a few months to see whether the Treaty 
will enter into force — it depends to a large extent on 
the Czech Republic, Germany and Ireland. But even if 
the Lisbon Treaty does not enter into force, there are 
provisions in this Treaty that will have an impact on the 
field of police cooperation.
This can be easily demonstrated by looking at the 
reports of the so-called high-level Future Groups on 
Home Affairs and Justice respectively. The German EU 
Presidency established these Future Groups to prepare 
the ground for a new programme in the Third Pillar, 
the area of freedom, security and justice. In June 2008, 
the Future Groups published their reports, marking the 
first stepping stones for the Stockholm Programme 
(2010-2014) that will substitute the Hague Programme 
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(2005-2009). The Lisbon Treaty and the reports of the 
Future Groups not only demonstrate how important 
police cooperation will become, but also what this 
presupposes in terms of comparison and comparative 
research (Fijnaut, 2009).
A Copernican Revolution in the European Union
In Dutch journals I wrote about the Lisbon Treaty saying 
that it is a Copernican revolution: a really radical change 
(Fijnaut, 2008b). One should indeed not underestimate 
the content and the impact of this treaty. Of course 
politicians like to give the feeling that it is just a minor 
adaptation of the existing treaties. But in my view, 
particularly in relation to the Third Pillar, it is a radical 
reform and will have a radical impact. The main reason 
for this is that the related policy area will no longer be 
an intergovernmental structure. In the Lisbon Treaty 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is a shared 
competence of the EU and the Member States. And 
in general it won’t be the rule of unanimity that will 
govern the decision-making process, but the rule of 
majority instead.
The Council will gain a much more influential role, 
developing strategic and operational guidelines in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, which means 
also in the field of cross-border police cooperation. 
A Permanent Committee for Internal Security will 
be built up to support the Council. The European 
Commission and Member States will develop an 
evaluation mechanism to see to which extent Member 
States realise the guidelines the Council will issue. In 
my view all this may have a major impact on policing. 
If one reads all the papers, the documents, the reports 
and statements published in the last 5 to 10 years 
by the European Parliament and by the European 
Commission, they all complain about the fact that 
the Member States do not really implement what 
they have promised in Brussels. ‘Brussels’ developed 
programmes in the field of terrorism, in relation to 
the trafficking of women and with regard to the 
containment of illegal trade in small arms and light 
weapons, but these important priorities in the EU 
don’t always get the resources they deserve in every 
region, every time.
How could they contain the trafficking of women 
when Member States are not closely cooperating? 
In 1993, I conducted some research for the Belgian 
parliament on the trafficking of women (Fijnaut, 
1993). At that time I could already see how trafficking 
of women is organised like a carousel in Europe. 
The women, in this case from the Philippines, were 
brought over via Cyprus, Rome, Paris and Amsterdam. 
They stayed for three months in the Netherlands, 
three months in Belgium, three months in Germany, 
three months in Denmark and other Scandinavian 
countries, three months at the Costa Brava and then 
they were moved to Northern Italy. How can they 
deal with such a problem without close cooperation 
between the relevant police institutions? It is nearly 
impossible. I also could talk about the problems in 
relation to the illegal trafficking of small arms and light 
weapons. That is the exact same story: it’s all about 
moving weapons across the borders of the Member 
States. How can they effectively deal with this illegal 
trade when police forces are not cooperating closely? 
(Fijnaut, Bruggeman a.o., 2008).
And that is reflected in the Lisbon Treaty. The frustration 
at the Brussels level that policies are developed in 
important fields, but that Member States finally decide 
whether they are willing to pay attention to them or 
not; that they will select sufficient qualified police 
officers to conduct the investigations or not.
This will change in my view when the Lisbon Treaty 
comes into force. Then, step-by-step, the Council, 
the Commission and the Parliament will put pressure 
on the Member States to implement the priorities 
set by the Council in Brussels. Police cooperation 
across borders will be part of that effort. If one wants 
to deal with the trafficking of women in an effective 
manner, that presupposes — like at the end of the 19th 
century — that the national police and judicial systems 
organise themselves in an operational manner to fight 
this problem. One needs qualified police officers that 
understand the issue. Special units at a national level are 
necessary to easily cooperate with similar units in other 
Member States. One would also need prosecutors that 
understand the importance of the issue.
The messages of the Home Affairs Future Group
I would like to go one step further, to the reports of 
the Future Groups. I will discuss only the three main 
messages in the report of the Home Affairs Future 
Group concerning the field of policing (High Level 
Advisory Group, 2009).
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First of all the authors want to strengthen the impact 
of the availability principle, as conceived in The Hague 
Programme and in the Prüm Treaty, i.e. that police forces 
and police officers can easily get access in an indirect 
manner to certain specific databases in other Member 
States (fingerprints, DNA characteristics and registration 
numbers). They cannot delve into the databases 
themselves but they can see whether there is a hit or 
not. They can then send a request for assistance to get 
the desired information from the database. The Home 
Affairs Future Group wants to reinforce this development 
and widen the spectrum of databases police officers 
can get access to.
Secondly, the Future Group wants to strengthen police 
cooperation in border areas. I have mentioned the 
example of the Heerlen coordination centre, where 
police forces of the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium 
work together. Now the Future Group wants to build 
a network of police cooperation centres in the border 
areas. This is an interesting development, because in 
the 1980s the dominant policy was to abolish once and 
for all police control on internal borders. These days 
the abolishment of control in border areas is being 
compensated by founding these cooperation centres. 
Taking into account the Dutch example in the city of 
Heerlen, it is a bright idea to do this and to construct 
a network of such coordination centres all over the EU. 
That is a very practical way of working together within 
a legitimate structure of policing.
But the most important issue in this future report is that 
of the principle of convergence. This principle really 
reflects the history of police cooperation in Europe: the 
more you can harmonise the cooperating systems, the 
easier it is to cooperate; harmonisation and cooperation 
go hand in hand. If one doesn’t have a more or less 
equal counterpart on the other side of the border, it’s 
really hard to cooperate effectively. Take, for example, 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. In Germany, 
the police is organised at state level, in the Dutch case 
it’s organised at a regional level and in Belgium there are 
a large number of very small local forces and a federal 
police. It’s not that easy — I can guarantee you — to 
bring them together and to come to agreements 
about cooperation, because they are organised in such 
different ways. That is one aspect of the principle of 
convergence.
It is hard to talk about harmonisation in the Future 
Group’s report, because if Member States get the idea 
that it is about harmonising — meaning uniformity — 
they will always underline that they are very special, 
even very exceptional, and that they have a very specific 
history. Most of this is pure nonsense. The police history 
of the 19th and 20th centuries clearly shows this. 
Nevertheless, one cannot talk about harmonisation 
in Brussels, because everything will just come to an 
abrupt halt. This is why a new buzzword is used, to 
soften what one really wants to achieve: convergence. 
It’s an important principle, because when reading the 
text of the report, one will see that convergence is 
related to the institutional organisation of policing, that 
it is related to operational structures, that it is related 
to policing powers, that it is related to training and to 
equipment, and that it is related to culture as well. The 
authors understood that, if one wants to facilitate and to 
reinforce cross-border cooperation among police forces, 
one must converge the systems, or otherwise it will 
prove to be extremely difficult. I can only confirm this on 
the basis of my research in the Euroregion Meuse-Rhine. 
If the systems are highly divergent, it is very difficult.
On top of institutional, organisational, legal and 
technical differences, there are otherwise two different 
problems. Cooperation can only be achieved if they 
share the same priorities and, equally important, are 
willing to spend a similar amount of resources on the 
priorities put in place. That is already quite difficult in 
a Euroregion like the Euroregion Meuse-Rhine, but is 
even harder on a European level. This of course is the 
reason why European authorities are generally in favour 
of the Lisbon Treaty. In an ideal situation one will have 
a criminal policy with five or six main priorities as well 
as police and judicial systems that are convergent at the 
different levels and can cooperate much better for this 
reason across borders at a European level.
Ways to facilitate comparative research  
in Europe
One can ask the question: how was it possible that 
although cross-border cooperation has such a long 
history, although police forces since long cross borders 
to look for examples of good policing, that the area of 
comparative research is so underdeveloped? There are 
many reasons for that. I will give you a few of them.
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 A nasty barrier: the language problem
The most important reason is that, although we have 
a long history of writing on policing — incidentally 
most of it is about legal issues — not that many 
universities in Europe have a curriculum in police 
research or police studies. Only in the 1960s and 1970s 
were the first efforts made in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
the UK and to some extent in Germany, to establish 
such curricula. In those years it was nearly impossible 
to find anyone who was involved in police research. 
How can comparative research be done if there are no 
researchers at a national level?
One needs researchers in the individual Member 
States for one main reason: the language problem. 
I am quite fluent in English, German, French and Dutch, 
but then it stops. How to deal with Italian, Spanish 
and all the other European languages? This aspect of 
police research in the European Union is very different 
from the situation in the United States. There one can 
have a research group that can easily do comparative 
research e.g. in New York City and in big cities in the 
south, without running into any language problem. 
The language problem is therefore a huge obstacle for 
comparative research in Europe.
When Letizia Paoli and I made an effort to publish 
a book about organised crime in the EU we brought 
nearly 40 researchers from 15 different Member States 
together. But it was a very challenging task to identify 
in the Member States’ qualified researchers who were 
able to join such a comparative endeavour. It took us 
four years to get the book finished. And even if it is 
possible to find very good researchers in the different 
countries, not all of them will be used to writing in 
English i.e. there will be serious rewriting. It is very 
difficult to conduct comparative research in Europe in 
fields like ours.
 The lack of support at the EU level
Secondly, the European Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament spend a lot 
of money on research, but they are not that willing to 
finance comparative police research. Huge amounts 
of money are handed over to companies in the field 
of security technology, but if social researchers ask the 
Commission, they can only get some peanuts. When 
Paoli and I took the initiative for a European research 
project on organised crime, it was so difficult to raise 
any money that we told the Commission to keep the 
money; they weren’t willing to pay. In the end we paid 
for it ourselves, together with the Max Planck Institute 
of Foreign and International Criminal Law in Freiburg. It 
was an extremely disappointing experience. Organised 
crime is a big issue in the EU, but if one needs some 
money to build a productive European research 
network, ‘Brussels’ says that there is no money for such 
an initiative, because it would be too academic. This 
should change in the future (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2006).
Thirdly, the police forces themselves should also take 
the initiative. These days there is a European Police 
Chiefs Operational Task Force (TFPC), there is the 
European Police College (CEPOL), there is Europol and, 
finally, Frontex. They should put together a research 
budget which they could finance themselves. Why not? 
I don’t understand that police chiefs in Europe are not 
aware of the importance of comparative research in the 
interest of policing in Europe. Why are they not setting 
up a research fund to further comparative analysis in 
the field of police cooperation? I believe it is also their 
responsibility. In any case it is not just the responsibility 
of individual researchers or lonely academic workers in 
universities. The police themselves in Europe are also 
responsible for this dire situation. They should do at 
least three things.
 Three stimuli: a journal, a library and a forum
First of all, the police chiefs should — perhaps in 
cooperation with researchers—establish a European 
Police Journal. All the police journals in Europe are 
national journals these days. Some of them try to cover 
other Member States and European developments, 
but basically they are all national journals, e.g. the 
New Police in Europe, edited by I. Weitemeier. It is quite 
amazing that after two or three decades of increasing 
police cooperation the police chiefs in Europe have 
not established a European Police Journal so that they 
can share experiences, information, research findings 
and important policy developments at a national level 
as well as at EU level. That could be the first step to 
further comparative research.
Another initiative that should be taken is to establish 
a European police library. It could be built up in an 
electronic, as well as in a paper, form. In order to realise 
this library they need to bring together an editorial 
board from the Member States that could build such 
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a reference library, so that everyone — also in the 
CEPOL context — could easily have access to what is 
going on, in any case in Europe, but also in other parts 
of the world.
The third initiative should be — in the wake of what 
CEPOL already has achieved — establishing an annual 
European police research forum for police research in 
general, so that people can meet each other, discuss 
their research and build networks in order to do 
comparative research in the increasingly important 
field of cross-border policing in the EU.
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The disconnect between science  
and policing
Commentators draw attention to ‘a fundamental 
disconnect between science and policing’ (Weisburd 
and Neyroud, 2011). Echoing the comments of McDonald 
(1987), Bradley and Nixon (2009) highlight a prevalent 
miscommunication between police and researchers, 
which sees police distrustful and cynical about the 
contributions of researchers, and scientists frustrated 
and incredulous at the police’s resistance to scientific 
expertise and insights. It seems that (in the eyes of police 
practitioners) scientists are not able to provide useful 
contributions to the pressing (management) questions of 
police practitioners, while (in the eyes of scientists) police 
practitioners are neither willing nor able to appreciate 
and use the academic insights of scholars, which aim at 
more efficient and professional police management.
Obviously, scholars and practitioners could learn a lot 
from each other. As we are scholars at a business 
school, we are reluctant to comment on what we feel 
practitioners should do to overcome what McDonald 
(1987; cited in Bradley, 2005) called the ‘dialogue of the 
deaf’. Nevertheless, we are passionate about engaging 
in this dialogue.
In an attempt to contribute to the conversation 
between science and policing, we present the EU 
project COMPOSITE (Comparative police studies in 
the EU), which we are coordinating at the Rotterdam 
School of Management, Erasmus University, The 
Netherlands. In a second contribution in this volume 
(Bayerl, Jacobs and Horton) we describe an example 
of an empirical study done by COMPOSITE together 
with CEPOL on the use of social media in European 
polices. In the current chapter, our aim is not to discuss 
results, but rather, to take the opportunity to reflect 
on the main driver behind the project (contributing 
to reconnecting police, management and science), 
on the methodological set-up (cross-cultural and 
interdisciplinary) and on the challenges we have 
encountered so far on our research journey. We end 
with stressing that this demanding investment into the 
cross-cultural, science-practitioner, interdisciplinary 
dialogue is a tremendously rewarding endeavour and 
certainly worth the effort for all parties involved.
The link between police and research is the primary 
domain of the field of police science, which is mainly 
located at police schools and police universities. Police 
research explicitly pursues the ‘scientific study of the 
police as an institution and of policing as a process’ (Del 
Barrio Romero, Björgo and Jaschke, 2009). Yet critics of 
this field suggest that there are a number of important 
gaps in police science research, which detract from 
its contribution to the domain. Marenin (2005) rues 
a general tendency to disregard the influence of the 
cultural and social context of policing. In addition, he 
criticises a reliance on short-term evaluative studies, 
which are to the detriment of long-term, theoretically 
driven research agendas. Finally he pinpoints a dearth 
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of systematic and integrative empirical studies aimed 
at better understanding policing processes on an 
international level. The source of such criticism largely 
stems from the narrow focus of police science research, 
which tends to adopt an exclusively Anglo-Saxon and 
mono-disciplinary focus (van Maanen, 2002; Manning, 
2005). Yet police issues increasingly transcend cultural and 
geographical divides, calling for an integrative response 
that incorporates diverse perspectives, representing 
different cultural, linguistic and disciplinary traditions.
This contribution is developed in the context of the 
CEPOL Police Research and Science Conference in Lyon 
in September 2012. We experienced this conference 
as — compared to the academic conferences in which 
we normally participate — unusually inclusive and 
interactive. It was inspiring and encouraging being in the 
middle of a highly diverse group that was united by its 
commitment to policing. Not being police researchers 
ourselves, we were impressed to learn more about the 
vibrant field of police research, which witnesses new 
and promising developments. Among others, Professor 
Monica den Boer from the Dutch Police Academy and 
Professor Nick Fyfe from the Scottish Institute for Policing 
Research described that the police are themselves 
increasingly open to research activities, more frequently 
favouring evidence-based management. Police research 
can be of particular benefit in developing and advancing 
organisational processes and practices, mapping and 
anticipating social, economic and technological trends 
and contributing to police education in the form of 
curricular developments and executive education, 
published materials and accreditation schemes. 
Innovative scholarship and interdisciplinary approaches 
are on the rise in police research, combined with a more 
active participation of universities in the field of policing.
Has academic (business) research 
become irrelevant?
At business schools, academic voices have become 
increasingly uneasy with the growing divide between 
rigour in methodology and relevance for practice 
(Gulati, 2007), which sees the pursuit of research 
excellence as largely disconnected from the desire to 
engage practitioners and applied audiences in relevant 
dialogues. Business schools — which should be at the 
frontline of practitioner-relevant research — have been 
in a self-diagnosed identity and legitimation crisis for 
more than a decade now (Mingers & Willmott, 2012). 
While business schools have long been under attack 
for their low academic research standards, they seem 
now to have overly invested in their relatively newly 
gained academic ambitions. Business scholars warn 
that by the exclusive focus on academic excellence, 
business schools run the risk of ‘institutionalising 
their own irrelevance’ (Bennis & O’Toole, 2005). 
MBA programmes are dramatically losing their 
attractiveness to the market and there is very little 
evidence that current, academic, top-of–the-scale 
research at business schools is in any way influential 
on management practice (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). 
Obviously scholars need to be in the field, in close 
contact with practitioners to identify relevant research 
questions and to tailor scientific outputs to the messy 
management reality of organisations. Still scholars also 
should stick to their highly developed scientific tools 
and take a clear stance in terms of independent and 
innovative research agendas. Only when both aspects 
are well balanced, can scholars seriously contribute to 
the improvement of management and organisations. 
This is exactly the passion we felt, when building the 
EU project COMPOSITE: combining scientific rigour 
with practical relevance.
COMPOSITE — Comparative Police 
Studies in the EU
Within this context, COMPOSITE aims to enrich 
existing approaches to European policing by 
offering an integrative response to the study 
of police organisational change. In particular, 
COMPOSITE responds to calls for a more rigorous 
and comprehensive research platform, by offering 
a long-term (4 years), multi-disciplinary, European-
wide research project. In so doing, COMPOSITE unites 
researchers and practitioners from 10 European 
countries and 15 institutions to research complex 
issues regarding organisational change. The project 
includes psychologists, sociologists, economists and 
engineers, academics, consultants and technicians, 
police scientists and police officers of every rank and 
position. A unique characteristic of COMPOSITE is 
the ongoing dialogue between police and science 
representatives that is built into the project’s structure, 
including the direct involvement of police officers in 
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strategic advisory and end-user boards. These boards 
meet with the scholars of COMPOSITE at least twice 
per year and provide direct feedback on the research 
questions, methodology and findings.
The focus of COMPOSITE is on organisational change 
within European police organisations. The impact 
of societal change is increasingly felt across Europe 
as globalisation, internal (legal) integration and the 
financial downturn fundamentally alter the landscape 
of policing across the continent.
COMPOSITE is divided into three constituents (labelled 
actionlines), which each offer a different perspective 
on the topic of change. The first actionline, which was 
completed in August 2012, takes a macro perspective, 
providing an extensive comparative analysis of police 
forces in the 10 COMPOSITE countries (Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Macediona 
(F.Y.R.O.M), Netherlands, Romania and United Kingdom). 
This constituent combines an analysis of external 
context features with an investigation of internal climate 
and resources, in each of the 10 countries. In addition 
it incorporates a focus on two key topics, namely 
knowledge sharing and technology. The second 
actionline takes a micro perspective and provides a closer 
analysis of three focal topics; namely change dynamics, 
leadership and identity, which are expected to be critical 
to the execution and planning of organisational change 
processes. Initial insights from actionline 1 also inform 
a second and more focused investigation of police-
related technologies in actionline 2. Finally the third 
actionline turns attention to the practical and tangible 
outcomes of COMPOSITE in terms of the dissemination 
of project findings, the development of a managerial 
toolbox (containing training and consultancy materials 
and best practices) and an annual police monitor to 
track trends in European policing. The project collected 
a broad database in all ten countries; in total we 
conducted more than 700 qualitative interviews on the 
external threats and challenges and internal strength 
and weaknesses of police organisations, technology 
trends and knowledge sharing in the first part of the 
project. Additionally case studies were conducted on 
best policing practices and (international) knowledge 
sharing and surveys were run in all countries on 
knowledge-sharing practices. In the second phase of 
the project another 400 in-depth qualitative interviews 
on organisational change, technology acceptance, 
identity and change leadership were conducted. Next 
all country teams will run tailored studies on change 
topics in their specific policing context and a joined 
survey with police, public and media representatives will 
be conducted in all ten countries.
Dissemination efforts are equally diverse, ranging from 
peer-rated academic journals and conferences (e.g. Van 
den Born et al. forthcoming; Jacobs et al., forthcoming; 
Denef, Bayerl & Kaptein, 2013) to policy briefings, expert 
seminars and practitioner-orientated publications (e.g. 
Vallet & van den Oord, 2012; Gruschinske, Hirschmann, 
& Stein-Müller, 2012; Rus, Vonaş, & Băban, 2011). Among 
others we also provided a project overview and first 
results in the CEPOL bulletin (Jacobs & Christe-Zeyse, 
2012; Denef, Bayerl, & Kaptein, 2012).
In addition to formal and tangible benefits, 
COMPOSITE provides a platform for more informal 
connections and dialogue amongst diverse groups. 
Interestingly, findings from COMPOSITE’s research on 
knowledge sharing indicate that such face-to-face 
communication is critical to developing relationships 
and sharing insights amongst police officers. Similarly, 
research testifies to the importance of informal and 
proximal means of communications in minimising 
the miscommunications that are a hallmark of cross-
cultural and inter-disciplinary research.
This exchange is important in order to gauge the 
relevance of research topics and to ensure that the 
research is relevant and legitimate for internal police 
audiences. In research terms, this ongoing exchange 
between practitioners and academics is critical for 
external validity and for the applicability of project 
findings.
In the next two paragraphs we elaborate on the 
methodological background of COMPOSITE and 
the practical experiences we have gained on this 
European-wide project.
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Linking the insider and outsider view in  
cross-cultural research
COMPOSITE has an explicit cross-cultural set-up. 
A culture-dimensional approach has been proven 
to be too short-handed to deal with the many 
specific subtleties in cross-cultural management. 
The knowledge about cultural differences drawn 
from the research of Hofstede (1980) reflects only 
a first heuristic to capture cultural differences. These 
cultural dimensions were developed to increase 
cultural understanding, and to allow for cross-cultural 
comparison. Yet, using this research to understand 
concrete behaviours shows its limitations. In the 
context of COMPOSITE, therefore, we argue that the 
development of theory and the collection of data 
in the cross-cultural management domain require 
a broader selection of methods than are used at the 
moment in the extant literature. Cultural phenomena, 
as social phenomena in general, cannot be described 
sufficiently by simple dimensional characteristics. 
An extended model which incorporates — next 
to general cultural values — also situational and 
contextual information, such as the history of 
a specific police sector, provides a more complex way 
of understanding culture.
This resonates well with the so-called societal effect 
research tradition in European sociology (see, e.g. 
Sorge, 2005). In this tradition, the key message is that 
cross-country work requires much more than a simple 
comparison of rather aggregate national culture 
attributes. How things work out in a specific country 
context is driven by much more than ‘aggregate’ 
national culture alone. Other important aspects, for 
instance, are historical path dependencies rooted 
in institutional arrangements (North, 1990) and the 
subtle impact of language on attitudes and behaviour 
(Akkermans, Harzing and van Witteloostuijn, 2010). 
The bottom line is that the devil is in the detail of 
implementation. For instance, notwithstanding claims 
of universality, the actual implementation of, say, 
‘evidence-based policing’ in the British police force will 
be very different from that in the French police.
The sociological argument is reflected in the 
psychological literature. Social psychology shows 
that there can be large gaps between expressed 
attitudes — such as cultural value statements — and 
actual behaviours. Situational factors are often likely 
to overrule cultural norms. Personal experience of 
past interactions with a specific person, the specific 
demand characteristics of a social setting or personal 
characteristics of the individuals involved can exert 
strong influence on behaviour. As argued by Ajzen 
(1991), behaviours are predicted best by attitudes that 
specifically relate to those behaviours rather than to 
more global or general attitudes. Also, the (perceived) 
demand characteristics of a situation, a person’s 
self-efficacy or specific outcome-expectations can 
influence their behaviour. All this has clear implications 
for the methodology of cross-cultural research. Our 
other contribution within this volume shows that 
the use of technology is an interesting application 
of a cross-cultural perspective. In this case, specific 
factors in different national police forces strongly 
influence the acceptance and use of social media by 
police forces.
The methodology of current cross-cultural research 
can be best described as the contrast between an 
insider’s (emic) and an outsider’s (etic) perspective 
(Pike, 1971). Cross-cultural management research 
needs to incorporate qualitative methods in a more 
consequent manner to solve the methodological 
problem of quantitative measurement equivalence 
(Van de Vijver and Poortinga, 1997; Van de Vijver 
and Leung, 1997; Berry, 1989). Only then, can the 
explanation of concrete behaviour be enhanced. This 
is precisely what we incorporated in our research 
design of COMPOSITE: to reconcile emic and etic 
methodologies such that we can take account of the 
subtle mechanisms described above.
Pike (1971) illustrates the difference between the emic 
and the etic perspective with the following example. 
A car would be described from an emic perspective 
as a whole, a gestalt. All elements would be described 
in their relationship with each other: from an etic 
perspective all elements would be described organised 
into categories as in a warehouse. In social interaction 
we can observe etically completely different forms for 
the same emic meaning — a ‘no’ can be expressed 
by a word or by shaking the head. Vice versa etically 
identical utterances can have emically different 
meanings — a serious and an ironic remark are etically 
identical, the emic meaning can only be concluded 
from the context. Similarly, from an etic point of view, 
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a researcher can look at categories such as ‘loyalty’, 
‘professionalism’, ‘integrity’ or ‘authority’ by asking the 
target group to answer questions pertaining to certain 
operationalised items that attempt to measure the 
prevalence of these categories. From an emic point 
of view it is crucial to first understand the culture-
specific meaning of these concepts. An officer who is 
considered a loyal officer in country A would behave 
rather differently from a loyal officer in country B, 
because the understanding of loyalty in country A can 
include a different set of behaviours than in country B. 
As we see from our interviews, loyalty is shown in one 
country by proactive, critical behaviour, while in other 
countries loyalty is shown by following orders without 
asking questions. Professional identity is in one country 
mainly based on an urge to serve the public, in another 
country professional identity is first of all inspired by the 
duty of protecting the state. Therefore, when talking 
about a truly blue, highly professional police officer, 
some might have an impartial, weapon wearing, 
hands-on crime-fighter in mind, while others think 
about a tolerant, highly communicative, cooperative 
citizen-helper. Without knowing these context-
specific differences, standardised measurements of 
loyalty or police professionalism cannot be developed.
In COMPOSITE we look for both, universalities and for 
the cultural variability of behaviour. We aim to know 
the degree of loyalty and professional identification 
that police officers have across Europe, but we also like 
to learn how loyal behaviour varies across countries 
and how the contents of professional identity differ 
across contexts. Therefore we emphasise data breadth 
and comparability, but also in-depth analysis of each 
specific cultural context. Hence, we adopt quantitative 
etic and qualitative emic methods within COMPOSITE. 
To develop such an encompassing set of research 
instruments, researchers from all ten different countries 
start with emic research in their specific context. We 
do this by jointly developed interview guidelines. In 
the following steps, we identify where comparisons 
are possible and where not, to subsequently develop 
a mixture of research instruments with both universal 
components for all countries and country-specific 
components for each separate country in the study. 
Categories that we have to explore in an emic way (such 
as leadership, professional identity or change success) 
are identified in the research process. The questions 
around these categories determine the aspects that 
are taken for granted in the respective context, which 
includes a certain type of behaviour as well as certain 
assumptions, thinking patterns or value judgements. 
Only after these contextual differences are sorted out 
and described in detail, does a comparison become 
meaningful (derived etic). Figure 8 visualises an emic-
etic research process like this.
Figure 1: Emic, etic and derived etic (Berry, 1989)
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The research reality in the European 
laboratory: What to expect if you 
interconnect
Translations, sampling and other issues that keep 
a researcher’s life interesting
Of course this complex endeavour is not always destined 
to run smoothly. The complexity of the research design 
is greatly increased when working in an international, 
multi-cultural and multi-linguistic environment. Even 
larger problems arise when differences in sociocultural 
or psychographic variables imply different attitudes and 
behaviours when using particular products, such as video 
surveillance technology or intelligence data systems. The 
translation equivalence is an issue in nearly all contexts 
(what is a ‘stakeholder’ in German? How do we translate 
‘police intelligence’ in Macedonian?). Additionally, sample 
selection equivalence proved to be a serious challenge. 
Police forces are historically built differently in European 
countries, the degree of centralisation differs widely, and 
the embedding in the legal and democratic system is 
realised in many different ways. Next to this, the data 
collection equivalence was a topic, and will certainly 
remain a topic, in all of our research meetings. The coope-
ration readiness of respondents is different from country 
to country, influenced by many factors. In one country, 
it is perfectly appropriate to approach police officers for 
cooperation at the district level; in other countries, first 
the ministry needs to officially agree. In some countries, 
we received open and highly self-critical responses at all 
hierarchical levels, with standing invitations to join police 
forces in their daily duties; in other countries, respondents 
considered our requests for interviews as a possible 
threat to their professional career — not a surprising 
reaction given that the interviews were conducted 
while the television in one corner of the office showed 
messages stating that 7 000 police officers will be made 
redundant in the coming years.
Beyond the comfort zone
Apart from discussions within the COMPOSITE research 
team, we have benefited from feedback from local police 
partners, as well as the international end-user board. 
Our end-user board, composed of representatives 
from all participating police forces, has proved to be 
an important asset in overcoming the above research 
challenges. These end users can facilitate access to forces, 
offer open feedback and provide insider knowledge on 
the accessibility, interpretation and presentation of data. 
Moreover, end users have functioned as an important 
reality check of our first ideas, and helped us to focus 
and select research questions. Interestingly enough, 
the first media responses served a similar function, 
since we realised that certain topics were picked up 
with more interest than others. As can be seen from 
our dissemination activities (www.composite-project.
eu), especially the topic of the use of social media in 
the European arena has received wide media attention, 
which encouraged us to further focus on this issue in 
the form of specialised workshops.
We need to be honest: working in the highly diverse 
setting of COMPOSITE means for most of us, most of the 
time that we act outside of our comfort zones. Scholars 
joining night-police patrols for the first time in their 
life, travelling hundreds of kilometres at the Romanian 
border to conduct interviews, attending bruise-
intensive martial arts training with the Czech police. 
Police officers facing heated debates about seemingly 
minor methodological questions, being introduced to 
the strict co-author guidelines of academic journals 
and intellectual property rights of surveys, or needing 
to comment on hundreds of pages of scientific text and 
translating deadly boring abstract interview questions 
into plain police language. All in all, COMPOSITE has 
triggered steep learning curves in many unexpected 
and sometimes unintended respects. COMPOSITE 
is a thrilling experience, it triggers many theoretical 
insights and opens the eyes to our own blind spots and 
exciting new research agendas.
Logistics…
Not only is the research design highly complex in 
a multifaceted project such as COMPOSITE, but so is the 
daily research procedure. Working in a multi-national 
and multi-disciplinary group brings all the challenges 
of diverse teams to the table. Language problems, 
time-intensive and cost-expensive travel, unexpectedly 
cancelled flights and full agendas belong to the practical 
side of this reality. Talking about the academic side, 
different disciplinary perspectives on research designs 
and topics, and different approaches to methodologies 
and analyses are just some of the issues that enriched 
and challenged our first research year. In practice, 
this implies the need for an ongoing investment in 
knowledge sharing, as well as the regular discussion 
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of a wide variety of empirical, practical and theoretical 
issues, both in a series of face-to-face meetings and 
through the use of virtual facilities.
Nevertheless, for good reasons, international research 
collaboration is widely advocated as a way of conducting 
research in the social sciences, generally, and in the 
area of international business, particularly. Local data 
and contextual knowledge can best be accessed by 
collaboration with colleagues in the respective countries. 
Research teams that can tap into native insights can best 
guarantee a culturally and contextually sensitive analysis. 
The inclusion of researchers from different cultural and 
disciplinary backgrounds facilitates that a wider variety 
of different facets of the research domain are considered 
(Kumar, 2000). Still, the different institutional backgrounds 
and the varying research views have an influence on 
teamwork. Different research paradigms and cognitive 
referential systems (disciplinary and culturally, and 
practitioner or science -orientated) can enhance the 
quality of the jointly developed research solutions, as 
long as paradigms are openly discussed (Sauquoit and 
Jacobs, 1998; Trait, USAir, & Ravagnani, 1998).
All in all, assembling a group of researchers having different 
theoretical backgrounds, academic fields, proximity to 
the field of policing and cultural origins or nationalities 
is a complex matrix. We followed earlier insights from 
research on diverse academic teams (Sauquet and Jacobs, 
1998) that developing a research instrument that produces 
data useful to the different theoretical frameworks is 
a better procedure than coming to terms with complex 
issues such as whether paradigms are compatible or not. 
With this in mind, we developed interview guidelines that 
covered different theoretical interests, and we focused our 
research meetings on the discussion of the comparability 
of data, and the identification of communalities and 
differences.
And still … why crossing boundaries is 
worth the effort
We commented at the beginning on why we feel that 
we as scholars should engage in a practitioner-scientist 
debate and were reluctant to give advice to police 
practitioners. Here at the end of our contribution, we 
would like to mention nevertheless some observations 
from us as business scholars about police management.
We study police as one case of organisational behaviour 
and organisational change and we are able to conclude 
many general insights about organisations as such 
from our research. In a recent side study we compared 
the professional identity of police officers with market 
researchers and could identify many shared dimensions. 
Police organisations are organisations, the police 
profession is a profession, police tasks are tasks and police 
change is change. Obviously we do not recommend 
repeating the mistakes of the past where private-sector 
management solutions were blindly imposed on police 
organisations. Instead, we advocate a highly context-
specific analysis of police managerial implications — 
with the theoretical machinery and methodological 
tools developed in general management research. We 
would like to invite police management professionals to 
show more interest in the rich management literature 
developed by scholars worldwide. Police professionals 
rightly feel that business scholars should show more 
interest in non-profit organisations and police-specific 
conditions. Yet, scholars only do this when the police also 
actively voice their needs and interests. Police research is 
not a core topic of business schools and universities, but 
there are examples of highly recognised international 
scholars in the ‘hard core’ academic arena who study 
policing. The Academy of Management, which is the 
leading professional organisation for management 
scholars, has published 354 articles in their journals 
based on or referring to police organisations. Journals like 
Harvard Business Review, California Management Review, 
Sloan Management Review, Organizational Dynamics 
or Long-range Planning or the practitioner-orientated 
journals of the world leading Academy of Management 
such as Academy of Management Perspectives and 
Academy of Management Learning and Education are 
actually great value for money and also worth looking at 
for police practitioners. Stronger active interest from the 
police might also help police-interested management 
scholars at business schools and universities to legitimate 
their research activities within their own communities.
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perspective — introduction
Monica den Boer
Departing from a considerable body of research, 
this volume seeks to bring in new perspectives on 
strategies and perspectives for European police 
cooperation. Hence, this chapter addresses one of 
the key questions in the world of safety and security, 
namely what does the future hold and how will the 
agenda change in the next decades?
In order to read the future, it is instructive to take 
a profound look into the rear mirror. Cyrille Fijnaut — 
who has published extensively on the history of 
policing and organised crime — opens this chapter 
with a review of police history, police reform and 
police education. One of his major findings is that 
police reform is often prompted by a regime change, 
and far less frequently by large-scale public disorders 
or critical issues in criminal investigation. Historically, in 
most European countries this amounted to processes 
of centralisation, specialisation and militarisation. 
Historical analyses of police reforms help us to 
understand the contemporary processes of police 
reform. In his contribution, Fijnaut opens up new 
research avenues by pointing out that there are still 
gaps in our historical understanding of how police 
systems in Europe have been influenced by the North 
American model and how Europe — along the lines of 
former empirical tentacles — has influenced numerous 
police systems around the globe. Furthermore, Fijnaut 
advocates a firm position of historical studies on 
policing within police educational curricula, supported 
by solid historical research.
This brings us to the conceptual godfather of several 
academic concepts on policing: Jean-Paul Brodeur. 
His inspiration, wisdom and expertise is sorely missed 
by the international community of police scholars. We 
are very proud to be able to publish his contribution 
‘Trust and Expertise in Policing’ posthumously. In 
his contribution, Brodeur analyses the paradoxical 
relationship between trust, community and expert 
knowledge in community policing. One of the 
greatest paradoxes he tackles is that in countries which 
started community policing, there seems to be a wide 
discrepancy between the intentions of community 
policing (‘softening the coercive edges of policing’) 
and the actual practice of crime-sentencing and high 
incarceration levels. Also, engaging the community is 
much more complex than traditionally believed. The 
traditional culture of police, Brodeur argues, is to be 
suspicious of citizens. Hence, to build a mutual trust 
relationship is enormously difficult, if not impossible. 
This is a very apt observation in times when one of 
the greatest challenges for police is to guarantee 
legitimacy. Formal legitimacy is only part of the story, 
the rest has to be done by winning credits through 
constant responsiveness and prioritisation of safety 
issues across the board.
In his contribution ‘Future of Policing: Policing the 
Future?’, Didier Bigo is characteristically critical of EU 
endeavours in the field of internal security cooperation. 
At the same time, he shares his surprise (and even 
admiration) for the fact that in this sovereignty field 
of cooperation, Member States of the European 
Union have been prepared to let go of some areas of 
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influence in order to enhance standardisation. Bigo 
presents us with a historical reconstruction of the 
strings that currently constitute EU police cooperation. 
Traditionally, European police cooperation has been 
grounded in informal intergovernmental networks 
with strong ties to the intelligence world and with 
a strong focus on European terrorism. More recently, 
the impact of technology has been very influential on 
the shaping of new police cooperation arrangements, 
particularly in the area of ICT - networks - such as the 
Schengen Information System. Another development 
has been the ‘external’ side of EU-policing in the form 
of civil police missions, often with an emphasis on 
restoring peace and stability in post-conflict regions, 
the reform of police and judicial institutions, as well as 
the training of local police officers. With the Stockholm 
Programme, Bigo welcomes the recent but late 
introduction of checks and balances in the fields of 
justice and security, as well as the emphasis on social 
and professional legitimacy. A key concern for Bigo 
is however whether there are any boundaries to law 
enforcement cooperation, especially with regard to 
data exchange with third countries.
In her contribution, Sirpa Virta looks at what the future 
holds for preventive policing. She approaches this issue 
in a multi-dimensional way by looking both at how 
‘preventive policing’ has undergone a metamorphosis 
on the one hand, and how preventive policing is 
changing the essence of police performance on the 
other hand. Preventive policing has a strong historical 
rooting, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon context, and 
has gradually spread to other parts of Europe. In fact, 
preventive policing is not to be defined as a separate 
strand, but as an element of widely accepted models 
of policing, including community policing and 
proximity policing. The anxiety about terrorism and 
radicalisation, combined with the connection between 
global and local security, has given leeway to the so-
called precautionary principle. This principle places the 
presumption of innocence under pressure. But it also 
facilitates secret surveillance and the pathologising 
of groups in society, which fundamentally alters the 
traditional model of community policing.
The final contribution in this section is from Michiel 
Holtackers, who provides us with an account about 
the EU Stockholm Programme, which dates from 2009 
and which is to be succeeded by a new multi-annual 
programme for the development of the EU Area on 
Freedom, Security and Justice. This overall strategy was 
launched in the course of 2010 in order to place new 
pointers on the horizon in the development of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the European 
Union. Since the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty in the early nineties, police cooperation across 
national frontiers has been a crucial and fast-growing 
domain of action. Several legal instruments have been 
adopted to join efforts against a range of transnational 
security deficits, including those of radicalisation, 
terrorism, organised crime and trafficking in human 
beings. Still, the scope of regulatory activity is being 
expanded to issues concerning public order control 
and crisis management. Also, instruments such as 
the European Union Arrest Warrant have been in 
use for some years now. These types of instruments 
seek to encourage direct cooperation between 
police and judicial authorities, and new ones are on 
their way, such as the European Evidence Warrant. 
A precondition for making these instruments work is 
trust as well as reciprocity. These criteria can only be 
cultivated through mutual awareness and knowledge 
of national police organisations and criminal justice 
systems. A working knowledge of languages is 
deemed important for direct cross-border cooperation 
as well. The Stockholm Programme aims at making the 
various instruments more manageable for field officers, 
and seeks to support this ambition by emphasising 
interoperability between systems and the launch of an 
EU-wide exchange scheme for police officers. CEPOL 
certainly carries an important task in encouraging this 
process, not in the least by fusing innovative insights 
into policing with law enforcement curricula.
What is it we learn from this chapter? First, that the 
knowledge of history is pivotal to our understanding 
of current and future transformations in policing. This 
knowledge should be engrained into all levels of police 
education and should be based on historical research. 
Second, we have learnt that models of policing should 
never be taken for granted. Rather than taking them 
at face value it is instructive to probe beyond levels of 
rhetoric and symbolism, and to undertake empirical 
research on the translation and implementation of 
these models in the real world. Third, the development 
of international policing is firmly embedded in a wider 
discourse on security, which is deeply affected by 
changes in governance and technology. Fourth, and 
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in connection with the emphasis on the emergence 
of proactive policing, we learn from this chapter that 
policing is not only a chameleon, but also borderless. 
Fifth, as policing is one of the fields of cooperation in 
the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, police 
forces and police education institutions benefit from 
the new dynamic that pervades the European Union, 
which is an emerging security actor. Hence, policing 
is not only paradoxical (according to Brodeur), but also 
in perpetual motion (according to Fijnaut, Bigo, Virta 
and Holtackers). International and comparative police 
research continues to be a much-needed reservoir for 
providing evidence-based arguments in the pursuit of 
professional excellence.
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(2012 Conference in Lyon)
In this short speech I will discuss two big issues. On the 
one hand I want to focus on police history and police 
reform and on the other hand I will pay some attention 
to police history and police education.
Police history and police reform
My first big topic is concerned with police history and 
police reform: in 1978 I defended at the K.U. Leuven in 
Belgium a PhD thesis on the political history of the police 
in Europe. It was published in 1979 in two volumes, mainly 
covering the history of the police in France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and to some 
extent Austria, Italy and Spain, since the second half of 
the 18th century, up to the 1960s of the 20th century (1). 
This book was the final result of a project that started in 
1974 at the Leuven University and was meant to study 
the contemporary policing problems in Belgium and to 
come up with proposals for its reform.
Immediately, I was confronted in this project with the 
fact that political parties, police chiefs etc. used the 
history of the Belgian policing system and its main 
components as an important argument, a justification, 
or a counterargument in their discussions about the 
future of this system. But nobody could explain to me 
what the history of the system really was. And there were 
almost no books about the police history of Belgium. 
Police history at the time in Belgium was not at all 
(1) C. Fijnaut, Opdat de macht een toevlucht zij. Een geschiedenis 
van de politie als een politieke instelling, Antwerpen, Kluwer 
Rechtswetenschappen, 1979, 2 vol.
a topic for academic historians. So that is why I started to 
collect a huge amount of material about policing in this 
country since the end of the 18th century until the 1960s: 
legislation, police journals, parliamentary documents, 
references in books on the general history of Belgium 
etc.
But after two or three years I didn’t know how to 
analyse all these materials. In any case in Belgium there 
was no model, no theory, on how to do so. In order 
to understand the way in which I solved this problem 
I have to add to this that at the same time I was studying 
at the K.U. Leuven, philosophy and particularly the 
writings of Thomas Kuhn, the famous philosopher and 
sociologist of science. I was heavily impressed by his 
ideas about paradigms and paradigm shifts in scientific 
developments (2). Hence I came to the idea that I should 
develop a model by studying what happened in other 
relevant European states and that in the end I should 
apply this model to the history of the Belgian police. 
And indeed I developed in my PhD thesis a model to 
understand the general dynamics of police history in 
Western Europe by comparing the histories of policing 
in the named countries. I defended this thesis at the end 
of 1978. I can only summarise it here a bit.
One of my general conclusions was that the driving 
forces behind radical reforms of policing systems were 
wars, revolutions and coups d’états, and — to a lesser 
extent — large-scale public disorders and serious 
crime problems, or disasters in the field of criminal 
(2) Th. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press,1970 (2d enlarged edition).
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investigation. Take, for example, the revolutions of 
1830 and 1848 in France and other European countries, 
the French-German War in 1870, the First World War 
and the Second World War, and not to forget the 
establishment of the Soviet Union. If you asked what 
successively happened to the policing systems in the 
related countries at those crucial stages in the history 
of Europe, you could easily conclude that it meant, 
most of the time, three important things.
First of all, it meant the centralisation of policing and 
police forces; in any case the governance on the 
police forces became more and more centralised. 
Secondly, it meant specialisation of the police forces 
and police systems, particularly in the field of public-
order policing and in the field of criminal investigation. 
And thirdly and also quite self-evident and easy to 
understand; the militarisation of specific components 
of the policing systems; their militarisation was more 
or less a substitute for the involvement of the army in 
public-order policing. And parallel to centralisation, 
specialisation and militarisation one can easily see 
the rise of the intelligence services, or special units 
or special services within the existing police systems 
meant to deal with intelligence gathering on political 
opposition or political protest in general.
The irony of all this is, after I presented my PhD thesis 
in 1978 I didn’t get the opportunity to apply this model 
on my huge material research on the Belgian police 
system. But now I am retired I hope I can do this within 
the coming years and that I can write a coherent, long-
term history of the Belgian police system, applying 
the model I developed in the 1970s. The Belgian case 
nevertheless can currently teach a number of lessons, 
but two lessons are most important when it comes 
to the demonstration of the importance of historical 
studies on police and policing.
First of all, the history of police systems is very helpful 
in understanding contemporary policing structures, 
policing powers, policing ideas and policing practices. 
It also gives you an idea or a better idea, a better 
clue, on political, public and professional discussions 
about the issues I just mentioned: structures, powers, 
ideas, and practices. But history is not only helpful in 
this way. Secondly it is also helpful when it comes to 
understanding what really matters in policing over 
centuries, decades and years. Which factors and which 
circumstances can, or will have, a major impact on 
policing as an institution and as a practice?
These lessons make up one of the reasons why 
I initiated a number of historical projects in the field of 
policing, not only in the Netherlands and Belgium, but 
also at the European level (3). That is also why I joined 
national and international networks of historians, who 
gradually, step-by-step, have become more interested 
in the history of policing (4). And thirdly that I myself 
not only participated in international networks of 
historians and international book projects on the 
history of policing, but also organised such projects 
over the years (5). I am happy to say that step-by-step, 
I wasn’t that lonely fighter any more.
Over the years in a number of European Union 
Member States other academics took similar initiatives. 
I refer here in France to Jean-Marc Berliere and 
to Jean-Luc Noel — the first one spent (together 
with a.o. Rene Levy) a lot of energy on the history 
of the civil police forces in France and Jean-Luc 
Noel on the history of the French Gendarmerie (6). 
I may also refer to Herbert Reinke and others in 
Germany and self-evidently also to Clive Emsley in 
the United Kingdom (7). All this has led to a situation 
where we know much, much more about the police 
history in a number of European states than 20-30 years 
ago. There is now an increasing body of knowledge 
(3) Hereby I may refer to a comprehensive project on the history of 
the police in The Netherlands and its (former) colonies and as 
far as Belgium is concerned to C. Fijnaut, Een kleine geschieden-
is van de huidige organisatie van het Belgische politiewezen, 
Antwerpen, Kluwer Rechtswetenschappen, 1994, and to C. 
Fijnaut, B. de Ruyver and F. Goossens (eds), De reorganisatie van 
het politiewezen, Leuven, Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1999.
(4) E.g. the European network of historians who are heavily interest-
ed in the policing of the colonial empires in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.
(5) See a.o. C. Fijnaut (ed.), The Impact of World War II on Policing in 
North-West- Europe, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2004.
(6) E.g. J-M. Berliere and R. Levy, Histoire des polices en France de 
l’Ancien Regime a nos jours, Paris, Nouveau Monde, 2011, and J-N. 
Luc (ed.), Gendarmerie, etat et societe au XIXe siècle, Paris, Publica-
tions de la Sorbonne, 2002.
(7) C. Emsley, Policing and its context, 1750-1870, London, The 
Macmillan Press, 1983, and Gendarmes and the State in Nine-
teenth-century Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999. As 
far as Reinke is concerned, see e.g. G. Furmetz, H. Reinke and 
K. Weinhauer (eds.), Nachkriegspolizei; Sicherheit und Ordnung 
in Ost- und Westdeutschland, 1945-1969, Hamburg, Ergebnisse 
Verlag, 2001.
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that can be used in police education and is also useful 
with a view to police reform.
But of course there is still a lot to do with regard to 
the police history in a number of Member States, for 
example Italy or Spain or Portugal, or also Central and 
Eastern European countries. And also in relation to the 
history of policing at the European level.
First of all: what really was the impact of the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire on policing in 
Europe, as well as the impact of the totalitarian police 
states of the 20th century? The impact of the Nazi 
regime goes for many of us without saying, but what 
about the impact of the Soviet Union on policing in 
Central and Western Europe (8). And in the wake of 
this one should also pay attention to the impact that 
American policing policy has exerted on policing in 
Europe and in cross-Atlantic police cooperation since 
1945, particularly in the field of criminal investigation, 
but I believe that also in the field of political policing, 
this is a major issue (9).
Secondly, one should not only look, however, at the 
impact of these empires on policing in Europe, one 
should also pay attention to the force of policing models 
in Europe and in the United States on the ways in which 
policing has developed over the centuries in the West. 
For example, take the impact of the models of the 
police of Paris and the French Gendarmerie in the 18th 
and 19th centuries, and the impact of the Metropolitan 
police model after this force was established in 1830. 
One should also refer to the impact of the German big-
city police forces at the end of the 19th century and 
their impact on the structure, the division of tasks, the 
training, the housing and the equipment of police forces 
in big cities, not only in Europe, but also in the United 
States. I may in particular refer here to Raymond Fosdick’s 
(8) As far as the impact of the Soviet Union on policing in Central 
and Eastern Europe is concerned see a.o. D. Fogel, Policing in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Helsinki, Academic Bookstore, 1994; 
M. Pagon (ed.), Policing in Central and Eastern Europe. Comparing 
First-hand Knowledge with Experience from the West, Ljubljana, 
college of Police and Security Studies, 1996, and N. Uildriks 
and P. van Reenen (eds.), Policing Post-communists Societies. 
Police-public Violence, Democratic Policing and Human Rights, 
Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2003.
(9) One of the most important books still is: E. Nadelmann, Cops 
across Borders. The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law En-
forcement, Philadelphia, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1993.
book on the organisation and performance of European 
police systems, published in 1916 (10). And one must not 
lose sight of the impact of the Weimar Republic police, in 
particular the police of Berlin, on policing in Europe. Out 
of necessity to survive in such a highly divided society 
this police was steadily under pressure to modernise its 
operational systems in order to be able to deal with the 
manifold challenges it continuously faced.
Thirdly, apart from the impact of empires, and apart from 
the impact of policing models, I should also mention 
here in the third order the spreading of police techniques 
and police technology all over Europe since the second 
half of the 19th century, like for example the Bertillonnage. 
Which forces have driven the spread of this technology 
into the 20th century? And not only its spreading in that 
period, is most interesting. We should — sticking to this 
example — also look at what is going on currently in the 
security business and explore the historical connections 
between the rise of biometrics and the development of 
the Bertillonnage (11).
Police history and police education:  
the Dutch case
After these few words on police history and police 
reform I introduce my second topic — police history 
and police education. In particular I will focus on this 
issue in relation to the Dutch case.
After the defence of my PhD thesis in Leuven, I wrote 
several pieces on the history of the Dutch police and 
started to collect books, reports, leaflets and articles 
etc. on its history since 1813. Around 2000, the Chief 
Constable of Utrecht and later on The Hague, Jan 
Wiarda, together with chiefs of police of some larger 
regional and national police forces and with the support 
of the Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs, they all 
collected money for a major project on the history 
of the Dutch police. And they asked me to compose 
a research group of experienced historians to perform 
this project. Guus Meershoek became a member of 
(10) R. Fosdick, European Police Systems, New York, The Century Co, 
1916.
(11) P. Piazza (ed.), Aux origines de la police scientifique. Alphonse 
Bertillon, precurseur de la science du crime, Clamecy, Karthala, 
2011, and S. Cole, Suspect Identities. A History of Fingerprinting 
and Criminal Identification, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
2001.
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this research group. The other two members were Jos 
Smeets and Ronald van der Wal.
In 2007 we published a four-volume history of the 
Dutch police. Three volumes specifically focus on the 
development of the municipal police forces, the history 
of the state police forces and on the evolution of the 
police unions and police education (12). I myself wrote 
an overarching volume on the general history of the 
Dutch police since the end of the 18th century up to 
these days (13). Later on I summarised these four books 
in a paperback for the general public and for Dutch 
police officers. Some 30 000 copies of this booklet 
were published in a year. Later on it was translated into 
English for a more foreign audience (14).
In the wake of this more or less national project, I took 
the initiative together with historians from Utrecht 
University and Leiden University — in particular 
Elsbeth Locher at the Utrecht University and Gert 
Oostindie, director of the KITLV, the Royal Netherlands 
Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies in 
Leiden — to build up a research project on the history 
of police and policing in the former Dutch colonies. This 
comprehensive project was finalised rather smoothly. 
Indeed, in recent years three books were published 
on the history of policing in the Dutch Indies since 
the 19th century up to the Second World War, on the 
history of policing in Surinam until its independence 
in 1975, and on the history of policing on the Dutch 
Caribbean islands: Curaçao, Aruba etc., from the end of 
the 18th century, up to 2000 (15).
During this whole historical project we asked ourselves 
two key questions. The first one was: what will be the 
(12) G. Meershoek, De gemeentepolitie in een veranderende samenlev-
ing, Amsterdam, Boom, 2007; J. Smeets, Verdeeldheid en eenheid 
in het rijkspolitieapparaat, Amstrdam, Boom, 2007, and R. van 
der Wal, De vakorganisatie en het beroepsonderwijs, Amsterdam, 
Boom, 2007.
(13) C. Fijnaut, De geschiedenis van de Nederlandse politie. Een staatsin-
stelling in de maalstroom van de geschiedenis, Amsterdam, Boom, 
2007.
(14) C. Fijnaut, The History of the Dutch Police, Amsterdam, Boom, 
2008.
(15) M. Bloembergen, De geschiedenis van de politie in Nederlands-In-
die. Uit zorg en angst, Amsterdam, Boom, 2009; E. Klinkers, De 
geschiedenis van de politie in Suriname, 1863-1975. Van koloniale 
tot nationale ordehandhaving, Amsterdam, Boom, 2011, and A. 
Broek, De geschiedenis van de politie op de Nederlands-Caribische 
eilanden, 1839-2010. Geboeid door macht en onmacht, Amster-
dam, Boom, 2011.
legacy of this big project and what are the possibilities 
to continue historical police research in the Netherlands 
and also at the European level in the long run? Should 
we get the universities involved? Are they now really 
consistently and coherently and for the longer term 
interested in this topic? Or should we to some extent 
see whether we can integrate or should integrate this 
subject into the research programme of the Dutch Police 
Academy? Then we would have more guarantees that 
it would survive in the longer run. A precondition of 
course is that the research should be able to maintain 
its academic quality. These considerations led to the 
conclusion that the last option would be the best one.
The second question was: isn’t it important to integrate 
the results of historical research into the training and 
education, at least to some extent, of police officers? 
And we came to the conclusion that the answer is ‘yes’ 
for a number of reasons.
The first reason is that, if policing is moving from a craft 
to a profession then all police officers should have 
a clear idea about the ways in which their profession 
has come into existence. They should have an idea of 
the historical relationship between police forces, the 
army and private policing, of the images and realities 
of policing in the past, of the increasing complexities of 
police operations in modern society, of the evolution of 
the standards of police education and of the working 
conditions of police officers etc.
Secondly, police officers at all levels, but also judicial 
and administrative authorities, should be aware of the 
fact that their working environment — institutions, 
structures, powers, cultures, ideas, strategies — is not 
at all self-evident, but is the result of a sometimes very 
painful history that they should know about. What 
happened and in which conditions it happened. For 
example: why the Dutch political leaders maintained 
to a large extent the policing apparatus that the 
French and German occupiers installed? What are 
the dilemmas the professional forerunners faced in 
the field of criminal investigation and public-order 
policing, and what are the ways in which they tried to 
solve the dilemmas with which they were confronted. 
And of course they should also know about the history 
of cross-border policing and the challenges and 
possibilities in this field, not only in the 19th century 
but also since the Second World War in the framework 
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of the European Union, the Council of Europe and the 
United Nations.
And the third reason why we thought police history 
should be integrated into police education is that police 
officers generally should have sufficient knowledge of 
the history of policing in order to deal with historical 
arguments in the ongoing debate on policing in their 
home countries or home forces: to understand these 
arguments, to evaluate or to assess these arguments, 
and to criticise them, if necessary or desirable.
And so, on the basis of these three arguments, we 
convinced the board of the Police Academy and the 
Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs to establish 
a lecturer’s position in the field of historical police studies 
at the Dutch Police Academy. And a mixed committee 
of police officers and academics selected Guus 
Meershoek for this position. He is not only a qualified 
researcher in the field of police history — for example 
he wrote his PhD thesis on the Amsterdam Police in the 
course of the Second World War and wrote the history 
of the municipal police in the Netherlands — but he 
has also organised teaching programmes at the Twente 
University for many years now.

105
Trust and expertise in policing
Trust and expertise in policing
Jean-Paul Brodeur
Canada
(2007 Conference in Münster)
In this paper I want to explore the relationships 
between trust, community and expert knowledge 
in the context of policing. Taken together, these 
relationships result in a paradox. The move towards 
community policing, broadly defined as an attempt 
by the police to engage with the community in 
setting their priorities and developing partnerships 
with community members and civic organisations 
in order to achieve them (Skogan, 2006a: 28) was 
triggered in part by the gap that existed between the 
police and the various minorities during the late 1960s 
(Williams and Murphy, 1990). This gap was believed 
to cause violent conflicts between the police and 
minority groups. The community policing reform 
was intended to bridge this gap between police 
and community and to re-establish trust by bringing 
the police closer to the community (in France, the 
equivalent of community policing is called ‘police 
de proximité’, that is, ‘proximity policing’). However, 
getting closer to the public is far from being the only 
way to establish a trusting relationship, as is shown 
by the example of medical doctors. In all indexes of 
trust in selected professions, the medical profession 
generally comes first, followed by teachers. The 
trust enjoyed by doctors is built on their expertise, 
which also sets them apart from the community. 
The community is seldom consulted by the medical 
establishment, which thrives on its separateness and 
isolation. There is also an important movement within 
police organisations, particularly in Europe (CEPOL, 
2007), to base their competence and the public trust 
that would flow from it upon a new police science and 
expertise. One of the important benefits of operating 
from a secure base of expert knowledge would be 
to insulate the police from external, mainly political, 
interference in their business — doctors are believed 
to be free of such interference. This other kind of quest 
for trust thus leads the police in a direction opposite 
to community policing and its numerous derivatives, 
as they actually move away from the public into the 
seclusion of expertise. Quoting an example closer 
to the police than medical doctors, firefighters 
apparently succeeded in being both distant from the 
public through their expertise, yet remained trusted 
by them.
The respective relationships between trust, 
community and expertise in the context of policing 
are thus complex and deserving of more examination 
than currently believed. This paper is divided into 
four parts. First, I make some preliminary statements 
to avoid misunderstandings and clear the way for 
the ensuing discussion. Second, I discuss three ways 
to conceive this cluster of relationships in light of the 
findings of research. In the third part, I discuss how 
the police can contribute to building trust between 
themselves and the public and, more importantly, 
between the members of the public themselves. In the 
concluding section, I shall very briefly propose criteria 
for democratic policing.
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1. Preliminary remarks
The situation has drastically changed since the early 
1980s, when it seemed that community policing held 
the key to better public policing.
1. Since 1980 there has been an explosion of new 
policing philosophies, strategies and tactics. 
In their book on policing innovation, Weisburd 
and Braga (2006) discuss no less than eight new 
models of policing that were developed in the 
United States over the last three decades. To this 
review of developments in the United States, one 
ought to add at least two other frameworks that 
are now being tested in the United Kingdom. 
One of these alternative frameworks, called 
reassurance police, grew in part from a particular 
experiment in community policing undertaken 
in the city of Chicago (the Chicago Alternative 
Policing Strategy — CAPS). So, not only do we have 
a significant number of new models, but some of 
these models are morphing into yet another variety 
(e.g. community policing morphing into reassurance 
policing), thus adding to the complexity of present-
day policing. If we were to take into consideration 
all policing innovation taking place in the various 
democratic countries, the complexity would be 
overwhelming. (For the sake of clarity, I have tried to 
characterise the various models of policing that I will 
refer too in the course of this paper in Appendix I. 
The reader is invited to consult it).
2. There is one crucial problem with all the new models 
of policing that have been developed, which has 
never been solved to my satisfaction. According to 
my own research in Canada and my review of the 
abundant literature on police innovation, it is almost 
impossible to assess to what degree a model of 
policing that is claimed to have been adopted 
by an organisation is actually implemented. First, 
there is generally a limited proportion of the total 
police manpower that is tasked with practising 
the new methods, the majority of their colleagues 
conducting police business as usual. It was 
estimated, for instance, that one in five hundred 
sworn officers was enough to form an expert 
cadre for problem-orientated policing (the small 
proportion was later revised; see Bullock et al. 2006: 
175). Second, there are entire departments that are 
untouched by the reform. For instance, criminal 
investigation departments were little affected by 
the new ways to engage the public, the reforms 
actually increasing the gap between patrolpersons 
in uniform and plainclothes investigators. Third, the 
new methods evolved from a specific framework 
to transform police practices into a diluted 
‘philosophy’ that mostly served as a public relations 
device to soften the image of a police force. All 
these reservations make it overwhelmingly difficult 
to assess the depth and magnitude of the changes 
that were introduced into a police organisation that 
embarked upon a course of self-reform.
3. Community policing was not implemented 
everywhere and was the target of intense criticism 
from the outset. Yet there was a police management 
consensus that it was the standard under which 
nearly all new experiments in policing had to fall, no 
matter how imperfectly it was in fact implemented. 
It was quickly realised that this so-called standard 
was not even a common label and the initial 
consensus on the desirability of this orientation of 
police reform dissolved. Today, there are advocates 
and critics of every new policing model that is 
being churned out by the reform factory. Instead 
of a consensus, we have a situation that is evolving 
towards a kind of policing anomie.
4. Countries differ widely with respect to their adopted 
policing system. There is one difference that is 
especially significant for my argument. In many 
countries, the public police apparatus consists of 
a few organisations that are nationally based. This is 
generally the case with the countries of Continental 
Europe. In English-speaking countries, police 
organisations are based in cities or regions and are 
accountable to municipal or regional authorities. 
In some countries such as the United Kingdom, 
the police are jointly accountable to the central 
government and to a regional body. Countries 
where the basic police jurisdiction is municipal or 
regional have as many police forces as there are 
cities or regions, the United States and Canada 
being examples of countries that have many police 
forces. There was a time — in the 1960s — when 
the larger urban area of Chicago had as many as 1 
400 different police forces — each suburb, however 
small, having its own force. Although the present 
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trend is leading to the integration of small city 
forces into regional ones, there are by definition 
a much greater number of police organisations in 
countries where the police forces are municipally 
based than in countries with a few national forces. 
This difference plays a key role in terms of police 
innovation. The probability of finding a police force 
willing to experiment in new ways of policing, 
particularly in the field of relationships with the 
public, is increased by the number of police forces 
operating in a country. On the one hand, medium-
sized United States cities such as Flint in Michigan 
and Newport News in Virginia played an important 
role in respectively sponsoring community and 
problem-solving policing. However, on the other 
hand, large police forces are in a better position to 
implement a model of policing based on information 
technology and forensic sciences, because of their 
greater financial resources. Such was the case with 
the NYPD CompStat (comparative statistics) model, 
which acted as a magnet for international police 
management personnel who felt compelled to 
make their pilgrimage to New York even if they 
lacked the resources to implement such a model.
5. There are two kinds of coordination. Systemic 
coordination promotes consistency of action 
across one organisation and between several 
organisations with the same goals (e.g. various 
policing organisations, either public or private). Such 
coordination encompasses horizontal and vertical 
operational consistency. There is another kind of 
coordination that I will call process integration. It links 
different organisations that operate on a sequential 
basis. For instance, the police, the courts, corrections 
and post-correctional services are part of a process 
that is aiming to increase public security. With 
few exceptions, such as intensive zero-tolerance 
policing, the various reforms of public policing 
were initially intended to soften the most coercive 
edges of policing. There is no point in reaching 
out to citizens, if it only results in increasing their 
vulnerability to physical coercion. Nevertheless, 
there is a sharp disconnect of community policing 
from crime sentencing. In the showcase countries 
for community policing, such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, the rates of incarceration 
have never increased as much as when the drive 
towards community policing got into high gear.
The upshot of these remarks is twofold. First, all 
generalisations about policing are fragile: there are 
too many differences in policing to claim that one 
model applies to all police forces and even that it is 
implemented throughout an entire police organisation. 
Second, there is no guarantee that feel-good practices 
in policing will translate into a more humane society. 
The seeds of community policing have yet to blossom 
under the segregating sun of incarceration.
2.  Patterns of police and citizen 
relationships
As I just stressed there are numerous varieties of 
police-citizen relationships. I have tried to categorise 
them in three fundamental patterns that I will now try 
to characterise.
Police-led patterns
In all the variants of police reforms that were developed 
from 1975 onwards, the police retained the initiative. 
These reforms can be described in relation to four 
dimensions:
(1) police visibility — the belief that a conspicuous 
police presence increased people’s feelings of 
being in security;
(2) intensity — the extent to which police resorted to 
coercion;
(3) externality — the willingness to reach out for 
external output and to follow up on it; 
(4) intelligence processing — the need for basing 
policing intervention on sound knowledge.
The original design of this kind of reform was to 
maximise police visibility, to substitute consensus for 
coercion, to prioritise input from the community and 
form external partnerships, and to develop alternatives 
to criminal statistics templates in processing police 
intelligence. Community policing was to embody 
these original features and was initially assessed as 
being a promising start
However, it can be shown that police-led reform 
patterns developed in directions that conflicted with 
its original impetus.
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 — From Broken Windows to Zero Tolerance: ‘Broken 
windows’ was originally a catch phrase coined by 
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling in a famous 
paper published in 1982. Its original intent was to 
provide an argument in favour of ‘quality of life’ 
policing, which was criticised for being too soft 
on real criminals. This kind of policing focused 
on minor offences (e.g. vandalism), incivility 
and various forms of disorder that generated 
feelings of helplessness in the community. It was 
argued that such feelings led the members of 
a community to barricade themselves behind 
the locked doors of their dwellings, thus making 
their deserted neighbourhood into an open field 
for criminal enterprises. Broken windows policing 
was meant to assist citizens in reclaiming their 
neighbourhood and to revitalise their control 
over their environment. Instead of community 
empowerment, it eventually led to zero tolerance 
on the part of the police for any kind of civilian 
misbehaviour and led to a massive increase in the 
number of arrests. Aggressive plainclothes teams 
of police began to operate at night and intensive 
undercover operations replaced police visibility. 
Active coercion superseded the reliance on the 
power of symbols.
 — From community-orientated to problem-orientated 
policing: Community-orientated policing is 
a strategy to engage citizens as partners in the co-
production of security. This strategy stressing the 
need for externality is rather vague and short on 
tactics. This is the reason why problem-orientated 
policing quickly became an essential ingredient 
of community policing, although the two models 
are actually different, as Herman Goldstein, the 
father of problem-orientated policing, came to 
realise later on (Brodeur, 1998: 50-51). The insight 
underpinning problem-orientated policing is that 
police should not react to incidents, considered one 
by one, but should group similar incidents together 
in one category and solve the problem that they 
raise in one stroke. The key moment in this type 
of policing is the definition of the problem, which 
is achieved through the application of various 
knowledge-based methods by police analysts. 
In his influential book on problem-orientated 
policing, Goldstein (1990) is clear on the fact that 
‘the police cannot agree in advance that they 
will focus on the community’s choice’ (p. 71) and 
that ‘police officers on the beat are in the best 
position to identify problems from the bottom 
up’ (p. 73). This shift of emphasis from community 
input to police-processed intelligence became 
ever stronger as the police were conceived as 
‘knowledge workers’ (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). 
Community-orientated policing and problem-
orientated policing are actually orientated in 
opposite directions, although they are often 
mindlessly conflated (e.g. the infamous ‘COP-POP’, 
which sounds like a glib advertisement for some 
effervescent police drink).
 — From intelligence-led policing to policing-led 
intelligence (Cope, 2004): when he advocated the 
development of problem-orientated policing, 
Herman Goldstein expressed his concern that 
collecting intelligence relevant to the definition 
of security problems ought not to be confused 
with processing crime statistics. As he argued, the 
criminal label of ‘arson’ may be applied to problems 
as different as criminal negligence, insurance fraud, 
covering up a murder, not to mention expressive 
youth delinquency. All these specific problems call 
for a different solution. However, crime statistics 
are so enshrined in police culture that Goldstein 
wasn’t listened to. In many police departments, 
crime statistics are computerised on a narrow 
local basis (e.g. an urban neighbourhood) and 
precinct commanders are tasked with achieving 
a percentage decrease in selected crimes within 
a particular time frame. The consummate example 
of this strategy is the NYPD CompStat programme, 
which exercised a powerful influence on law and 
order politicians and on police executives. Many 
countries have now established so-called ‘crime 
observatories’, which limit themselves to the 
collection of crime statistics and the performance 
of minimal analyses on the patterns that they 
display. They play the same role with respect to 
true police intelligence that public opinion polls 
play in the study of public attitudes, which is 
to package complex matters in simple control-
friendly formats. Needless to say, the community 
has no say in these war games exclusively played 
by police executives and politicians. The New York 
Times reported on 7 February 2010 the findings 
of a survey of a hundred retired precinct captains 
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and higher-ranking officers conducted by two 
criminologists, John E. Eterno and Eli B. Silverman. 
According to this survey, the intense pressures to 
produce annual crime reductions generated by 
the implementation of the CompStat programme 
led these officers to manipulate crime statistics to 
produce the expected outcome (Rashbaum, 2010; 
see Chen, 2010 for the follow-up story). This rather 
unsurprising finding is all the more significant since 
one of the two researchers authored a book that 
did much to promote the reputation of the NYPD’s 
CompStat programme (Silverman, 1999).
 — From ‘what works’ policing to evidence-based 
policing: The impressive growth of evaluative 
research was the natural outcome of the drive 
towards police reform. With so many true or 
pretended innovations flooding the profession, 
it was reasonable to enquire whether they had 
productive results or not. The question ‘What 
works in policing’ became a rallying cry for many 
researchers as the end of the last millennium 
approached. Some of the proponents of the new 
models, such as Wesley Skogan, were among the 
most eager to test whether they worked or not. 
Like the previous ones that we discussed, this trend 
evolved significantly over time. First-generation 
assessments were very broad and methodologically 
unsophisticated. For instance, the whole field of 
criminal investigation was negatively assessed by 
Greenwood and Petersilia in 1975 (Greenwood and 
Petersilia, 1998). As time passed, evaluation research 
in police studies progressively modelled itself on 
experimental research as it was conducted in the 
more rigorous disciplines such as epidemiology 
in the medical sciences, with experimental and 
control groups, longitudinal cohorts and various 
research protocols (see the section devoted to 
evidence-based policing in Appendix I. It explicitly 
refers to the medical model as an ideal.) Members 
of the public may play a part in these enquiries in 
being consulted on their assessment of a police 
strategy, but the research itself is conducted by 
experts who assess the extent to which a practice 
works on the basis of factual evidence. The 
community policing practices that were initially 
tested to appraise whether they were empirically 
successful are now integrated into yet another kind 
of policing model in its own right, which is called 
evidence-based policing. I will not dwell on the fact 
that the epidemiological research is presently the 
target of mounting criticism (Taubes, 2007). Rather, 
I want to mention the fact that evidence-based 
therapies do not appear to provide an adequate 
and comprehensive foundation for medicine itself, 
where it originated. Evidence-proven therapies are 
actually small in number and narrowly constrained 
by the circumstances where they were shown to 
work. When faced with problems for which there is 
no or little precedent, doctors who were schooled in 
evidence-based medicine had either to improvise, 
a skill for which they had little or no training at all, 
or to apply an evidence-based remedy to a new 
problem for which it might be counter-productive 
(Groopman, 2007: 6-7). Needless to say, medicine is 
much more advanced scientifically than policing 
and the limits of testing police interventions to 
make them evidence-based are much more drastic 
in policing (there is no equivalent to laboratory 
animals for policing).
To sum up, despite expectations to the contrary, 
police-led reform patterns have evolved towards less 
police visibility in public spaces, more coercion, less 
external input and an increased reliance on traditional 
data processing and conservatively defined expertise.
Community-led patterns
Police research is generally conducted on a relatively 
small scale. However, an extensive research project — 
USD 51 million were devoted to funding this project — 
on the sources and consequences of urban disorder was 
conducted in Chicago at the end of the millennium by 
Felton Earls and his colleagues (Sampson, Raudenbush 
and Earls, 1997 and Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). 
One piece of this research involved 8 782 residents 
of 343 Chicago neighbourhoods (Sampson et al. 
1997); another one involved the videotaping of 23 
000 street segments in 193 Chicago neighbourhoods 
(Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). Although Chicago 
is also the city where community policing was 
implemented with the utmost care and is the most 
resilient, police researchers seem rather shy to refer to 
this other project that was also carried out in Chicago. 
The insight spurring Sampson, Earls and colleagues 
to undertake this vast research project was that 
endogenous collective action that sprang from within 
the community was more efficient to curb crime and 
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disorder than action instigated by formal agencies 
such as the police (Sampson et al. 1997: 918). One of the 
principal researchers in the Chicago project remarked 
that the number of yearly homicides plummeted from 
151 in 1991 to 35 after year 2000, apparently because 
a group of black ministers took to the streets to engage 
kids and work with adults to develop after-school 
programmes (Hurley, 2004).
The key concept of the Sampson team research is that 
of ‘collective efficacy’, defined as cohesion among 
neighbourhood residents, which is combined with 
shared expectations for the informal social control of 
public space. In the research, social cohesion/trust was 
represented by five conceptually related factors: the 
positive factors were willingness to help neighbours, 
close-knit social texture and trust; the negative factors 
were adverse relationships between the residents of 
a neighbourhood and failure to share the same values. 
Shared expectations were measured by asking some 
3 500 members of 196 neighbourhoods whether 
they could be counted on to act in various kinds of 
situations involving their children (e.g. ‘skipping school 
and hanging out on a street corner’), in witnessing 
violent conflict in front of their home and in acting 
against budgetary cuts in basic services (e.g. fire 
stations). Neighbourhoods showing the highest 
degree of cohesion/trust and of shared expectations 
experienced lower rates of violent crimes. It was also 
found that contrary to the ‘broken windows’ theory, 
the relationship between public disorder and crime 
was spurious except perhaps for robbery (Sampson 
and Raudenbush, 1999). Since the ‘broken windows’ 
assumptions are shared by the advocates of community 
policing, this refutation may account for the relative 
lack of communication between the community 
policing researchers and the Sampson team.
A crucial finding of this research programme was 
that collective efficacy did not occur in a vacuum. 
Home-ownership promoted collective efforts to 
maintain social control (Sampson et al. 1997: 919), 
whereas ‘concentrated disadvantage’ (poverty) seems 
to be an overwhelming obstacle to the willingness 
to intervene on behalf of the common good. These 
findings underline a characteristic feature of the 
research on collective efficacy: it is research on the 
‘what’ and not on the ‘how to’. Once a key number of 
structural features of neighbourhoods exist, collective 
willingness to act for the common good is an efficient 
way to achieve social control. The question then 
becomes: how is it possible to bring social cohesion 
and trust into a disadvantaged neighbourhood where 
there is no collective efficacy? Despite their failings, this 
is the question that advocates of community policing 
tried to answer and which the research on collective 
efficacy leaves open. It should also be mentioned that 
social programmes that made home-ownership easier 
for the ‘disadvantaged’ in various countries of Europe 
(especially in the United Kingdom — UK), did not 
impel in themselves a drop in the crime rates.
Community policing revisited
Despite the slide of policing innovation into patterns 
of expertise uncritically modelled on medical science 
and much less welcoming to community input, 
some community policing initiatives proved to be 
quite resilient and are even enjoying a resurgence of 
popularity. The most enduring of all the community 
policing experiences occurred in Chicago. The 
Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) began 
to be implemented on an experimental basis in five 
Chicago districts in 1993. The experiment proved 
successful and was extended to 20 other police 
districts in the following year. The CAPS programme is 
now operational in all Chicago police districts, with the 
five original prototype districts serving as a laboratory 
for testing new ideas and technology. Community 
involvement has remained to this day one of the 
cornerstones of CAPS.
The distinctive feature of CAPS and no doubt one of 
main reasons of its resiliency is that the operation of the 
programme was supervised from its initial stages up 
until now by a strong team of researchers who issued 
progress reports on its implementation every year and 
thoroughly assessed its results (see the bibliography 
of Skogan, 2006b: 338-39; special care was devoted to 
assessing the impact of the programme in 1997 and 
after its eighth, ninth and tenth years in existence). 
There was one unexpected finding of the assessment 
research that received a great deal of attention. 
Although CAPS worked well in the white and the 
black Chicago communities, it produced much less 
impressive results in the Hispanic community, where 
it was expected that it would work better than in 
the more violent context of the black communities. 
Research into this problem showed that engaging the 
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community was much more complex than originally 
believed. For instance, the assumption that residents of 
the Hispanic neighbourhoods spoke and understood 
English — the language used in community meetings 
with the police — proved to be mostly incorrect. 
This finding is particularly significant in today’s world 
marked by mass immigration and great ethnic and 
linguistic diversity.
The UK has also experimented with innovative models 
of policing, team policing having been first tested in 
Great Britain after World War II. This interest in policing 
innovation endured as the Home Office created 
what is perhaps the most productive research unit 
on policing and criminal justice. It was found that 
although the British police were making good progress 
in reducing major crimes, it was paradoxically losing 
ground in maintaining public confidence (Fielding and 
Innes, 2006; see the excerpt on reassurance police in 
Appendix I). The British then embarked on yet another 
new experiment in policing, called Reassurance 
Policing (RP) (see Appendix I; also see Tuffin, 2006). 
This development intentionally borrowed a great deal 
from CAPS. First, it reactivated the idea of engaging the 
community with a view to improving its confidence 
in the police. Second, it adopted CAPS’ focus on 
constant measurement of the impact of the police 
strategy being experienced. Lastly, it renewed with the 
‘Broken Windows’ perspective of targeting the sources 
of community feelings of insecurity. In so doing, it 
rediscovered that these feelings were not based on 
the fear of being a victim of a major crime but rather 
on conspicuous signs of disorder, such as abandoned 
vehicles (the deleterious effect of abandoned cars had 
long been highlighted in Wilson and Kelling’s seminal 
1982 piece on neighbourhood decay).
It remains to be seen whether resilient programmes 
such as CAPS or revitalised community engaging 
projects such as RP will stem the tide of expert policing 
where the role of the community is essentially passive.
3.  Policing and building trust
Setting aside limited programmes such as CAPS and 
RP, which seem to strike a balance between policing 
and community involvement, our previous discussions 
have identified two trends, both of which result in 
a split between the police and the community. On the 
one hand, policing reform is evolving towards forms 
of expert policing in which the reliance on scientific 
underpinnings is de facto — perhaps unintentionally — 
reducing the role of community input. On the other 
hand, the research on collective efficacy as measured 
by cohesion, trust and a willingness to act for the 
common good did not find that the police had made 
an important contribution to it. Consequently, we 
could explore two questions. One question would be 
how to reintegrate the community into expert policing. 
The second question has a reverse formulation: how 
to define the police contribution to collective efficacy. 
I shall devote my endeavours to exploring the second 
question, at times also touching upon the first. The 
research on collective efficacy is not (yet) focused on 
its policy implications and problem-solving capacity. 
It identifies the structural determinants that are 
positively and negatively related to collective efficacy. 
Concentrated disadvantages and poverty were found 
to be destructive of social cohesion and trust, which 
are the bases of collective efficacy. Is there a role for 
the police in re-establishing trust and social cohesion 
and thus restoring collective efficacy? This question is 
not entirely foreign to concerns that spurred James Q. 
Wilson and George Kelling to write their paper entitled 
‘Broken Windows’. Furthermore, the place of trust 
in policing is increasingly seen as central by police 
sociologists such as Peter Manning (2003). However, 
the study of trust in policing has not yet received the 
attention that it deserves and there are few findings 
that can be presented as definitive. My remarks will 
therefore be tentative, my aim being more to bring 
attention to a necessary debate than to articulate 
a doctrine.
A group of individuals committed to global peace and 
environmental sustainability has recently developed 
a Global Peace Index that can be consulted on the 
Vision of Humanity website. These individuals belong to 
the intelligence unit of the prestigious British magazine 
The Economist and to various university research 
centres. The index ranks the countries of the world 
according to their peaceful character, which is assessed 
through measurements taken on several dimensions. 
One of these dimensions is safety and security within 
a country. The first indicator of a lack of safety and 
security is the level of distrust in other citizens. This 
level is determined through various measurements, 
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one important measurement being the ratio of 
police per head of population. The reasoning behind 
such a measurement seems to be the following: the 
more citizens have to rely on the police in order to 
have peaceful relationships between themselves, the 
less they actually trust each other. This observation 
surely conforms to common sense, but as often 
happens with alleged common sense, things deserve 
further examination. There are rural areas where the 
police are generally unseen which are populated 
with people known to be highly mistrustful of each 
other. At the other end of the spectrum, when British 
society invented the modern police at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, it was not generally described 
by historians as a society that was experiencing 
a collapse in social cohesion and trust. What should be 
acknowledged from this very brief discussion of the 
Global Peace Index is that the relationship between 
policing and building trust is never one-dimensional. It 
generally takes the form of complex dilemmas where 
we have to carefully balance the elements involved 
in selecting the best option. I will now try to describe 
some of the main dilemmas.
 — Varieties of trust: there are two very different ways 
in which the police can build trust. They can strive 
to build trust or confidence in them as members 
of an institution. We might for lack of a better 
expression call that vertical trust (or more elegantly, 
confidence). Most attempts by the police at building 
trust are directed at vertical trust or confidence 
in them. There is a second variety of trust that is 
a feature of the relationships of the members of 
a community between themselves. We can call 
that horizontal trust (or narrowly apply the word 
trust only to this kind of relationship). The crucial 
difference between vertical and horizontal trust 
(or confidence and trust) is that only the latter is 
mutual and implies reciprocity. The police want to 
be trusted by the citizens but they are generally 
suspicious of them. Needless to say, the police can 
return trust in particular situations, as opposed to 
their professional culture of having to be suspicious.
 — Protectors and benefactors: some professions fall 
within the category of protectors (the police, 
the military, private security guards and so forth) 
and many others in the category of professional 
benefactors (doctors, teachers, and, more generally, 
service providers). There is one important difference 
between benefactors and protectors. Doing 
good implies two parties, the benefactor and the 
beneficiary, who are involved in a relationship of 
mutual satisfaction (when things work out well). 
Providing protection generally implies three parties; 
the protector, a potential victim being protected 
and a predator against which the potential victim 
is protected. This enforcement triangle is at the 
root of the need to make the distinction between 
the vertical and horizontal trust that was made 
above. Professionals who provide protection are 
by definition split between their loyalty towards 
real and potential victims and their aggressiveness 
against predators. In consequence, the police 
cannot be wholly included in the chain of mutual 
horizontal trust, as they have to be on the lookout 
for potential predators. This is also why it is difficult 
for the police to generate mutual trust between all 
the members of a community, since they partake 
in the exclusion of identified offenders from trust 
relationships. One thus needs to distinguish, 
as I suggested, between vertical trust, which is 
asymmetrical (non-reciprocal), and horizontal trust, 
which is symmetrical (mutual). The ambiguity of 
policing in relation to trust is reflected by research. 
A recent six-site evaluation of the British National 
Reassurance Policing Programme found that the 
programme had a positive impact on one of the 
social cohesion indicators: the percentage of 
people saying they trusted many or some of the 
people in their area increased by three percentage 
points across the trial sites and fell by two in the 
control sites. This effect was small and statistically 
significant in only one comparison between a trial 
and a control site. There was no overall effect on 
the other indicators of collective efficacy such 
as viewing one’s community as tightly knit and 
increasing community or voluntary activity (Tuffin, 
2006: 3).
 — Expertise and trust: as we previously argued, the 
possession of a recognised expertise is one of the 
major ways to build what we called vertical trust. 
Upon closer examination, it is not certain whether 
expertise generates actual trust or merely symbolic 
prestige. Expertise depends on a process of 
reconstructing experience to make it amenable to 
a scientifically calibrated intervention. The process 
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implies that the expert extracts from the rich texture 
of experience a few features that are usually subject 
to quantification and which he or she can act upon. 
This simplification of human experience — often 
of human suffering — may be so reductive that 
the reconstructed problem is perceived by those 
afflicted by it as being alien to their plight. In those 
situations, expertise is a source of discredit rather 
than a source of trust. Psychiatric expertise fell into 
disrepute for a time for having lost its mooring to 
mental illness as actually experienced by patients. 
Despite all the warnings on the crippling nature 
of crime labels, police expertise is still almost 
exclusively focused on criminal statistics and 
communication formats that have a tenuous link 
with the concrete problems that arise in the field. 
As Peter Manning stressed in his last book, the 
police ‘communicational system (then) becomes 
a source of distrust’ (Manning, 2003: 230).
 — Police and citizens: police and citizens interact 
in many ways. (1) The citizens are police clients, 
either on an individual basis by calling the police 
or on a collective basis by making known their 
demands for service through public consultations 
and through the constitution of pressure groups 
upholding, for instance, the rights of victims; (2) 
They are the prime source of information for the 
police and it is unlikely that this situation will be 
substantially reversed by surveillance technology; 
(3) They provide vital assistance to the police 
through formal partnerships or through informal 
networks influencing behaviour; (4) Their role at 
the court level — as witnesses, members of juries 
or in other capacities — is also indispensable; 
(5) They finally act at a distance through public 
opinion surveys, although it is questionable 
whether it is their own opinion that is expressed 
through these surveys. Vertical trust (confidence 
in the police) plays a fundamental role in each of 
these types of relationship. Mistrustful citizens do 
not call the police, consult with them, inform them 
or become police witnesses, or assist them unless 
forced to do so. They also tend to savage the police 
in public-opinion surveys when their trust in them 
is decreasing.
 — Public consultations: public consultations play an 
important part in the generation of both of the kinds 
of trust that I discussed. Having been involved in 
many police consultations with the public, I would 
like to draw attention to the fact that there are two 
different ways of consulting with the public. Most 
frequently, what is sought by the police is public 
approbation of a plan that has been pre-established 
by them without external input. The scope of the 
amendments that can be introduced by the public 
to the plan is narrowly limited. In the best of cases, 
the priorities have not been predetermined by 
the police organisation and can be amended by 
the public. These instances are fewer, because the 
police fear — not always without justification — 
that their agenda is then going to be set by moral 
entrepreneurs and would-be politicians within the 
community.
 — A clash of trusts: the border between trust and 
suspicion is very porous and unbridled trust in the 
police can morph into mutual suspicion among 
citizens. Citizens inform the police, either because 
they trust them or because they are in fear of them. 
There is however a threshold beyond which they 
end up relinquishing the mutual trust that binds 
them for the dubious benefits proffered them by 
the police. The citizenry then becomes a nation of 
informers, of which the twentieth century offered 
many examples. Principled historians tend to 
exaggerate fear over zealotry in the generation of 
police states. What happens here is that one kind 
of trust destroys another, and more basic, kind, 
confidence in the police overtakes mutual trust 
among citizens.
 — Punitive populism: much has been said in the 
UK about punitive populism. Research that 
I conducted when I was director of research for 
the Canadian Sentencing Commission (Canada, 
1987), that is, long before the problem of punitive 
populism was raised, produced troubling findings, 
which have been replicated several times since 
then (Brodeur and Shearing, 2005). Under the 
assumption that crime is a breach of security, 
a sample of the Canadian public was asked what 
was the most effective way to control crime: only 
4 % answered that increasing the number of 
police was the answer, as compared to 27 % who 
said that making sentences harsher was the most 
effective measure (Canada, 1987, Table 6, p. 485). 
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To the question of where the main responsibility 
for controlling crime should be laid, only 8.3 % 
answered that it lay with the police, as compared 
to 24 % for whom it rested with the courts (Canada, 
1987, Table 12, p. 490). For reasons that are difficult to 
fathom, the public tends to invest judges imposing 
punishment rather than the preventive police 
with the duty of providing them with security. 
When members of the public actually take part in 
criminal justice decision-making, such as granting 
parole, they often make harsher decisions than 
the professionals. It was also shown that the police 
tend to resist the more repressive demands by the 
public, such as performing an arrest (Mastrofski et 
al. 1995). This undeniable punitive streak should 
keep us from sentimentality when we claim more 
public participation. It does not always generate 
trusting relationships. On the contrary, it is now 
clearly emerging that the most basic ‘right’ that is 
claimed by victims and relatives of victims is their 
alleged right to have the person who victimised 
them punished with enough severity to allow for 
‘closure’, that is, closing a traumatising chapter 
of their life and moving beyond their grief. This 
perverted right to atonement is a travesty of the 
original victim’s rights movement.
 — Asymmetrical impact of police behaviour: in 2006, the 
journal Policing and Society devoted in 2006 a whole 
issue to reassurance policing. This issue contains an 
important paper by Wesley Skogan (2006c). Several 
studies of police encounters with the public have 
found that how citizens rated their satisfaction in the 
context of such an encounter had an impact on their 
confidence in the police. Moreover, these studies 
also highlighted that the impact of a satisfactory 
encounter and of a frustrating encounter with the 
police were markedly different. It was assumed by 
the researchers that the police may get essentially 
no credit for delivering a professional service, while 
bad experiences can deeply influence people’s 
views of their performance. This hypothesis 
was tested using survey data on police-initiated 
and citizen-initiated contacts with the police in 
Chicago. The findings indicate that the impact of 
having a bad experience is four to fourteen times 
as great as that of having a good experience and 
that the coefficients measuring the positive impact 
of having a good experience were not statistically 
different from zero (Skogan, 2006c: 99). The 
experience was replicated in seven other urban 
areas located in three different countries with 
similar results. Skogan rather direly concludes that 
‘the empirical message is, unfortunately: ‘You can’t 
win, you can just cut your losses. No matter what 
you do, it only counts when it goes against you.’ 
(Skogan, 2006c: 119).
 — Threats and guarantees: the preceding remarks 
do not point to a positive role of the police in 
building trust. However, the notion that the police 
can do more harm than good in the construction 
of a trusting society seems to me too pessimistic, 
although it is not without foundation in respect 
to what is presently known. This does not mean 
that we cannot explore how the police could play 
a more constructive role. One of the insights of 
early criminology was that there is a hard core that 
pervades the most harmful forms of crime, which 
either embody violence or deception. Policing 
has so far been mainly conceived as a form of 
counter-violence (as in ‘counter-terrorism’), that is, 
a legitimate defensive reaction against predatory 
violence. However, this only takes care of one part 
of the hard core of crime. Deception is not only 
instrumental in a great number of very harmful 
crimes, but it is the main factor undermining trust, 
its arch-enemy, as it were. The management of trust 
is a complex endeavour in the field of economics, 
where establishing and maintaining confidence 
implies the use of practical means that go beyond 
the cultivation of mutual feelings. Offering 
guarantees plays a special role in the furtherance of 
trust. English words such as ‘guarantee’, ‘warranty’ 
or the French word ‘garantie’ and its derivatives 
originally referred to a process of certification of 
the truth or authenticity of persons (and what 
they claimed to be), substances, and products. 
Interestingly enough, all these words derive from 
the ancient Indo-European root ‘wer’, which meant 
‘true’. This verbal root is the origin of words such 
as ‘verus’, ‘vrai’ and ‘wahr’, which respectively mean 
‘true’ in Latin, French and German. As is plain to 
see, this same root is also the source of ‘guaranty/
guarantee’, ‘warranty’ and similar words in various 
languages. In the same way that the police use 
legitimate force against predatory violence, could 
they not act in some capacity as ‘guarantors’ or 
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‘trustees’ against the abuses caused by deception? 
Needless to say, such mechanisms of certification 
are already functioning in many sectors of activity 
(e.g. the economy, the arts and various markets). 
Yet there is still a vast amount of deception that 
is exercised at grass roots level in the daily lives of 
many relatively helpless victims, particularly the 
elderly. The police could play an important role 
in a process of ‘certification’ of micro-transactions 
and social relationships and thus contribute in 
a positive manner to the establishment of a more 
trusting society. It must be stressed that the police 
are already called to perform such a function at 
the most basic level of the protection of personal 
identity.
4. Concluding comments
The preceding analyses emphasise the point that 
policing has grown enormously in complexity. As they 
do not point to one all-encompassing conclusion, 
I would like to just offer a few concluding comments.
I do not believe that the momentum of information-
based policing will be lost in the short and mid 
terms as it builds on powerful social undercurrents 
that are felt almost everywhere. I would nevertheless 
like to raise two questions. First, reviewing police 
reforms over the last thirty years should make us 
very cautious in our assessment of how profound 
and enduring the changes really are. Some police 
departments claimed to have, at one time or another, 
been through all eleven models that are described in 
Appendix I. One sometimes gets the impression that 
police departments — like other organisations — are 
split in their personnel between an upward-moving 
cadre that is stimulated by all forms of innovation and 
a hardened thick underbelly of rank-and-file personnel 
convinced that policing is an immutable routine 
requiring minimal training and no education of the 
mind. Second, evolving from information-fed practices 
that may thrive on rumours to truly knowledge-based 
interventions requires a quantum leap. The confusion 
between the data smog and factual expertise can be 
fatal to a policing organisation.
We have also seen that we were more knowledgeable 
in the ways that the police could undermine trust and 
collective efficacy than in the ways that they could 
promote them. I also have two comments to make about 
this situation. First, although a great deal of the criticism 
directed at the police is rhetorical and even prejudiced, 
I think that we should not belittle the capacity for social 
mischief of some of the harder edges of policing. The 
galloping militarisation of riot policing is for me inimical 
to the pursuit of a peaceful society. The recycling of riot 
police units into part-time ‘community’ functions to 
keep them busy is courting disaster, as it is now being 
experienced in France. My second remark is in line with 
the first one. If we had not been as fascinated as we 
were with the so-called monopoly of the police in the 
use of legitimate force, we might be in a better position 
to develop thoughtful anti-deception strategies that 
would be more efficient than forceful physical action 
in building confidence in the police and trust among 
citizens.
Finally, the bigger issue that lies at the bottom of 
engaging the community is democratic policing. 
I cannot review in this concluding paragraph all the 
criteria that jointly define democratic policing and will 
limit myself to observations that have a link with the 
matters previously discussed.
 — Police visibility: the issue of police visibility is broader 
than deploying foot patrols to reassure citizens. 
Although police undercover work is necessary 
to fight organised crime or terrorism, there is no 
more efficient way to destroy the social fabric of 
a community than stealth policing and infiltration. 
The basic core of police visibility is physical: citizens 
can actually see the police as they ought to, the 
greater part of the staff of police organisations 
working in uniform. However, there are other 
important ways in which the police should be 
open to the public, one of them being to issue 
public statements of policy.
 — Police openness: the notion of openness is 
problematic. We all know intuitively what it 
means, but we experience difficulties in explicitly 
formulating its meaning, precisely because we are 
so familiar with it. I will tentatively propose this 
limited formulation: an open organisation is one 
that is able to have contact with outsiders, which 
are neither overtly nor covertly shaped exclusively 
by power. To illustrate the point, most contact 
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between the police and the public is structured 
by the power of the police. A police organisation 
that can receive external input in the context 
of a dialogue between equals, where there is 
no hidden agenda, is making steps in the right 
direction to become an open organisation.
 — Police containment: the most basic characteristic of 
a police state is that the police extend their reach 
so far that they become a criminal/political justice 
system in themselves. In addition to their traditional 
order maintenance and crime-detection functions, 
undemocratic policing systems usurp the functions 
of the court system and they operate their own 
correctional facilities. Western democracies are not 
at risk of falling into such a totalitarian pit — pace 
Guantanamo and CIA ‘black sites’. What must be 
kept at bay are incremental police appropriations 
of the prerogatives of their criminal justice partners, 
such as the meting out of ‘street justice’ where the 
police are at the same time investigators, judges 
and punishers.
 — Police accountability: this requirement is the most 
obvious and much has been said about it. I will 
only add one brief note. We are misguided in 
taking a problem-solving approach to police 
accountability. Police accountability is not 
a problem but a predicament. Not being a problem 
in the technical sense of the word, accountability 
does not admit of one definitive answer, such 
as creating a unique body for processing public 
complaints against individual police and for 
overseeing security policy. Being a predicament, 
police accountability is constantly evolving and 
ways to secure it must be constantly reinvented. 
Government oversight agencies tend to lose their 
teeth over time and must be replaced.
There are no doubt other conditions that must be 
respected for democratic policing to be vibrant. What 
I said about the four criteria that I addressed should be 
revised, expanded or rejected.
Appendix I: Policing models
Community-orientated policing
It is defined by three core elements. (1) Community 
involvement: community policing is defined in part 
by efforts to develop partnerships with community 
members and the civic organisations that represent 
many of them collectively. It requires that police engage 
with the public as they set priorities and develop their 
tactics; (2) Community policing also involves a shift 
from reliance on reactive patrol and investigations 
towards a problem-solving orientation. Problem-
orien tated policing is, in the context of community-
orientated-police, an approach to developing crime-
reduction strategies. It highlights the importance of 
discovering the situations that produce calls for ‘police 
assistance’, identifying the causes which lie behind 
them and designing tactics to deal with these causes; 
(3) decentralisation is an organisational strategy that is 
closely linked to the implementation of community 
policing.
(Wesley Skogan, in Weisburd and Braga,  
2006, Chapter 2.)
Problem-orientated policing
Problem-orientated policing is guided by three 
principles. The empirical principle states that the public 
demands that the police handle a diverse range of 
problems. The normative principle claims that police 
are supposed to reduce problems rather than simply 
respond to incidents and apply the relevant criminal 
law. The scientific principle asserts that police should 
take a scientific approach to the problem. Police should 
apply analytical approaches and interventions based 
on sound theory and evidence, just as the decisions of 
doctors are supposed to be based on medical science.
(John Eck, in Weisburd and Braga,  
2006, Chapter 6)
The ‘Broken Windows’ Approach
The core ideas of the ‘broken windows’ approach 
were presented in the 1982 article published in the 
Atlantic Monthly. (1) Disorder and fear of crime are 
strongly linked; (2) Police negotiate rules of the street. 
‘Street people’ are involved in the negotiation of those 
rules; (3) Different neighbourhoods have different 
rules; (4) Unintended disorder leads to breakdown 
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of community controls; (5) Areas where community 
controls break down are vulnerable to criminal invasion; 
(6) ‘The essence of the police role in maintaining order 
is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the 
community itself.’; (7) Problems arise not so much from 
individual disorderly persons as from the congregation 
of large numbers of disorderly persons; (8) Different 
neighbourhoods have different capacities to manage 
disorder.
(William H. Sousa and George L. Kelling, 
in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, Chapter 4.)
Pulling-levers policing
Pulling-levers strategies are one fruit of the problem-
orientated policing movement. It emerged as part 
of the Boston Gun Project aimed at youth ‘gang’ 
violence in Boston. Pulling levers (all legal tools 
and sanctions) or focused deterrence strategies 
deploy enforcement, services, the moral voices of 
communities and deliberate communications in order 
to create a powerful deterrent to particular behaviour 
by particular offenders. It includes: (1) Selection of 
a particular crime problem; (2) Pulling together a public 
criminal justice interagency enforcement group (police, 
probation, parole, prosecutors and federal agencies); 
(3) Conducting research, usually relying heavily on the 
field experience of front-line police officers to identify 
key offenders (including groups) and the context of 
their behaviour; (4) Framing a special enforcement 
operation directed at those offenders and groups of 
offenders; (5) Matching those enforcement operations 
with parallel efforts to direct services and the moral 
voices of affected communities to those same 
offenders groups; (6) Communicating directly and 
repeatedly with offenders and group to let them know 
that they are under particular scrutiny… One form of 
this communication is the ‘forum’, ‘notification’ or ‘call 
in’, in which offenders are invited or directed (usually 
because they are on probation or parole) to attend 
face-to-face meetings with law enforcement officials, 
service providers, and community figures.
(David M. Kennedy, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006 
Chapter 8.)
Third-party policing
Third-party policing is defined as police efforts to 
persuade or coerce organisations or non-offending 
persons, such as public housing agencies, property 
owners, parents, health and building inspectors, 
and business owners to take some responsibility for 
preventing crime or reducing crime problems.
(Lorraine Mazerolle and Janet Ransley, in Weisburd 
and Braga, 2006, Chapter 10.)
Hotspots policing
The idea of hotspots policing can be traced to recent 
critiques of traditional criminological theory. For 
most of the last century criminologists have focused 
their understanding of crime on individual and 
communities… The emphasis placed on individual 
motivation in criminological theory failed to recognise 
the importance of other elements in the crime equation. 
They noted that for criminal events to occur there is 
a need not only for a criminal, but also for a suitable 
target and the absence of a capable guardian…One 
natural outgrowth of these perspectives was that the 
specific places where crime occurs would become an 
important focus for crime prevention researchers… In 
the mid to late 1980s a group of criminologists began 
to examine the distribution of crime at microplaces…
Perhaps the most influential of these studies was 
conducted by Larry Sherman and his colleagues. 
Looking at crime addresses in Minneapolis they found 
a concentration of crime at places that was startling. 
Only three per cent of the addresses of Minneapolis 
accounted for 50 percent of the crime calls to the 
police…The idea of focusing police patrol on crime 
hotspots represented a direct application of the 
empirical findings regarding the concentration of 
crime in microplaces…In policing, most innovation 
has been developed using what might be termed 
a ‘clinical model.’ In such a model, research may play 
a role, but the adoption of innovation is determined by 
the experiences of practitioners and often has little to 
do with research evidence. Such models have a weak 
theoretical basis… Our discussion of hot spohotspots 
policing suggests an alternative model for police 
innovation. Hot spots policing was consistent with 
developing theoretical insights in criminology and was 
supported by basic criminological research on crime 
and place.
(Weisburd and Braga, in Weisburd and Braga, 2006, 
Chapter 12)
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Evidence-based policing for crime prevention
In characterising the evidence-based model with 
respect to policing, it is important to first define what 
is meant by the term ‘evidence’. Evidence is taken to 
mean scientific, not criminal evidence…At the heart 
of the evidence-based model is the notion that ‘we 
are all entitled to our own opinions, but not to our 
own facts’ (Larry Sherman)… In an evidence-based 
model, the source of scientific evidence is empirical 
research in the form of evaluations of programmes, 
practices and policies. But not all evaluations are made 
equal. Some are more scientifically valid than others. 
The randomised controlled experiment is the most 
convincing method of evaluation crime-prevention 
programmes…Evidence-based policing is a part 
of a larger and increasingly expanding evidence-
based movement. In general terms, this movement 
is dedicated to the betterment of society through 
utilisation of the highest-quality evidence on what 
works best. The evidence-based movement first began 
in medicine and has, more recently, been embraced by 
the social sciences.
(Brandon G Welsh, in Weisburd and Braga,  
2006, Chapter 16)
CompStat
CompStat is most frequently understood by its most 
visible elements today. These include: up-to-date 
computerised crime data, crime analysis and advanced 
crime mapping as the basis for regularised, interactive 
crime strategy meetings which hold managers 
accountable for specific crime strategies and solutions 
in their areas.
CompStat, however, is a far more complex product 
of changes in management and organisational 
arrangements, including flattening, decentralisation, 
greater personnel authority, discretion and autonomy, 
geographic managerial accountability, and enhanced 
problem-solving. Based on the New York experience, it 
is my view that CompStat cannot be a fully viable entity 
if the above administrative, managerial and operational 
activities do not precede it.
(Eli B. Silverman, in Weisburd and Braga,  
2006, Chapter 14)
Reassurance policing
Reassurance policing is a model of neighbourhood 
policing which seeks to improve public confidence 
in policing. It involves local communities in 
identifying priority crime and disorder issues in their 
neighbourhood which they then tackle together with 
the police and other services and partners.
(Richard Tuffin, 2006: 1)
Reassurance policing (RP) seeks to address the gap 
between broadly improving indicators of risk of 
criminal victimisation and declining indicators of 
public confidence…Through its orientation to ‘signal 
crimes’, events that disproportionately influence the 
public’s sense of security, RP is almost intrinsically 
‘about measurement’. A core practice involves police 
officers and auxiliaries working with the public at beat 
level to identify physical and social ‘signals’ (positive 
and negative) and marrying diagnosed reassurance 
inhibitors with action to address the problem 
(e.g. having abandoned vehicles removed from 
neighbourhoods).
(Nigel Fielding and Martin Innes,  
2006: 130)
Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS)
Community policing is not a set of specific projects; 
rather it involves changing decision-making processes 
and creating new cultures within police departments. It 
is an organisational strategy that leaves setting priorities 
and the means of achieving them largely to residents 
and the police who serve in their neighbourhoods. 
Community policing is a process rather than a product.
Across the nation it has proved to have three core 
strategic components: decentralisation, citizen 
involvement and problem solving. In practice 
these three dimensions are densely interrelated. 
Departments that short-change even one of them will 
not field a very effective programme.
(Wesley Skogan, 2006b: 5-6)
Intelligence-led policing
The (National Intelligence) Model (NIM) provides the 
picture that drives effective strategy, not just about 
crime and criminals, but for all enforcement needs, 
119
Trust and expertise in policing
from organised crime to road safety. It is capable of 
use in relation to new or emerging problems within 
a force or operational command unit; to provide the 
strategic and operational focus to force, organisation 
or local command unit business planning…This 
work is the outcome of a desire to professionalise 
the intelligence discipline within law enforcement…
It is also recognition of the changing requirements 
of law enforcement managers which highlights three 
particular needs: to plan and work in cooperation 
with partners to secure community safety; to manage 
performance and risk; to account for budgets.
(National Crime Intelligence Service (2000),  
The National Intelligence Model (available on NIM 
Web site)
NIM is an information-based deployment system and 
a cornerstone for the management of law enforcement 
operations in England and Wales. Historically most 
policing has been driven by the need to respond to 
calls from the public. This is necessary police business 
but crime and incident patterns are not identified. 
NIM identifies patterns of crime and enables a more 
fundamental approach to problem solving in which 
resources can be tasked efficiently against an accurate 
understanding of crime and incidents problems. NIM 
promotes a cooperative approach to policing and 
many of the solutions to problems will require the 
participation of other agencies and bodies. It is further 
strengthened when used in conjunction with other 
partner agencies, eg, joint tasking and coordination 
processes, and when it incorporates community 
information into the strategic assessment.
(Guidance on The National Intelligence Model, 
2005. Produced on behalf of the Association of 
Chiefs of Police Officers by the National Centre for 
Policing Excellence, CENTREX)
A note on sources: the majority of the definitions 
consist of selected quotes or paraphrases excepted 
from Weisburd and Braga (2006). This is a useful book 
as it brings together 17 key proponents of innovation 
in policing, asking them to define and argue for the 
model that they advocate. Each advocate is paired 
with a critic.
The sources for the other definitions, which 
include researchers in government agencies, were 
chosen because of their close relationship with the 
development of a particular model.
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Future of Policing: Policing the 
future? Lessons from the past to 
understand the present
Didier Bigo
France
(2009 Conference in Bad Hoevedorp)
Introduction (1)
Contrary to what European experts expected 
concerning an area of freedom, security and justice, 
this field has seen some of the most active creation of 
standardised rules within the EU. After 11 September 
2001, as no one dared to ignore the question of 
security any more, it gained in importance and became 
a central issue in the debates between Member 
States and institutions concerning the boundaries of 
their respective powers. The EU’s zealous activity in 
the issue contradicted predictions for a sector that, 
according to advocates of national sovereignty, should 
never be managed on the European scale because it 
was too closely linked to a state’s sovereign activities 
and that, according to integrationists, could not work 
due to the overly complex problems that would make 
it impossible to meet security needs for all of Europe.
This excessive activity was not evenly distributed 
however, and while countless European measures 
in favour of security, border control and surveillance 
within and beyond its borders were adopted, along 
with numerous measures in favour of cooperative 
legal investigations, the same can hardly be said for 
individuals’ right to defence in judicial matters, or for 
extending the same rights and freedoms to citizens 
and foreigners residing in EU territory. It has reinforced 
(1) The author wants to thank Christian Olsson for his comments. 
The article is part of a larger project which will be published 
under the direction of Didier Bigo and Christian Olsson ‘ the 
mapping of the EU internal security agencies II’, Cultures et 
Conflicts –CCC5-, L’Harmattan (2010)
a trend which may create difficulties in the future, but 
which is part of a pattern characterising at least the 
last 50 years of European policing and that is difficult 
to change. Nevertheless it is possible to create the 
conditions of possibility of a more legitimate form 
of policing at the European and transatlantic levels if 
serious adjustments concerning the presumption of 
innocence and privacy are made immediately and 
if the trend towards prevention, control of mobility 
and technologisation is reversed in favour of a more 
criminal justice and rule-of-law-bound orientation.
This article is based on the results of research on the 
contemporary field of the EU internal security agencies 
and on its genesis (Bigo, Guild and Walker, 2010) (2). 
It will sum up some of the findings concerning the 
history of European policing in order to discuss what 
its future might be (Bigo et al., 2007).
For many people (professionals of security, professionals 
of politics, journalists, the larger public), and still 
today, security (meaning internal security, including 
monitoring and controlling foreigners when they 
cross borders), justice (simplifying and speeding up 
procedures in criminal matters) and freedom (free 
movement of people and freedom from fear of severe 
threats) are bound together under the heading of 
what some continue to call Justice and Home Affairs, 
(2) Project financed by the 6PCRD. More on www.libertysecurity.
org. CD and DVD are available for training course purposes. Ask 
didier.bigo.conflits@gmail.com For a more complete description 
see Bigo, Didier et al. (2007), The Field of the EU Internal Security 
Agencies. Paris: Centre d’études sur les conflits/l’Harmattan.
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the label chosen by the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 
to designate the content of the third pillar of the EU. 
For them, these activities have to be principally the 
responsibility of the Ministries of Interior of the Member 
States, and not the responsibility of the Ministries 
of Justice or of Fundamental rights and citizenship 
Ministries, departments or agencies in these same 
Member States. They often dismiss European policing 
and consider it superfluous. Even if they know about it 
and are supportive, they think it is a new phenomenon, 
in its infancy. This is wrong.
European policing has been constituted as a rope 
woven by four strings (see graph), which have each 
reinforced its strength. These strings can be analysed 
as a series of events which all make sense on their own, 
but which have to be interlinked by a mapping process 
in order to understand their logic.
The first one and the most well-known is to understand 
European policing as a product of community 
development and as a tension between the pooling 
of national sovereignties, harmonisation, mutual 
recognition, mutual ‘trust’ and a core of common 
standards. It has been profoundly marked by the 
EU enlargements and their access to freedom of 
movement of persons internally, with key landmarks 
such as the single European act of 1986, the Maastricht 
and Amsterdam Treaties and the creation of European 
internal security agencies as well as the summits of 
Tampere, The Hague or Stockholm. It is an important 
trend and a changing one, which frames the 
boundaries and the legitimacy of European policing. 
As the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrates, it 
may completely reshape the relationships between the 
actors who believed that the third pillar would exist 
forever, but it is not at all a complete picture.
Long before the development of the European 
Communities, European policing was shaped by 
informal and intergovernmental police and intelligence 
services’ cooperation at the European and transatlantic 
levels. This second string can be traced back to the 
1880s and the inter-war period. It was strengthened 
during the cold war, especially for intelligence services, 
and gained notoriety in the mid-seventies when the 
European governments had to prove that they were 
active against the internal terrorism of that time, quickly 
labelled ‘Euroterrorism’ in the mid-eighties. It has 
continued in parallel with Community development, 
even if sometimes the two strings were interwoven 
but in contradiction, and after September 11 2001, it 
has been pushed through, with the Prüm agreement 
and mainly in favour of a line of thought favouring the 
United States intelligence services and their methods. 
The United States intelligence and police services have 
for long been active in the EU and they have constituted 
their own system with the department of homeland 
security, but they have also learned a lot from the EU 
databases and information networks, which were 
older than many of the United States ones in matters 
of policing and were already applying the principle of 
interoperability.
This technologisation of policing through the 
extension of information networks available to police 
and intelligence services has been one of the central 
elements of the present. It may be considered as a third 
specific string It has developed a different form of 
policing; a form of so-called preventive or pre-crime 
policing through data mining and the pretence to 
know the future behaviour of unknown individuals. 
The multiplication of projects involving interconnected 
databases and the dream of total information awareness 
has induced a will to create a ‘police industry complex’ 
using the surveillance tools already developed in 
other locations (banking, taxes, social security, local 
communities, schools) and a profitable market for some 
companies. In addition to SIS and Eurodac, the years after 
2004 have seen the development of multiple projects 
not yet finalised as SIS2, VIS, Eurosur, EU-PNR and so on. It 
has increased exponentially the transatlantic links with 
ESTA, Swift and may have played a role in the European 
complicity in extraordinary renditions by creating the 
sense of common interests, going as far as to consider 
that Europe was also at war against terror, and not only 
in a policing mission against terrorism.
Last but not least, it has also re-activated the de-
differentiation of internal and external dimensions of 
European policing and security and has created the 
bureaucratic label of the external dimension of AFSJ 
to say that we have an external dimension of internal 
security, without discussing what that means. The 
internal security strategy document is particularly 
interesting in this respect and shows that this label or 
acronym has blocked any serious discussion about the 
limits of this area in terms of collaboration, exchange of 
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information or/and integration through technological 
platforms, as we will see in the conclusion.
1. Origins of European police 
collaboration: a necessity for 
understanding current developments
Newspapers and analysts of public policies tend 
to believe that to account for the past is to go back 
several years in time. In this regard 2001 now appears 
as a landmark for speaking of European policing, 
as if everything changed at that moment, and as 
if nothing existed before. It is a dangerous illusion 
and an easy way to de-responsibilise part of the 
European networks of policing, and to charge the Bush 
administration for tendencies largely shared by some 
European networks. Even to make things start with the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties is quite a limited 
view. It is certainly important for the juridicisation of 
European policing and for the formalisation of police 
agreements, respectful of the rule of law and allowing 
judges to look more carefully into what is going on. It is 
however also only one small part of the picture, even if 
it is the most official one.
As we said, law and constitutions draw official 
boundaries that are central for the legitimacy of 
policing, and especially of transnational policing, 
which cannot be considered as foreign affairs or 
diplomatic matters only, or as an add-on to a military 
logic. But a legal view is also misleading. That is why it 
is central to look first at all the informal agreements or 
at the complex networks of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements that have existed from the Second World 
War onwards and even before. It allows understanding 
that some of these agreements still shape our present 
and maybe our future in terms of policing. Our research 
shows that the origins of this cooperation seem to have 
come full circle in the relationships between America 
and Europe, and that the transatlantic relationships 
in terms of policing that we re-discover now — to 
applause or criticism — were obscured in the eighties 
and nineties, but can be traced back largely before this 
period and have never been completely severed. The 
future of European policing then may be dependent on 
its relationship with the United States, and especially in 
regard to the competition of EU and United States for 
an industry of surveillance technologies.
From nation-state to European policing? 
A juridical perception and its ambiguities
The three treaties that instituted the European 
Community did not deal with these fields of policing 
and justice, or even freedom; they merely evoked free 
movement of workers and services, with no answer 
to the question of non-workers and family members 
of a worker, leaving them to be determined by the 
Court of Justice at a later stage (Guild and Lesieur, 
1998; Stone Sweet and Caporaso, 1998). They also 
made it seem preferable for Europeans to encourage 
free movement in Europe to the detriment of free 
movement worldwide. Economic reasoning focused 
on creating a specific economic zone with a single 
tariff policy laid at the heart of the project; questions 
concerning public freedoms and policing were only 
marginal concerns.
Does that imply then that questions of justice and 
security were the last to be raised at the European 
level; that they were merely a last-minute spill-over 
because they fell under sovereign prerogatives? 
If we consult only the legal acts that tie their 
creation to the Convention applying the Schengen 
Agreement in 1990 and the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, this does seem to be the case: these questions 
only appear in European law via a sort of shortcut 
in the form of international agreements between 
certain Member States, which were then partially or 
completely Europeanised. But this belief of lawyers, 
that they can identify the origins of European 
policing through the process of legislating, is quite 
illusionary, and the argument of a struggle between 
communautarisation versus national sovereignty as 
the key element to understand policing is useless. 
Policing was transnational before it was Europeanised. 
It has nothing to do with a ‘spill over’.
So, if we use a wider sociological reading of this issue, 
far from showing that European policy on security and 
justice lags behind economic and social developments, 
it shows that cooperation in legal and police matters 
began in Europe well before Maastricht and even 
before the Rome Treaty.
The strength of informal networks and their 
transatlantic characteristics
Unlike judicial cooperation, police cooperation has 
always taken place behind the scenes through informal 
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networks recognised by the authorities only officially 
many years after their establishment. The first actual 
cooperation dates back to the 1880s with the exchange 
of information about the anarchist threat and efforts to 
institute cooperation among police to combat crime 
by creating individual records. This shows that contrary 
to popular belief, police cooperation does in fact date 
back to the time when national police forces were 
established (Fijnaut, 1987). However, we can consider 
the modern police and intelligence networks to be 
essentially products of the post-war era, intended 
in particular to establish rules for the protection of 
personal data.
The 1950s also saw the creation of informal, trans-
national intelligence networks that were often secret 
and of which the founders of Europe were only partially 
aware. Most of them were transatlantic in origin or 
created around the colonial organisation in effect 
then. Exchanges between police intelligence services 
were often also transatlantic, operating between 
Western Europeans, North Americans, Australians, New 
Zealanders and Israelis. Cooperation was based on 
‘friendly relations’ between departments and gave rise 
to distinct networks — cooperation between police 
counter-espionage departments, between military 
departments within NATO and between English-
speaking countries more or less independently from 
the other, more-European networks. Cooperation 
between intelligence departments was quickly 
separated from police cooperation, including the 
anti-terrorist Trevi Group, and they used separate 
information channels. They often favoured informal, 
top-level and operational meetings, refusing the more 
strictly organised and legal approach taken by law 
enforcement within their networks.
Conversely, formalising cooperation via ICPO-Interpol 
and bilateral exchanges between polices led to more 
regulation and surveillance of police cooperation 
by legal courts. Many within the police felt that the 
information channels had become too long and 
complicated. The success of Interpol in the 1960s was 
part of this trend, but by moving rapidly to a global scale, 
it became a source of tension between Americans and 
Europeans, both of whom were vying for leadership 
of the institution. It also led to a desire within Europe 
for an institution of their own that they could trust to 
be more confidential, a ‘Europol’. Cooperation among 
Europeans was therefore actually born out of Interpol, 
but was developed elsewhere, in informal clubs and 
networks created in the 1950s, some of which would 
become formal institutions in the 1980s. Among many 
other groups (see graph) the Trevi group, informally 
founded in 1976 and only officially recognised in 1986 
in order to show that the governments could respond 
to terrorism in the Middle East, played a major role 
in constructing the strong ideological tie between 
free movement and lack of security. It also played 
a very important role in trying to limit the influence 
of the United States in European policing and it was 
among the first to insist that the United States was 
a ‘third party’ that cannot assist in the meetings: the 
United States had to wait for a common European 
position to emerge. And so, even if they used and 
over-used the technologies of policing promoted by 
United States’ liaison police officers, they wanted their 
autonomy as a centre of decision-making independent 
from Washington. At that time the lack of interest of 
the United States for any form of internal terrorism 
was a key element of differentiation, and some of the 
former Trevi members, not yet retired, have insisted on 
their cleverness in comparison to the under-reaction of 
the eighties of the United States and their over-reaction 
after September 11. Trevi has also been central for the 
creation of a specific European identity in policing 
matters by constructing a strong insecurity continuum 
specific to the EU and built on the fear of the removal 
of internal borders with the implementation of the 
Single Act on 31 December 1992, and by insisting later 
on, on the creation of Europol, which, in their view, was 
not to share any information with the United States. In 
addition to the Trevi group dealing with terrorism, drug 
trafficking and hooliganism, a fourth group (known as 
Trevi 1992) was created, dedicated to making up for 
the security loss that resulted from the end of border 
controls. It has promoted new technologies, including 
the possibilities of biometric identification and the 
interoperability between databases that we know now. 
The blueprint not only of the SIS, but also of Eurodac, of 
VIS, of FADO can be found during this period.
This earlier history of cooperation is important to 
highlight in order to understand that informal networks 
prospered and were not all abolished or absorbed with 
the creation of formal institutions, in opposition to the 
wishes of those who initiated the institutionalisation 
of European police cooperation, who were working 
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both to free themselves from American oversight 
and to submit international cooperation to the rule 
of law. They have been central to the transatlantic 
‘community’ of policing and they have marked 
a complete generation of policemen sharing more 
with their United States counterparts in terms of 
behaviour, ideology, vision of their role, than with their 
national colleagues, belonging to a rival police force 
as it happens in many Mediterranean countries, which 
have both civil police and civil police with military 
status, like the gendarmeries.
2. The fight against global insecurity: 
the structural element for an area of 
freedom, justice and security?
An (in)security continuum
The Maastricht Treaty has been considered the 
landmark of European policing and many texts refer to 
it almost ‘religiously’. But the Treaty is more a de facto 
rationalisation of the development of the fear of a global 
insecurity. The various elements — free movement 
of people; crossing of borders; citizenship, the 
relationship to illegality, fraud, migration; the increase 
of cross-border crime encouraged by globalisation; 
the relationship to labour exploitation, particularly of 
women and children; the creation of delocalised mafia 
networks; the increase in the drug trade and laundered 
money trafficking; the continued terrorism and the 
appearance of new forms of terrorism; the need for 
a quick, inflexible justice system — have been put 
together as ‘proofs’ of this global insecurity, but each 
element should only be linked to another with great 
caution, and with sustained statistics in a long period 
of time. These connections have for the moment been 
made without such a research, and more on the basis 
of media reports and their propagation. They have 
been more the objects of the symbolic politics of 
some professional of politics in security matters than 
the object of in-depth research about the connections. 
Each time one thread has been analysed, it has been 
proven weak. The connection between terrorism 
and illegal migration is absolutely not proven, and 
the label ‘clandestinity’ in both cases is not sufficient 
to amalgamate the two phenomena. The common 
belief in an increase of global insecurity has also always 
been the subject of competition between the various 
services of the ministries of interior and justice that 
are competent in the matters. Indeed, each service 
has wanted to prioritise the specific threat it claims to 
counter the others. No one has accepted once and for 
all a hierarchy of threats and the results of the various 
arbitrations in terms of budget, missions have always 
been contested, questioning the boundaries of the 
area of internal affairs, and even the pertinence of its 
definition as an ‘area’. If the future of European policing 
remains dependant on this path in favour of the 
struggle against transnational threats, and in particular 
terrorism, with its implications regarding prevention, 
mobility control and technologisation of policing, it is 
because it is still dependant on a doxa (an erroneous 
common sense) which largely predates September 11, 
and which is shared by the informal and the formal 
networks of policing as well as by a major part of 
the American and European intelligence services. We 
can call it a belief in the inevitable increase in global 
insecurity at the world level against which only 
a strong integration of all the police, intelligence and 
even military instruments and organisations can be 
efficient.
The impact of September 11
The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, 
or more exactly the answer on the part of the United 
States administration on the 14 September, amplified 
an already-existing trend, which was to consider 
issues of movement, tourism, migration and asylum 
as being linked to police and intelligence, or even to 
military issues. From this point of view, internal security 
agencies, which may at times work outside the borders 
of a country to prevent threats, must cooperate with 
neighbouring countries. Moreover, the police, and 
more importantly certain intelligence agencies, have 
tried to carry out a discretionary policy, independent 
from judges, thereby refusing to bend to the will of the 
Commission’s legal experts and various authorities on 
data protection for oversight and transparency.
While the events of 11 September 2001 clearly had 
an impact on European institutions, it was after the 
attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in London 
on 7 July 2005 that counter-terrorism truly became 
an omnipresent issue and security came to be seen 
as a part of every problem facing the EU (crime, illegal 
immigration, unauthorised border crossings, falsified 
documents), requiring dangers to be listed and specific 
techniques to be employed (in particular the use of 
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databases, profiling and lists of persons banned from 
entering a country).
As early as 21 September 2001, the Freedom, Justice 
and Security (FJS) Council stated that ‘the gravity of the 
recent events has incited the Union to work faster in 
setting up the area of freedom, justice and security and 
increase and strengthen cooperation with our partners, 
particularly the United States’, and it presented an action 
plan against terrorism in November 2001 (Bossong, 
2008). The Laeken summit which followed thereafter 
presented a series of security measures taken as a direct 
result of 11 September, with European solidarity with 
the United States and a general consideration by the 
Union of ‘European citizens’ expectations in terms of 
justice and security, combating international crime, 
controlling migrations and accepting asylum seekers 
and refugees from distant zones of conflict’ (excerpt 
from the Council of Laeken, 2002). The Commission 
touted the EU’s swift reaction in drafting a definition 
of terrorism, extending Europol’s powers, creating 
a European arrest warrant, officially instituting Eurojust 
which had until then only existed as a project team, 
and the signing of an agreement with the American 
government concerning passenger name records 
(PNR). However, work on all these actions was already 
under way and many of them were near completion. 
The definition of terrorism as set by Europe owed as 
much to the problems that accompanied the G7 
summit in Geneva as to 11 September; the European 
Arrest Warrant and Eurojust had been planned 
long before (3); the new item among all of these 
was undoubtedly the acceptance of an American 
prosecutor in Eurojust without an opposite equivalent. 
As for the PNR procedure, although it was accepted 
under pressure from the American Homeland Security 
department, it was in keeping with an older, internal 
movement to step up passenger controls.
Beginning in 2003, European police and intelligence 
services, along with the services in charge of external 
borders and visas, made considerable efforts to 
Europeanise themselves, provided that this move 
would increase their discretionary power and not 
result in greater judiciary control. These services 
(3) Eurojust was included in the EU Treaty of Nice in Article 31. 
A provisional department had existed since 14 December 2000. 
The Council’s decision to create the institution was signed on 28 
February 2002.
were seeking an intelligence agency and a European 
equivalent of the American Homeland Security 
department via a system of border controls with 
biometric identification and travel authorisations 
granted before travelling, or an inter-operable 
database that would allow them to gather, store and 
compare data for investigations; this led to the Treaty of 
Prüm and renewed agreements between the EU and 
the FBI. For some, while these efforts were necessary 
to avoid risks, they were also a way to avoid American 
hegemony in this field. These developments were not 
made simply to follow the American position; there was 
a real push to create a European industry for databases 
and security technology that could compete with the 
United States and at the same time guarantee the 
control of information concerning European citizens 
and foreigners living in EU territory. Unlike criminal 
investigation police, the intelligence departments 
insisted on the danger posed by Al Qaeda within 
Europe where there were large communities of Muslim 
origin, particularly in France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, which could serve as a groundwork structure. 
Despite a difference of opinion on participation in 
the war in Iraq, the different anti-terrorist services of 
the different Member States made a joint evaluation 
of the threat and were mostly in agreement. Within 
Europe, anti-terrorist services shared more or less 
the same opinions on the possible threats, although 
they proposed different responses to the problem, 
and they had for some time stressed the idea of the 
infiltrated enemies within our own borders (Bonelli, 
2005). European leaders did take the threat of Al Qaeda 
seriously, but many considered anti-terrorist activities 
to be the concern of the police and judicial fields, aided 
by intelligence services, rather than the business of the 
army or agencies such as the United States’ National 
Security Agency (NSA) and the United States’ Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the spearheads of American 
policy. So, the more European policing collaborated 
with the United States, the more they were driven 
towards a trend obliging them to be subordinate to 
their own intelligence services and even to their own 
militaries. The idea of integration of information, even 
balanced by the EU Commission in terms of availability 
of information, was never in favour of criminal justice, 
but in favour of prevention, hence fostering a certain 
kind of suspicion, freeing the agencies from the 
judges’ supervisions and giving the upper hand on the 
network to intelligence services.
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It is nearly impossible to draw up a complete summary 
of the cooperative activities led since 2001 among 
European countries or between them and third 
countries for the area of freedom, justice and security. 
By March of 2007, 51 texts had been adopted, 33 were 
in the process of being adopted and 22 communiqués 
and 21 reports had been published, making the area of 
freedom and security one of the most dynamic fields 
of legislative activity. The ‘de-pillarisation’ or ‘cross-
pillarisation’ of certain initiatives that involved various 
groups from the Commission and the Council, and 
even some private players within specific partnerships, 
was by far one of the most important effects of this 
increase in activities (Monar, 2006; Balzacq and Carrera, 
2006; Baldaccini, Guild and Toner, 2007). Some people 
perceived this combination of internal and external 
security concerns as the third pillar spilling over into 
the first pillar, others as a sort of ‘Americanisation’ of 
European policies (Bigo, 2006; Kanter and Liberatore, 
2006). Information exchange, cooperation between 
institutions and a feeling of belonging to a common 
professional field specialised in internal security threats 
grew out of the network of police officers, magistrates, 
customs officials, border guards and even intelligence 
departments. This cross-border cooperation tended to 
make this field less dependent on political officials at 
the national as well as at the European levels. The new 
field has ‘de-nationalised’ and ‘de-governmentalised’ 
European policy and strengthened the common 
vision shared by the Ministries of Interior with their 
specific interests in migration policy, border crossing 
and acceptance of American anti-terrorism standards; 
and their common distaste of legislative activities 
and procedural discussions as well as of constraints 
on speed due to privacy requirements. These points 
were hotly debated, but the fact that they were dealt 
with by this group of Ministers for the Interior was 
quite naturally accepted as legitimate, even when 
they were speaking of human rights, travels, mobility 
and freedom. In addition, the ‘European’ field of 
professional security underwent a change of focus due 
to the United States’ involvement in European affairs 
and the role attributed to intelligence departments 
and border controls, to the detriment of judicial police 
and magistrates because of a supposed link between 
terrorism and the presence of foreign citizens in the 
EU (Geoffrey and Meyer, 2008; Bigo et al., 2008). But, 
the activity of intelligence services transnationally was 
however offset by the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the implementing of joint decision-making processes 
and the transparency and legal value granted to the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights with a sudden U-turn 
or break that many professionals of security have not 
understood because they were not paying attention to 
legislation. And it is with this specific situation that we 
live in the present.
The revenge of the legislation? Stockholm 
programme and Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty, by reframing the structure of the 
European Union and the idea of three pillars created 
thirty years ago, has re-opened questions which were 
the key questions of the seventies and the eighties. In 
addition our ideas about what is considered relevant 
for freedom, security and justice vary a lot. It is therefore 
important to have a larger view than the ‘sectorial’ 
view created by the three-pillars mindset. What the 
European Union has done to increase freedoms 
has been due first and foremost to its enlargement, 
its ability to manage administrative issues and the 
prerogatives of sovereignty and its structural reforms 
through various treaties, and not much to the third 
pillar dealing in theory of freedom. Many observers 
now feel that combining all three dimensions of 
security, justice and freedom, which have clearly 
contradictory interests, under the authority of a single 
commissioner was an error that has lasted more than 
twenty years. It has just been corrected, and if the idea 
of three commissioners (one for security, one for justice, 
one for freedom) has not been taken into account, we 
have nevertheless seen the sharing of responsibility 
of DG JLS (Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom 
and Security) by both Viviane Reding, Vice-President, 
responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship, and Cecilia Malmström for ‘Internal Affairs’ 
(Lieber and Guild, 2008).
Many observers hope that this transformation will stop 
the old habit of considering police and security as the 
ultimate goal, and freedom and justice as only ‘minor 
gods’, possible adjuncts or limitations to security, but 
never of equal or superior value (Bigo, 2008). The 
treaty signed in Lisbon in 2007 is therefore central, as 
it laid down three distinct pillars to hold up the roof 
of the single, common European house set up by the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), and the Stockholm programme 
makes sense only in relation to the enforcement of the 
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Lisbon Treaty, now that all the countries have agreed 
to it.
The tone and style of the Stockholm programme also 
demonstrate this view that legitimacy of policing is 
much more important than a so-called short-term 
efficiency, as the last one creates de facto more 
problems than it can solve. And the dream of complete 
control of the movement of citizens and foreigners 
by technology in order to prevent their actions is 
destroying the basis of what is said to be protected: 
democracy, habeas corpus, privacy, protection rights 
and freedom. The Swedish proposal was therefore 
different from the Hague programme and declared 
that the core values of the EU needed to be respected 
and that any theory of permanent derogations or 
exceptions was not accepted. Rule of law, privacy, 
protection of asylum seekers and right of defence were 
placed at the core of the text. But they did not address 
the reasons of the breaches of these principles, and 
at the same time the programme contains a series of 
elements, which led to these breaches of rule of law. 
The technological trend was not halted, but on the 
contrary accelerated, even if evaluation is at least asked 
before new projects begin. The role of the exchange 
of information is valued in principle, and if privacy is 
incorporated into the picture, it is more as a warning 
against excess than a serious discussion about the 
limits and the boundaries of these exchanges.
So what can we say concerning the future of policing 
from this contrasting view of the present?
3.  Implications of the Stockholm 
programme for future policing
The relation between The Hague  
and the Stockholm Programmes: a break,  
an achievement, a parenthesis?
The Stockholm Programme has been presented by 
some as a third phase after The Hague Programme 
and the Tampere Programme. The first was about 
principles, the second about organisation and the 
third about implementation, it is said. But how far can 
we believe this linearity and this ‘progress’? Is it not 
once again a rhetorical device, an illusionary belief 
that history has only one direction? To the contrary, 
others have presented the Stockholm Programme 
as a major break, as a U-turn in relation to the Hague 
Programme and they have insisted on the involvement 
of non-governmental organisation (NGOs) and 
private actors into its framing. From what we have 
analysed a different perspective emerges. The Hague 
Programme was a parenthesis particularly influenced 
by the United States administration, and now the 
Stockholm Programme is returning to the trend of 
Tampere, which was already torn between on the one 
hand a bigger concern for privacy, data protection and 
freedom, and on the other a strong impetus for the 
technologisation of security, the reinforcement of the 
exchange of personal data through different database 
systems and the first ideas of a systematisation of 
biometric elements for national documents (visa, 
passports and ID cards). For some, this idea of a non-
linear evolution of European policing is certainly 
strange, and they will insist on the different ‘steps’ to 
valorise or de-valorise these incremental steps. But 
for us, Stockholm is more or less the reproduction of 
Tampere and bares the same ambiguities.
Remember Tampere. Tampere, after the Amsterdam 
Treaty, was seen by some as the moment of 
juridicisation of policing and the moment when the 
distance between European policing and transatlantic 
policing was quite important, resulting in an increased 
respect on the part of both sides for their mutual 
differences in appreciation. But it can also be seen 
as one of the key moments of US-EU collaboration. 
Tampere in 1999 was still informed by the end of 
bipolarity, by the reunification in Germany and by 
the possibility of a larger Europe reincorporating all 
its Eastern part. The preoccupations of the United 
States were then not much in tune with the European 
Union. And in retrospect, Tampere appears to many 
observers as the highest wave of a movement 
in favour of personal freedoms that was thrown 
into question by the events of 11 September 2001, 
creating some nostalgia for this period. However, 
this summit also firmly supported a tie between 
mobility, insecurity and strengthened discretionary 
powers for the police by claiming that we can only 
enjoy liberty in an area that has already ensured 
justice and security, the latter being the sine qua non 
for establishing positive conditions of justice and 
freedom. The summit also abandoned the idea of 
harmonisation or anything approaching it in favour 
of mutual recognition. In other words, Member States 
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were not required to modify their own laws provided 
that they accept the laws of other Member States 
within their own territory when these laws have 
the same aim. Judicial cooperation and the Eurojust 
project suffered the consequences of this principle, 
which assumes a mutual trust that has been all 
too rare. The most ambitious projects (Corpus Juris 
and the European Public Prosecutor) were also 
abandoned (Guild, 2006; Megie, 2006; Peers, 2004; 
Valsamis, 2006). So, the moment of juridicisation of 
Amsterdam in 1997 and its legacy was very short. 
The third pillar has been reframed, some important 
matters went into the first pillar under title four, and 
created a differentiation limiting the possibility of 
the insecurity continuum to construct asylum and 
border crossings as forms of insecurity linked with 
terrorism and trafficking. Nevertheless the third pillar 
was not only reaffirmed as such, but also extended 
with the Schengen integration. Tampere, following 
Amsterdam, was already a turning point in favour of 
more links with third countries and it resulted in the 
official acceptance of a transnational exchange of 
information, like the telecommunications surveillance 
system shared between the EU and the FBI, despite the 
Echelon scandal, the Commission’s officials in charge 
of data protection taking a stand for the opposing 
opinion and the European Parliament’s criticism. In 
other words, the Hague Programme accelerated 
this Tampere trend and destabilised the willingness 
for autonomy of European policing regarding the 
United States. The Stockholm Programme is once 
again adjusting the contradictory desires of the EU to 
be more autonomous and more interconnected with 
third countries. It is more or less the same tension 
between privacy and preventive policing which 
has been at the heart of the discussion, and the 
strategy has been, this time, to try to accommodate 
both objectives and not to give absolute priority to 
security. Soft critiques have been heard concerning 
the previous programme. We can read on the 
Swedish website: ‘By comparison, the Stockholm 
Programme has a better balance between law 
enforcement and the rights of the individual’. And 
as explained by the Minister for Justice of Sweden, 
Ms Ask, ‘With the Stockholm Programme, the EU is 
focusing on the rights and needs of the individual. 
We are taking vigorous measures against crime. At 
the same time, we are safeguarding the rights of the 
individual across a broad spectrum, from migrants’ 
rights and a legally secure and predictable asylum 
process to the protection of privacy and support to 
victims of crime.’ Mr Billström, Minister for Migration 
and Asylum Policy has added: ‘We have confirmed 
the goal of having a common asylum system in 
place by 2012. The days of the asylum lottery are 
numbered. Visa exemption for the Western Balkans 
will mean a great deal for hundreds of thousands of 
people. From 19 December 2009, citizens from Serbia, 
Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia will be able to travel without visas to the 
Schengen area. I think we should all be proud of this 
achievement.’ Without saying the Swedish presidency 
has sidelined the technological belief in Eurodac and 
the Dublin Convention, it has at least tried to come 
back to ‘compassionate policing’: understanding the 
difference between the perpetrators of crime, the 
victims and the suspects which have rights as long as 
they are not effectively convicted. Doing so, they have 
shown that they were disagreeing with the teleology 
of the unknown unknowns of Donald Rumsfeld, the 
Total Information Awareness of ex-admiral Poindexter 
and the computerisation and data mining that they 
imply. Exchange of data cannot be a way to construct 
profiles of potential suspects unknown by the police, 
but can be used for criminal justice purposes. This 
has been highlighted by the technical discussion 
between the push or pull system in the PNR and 
Swift cases. Data mining needs to have access to 
a maximum of data in order to construct profiles and 
it is a permanent justification to have a pull system 
with raw data and construction of correlations. To the 
contrary a push system is sufficient for criminal justice, 
and the technical controversy is in fact a very strong 
political controversy engaging the presumption of 
innocence. The European Parliament has been clear 
on this subject which opposes not the United States 
to the EU, but the intelligence services of both sides 
to the privacy organisations on both sides.
The future of policing: policing the future by 
technology or compassionate policing?
It is too soon to say what the effective results of the 
Stockholm Programme will be beyond its declared 
intentions. However, one of the key elements for the 
future is linked to the emphasis put by the Stockholm 
Programme on achieving security through technology 
infrastructures and databases, with the participation of 
private companies in this framing of a ‘global’ policing 
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(and not only in the realisation of equipment for the 
police). It seems that this tendency is contradictory to 
the human dimension of ‘compassionate policing’ and 
the criminal police logic and has a tendency to favour 
de facto preventive policing, software detection and 
data mining.
The reliance on technology seems to be clearly 
demonstrated by the development of ‘an EU information 
management strategy’ which reproduces locally in 
Europe what has been done previously in Australia and 
in the United States, and which tries through an entry-
and-exit system to register the complete population of 
those who travel abroad (including the EU citizens de 
facto).
This EU information management strategy will 
exacerbate the question of exchange of personal data 
between the services of different institutions (law 
enforcement policing, but also administrative bodies as 
‘prefectures’, and some intelligence services plus border 
guards and customs) whose trajectories and functions 
vary from country to country and may end up with 
a development of mistrust in the other countries’ police 
institutions if a better knowledge of their structures and 
missions is not acquired. It is a central task to develop 
this knowledge. Learning about the other Member 
States’ police organisations, justice and administration, 
as well as external affairs (in embassies and consulates, 
the hierarchy between the liaison officers abroad, the 
ambassadors and the ministries), and understanding 
the relationships of power and duties of each of them, 
(for example the complicated and different relationships 
in many countries between police, prosecution and 
judges), as well as their autonomy towards the ministry 
and the government, will certainly help in this regard. 
Without such a mapping, and a thorough understanding 
of the tensions between a ‘preventive’, ‘intelligence-led 
approach’ loaded with technology and software and the 
presumption of innocence, the respect for fundamental 
rights, their international protection, the rights of 
EU citizens abroad, the level of uncertainty and the 
ambiguities implied by such a ‘management’ will deter 
the use of the system and will maintain multiple and 
more informal channels of communication, overlapping 
with the official one.
It would be important in this regard to abandon a certain 
level of secrecy not adapted to the present situation, 
and which has nothing to do with national security, and 
to deliver an exhaustive and public list of all the services 
in Europe contributing to each database and the list of 
databases they are connected to. It will help citizens 
and policemen themselves to understand where and 
to whom the data circulates. The fact that personal 
data is introduced into a system of systems, which is 
now constructed to create interconnections with future 
databases still not in service and still without legal base, 
is not reassuring for everyone, except for the promoters 
of the companies who have the contracts to build these 
technologies and the persons working symbiotically 
with them at the Commission or in different Member 
States ministries.
The question is important inside the EU, through the 
Prüm Treaty, but is exacerbated when data exchange 
goes beyond the EU Member States and includes third 
countries. Certainly the Stockholm Programme states: 
‘The Union must secure a comprehensive strategy to 
protect citizens’ data within the EU and in its relations to 
third countries’ (Ibid: 7), but the level of doubt about the 
accuracy of this strategy and the defence of the rights 
of EU citizens regarding the cooperation with allies in 
counterterrorism rose exponentially, with good reason, 
after the enquiries concerning the United States and UK 
exchange of data during the Bush period, and their lack 
of respect of basic principles of rule of law and human 
rights, as well as the Swift affair and the acceptance by 
EU negotiators, in the name of good relationships with 
their United States counterparts, of the possibility for the 
United States to have access to the complete database 
through a pull system.
The recent discovery that the so-called technical 
constraints that Swift was giving in order to avoid the 
cost of creating filters that were previously required 
by the EU and the United States congress, and then to 
allow the United States administration to have access 
to all the data instead, has infuriated some members 
of the European Parliament. Indeed, it seems to them 
that a strong lobby has been created at the transatlantic 
level by a small group of persons sharing the same 
interests on both sides. These MEPs consider that this 
group has not acted in good faith, and has not seriously 
represented the interests and values of their respective 
institutions, but has instead ‘colluded’.
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This ‘solidarity’ between the civil servants on both sides 
of the Atlantic is not a surprise for the researcher. Some 
have used the terminology of a European police elite, 
other have used the notion of transnational guilds to 
express the structuration of transversal solidarities. 
It can be explained by many reasons: ideological 
certainly, but also and more profoundly, similarities of 
trajectories and carriers, misunderstandings regarding 
the importance of privacy, and so on. It will take time 
to reconcile what is more and more perceived as two 
opposed communities (one of intelligence backed by 
some law enforcement policemen, and one of data 
protection and privacy) which have different weights 
in the United States and in Europe, but which are more 
and more interconnected at the transatlantic level. The 
‘privacy’ community felt that their arguments had been 
marginalised during the Bush period and the ‘Frattini’ 
period in the EU. They sometimes demonstrate a sense of 
revenge and hope that their United States counterparts 
will be strengthened with the Obama administration 
and its Congress, but they are still isolated in front of 
a transnational community integrating military, police 
and intelligence service networks. Consequently, they 
are not ready for conciliations. If, Swift is finally passed, 
but under strong pressure of the defence, foreign affairs 
and interior ministries, it will upset them even more, 
which will have repercussions in the future. The vision of 
some of them of a ‘plot’ is certainly exaggerated as the 
different networks of police, military and intelligence are 
in a process of ‘linking-up’ at the transatlantic level, as we 
have seen, but they are also in competition, and are not 
‘integrated’, even if the ‘fusion’ discourse in the name of 
efficiency is still strong in the department of Homeland 
Security in the United States, and has supporters inside 
the EU as well. But, in the future, only if a change of 
attitude by the intelligence services concerning secrecy 
and practices contrary to human rights happens, will it 
be possible to have a security driven by rule of law and 
not opposed to it.
It is one of the elements to build on for the future 
of policing, in agreement with the United States 
administration, which required a reflexive stance on both 
side, and the necessity for the United States to accept 
that they have also to change their national legislation to 
comply with the EU requirements, a difficult element to 
achieve as it required a change of mind-set concerning 
the relation between United States national sovereignty 
and international agreements, between hegemony and 
reciprocity. The future of European policing is perhaps 
also dependent on a change of attitude on the part 
of the United States, change which itself will depend 
on the strengthening of the privacy community and 
the limitations imposed on the intelligence service 
community in their activities abroad.
The boundaries of information exchange: 
cooperation between states or between 
democracies?
If the transatlantic community is difficult to build, what 
should we think about the exchange of personal data 
with other third countries? The Stockholm Programme 
identifies as a priority ‘information exchange that flows 
securely, efficiently and with adequate data-protection 
standards between the EU and third countries’. 
Exchanges of information are particularly emphasised 
with regard to terrorism, where the document 
highlights: ‘Framework agreements should be entered 
into with the United States and the Russian Federation 
on the exchange of information while ensuring that 
adequate data-protection safeguards exist.’ But, we have 
to wonder about the Russian Federation and the other 
third countries considered as ‘strategic partners’. The 
legal and diplomatic language may be prevented from 
discriminating between third countries, but is it not an 
open door for mismanagement of personal data if they 
flow towards these other third countries which are not 
all democracies and which have themselves their own 
networks of exchange? Where are the boundaries of 
responsibility? Is any state willing to contribute to the war 
on terror a candidate for receiving the personal data of 
EU citizens or of residents and non-residents travelling to 
the EU? Not answering the question, developing a form 
of fuzziness about the political limits of collaboration 
and extending this collaboration beyond democracies 
to any allied state, is endangering the whole scheme of 
collaboration, and may result in a serious breach of our 
international obligations concerning persons in need 
of protection. A key element is then to have a clearer 
definition of the boundaries of collaboration, and 
a shared list of countries to which the data have to be 
refused, whatever the alleged purpose. This clarification 
will help to build a legitimate form of transnational 
policing in the future.
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Introduction
Many elements make future preventive policing very 
challenging for both practitioners and researchers. 
The most important elements to be taken into 
account are the network structure and model of 
contemporary prevention, the nature of security 
knowledge, the global and ambiguous nature of the 
threats to be prevented and the emerging possibilities 
and innovations of ‘virtual’ preventive policing of the 
Internet.
The modern police service is based on the principle of 
prevention. The origin of this principle can be traced 
for instance to influential writings like ‘A Treatise of 
the Police of the Metropolis’ by Patrick Colquhoun in 
1795. According to him, the objectives of a system of 
policing should be the prevention and detection of 
crime, the maintenance of order and the improvement 
of morals. However, prevention of crime was not a new 
idea even then. The Anglo-Saxon methods of ‘keeping 
the peace’ and the later system of mutual pledging 
included the notion that crimes could be prevented by 
the vigilance of one’s neighbours or by obedience to 
a higher authority. (Pike 1985, 133). The roots of a policy 
of preventive policing in the nineteenth century were 
in ancient traditions of communal self-policing (Reiner 
1985, 14).
The principle of prevention, since Colquhoun, Peel and 
the others, can be seen in the practices and strategies 
of the modern police. For academics, researchers 
and police scientists the tremendous elasticity of 
the term prevention has caused a lot of problems. 
As argued by Gilling ‘the term prevention is clothed 
in ambiguity’ (Gilling 1996, 101). Crime prevention is 
an essential part of proactive policing, community 
policing, proximity policing and all their variants. The 
main purpose and goal of intelligence-led policing is 
prevention too. Prevention has today the same ethos 
as in the eighteenth century but a broader meaning, 
well described in the book of Bruggeman, van 
Branteghem and van Nuffel (eds), Toward an excellent 
police function (2007): ‘Prevention (preventive measures) 
is aimed at preventing situational and direct causes 
and reasons of the problems of security, liveablity and 
criminality and limiting their consequences.’
Perhaps the most significant element in broader 
definitions is that in addition to crime prevention, 
security is included. Crime has been reconceptualised 
as security risk (Zedner 2009, 71), and insecurity and 
threats to security are to be prevented too. It can be 
argued that crime prevention has been securitised. In 
many security strategies today phenomena like social 
exclusion are the first priorities for prevention, not as 
the root cause for crime and criminal behaviour but 
as a security threat as such. For instance in Finland’s 
Internal Security Strategy (2008), social exclusion is 
seen as the biggest threat to security (Virta 2010). This 
means that preventing social exclusion is a part of 
preventive policing as well. The forthcoming Internal 
Security Strategy for the EU will also have a very strong 
preventive ethos. According to the Spanish Presidency’s 
136
European Police Science and Research Bulletin · Special Conference Issue Nr. 2
strategy draft, ‘Towards an European Security Model’ 
(January 2010) key elements for EU internal security 
are integration, social inclusion and the fight against 
discrimination. The proactive and intelligence-led 
approach of the forthcoming internal security strategy 
will guide preventive policing in Member States in the 
future.
Preventive policing has many dimensions. The aim of 
this chapter is to deal with the complexity of preventive 
policing and especially radicalisation prevention, in the 
context of counter-terrorism. Scenarios and the making 
of future policing in Europe cannot ignore terrorism and 
radicalisation. The police have to think globally and act 
locally. Virtual preventive policing will be introduced at 
the end of the article; in Finland the police already have 
a positive experience with virtual prevention measures 
on the Internet (Facebook, Twitter, IRC-Gallery and 
some other forums). The new challenges for preventive 
policing, police training and education and police 
research are enormous.
Precautionary principle
Crime prevention and preventive policing have a long 
tradition in Europe, and it has been argued that over the 
past three decades there has been another ‘preventive 
turn’ and preventive policing and partnerships have 
become a defining attribute of contemporary crime 
control and its interface with wider social and urban 
policing in a way that is both novel and demands 
critical contextual scrutiny (Crawford 2009, xv). The EU 
itself has also invested in crime prevention and funded 
projects like the AGIS programme and the Secucities 
Cultures of Prevention project of the European Forum 
for Urban Security (EFUS), in search of a European 
model of crime prevention and common prevention 
culture (EFUS, 2006).
In the broader social and political context, the growing 
sense of uncertainty surrounding the terrorism issue 
has resulted in a new mood of prevention, pre-emption 
and precaution. The nature of policy-making processes 
follows the ‘Precautionary Principle’. Terrorism made 
precautionary logic obvious after 9/11, and politics in 
general have taken a dramatic turn aimed at making 
precautionary logic part of everyday life (1). In terrorism 
research, 11 September 2001 has refocused the issue of 
pre-emption and introduced the notion of ‘preventive 
war’, but there is also a dichotomy between the 
criminal justice and the war models of countering 
terrorism (Ranstorp 2007, 15). Counterterrorist policy 
and strategies increasingly draw upon a transnational 
policy community. The Hague Programme (2004), 
the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment (2005), the EU Counter Terrorism 
Strategy (2005) and its Action Plan on Combating 
Terrorism (2006) and some other common security 
and policing strategies, are the results of such policy-
making processes in the EU policy community. They 
count on policing, and especially preventive policing 
and community policing, as vital tools for local level 
counter-terrorism. Prevention is the key element and 
objective in the strategies.
Intelligence-led policing, and intelligence, have 
become an additional element to the field of 
preventive policing. The European Criminal Intelligence 
Model was adopted in the Hague Programme, as ‘the’ 
policing model for the EU. In the Spanish Presidency 
draft of an Internal Security Strategy for the EU (January 
2010) strategic guidelines include prevention, defined 
as a ‘proactive intelligence-led approach’ (2).
In many national and local level prevention strategies 
intelligence-led policing and community policing have 
been reconciled so that they are seen as complementary 
rather than competitive models. Intelligence and 
intelligence-management processes (intelligence 
gathering, strategic analysis, targeting and exchange) 
improve the capacity of community policing and other 
preventive policing initiatives. On the other hand, 
community policing and a good relationship between 
the police and the public, play an important role in 
intelligence-led policing because trust and confidence 
towards the police is a precondition for successful 
intelligence gathering (especially for gathering 
community intelligence, which is often tacit knowledge 
and therefore one of the most important forms of 
(1) About the precautionary principle and its implications see for 
instance Ericson 2007, Hörnqvist 2007 and Goldsmith 2008.
(2) However, in his book Intelligence-Led Policing Jerry Ratcliffe 
(2008) claims intelligence-led policing is mainly a management 
model and not crime prevention model.
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intelligence in local counter-terrorism context). (Virta 
2008, 27-30.)
Radicalisation — a challenge for 
preventive policing
The EU strategy for combating radicalisation and 
recruitment to terrorism (2005) is part of a broader EU 
counter-terrorism strategy and action plan. In order to 
prevent radicalisation and recruitment ‘the threat must 
be reduced by disrupting existing terrorist networks 
and by preventing new recruits to terrorism’. According 
to the strategy, the challenge is as follows: ‘To counter 
radicalisation and terrorist recruitment, the EU resolves to 
disrupt the activities of the networks and individuals who 
draw people into terrorism; ensure that voices of mainstream 
opinion prevail over those of extremism; promote yet more 
vigorously security, justice, democracy and opportunity for 
all.’ (p. 3).
The strategy has a broad approach to problems and 
challenges, and it is not primarily a police strategy. 
However, when trying to disrupt the activities of the 
networks and individuals who draw people into 
terrorism, the strategy relies on preventive policing and 
community policing in particular.
It has been argued that at least to some extent, 
preventing radicalisation is something beyond 
conventional crime prevention. Radicalisation, as 
a phenomenon, has been defined as a psychological 
process (Silke, 2008) and a social process, and 
explanations of how individuals become radicalised 
are psychological, social, political or religious 
(Sinai 2007) which makes prevention efforts very 
complicated. Additionally, like in the security strategy 
of the Netherlands from 2008 to 2011, radicalisation is 
seen as a threat to social cohesion in a society, even 
without the actual perpetration of an act of terrorism. 
Radicalisation as such is not a crime. It means that 
once radicalised, a person thinks in a certain way, 
which is seen as unacceptable and he or she must 
be prevented from thinking and acting further in the 
direction of recruitment. In the EU strategies, there 
are no separations made whether the suspected 
radicalised target has any contact with terrorist groups 
or whether he or she is an individual thinker (in danger 
of becoming a potential suicide bomber alone, or 
without any intentions at all) (Virta 2010). ‘To win the 
battle of ideas’ — objectives in the counter-terrorism 
strategies operate at collective level but policing 
unacceptable forms of individual thought may lead 
to thought police, when an individual’s internal life, 
thoughts, have become a legitimate subject for public 
concern (Furedi, 2005, p. 155).
Therefore, radicalisation is a challenge for preventive 
policing. When trying to prevent radicalisation which 
may lead to (home-grown) terrorism the police have 
to assess local community context and tensions and 
the state of the society, and keep in mind national 
security threat assessments and priorities, as well as 
European and global terrorism threat assessments. 
Intelligence requirements are potentially endless. 
In Britain, neighbourhood policing teams have 
community engagement strategies which define the 
methods of capturing community intelligence and 
building a community profile (BCU Commanders Guide 
for Counter Terrorist Operations, 2008). Community 
profiling and community impact assessments are 
innovations in local counter-terrorism; profiling is 
used as a method that can be used for the purpose of 
preventive policing and impact assessments are made 
for effective organisation of the services after an attack 
(Virta 2010).
Community policing in transition
There are already few studies about the response of 
communities and community police officers to the new 
strategies, and about the community counter-terrorism 
partnerships (De Kool 2008; Spalek et al., 2008), which 
indicate that preventing radicalisation is something 
more, or different than conventional crime prevention. 
In the Netherlands, the Counter Terrorism Coordinator 
has differentiated between three indicators, which 
‘can prove helpful in recognising the processes of 
radicalisation’. These are ideology, behaviour and 
appearance. Indicators relating to ideology refer to 
changes in social, political or religious convictions (a 
change in a person’s ideology). Indicators relating to 
behaviour involve a change in the way a person acts 
and reacts: someone refuses to shake a woman’s hand, 
for instance. Indicators relating to appearance involve 
a change in outward appearance (different dress, a new 
beard). For police training, additional indicators have 
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been developed: cash, accommodation, preparation, 
objects, transport and forged documents, connections 
and changes in behaviour. (De Kool 2008, 98)
There have been numerous problems with police 
efforts to prevent radicalisation by community policing 
methods. The police lack the skills and knowledge 
about the cultural differences and backgrounds of 
ethnic groups and also about the nature of terrorism 
and radicalisation. The ethnic communities are insular, 
and the language barrier is a significant problem. At 
the organisational level, there are failures in sharing 
information between departments at the local level 
and between the local police and intelligence services. 
Community policing officers feel uncomfortable 
approaching people in their new role, and they have 
experiences of losing trust, which is the most important 
precondition in getting community intelligence. Once 
lost, trust is very difficult to rebuild. The changing 
role of local police in this respect has reduced the 
trust between the officers themselves too, between 
departments and individuals. (De Kool 2008, 104-107.) 
Dave Sloggett also warned recently, that the counter-
terrorism and radicalisation prevention measures of the 
police — especially in the area of chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threat — may have 
unintentionally driven people into the radicalisation 
processes. There should be more understanding of the 
processes, and the fact that once started it is difficult 
to provide legitimate exit routes from radicalisation 
processes. (Sloggett 2008; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009)
The research of Basia Spalek et al. focused on the 
enhanced community focus in counter-terrorism and 
the central role of preventive policing. It highlights the 
tensions for policing in a counter-terrorism context 
in having to negotiate adopting a pragmatic ‘what 
works’ approach within a highly politicised arena. The 
pathologising of Muslim youth increases the sense of 
alienation in ‘suspect communities’. The results also 
show that it is harmful for trust building as people feel 
uncomfortable living in suspect communities and they 
feel pressurised to explain the construction of their 
Muslim identities, particularly in relation to Britishness. 
(Spalek et al., 2008)
The role of local police and community policing 
strategies in counter-terrorism is problematic as they 
are positioned between the EU (and its growing 
intelligence requirements), national security agencies 
and intelligence services and local authorities, 
community safety partnerships and local communities. 
They should be able to balance tensions between 
secrecy, repression and national security priorities 
and openness, transparency and local needs and 
priorities. The climate of suspicion often reduces the 
level and willingness to engage with police for the 
purposes of counter-terrorism (Spalek et al., 2009). The 
new politics of community policing brings the state 
to neighbourhoods but there should still be room 
for local strategic priorities regarding how to translate 
counter-terrorism strategies into action.
There has also been a shift in preventive policing from 
cooperation to partnerships in the context of prevention 
of terrorism. The ‘Secucities’ (EFUS) report against 
terrorism (2007) introduces local counter-terrorism 
initiatives from some EU countries; partnerships 
between the cities, local authorities and the police. The 
practical problems that local authorities face are for 
example that they do not have the necessary expertise 
to confront all the demands of counter-terrorism, and 
the diversity of preventative actions requires excellent 
coordination between all agents involved, be they 
in the same organisation (horizontal cooperation) or 
at other levels of the state or with foreign partners 
(vertical cooperation). (Cities against terrorism, 2007, 
41.) There is also research evidence that the body of 
experience, skills, knowledge and styles of policing, 
such as neighbourhood and community policing are 
invaluable tools in countering terrorism. Space made 
within policing for recognising and understanding 
religion, for instance, is seen as an important step for 
community policing approaches, and it has facilitated 
the recruitment of Muslims into policing, and the first 
Muslim police officers into counter-terrorism work,in 
Great Britain. (Spalek et al., 2009)
The role of local law enforcement (in the United States) 
is seen differently in Deflem’s book, ‘The Policing of 
Terrorism’ (2010), especially when it comes to preventive 
policing. Hometown Security strategies of local counter-
terrorism rely on police professionalism, effective crime 
control and intelligence work, and organisational 
arrangements. Community policing resources and 
possibilities were not discussed in Deflem’s ‘theory of 
counter-terrorism policing’, which derives from Max 
Weber’s bureaucracy theory. However, the support of 
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the communities for the police and the fact that local 
police are physically close to communities are seen as 
positive factors in local intelligence gathering. (Deflem 
2010, 77). The focus of this approach is to prevent 
terrorist attacks, not a radicalisation process. Therefore 
it follows situational crime-prevention principles. 
Fighting terrorism through situational crime prevention 
comprises environmental manipulations that either 
block opportunities to commit terrorist attacks or that 
reduce cues motivating potential terrorists to commit 
such acts. The SCP approach has learned from military 
studies and international relations, and counts on for 
instance the ‘EVIL DONE’ diagnosis of potential targets, 
or other kinds of modelling and asymmetric warfare 
approaches. (Freilich & Newman 2009). Both of these 
counter-terrorism philosophies focus on terrorism as 
a form of crime or deviance (Deflem 2010, 11; Freilich & 
Newman 2009, 1), and count on police professionalism, 
effective intelligence gathering and exchange, and 
situational crime-prevention methods.
Radicalisation, therefore, is a challenge for preventive 
policing. Community policing and local partnerships can 
provide a useful and productive method in preventing 
radicalisation, and ‘hometown security’ and SCP 
methods could support these and focus on preventing 
the actual attacks. Organisationally, the solutions may 
vary from special local counter-terrorism units and 
police staff to a community-policing style of counter-
terrorism work, so that radicalisation prevention will be 
just a part of local, community police officers’ work. 
There is a trend in Europe that preventing radicalisation 
and home-grown terrorism will be more and more 
embedded in local community-policing practices. 
A special EU ISEC-programme funded project COPPRA 
(Community Policing on Preventing Radicalisation and 
Terrorism), the initiative of the Belgian Federal Police, 
is one example of implementation of the EU counter-
terrorism and radicalisation prevention strategies (3). 
More comparative research is needed in this field.
(3) The author is a member of the Steering Committee of the 
COPPRA project 2009-2010.
Future preventive policing — a challenge 
for practitioners and researchers
Several elements turn future preventive policing into 
a very challenging exercise for both practitioners and 
researchers:
1. the network structure and model of contemporary 
prevention,
2. the nature of security knowledge,
3. the global and ambiguous nature of the threats and 
crimes to be prevented and
4. the emerging possibilities and innovations of virtual 
preventive policing.
In many cases (crime) prevention itself has turned into 
promotion and production of security, social cohesion 
and inclusion. Instead of working on the prevention of 
something, we focus more and more on making good 
things happen (security, safety, well-being), in the 
name of the precautionary principle.
It is the mutual dependencies of the network rather than 
the command structure of the hierarchy that characterise 
almost all forms of prevention at all levels, from the EU 
policy-making and police cooperation level (see Den 
Boer et al. 2008) to the national security assemblages 
and community safety partnerships. Networking is also 
a solution for researchers, particularly in the context of 
embedding learning and knowledge from research 
into policing practice. This is also acknowledged in 
national strategies that aim to increase cooperation and 
coordination between science and policing, for instance 
in the Police Science and Innovation Strategy of the 
UK (published by the National Policing Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) in March 2010) and the forthcoming 
Policing Knowledge Strategy (UK), and in the Security 
Research Strategy of Finland (2009). Networks offer a lot 
of opportunities for preventive policing; higher chance 
of success, effective information exchange, learning 
from the others, synergy advantages in many fields and 
so on (de Brujn & ten Heuvelhof 2008, 22). However, the 
network structure and model requires openness and 
transparency to be legitimate and accountable (see for 
instance McLeay 1998, de Brujn & ten Heuvelhof 2008).
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It has been argued that security governance today is 
‘governing at the limits of knowledge’, thinking of the 
unthinkable. Preventing security threats is pre-emption 
by nature; it stands temporarily prior to prevention 
of proximate harms, it seeks to intervene when the 
risk or threat is no more than an unspecified threat or 
propensity as yet uncertain and beyond view (Zedner 
2009, 85). The pre-crime logic of security makes it 
even more challenging. Although pre-crime counter-
terrorism measures are rationalised on the grounds of 
preventing terrorism, these measures do not fit in the 
frame of conventional crime prevention. Still, it has been 
argued that the new paradigm in prevention means 
a shift from post-crime criminal justice to pre-crime 
national security (Mc Gullogh and Pickering, 2009).
The threats and crimes to be prevented are global 
and ambiguous, and often politically very sensitive; 
from terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking 
and genocide to more conventional and street-level 
crimes, violence and security threats. However, new 
kinds of innovations have emerged in preventive 
policing. The police in many countries, for instance 
in Finland and Great Britain (for instance North Wales 
Police) have strategies for the police to be represented 
on social networking websites such as Facebook, IRC-
Gallery, Twitter and MySpace. Because these are vibrant 
online meeting places the police can meet young 
people and chat with them, give advice and listen to 
their concerns. This is seen as a new complementary 
model of community policing, as internet is today very 
popular community. The police in North Wales and 
in Finland have statistics and positive experiences in 
working in social networks and about virtual preventive 
policing or web policing (see for instance Evans 2008, 
Kilpeläinen 2010).
Preventive policing in the future will be not just 
‘thinking globally and acting locally’ but also networked, 
knowledge-led and intelligence-led, effective and 
outcome-orientated, accountable and legitimate 
policing. This will be also a shared agenda for researchers 
and police training, and therefore an important item on 
CEPOL’s agenda too.
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Introduction
Creating a safe society has traditionally been a core duty 
of national governments. Until just a few decades ago, 
society and government regarded this duty as virtually 
the exclusive preserve of the government. This opinion 
has changed radically throughout the years. In many 
Member States of the European Union, responsibilities 
relating to safety and security have now also been 
ascribed to, and assumed by, the public, society and the 
market. National governments have evolved from being 
the monopolist actor to one of the many partners in 
safety provision.
But not just an ordinary partner. When it comes to 
safety, government provision tends to be extensive, 
wide-ranging and decisive. This is related to the state’s 
monopoly of violence, exercised as soon as coercive 
measures have to be applied. The involvement of 
the market and society in creating a safe society is 
the outcome of considerations based on ideology, 
pragmatism, efficiency and effectiveness. Nor is 
a government that operates in isolation (apparently) 
omnipotent when it comes to providing safety and 
security. The provision of safety without the active 
involvement of the public and society is simply not 
effective and also lacks societal support. The modern 
provision of safety is based on the principles of 
community policing, the most efficacious components 
of which are a multi-agency approach, a bond with the 
community, transparency and the active involvement of 
society and the public.
Since the end of the last century, internationalisation, 
and Europeanisation in particular, have become very 
tangible and these developments are being given 
a more prominent position in the local and national 
safety strategies of separate EU Member States. Not 
everyone is convinced, however, of the relevance and 
necessity of designing safety and security strategies 
in a more international fashion. Opponents regard the 
encouragement of European (police) cooperation as 
a trend which may undermine the national sovereignty 
of EU Member States and that it may pose a threat to 
the privacy of citizens. Supporters, however, point to 
the opposite. Through cooperation something can 
be done about threats which are far less manageable 
for individual Member States. Here, they are referring 
to cross-border crime such as human trafficking, 
drugs trafficking and terrorism. Supporters argue that 
clinging on to classical, national sovereignty should 
not be stretched to the extent that individual Member 
States forego opportunities to provide their citizens 
with full protection against threats from beyond their 
own national borders. The supporters seem to be on 
the winning side, although the road forward remains 
full of obstacles.
Whatever the situation, cooperation between the police 
and judiciary has been an area of special attention for 
the European Union since the Maastricht Treaty. As is 
the case in Member States, the administrative plans of 
the European Union are based on policy documents 
and accompanying action plans. The plans apply for 
a period of five years, coinciding with the terms of 
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office for the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. In 1999, the first policy document was 
issued, the Tampere Programme. In 2004, the Dutch 
Presidency of the EU chaired the negotiations of the 
‘The Hague Programme’. The most recent programme 
in the field of freedom, security and justice is the 
‘Stockholm Programme, which saw the light of day in 
December 2009. In addition to a brief description of 
the content, this article makes a case, based on four 
separate arguments, for giving the establishment and 
content of the Stockholm Programme a prominent 
place in higher European police education.
Establishment and content of the 
Stockholm Programme
On 10 June 2009, the Commission presented its text 
proposal for the Stockholm Programme. During its 
presentation, the Director-General of the Directorate-
General for Freedom, Justice and Security noted that 
he had absolutely no illusions that the text proposal he 
presented would be the final draft of the programme. 
This prediction was more than accurate. Discussion 
and consultation around various conference tables 
resulted in the draft of the programme ultimately 
being approved by the European Council. The final 
text was twice as long as the Commission’s original 
draft. Comparison of the two versions reveals 
considerable differences. The input from the Member 
States not only led to ‘diplomatisation’ of the text, as 
a result of which points of criticism and proposals were 
formulated less strongly and more guardedly, or even 
disappeared completely if they were subjected to too 
much criticism. The latter occurred, for instance, with 
text proposals on developments which were failing 
to meet previous objectives. The consultation process 
also yielded new elements. The drafts underwent 
significant expansion, particularly with respect to the 
external relationships of the European Union.
The final result is a safety programme consisting of 
an introduction and seven chapters, in total 82 pages 
with 170 concrete initiatives, focusing directly on the 
interests of the citizens, which can evolve directly 
from a proposal. A good example of this is the mutual 
acknowledgement of driver disqualifications between 
the Member States of the European Union, which 
is expected to enhance safety on European roads. 
Another clear example is the creation of a European 
register of convicted child abusers. The objective of 
this instrument is to prevent child abuse by excluding 
paedophiles from working with children or from living 
in residential environments, which could put children 
at risk. The proposal to design an internal security 
strategy for the European Union is hardly open to 
standardisation in terms of direct usefulness for the 
public, not least because no explanation at all is given 
here of what exactly this coherent strategy should 
cover.
Cooperation between the police and judiciary are 
important elements in the programme and are 
highly relevant for police and judicial practice, as are 
migration, asylum and international relations. For 
police cooperation, the chapter on civil law bears 
less relevance. The proposed policy with respect 
to the logical and technical European information 
infrastructure only warrants the attention of specialists. 
They are provisional facilities for operational police 
cooperation. For police officers, the programme’s 
introduction and Chapter 4 are essential. Anyone who 
has more time to look at the programme in depth is 
recommended to concentrate on Chapters 5, 6, and 7, 
although a thorough study of the whole programme 
is worthwhile. Four arguments underpin why the 
Stockholm Programme should be included in the 
study and used as reading material for serving police 
officers as well as police trainees.
The subsidiarity principle and the 
international dimension
Member States and Europe were (partly) shaped on 
the basis of the subsidiarity principle. According to this 
principle, a higher administrative layer is not activated 
if a lower layer can act independently. Europe must 
not therefore interfere in what can be dealt with at the 
national level. The Stockholm Programme makes this 
principle very concrete by stating what European police 
cooperation should cover and what not. The following 
quotation (p. 40) provides a concise definition.
‘The prime objective of EU law enforcement cooperation 
is to combat forms of crime that are typically cross-
border in their dimension. Focus should not only be 
placed on combating terrorism and organised crime 
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but also cross-border widespread crime that has 
a significant impact on the daily life of the citizens of 
the EU.’
Cooperation can thus involve very serious forms of 
crime, but need not. The cross-border character is most 
decisive and not always the seriousness of the crime. 
The programme is not completely consistent on this 
point, however. More or less implicitly, the Stockholm 
Programme encourages Member States to exchange 
best practices, even if they have no cross-border features, 
but are isolated incidents, which occur throughout 
Europe, as in the case of domestic violence, for example. 
However, the greatest added value of European police 
cooperation can be found in the approach to problems 
whereby Member States are highly dependent on each 
other when it comes to finding a solution. This is the 
leitmotiv in the programme and is visible in virtually all 
policy proposals. Anyone who gains insight into the 
nature of the international dimension will understand 
how crucial local and national policing, on the one hand, 
and international criminal investigation, on the other, 
are related. All three levels are indispensable for creating 
a working environment that contributes to the safety 
of citizens. Police officers should be made aware of this 
connection.
Freedom, security and justice as basic 
conditions for the single market
Project Europe is regarded as the most important factor 
when it comes to maintaining peace and preventing 
war between the Member States in the past 60 years. 
Historically, that is an unprecedentedly long period. In 
addition, the European Union has made a considerable 
contribution to increasing prosperity on the continent. 
This prosperity has arisen with the gradual abolition of 
trade restrictions, differences in import regimes, the 
removal of borders and the introduction of a single 
currency. The emergence of one liberalised European 
market in which goods, services, persons and capital 
can move freely has strengthened the representation 
of national interests across the full European territorial 
spectrum. As a consequence of this, Member States can 
by no means individually protect their own interests at 
the national level and therefore have to trust the efforts 
of other Member States. In the Stockholm Programme, 
this responsibility of Member States for each other is 
very clearly elaborated and clarified. For instance, by the 
proposals to intensify progress in the implementation 
of already-agreed measures, the protection of the euro, 
the reinforcement of such organisations as CEPOL, 
Europol and Frontex, strengthening Euregions and, 
last but not least, making information more available 
to other Member States. Police officers in Member 
States serve an important function when it comes to 
protecting European achievements and in enabling 
them to function.
The engines of European integration: via 
mutual trust to mutual recognition
It is highly unlikely that a United States of Europe will 
be created within a time horizon of 25 years. On the 
basis of current insights, it is even inconceivable that 
project `Europe` will ever evolve into a merger of 
Member States with the abolition of their national 
sovereignty. The reasons for this can be found in the 
cultural individuality of Member States, their language 
and the attachment to and identification of citizens 
with their own country. Cooperation and integration 
must therefore run along different tracks, and allow 
for the accommodation of different objectives at the 
same time. In this sense, project Europe is unique and 
cannot be compared to any other supranational or 
international organisation. Manuel Barroso, President of 
the European Commission, once referred to Europe in 
this context as a ‘UPO’ or Unidentified Political Object. 
The diversity that is so characteristic of Europe only 
permits the harmonisation of rules, laws and procedures 
on a modest scale. Large-scale harmonisation would 
simply run aground on the differences in ‘hard’ variables 
such as a legal or information management system. 
Harmonisation would encounter most resistance in the 
softer ‘variables’, such as differences in existing working 
methods or the opinions on priorities held by Member 
States. The knowledge that harmonisation can only be 
used as a strategy to bring unity in diversity on a limited 
scale exposed the need to find an alternative to enabling 
police and judicial cooperation between Member 
States. That alternative was found in the principle of 
mutual recognition. Elaboration of this principle means 
ideally that Member States are prepared to recognise 
judicial decisions and official acts by the police and 
judiciary of other Member States as if they were the acts 
and decisions of the Member State itself.
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When this situation is realised, it will entail a massive 
increase in the efficiency of cooperation. It will be clear 
that full implementation of the principle of mutual 
recognition cannot be achieved overnight. Despite 
this, important progress has already been made. At 
the moment, there is such a thing as a European arrest 
warrant. This facility enables Member States to request 
the arrest of persons who, if they are actually arrested, 
are handed over to the Member State requesting the 
arrest without too much additional red tape. A similar 
facility, though diluted in the negotiation process, is 
the European evidence warrant, on the basis of which 
rulings on the evidence and the grounds for this are 
recognised by Member States other than the Member 
States which constructed the evidence. The most 
important precondition for the implementation of 
mutual recognition is the mutual trust between Member 
States. The Stocmme provides continual evidence of this 
awareness. Many measures are geared to building up or 
strengthening mutual trust.
A good example is the proposal to set up exchange 
programmes for officials from the police and judiciary, 
border guards and judges. Police officers in Europe are 
selected on the basis of a number of qualities. One of these 
is the willingness and ability of candidates to immerse 
themselves in the opinions and views of others and to 
then consider these when forming their own opinions. 
The principle of mutual recognition demonstrates why 
police officers are so urgently required to possess this 
quality. Study of the Stockholm Programme brings the 
relationship between job requirements and international 
police cooperation to the surface.
Human rights and police
The fourth and last argument in favour of giving 
more prominence in police training to the Stockholm 
Programme is related to the attention that the 
programme pays to protection of the public. Powerful 
initiatives to reinforce freedom, safety and justice in the 
EU go virtually hand in hand with arguments in favour 
of protecting privacy. The need to offer safeguards 
against the improper use of police data crops up, in fact, 
in every chapter. Protection of the public by the state 
receives almost as much attention as the protection 
of the public against the state. Critics believe that the 
attention in the programme for protection against the 
state will turn out to be no more than politically correct 
lip service. I see no reason to assume that this would 
be the case. This aspect, including the concrete cases 
made for better protection for more than vulnerable 
citizens, such as children, minority groups or victims 
of crime, provide police training with many starting 
perspectives on the theme of human rights and its 
transposition into police action.
Conclusion
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is 
a precondition for the functioning of the internal 
market. This article makes a case, based on four 
separate arguments, for adhering a more prominent 
position in higher European police education to the 
policy-making process and content of the Stockholm 
Programme. As has become apparent from our CEPOL 
study tour, this programme offers an excellent learning 
mechanism because of the few concrete examples, 
which allow a deepening of our understanding of 
police and judicial cooperation in educational settings. 
The basic principles concern human rights, subsidiarity 
and the international dimension. A safer Europe can 
only be realised if Member States evolve from mutual 
trust to mutual recognition, and if members of the 
European police community can build cross-border 
ties through European police education.
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It could pass as general wisdom that the more 
scientific research is geared towards issues considered 
as ‘real’ problems by police officers, the more likely 
the outcomes of such projects are regarded as ‘useful’ 
and accepted among police practitioners. This is the 
general advantage ‘applied research’ often has over 
more reflective, strategic varieties, let alone critical 
approaches. While this assessment might be taken for 
granted, it is not necessarily self-evident what exactly 
a real, practical police problem constitutes, and from 
which angle it is perceived and defined. A simple 
starting point would be to declare a police problem 
those areas of unlawful behaviour, where the police are 
called upon to intervene, investigate or prevent. The 
challenge then is that there are many situations, and they 
change their form and characteristics depending on the 
position and viewpoint of the observer or stakeholder. 
In this chapter we have collected contributions 
that can be easily classified as dealing with research 
applied to real, practical police problems. The levels 
of ‘practicality’ and the approaches to analysing and 
tackling the underlying problems vary significantly 
however. The papers in this chapter mostly exemplify 
the multiplicity of ‘police problems’ and how differently 
research can be applied in search of solutions.
To begin, the paper by Stol, Gundhus, Runhovde and 
Rønning deals with an issue which prima facie seems 
to be a rather mundane police problem: police patrol 
work. Based on proper empirical observational studies 
of what police officers in diverse places actually do, 
when they do patrol work, their approach attempts 
to capture the broader picture, by also looking at the 
context of the well-known daily routine: trying to grasp 
why patrol work is done in the way it is done. While they 
mainly present empirical findings for Norway, as one of 
the five European countries that were part of a wider 
comparative project, they give an excellent example 
how proper reflection on key terms and methods 
used pays off in getting useful practical results, as well 
as revealing conceptual insights. What appears to be 
a rather sober empirical stock-taking exercise, led by 
a dominant managerial perspective of how best to 
allocate resources, leads to a helpful conceptual model 
of police patrol work and is convincingly connected to 
the more fundamental issue on how modern policing 
concepts are in line with citizens’ expectations.
The next two papers, both initially presented in 2006 
but nevertheless very much up-to-date in terms of the 
principle challenges at stake, will take the reader from 
the day-to-day beat police business on the streets to 
the more volatile and sometimes tumultuous scenery of 
public-order policing.
Based on her extended scholarship and publication on 
urban problems, French professor Sophie Body-Gendrot 
offers a captivating analytical narrative about the riots 
that occurred in French cities in 2005. Interestingly, 
she is following a similar framework of enquiry, which 
was famously first deployed by the 1967 United States 
presidential National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorder: What happened? How did it happen? Why did 
it happen? What (can be) was done? Carefully presenting 
and reviewing the actions on the parts of rioters as well 
as police, she makes the point that there was something 
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quite specifically ‘French’ about the events and rejects 
their simple categorisation as ‘riots’ as well as simplistic 
one-cause explanations, pointing out the specific 
circumstances and conditions where they took place.
The notion of ‘riots’ in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries is chiefly associated with the urban, the big 
cities, perhaps not only in the mind of the public and 
the media. Rob I. Mawby clearly challenges this notion 
of public disorders as a police problem solely belonging 
to the fabric of the urban centres in his contribution. 
Instead he directs our attention to public order problems 
for the police in leisure and holiday areas, where anti-
social behaviour and crime is often fuelled by alcohol 
and drug consumption: ‘Research suggests that many 
tourist’ areas experience relatively high levels of crime 
and disorder (…).’ He illustrates his argument with four 
case studies: street disturbances between ‘mods’ and 
‘rockers’ in Brighton, school leavers holidaying in an 
Australian coastal resort, Amsterdam’s red light district, 
and Faliraki, a holiday destination for young Brits in 
Greece. While concerned about the appropriate — and 
effective — style of policing, Mawby highlights available 
policy options to deal with the ‘police problem’ and 
emphasises the chances of ‘community involvement 
and multi-agency partnerships’. In his view, it would be 
unfair to focus criticism on the police, for what should 
not be framed exclusively as a police problem.
The authors of the first three papers in this chapter 
have shed an analytical light on a specific police — or 
policing — problems from an external observational 
point by applying a variety of disciplinary research 
methodologies. ‘External’ here means looking at ‘the 
problem’ detached from the pressures and limitations 
of direct operational engagement. Nevertheless their 
observations are engaged with the issue at hand and, in 
conclusion, critical but constructive and advice offered, 
if wanted.
The perspective locus of Long, Alison and McManus´ s 
approach is different: they look at research as a means 
of operational support to find more effective ways to 
identify and investigate child pornography offenders. 
They ask ‘perhaps the simplest question the police 
currently face (…) whether an indecent image offender 
is committing, or is likely to commit contact sexual abuse 
against a child?’. In an effort clearly based on an evidence-
led approach, they scan the criminological landscape for 
what research has to offer as knowledge, which might 
be useful to guide investigations and operational tactics. 
Being aware that the nature of this offence instantly 
crosses national and juridical boundaries, they highlight 
the potential significance of culture and adequate 
understanding of the diversity of these cultures in regard 
to this type of crime. Interestingly, behind the ‘outbound’ 
police problem of tackling child pornography another, 
‘inbound’ one surfaces: the need to focus scarce — and 
obviously insufficient — resources on the most harmful 
cases and offenders. Efficiency is certainly a reoccurring 
issue in many other practical police problem areas — 
and applied research is the vehicle that is called in 
as a prospective solution to this police problem of 
organisational nature.
Applied research has significant potential to solve or 
at least limit practical ‘police problems’ and will, over 
time, yield a more evidence- and science-based style 
of and approach to policing. But can new research 
and science-based policing methods create their 
own practical problems — calling for new research to 
grasp what it happening? That conclusion could be 
provocatively drawn from the presentation of a French-
German comparative research project, which is in its 
early stages, but still highlights another version of how 
research is applied to policing problems. In their paper, 
respective project heads Thierry Delpeuch and Thomas 
Scheffer present a detailed outline of their research 
project. CODISP (Création de Concepts et d’Outils pour le 
Développement de l’Intelligence de Sécurité Publique) is 
introduced as a cultural and social science project on 
recent forms of knowledge management work in law 
enforcement organisations. The aim is to analyse the 
way knowledge management in law enforcement (its 
methods and forms, as well as the means and degree 
of knowledge sharing), and knowledge-based law 
enforcement work (in regard to social environments 
and types of tort), interact. The project traces and 
tries to understand the specific workflows occurring 
in the everyday work of law enforcement staff. The 
project specifically looks into the question of what role 
innovative concepts (such as ‘intelligence-led policing’) 
play in police work. The outcomes of this research will 
be translated into training material and, based on this, is 
considered useful for solving or preventing (new) police 
problems.
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As mentioned before; this chapter opens just a small 
window onto the wide and varied landscape of the 
deliverables of scientific research and academic 
perspectives, which can be useful and supportive for 
the improved handling of police problems. In ideal 
case this will be scientific truths delivered for the 
practitioner’s consumption — sometimes inconvenient 
and occasionally to be taken with a pinch of salt.

151
“Riots” in French cities  in November 2005:  visions and revisions
“Riots” in French cities  
in November 2005:  
visions and revisions
Sophie Body-Gendrot
France
(2006 Conference in Bramshill)
Words can hide more than they reveal and language has 
the power to make all look similar. Scholars have thus 
the duty to bring forward distinctions that have been 
conflated by common language. Regarding the forms 
of urban violence which inflamed over three hundred 
sensitive neighbourhoods in France in November 2005, 
the media as well as numerous social scientists and 
politicians referred to “riots”. The term evokes fewer 
riots due to starvation in India than the racial riots in 
American cities in the 1960s and later, those of Los 
Angeles in 1992, the images of which have been seen 
all over the world (Cachet et.al., 2008, p. 263-280) (1).
The use of this word is not appropriate in the French 
case, as will be shown. Charles Tilly himself (Tilly, 2003, p. 
18) explains indeed that this term “embodies a political 
judgement rather than an analytical distinction”, an 
opinion I share.
To analyse what went on in France in 2005, the 
questions that President Lyndon Johnson asked 
Judge Otto Kerner when he appointed him in 1967 as 
the head of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorder may structure our roadmap. What happened? 
How did it happen? Why did it happen? What can be 
done? What is specifically French in these outbursts 
conclude this essay.
(1) This text borrows from and updates “Urban “riots” in France: 
Anything new?” in: Cachet, L. et. al. (2008); Governance of Security 
in the Netherlands and Belgium, Den Haag, Netherlands: Boom 
Legal Publishers, p. 263-280.
What happened?
The first tinder that sparked these disorders occurred on 
October 27, 2005, at Chêne Pointu, a neighbourhood 
of Clichy-sous-Bois (referred to by its shortened 
nomenclature as Clichy), a locality in Seine-Saint Denis 
(one of 100 départements or territorial units), in the 
Greater Paris. At dusk, a group of boys from a nearby 
housing project after playing soccer headed to their 
homes to break the day’s fast during Ramadan. Three 
boys, one of Turkish descent, the other two of African 
heritage, took a shortcut across a locked construction 
site. An employee from a nearby funeral home called 
the police. A patrol car from the Brigade Anti-Criminalité 
(the BAC, France’s anticrime unit) arrived at 5:20.
In Clichy, like much of the Seine-Saint Denis, 
confrontations are common between the police and 
boys from public housing projects, who are notably 
of North African and African descent. As the police 
car approached, the boys fled, since they were not 
carrying their identity cards. The BAC unit called in 
reinforcements and three more cars arrived, a total of 
eleven policemen. The three boys sprinted and finally 
came upon a three meters high wall, topped with 
barbed wire, the property of Électricité de France (EDF). 
The boys ignored the “Danger/High Voltage” signs and 
went in (2).
(2) This description borrows from Canadian journalists Luc 
Bouchard and David Wright who did investigative work after the 
events in the concerned localities. May they be thanked.
152
European Police Science and Research Bulletin · Special Conference Issue Nr. 2
At 5:36, a pursuing officer reported over his radio that 
the boys were seen climbing into the installation. But 
as the official report investigating police behaviour 
(Inspection générale des services) stated one year later, 
he did not go any further and spotting no move inside 
the EDF property, he gave up and the police patrol 
went back to the police station.
At 6:12, the entire neighbourhood went suddenly dark. 
Two of the youth had misstepped and 20,000 volts 
of current caused their instant death. The survivor 
managed to climb out and stumbled upon older boys. 
A rumour spread among the youth that the police had 
provoked the incident. Later that day, Interior Minister 
Sarkozy suggested that if the boys had not been 
guilty of something, they would not have run. Three 
days earlier, visiting one of the Paris suburbs, he had 
declared that he would rid the residents of the riff-raff 
(racaille), a term interpreted as an insult by the youth. 
The mention of a possible theft, reported as such by 
the media discrediting the victims, shocked numerous 
youth who expected words of compassion or at least 
some respect towards the grieving parents. They took 
the Minister’s statement as a provocation.
Within two hours, in an explosion of rage that was 
neither planned nor organized, around one hundred 
young men descended onto the streets of Clichy, 
chanting “Dead for nothing!. Hiding their faces with 
hoods and bandanas, they threw rocks at city buses 
and the police and set twenty three cars ablaze. In usual 
circumstances, the disorders should have stopped after 
three or four days. The scenario is well known. French 
urban areas have experienced it since the first urban 
disorders took place in 1981 at the periphery of Lyon, 
then during the 1980s and 1990s with a peak in 1990 
in Vaulx-en-Velin, again at the periphery of Lyon. The 
youth express their anger after an incident with the 
police with their limited repertoire, they torch cars and 
garbage cans, break windows and vandalize public 
goods, they confront the police and after a climax, the 
disorders recede.
A second unanticipated event then took place. On the 
evening of October 30, a tear gas canister, as those 
belonging to the police, fell into the entrance of a store-
front mosque causing those inside—parents, family 
elders—to rush out, angry and humiliated. Some youth 
claimed that the police had thrown it on purpose and 
that Islam was disrespected, the police denied being 
the author of the act. The consequence is that disorders 
started again, spreading to seven localities. Then, 
a strategic error was made by the police headquarters 
in Paris. Despite local mayors’ urgent warnings, the HQ 
decision was to heavily protect the National stadium in 
Saint-Denis where a high risk soccer game was to take 
place on November 2. 800 experienced policemen 
were sent there rather than to localities adjacent to 
Clichy where insufficient and uncoordinated police 
forces including gendarmes confronted the youth. 
The fourth spark came from the four-day week end 
(All Saints’ Day) which prevented local mayors from 
mobilizing their usual resources. After six days, 200 cars 
had been torched. But until November 4, except for one 
locality, the Eastern and Southern parts of the region 
remained quiet. Most clashes opposed Compagnies 
Républicaines de Sécurité (anti-riot squads) and small 
groups of youth in the Parisian region.
During 25 nights of unrest in November 2005 in three 
hundred neighbourhoods of two hundred cities 
(Rivayrand, 2006, p. 56-57):
 § 10 346 vehicles were burnt (4 207 in the Parisian 
region),
 § 233 public buildings and 74 private buildings, 7 
bus depots, 22 buses or trains damaged or burnt, 
including 18 religious sites,
 § 4 770 persons were stopped (2 808 during the crisis), 
4 400 kept in custody,
 § 800 people were incarcerated (including over 100 
juveniles),
 § 11. 500 civil servants, including 4 500 police officers 
and gendarmes (60 units per night) were mobilized 
on November 13 and 14,
 § over 200 of them were injured during the outbursts 
(Waddington, King, Jobard, 2008, p. 5).
How did it happen?
As is usual in urban violence, a small core of youth 
groups moved rapidly from one area to the other 
and arson spread to localities West and North of the 
region. The torched cars or huge garbage cans which 
attracted the television crews based in Paris were 
frequently limited to one or two streets. Arson would 
start in the evening (darkness shielding the youth) and 
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would stop after the journalists had left. In no locality, 
did unrest last more than four consecutive nights (3).
After November 6, the disorders reached provincial 
cities: Dijon, Rennes, Soissons, Evreux. In Toulouse, 
a public library and a commercial mall were damaged. 
The number of torched cars kept climbing and 274 
localities were concerned. On November 7 marking 
the apex of the contagion, after the Prime Minister had 
delivered a speech on TV, about 1200 cars were burnt in 
300 localities around the country. Then a decrescendo 
took place and, after November 14, the number of 
torched cars averaged 100 a night. The weather had 
turned cold, the actors were tired, numerous arrests 
followed by real time justice process had occurred and 
a state of emergency had been imposed.
More than half of the violent actions took place in 
three regions: Ile de France (35%), Rhone-Alpes (10.7%), 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (7%); and in 40% of the urban 
problem zones of the eight most industrialized and 
socially polarized départements (4). (700 urban areas 
are labelled “sensitive” or high risk by the French 
administration). 60% of immigrant families in France 
live in these three regions.
During these three weeks, “only” one death was 
registered, that of a senior citizen, the cause being 
personal revenge rather than the disorders. A 56-
year old woman was severely burnt after a bus was 
torched in the Parisian region. She was rescued by the 
bus driver (of immigrant origin). Damages have been 
estimated between 200-250 million Euros, according 
to insurance companies.
Limited copycat attacks occurred in neighbouring 
countries. World-wide coverage was given to the 
incidents with interpretations of racial riots that do 
not match those offered in France. A proliferation 
of extremely diverse interpretations followed the 
events, reflecting the ideology of those who either 
criminalized the youth or empowered them as the 
vanguards of a new social movement. The few youth 
who talked offered a very diverse range of viewpoints, 
either stating what they thought was expected of them 
(3) Cf. Violences urbaines: une exception française, Note externe de 
veille 31, Centre d’analyse stratégique, October 23, 2006, p.3
(4) According to a 2006 Report from Délégation à la ville on urban 
violence.
by the interviewers (we are victims) or denouncing 
the arsons as “irresponsible” or suggesting other 
motivations.
Why did it happen?
It is complex to distinguish between the specific 
circumstances which triggered the events and 
the structural dimensions brought forward in the 
interpretations: they interplay in various degrees, 
according to contexts. What can be learnt from the 
perspective of this ‘urban violence’? What are the 
differences between what looks like similar causes and 
processes and the numerous variations observed in 
time, place, and social setting?
First of all, a fraction of 15-20-year old male youth from 
poor areas, French and frequently of immigrant origin 
(because immigrants are the major component of the 
working classes in France) acted out of emotion and 
anger. By any measure, it was not a whole cohort of 
youth who mobilized. Youth – a deceptive word – are 
very diverse, some are students, some have regular 
jobs and keep away from the justice system, some are 
high school students eager to have fun, others are idle 
and resentful, their attitudes and age vary along a wide 
spectrum.
It appears that two interacting factors contributed 
to urban violence: first, angry teenagers acted out 
collectively and their actions, made visible by the 
media, had a contagious effect on other youth; 
second, other individuals instrumentalised chaos and 
violence for specific motivations. The first type of 
actors frequently set fire to public goods including 
some primary schools (close to their housing projects, 
schools are the symbol of their frustrated hopes for 
mobility). It has been estimated that one fourth of 
those sent before the judge were school dropouts. It 
seems the choice of targets was discussed collectively 
and the risks assessed; it was not just mass hysteria 
(Mohammed).
These events gave an impression of “déjà vu” because 
every year, since the 1980s, around 10-15 outbursts 
happen, with a noteworthy evolution. After 1997, as 
in other countries (Norway, the Netherlands, the U.S. 
for instance), half of the time, turf wars or quarrels 
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about girls or family feuds cause the disorders. Police 
shootings or chases or justice decisions are less often 
the cause of disorders. Whether the turfs controlled 
by dealers remained quieter than others or had been 
disrupted is a matter of debate.
What was new, besides the four sparks already 
mentioned, was the huge television coverage of the 
events. “The fact that at the start, they counted the 
number of burnt cars, the number of cities, even 
concerned neighbourhoods, does not help. It creates 
a sort of Top Ten of the hottest city and as they are 
somewhat stimulated by the fact that they compete 
with the youth of the nearby city, they want to cause 
more damage to be seen”, remarked Antoine, a 22-year 
old (Ciccelli et al. 2006, 35). Then, the media and Sarkozy’s 
political opponents were probably hoping that he would 
repeat the mistake the Chirac government had made 
in 1986, when a young man, Malik Oussekine, chased 
by a motorcycle police squad, died during a student 
demonstration. The national emotion caused by this 
event is said to have eased the victory of F. Mitterand 
in the Presidential election (Fillieule and Jobard, 1998). 
Youth were stimulated by the presence of television 
crews and by the potential attention they could get. 
“Had we engaged in peaceful demonstrations, it 
would have achieved nothing. The only means for us 
to be heard was to torch cars while on TV. I would say 
it worked”, a teen-age remarked (Kokoreff, 2008, p. 149-
150). The media acted as a magnifying glass, making 
sense out of isolated acts, rewarding negative heroes, 
but after a while, denouncing them for their excess.
Torching cars is one resource in the limited repertoire 
these youths have in marginalized areas. About one 
hundred cars are torched every week end in France 
with peaks on Bastille Day and on New Year’s Eve. But 
it should be said that numerous cars burn simply by 
contact, others are burnt by their owners to get the 
insurance, conceal a robbery, or get rid of wrecks.
Yacine admitted having thrown objects and “cocktails” 
at the police during the riots (see Wright & Bouchard, 
2006). “It was an incredible release. I felt super.” He 
pointed at a scar above his eye as he was stopped by 
a squad of CRS with a trunk-load of glass bottles filled 
with gasoline. He spent the next five days in detention 
and then was sent to the judge.
Numerous French commentators have resorted to 
a social stratification perspective and to the theory 
of relative deprivation to explain the events. They 
emphasize mounting and cumulative burdens on 
specific groups in specific places. Clichy is indeed 
the poorest locality in Seine Saint Denis. Dependent 
families make up 67.4% of the population and 46.6% 
are under the poverty threshold. 33% of the residents 
are not French (45% in Chêne Pointu) and among 
them, 60% are jobless (Kokoreff 2006, 166).
The (improperly used) term banlieue evokes poorly 
designed urban space including public housing, 
insufficient and costly transportation, dysfunctional 
public services (for instance Clichy had no police 
station at that time, despite continuous political 
promises to create one). But, when budget cuts hit 
community organizations in 2002, disorders did not 
follow. It should also be pointed out that numerous 
“sensitive areas” remained quiet during the outbursts. 
The structural explanation is thus limited.
The zones marked by urban violence in 2005 had no 
prior tradition of disorders. There was no transmission 
of a culture of protest from the older ones to the 
youngest. The new sites of violence were characterized 
by large sub-Saharan families, recently settled. Their 
concentration and their level of segregation correlate 
very significantly with the geography of the riots, 
according to Lagrange. The political representation of 
these residents is non-existent (Lagrange, 2008, p. 113).
Place mattered and the areas which remained 
calm (like Marseille or Strasbourg for instance) were 
frequently those with a strong local culture, energetic 
social control exerted by families and community 
organizations. In some of these localities, previous 
social work had been done, crisis cells established, 
dialogues led.
Paris never burnt, unlike what was evoked on the 
international media (5), but for other reasons. The city 
is a highly protected sanctuary and a high priority on 
the police list (6). What occurred was not a Jihad-led 
(5) CNN sent C. Amampur, back from Irak, as if this were a war and 
Ben Laden to be found in Seine Saint Denis.
(6) When there was a rumour on a blog that youth would march on 
Champs Elysées, 1500 policemen were mobilized, just in case.
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mobilization nor race riots (Body-Gendrot, 2007) (7). 
Identities in France emanate from turfs, gender, 
marginalisation. Ethnicity constructed here and now is 
only one element. Most of these youth acted as French.
What was done?
At the national level, the state kept the upper hand but 
with a delay. A state of emergency was pronounced by 
decree on November 9, reviving a law passed in 1955 at 
the beginning of the Algerian war. It allowed curfews 
and home searches all over the territory, the ban of group 
reunions and the closure of cafés and entertainment 
places in the risk zones in 25 départements. Préfets 
were required to deport undocumented foreigners 
implied in the outbursts. The Police Prefect from the 
Seine-Saint-Denis forbade the selling of gas cans in 
local stores. The state of emergency meant to last 
three months was terminated after January 4. Very few 
localities resorted to curfews.
The police and gendarme forces were praised for 
their efficiency, competence and self-control in order 
maintenance. It was suggested however that their 
mode of intervention, while effective and cautious, 
impacted on the length of the disorders. Their goal 
was not to enforce mass arrests but to contain urban 
violence within the sensitive zones. It thus left the 
fastest running youth free to continue their actions. 
Due to the politicization of French society, also labeled 
a delinquent or distrustful society, the use of authority 
and force is blamed when it is exerted at the expense 
of the weakest. Vandals are ostracized, but so is heavy 
repression; disobedience is tolerated, yet people expect 
the state to intervene to solve their problems. In an 
opinion poll (8), 66% of the French trusted the Interior 
Minister for bringing solutions to the marginalized 
banlieues and 63% approved the deportation of 
foreigners arrested during the outbursts, whether they 
were legal or not. In 1968, the Paris Police Prefect had 
warned his men that they might win the battle on the 
streets but that if they lost their self-control after the first 
(7) The report from the International Crisis Group in 2006 hints that 
because radical Islam is in decline in France and does not attract 
male youth from housing projects, the latter resort to urban 
violence. Only 28% of Muslims in France are regular religious 
practitioners according to recent polls.
(8) National Gallup Institute IPSOS published in Le Point, nov.12, 
2005.
violent necessary move, “they would lose something 
very special that they rank highly – their reputation. To 
hit a man on the ground is to hit oneself”, he had said. 
Consequently, numerous police chiefs admit that their 
job is to calm their men and “when confronted with 
fifty youth armed with iron bars, the only civic reaction 
for the police is to leave and not treat the problem 
when it is inflamed: it would only worsen the situation 
and make it impossible to redress later on. The police 
refuse to contemplate a Pyrrhic victory” (Body-Gendrot, 
2007, p. 237).
Police handling of events have very different 
outcomes. How to manage outbursts varies according 
to police leadership, initiatives, public expectations, 
accountability, police ethics, etc. Sometime stops and 
searches are more revealing about modes of policing 
than the race or ethnicity of those who are stopped. 
Compared with the community mode of policing 
which is much more accountable, the French national 
police are only accountable to the Minister via the 
Prefect, which may give some of them a sense of 
impunity. But accusations of racism are denied.
The accumulated savoir-faire regarding the role 
police have to play when disorder occurs should to 
be mentioned. Riot policemen first resort to water 
pipes against demonstrators, then throw tear gas, 
then launch an assault, which is the inverse order of 
what demonstrators expect. They also attempt to 
isolate the provocateurs or ‘potential assaulters’ from 
the followers and voyeurs that they force to disperse. 
Riot policemen are aware that they are being watched 
by television crews which may give a hostile coverage 
of their actions and the presence of which boosts the 
demonstrators. On the one hand, it is because the 
police maintain a spatial distance with hostile groups, 
that journalists can approach the latter so closely. 
On the other hand, this assumption can be reversed 
and the police may use the media in the pursuit of 
their own interests. It is a chicken-and-egg question. 
Most policemen however are trained to ignore such 
coverage.
Unlike what happened after the riots of the 1960s in 
the US with the appointment of the Kerner commission 
or the Brixton disorders of 1981 followed by the 
Scarman report, there was no commission of that type 
convened by the government. It can be interpreted as 
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its unwillingness to implement strong changes before 
the national elections in 2007.
As for justice, the curve of massive arrests (2 808 
demonstrators were stopped and frisked during the 
crisis followed that of disorders and shows that real 
time judicial processes resulted in massive sentencing. 
800 people were incarcerated, including over 100 
juveniles and the prosecutors were required to be 
tough by the government. In more than one third of 
the cases however, youth were not convicted because 
the proofs against them were not strong enough. Most 
of them were accused of throwing stones and other 
objects at the police, others were indicted for arson 
or vandalism. Those convicted were sentenced to four 
months of incarceration on average, with two months 
and a half of suspended sentencing.
At the local level, numerous mayors of urban 
vulnerable areas mobilized their city police forces 
(between 16000 and 19000 officers in France), made 
use of private safety agents, summoned the anti-
violence wake cells that had been created years ago. 
Mediators, volunteers, some of them religious leaders, 
others adult residents watching the sites and talking to 
the youth all night long intervened. Special mention 
should be made of public housing managers in charge 
of numerous units. Their accumulated expertise led 
them to 1) systematically review security, alarms, locks, 
CCTV’s, lights, power rooms, elevators, basements, 
terraces, parking lots, vacant apartments and green 
spaces. 2) clean wrecks immediately 3) negotiate with 
youth required to burn garbage cans elsewhere than 
on the premises. They had daily debriefing sessions 
with partners (including local police) during the three 
weeks of outbursts.
What is so French about these disorders 
and the responses?
The outbursts are a symptom of the disconnection of 
an inflated central state and its elites from the people 
at the margins. The heart of the matter is that the 
central state does not know what to do with these 
marginalized banlieues. The state acts on long trends, 
whereas media pressures requires quick responses; its 
answers are usually technocratic, whereas à la carte, 
tailor-made measures are needed. Hardly any resident 
of immigrant origin from these areas is asked to explain 
how people there feel, think, evaluate the situation and 
what ideas they have. In France, the higher spheres of 
the state and intellectuals speak in the name of sensitive 
areas’ residents and do not even try to empower them. 
The failure of integration in the sense of belonging and 
“feeling part” of a multicultural society comes from an 
archaic path dependency characterizing French society 
and its system of political representation. France is not 
the only country to blame for its difficulties to deal 
with “visible minorities” (the very word minority has no 
official recognition). The Netherlands, Belgium, the UK 
experience similar problems with some of their Muslim 
populations but at least experimentations are tried 
and can be successful. In France, a strongly centralized 
country, with the largest number of civil servants (30% 
of the working population) and the largest Muslim 
population in Europe, it appears that empowering 
civil society in the solution of its problems is a dream 
deferred.
In France as in Britain, civil unrest involves second or 
third generations who, as citizens, expect an equal 
treatment. In Milan or in Barcelona, outbursts mobilize 
newcomers. But in UK, in the 2000s, as in former East 
Germany “Länders”, far right activists contend with 
immigrants, which is not the case in France where 
symbols of the state are the first targets of the angry 
youth.
Local authorities do not have enough resources for 
initiative and remain supervised by Prefects in charge 
of law and order. A new law passed in the fall of 2006 
gave them more leadership over police strategies but 
mayors did not enjoy being accountable on this matter 
without additional resources or major changes in the 
structure of power. The redistribution of social justice is 
politically risky when many impoverished populations 
do not vote.
As for the police, comparisons with other countries 
show that while the French police excel at order 
maintenance and investigation, they fail at preventing 
or at anticipating social unrest. French police academies 
almost never directly tackle the issues of discrimination 
and institutional racism in training sessions (Body-
Gendrot and Wihtol de Wenden, 2003) and on the 
whole, police unions are hostile to the development of 
discussions on such issues. Residents are not invited by 
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police academies to give their reasons for antagonisms 
between police and youth.
New recruits in the police are frequently under the 
impression that they are doing the “dirty work” for 
which society does not want to take responsibility. 
They receive contradictory injunctions: they are 
submitted to a culture of results in terms of arrests, 
required to control the youth’ s behaviours and instil 
social discipline to them; yet they are also asked to 
avoid any escalation of disorder by going to ‘hot’ places 
at the wrong time.
It is most difficult for inexperienced policemen to exert 
control on housing projects where youth can easily hide. 
Significant sites like soccer field, buildings’ basements 
and entrance halls, green spaces, commercial centre 
and stores are under the surveillance of youth groups. 
There is often only one access road to housing projects 
closely watched over by youth signalling the arrival of 
police cars to others.
The level of accumulation of grievances on the part of 
both youths and the police is a major explanation for 
why some neighbourhoods experience outbursts of 
violence and why similar neighbourhoods do not.
Their professional culture leads policemen to see 
youth in risk areas as ‘hostile’. In a mimetic posture, 
the youth perceive the police as a gang trying to 
control the public spaces which they have somewhat 
appropriated and privatized. They complain of 
harassment and humiliation. Their honour is at stake. 
On each side, the memory of events and of clashes is 
perpetuated, with no option for understanding the 
position of the other. The training of young recruits by 
police chiefs looks like an uphill battle. The former ask 
for their transfer as soon as they are sent to Saint Denis. 
The same is true with the Educational system where 
students often have a better knowledge of their school 
than any of their teachers.
Such a social context explains why any incident 
involving youth and the police looks like a bomb 
waiting for a match. Youth with no hope for mobility 
do not believe that social change may reach them 
positively, they hold both fatalistic attitudes and 
a feeling of injustice. Under such conditions, why 
should they adopt the norms of those by whom they 
feel rejected? Why would they resist the temptation of 
violence?
Conclusion
These forms of urban violence ‘in crumbles’, or ‘paper 
riots’ were not “a prelude to negotiation” (Hobsbawn, 
1959), they did not lead to further social integration 
via their transformation into conflicts. Torching cars 
was not a political statement leading to an entitled 
empowerment. For the Intelligence Service (RG): 
”This was a form of unorganized insurrection with the 
emergence of leaderless and program-less revolt. No 
manipulation was observed, no action on the part of 
Islam fundamentalists. The far left did not anticipate 
the outbursts to its great dismay”. This was neither 
an insurrection nor an uprising either. There were no 
leaders, no articulated program, no specific grievances, 
no attempts to connect with the political apparatus 
as was the case with the Black Power leadership in the 
U.S. in 1968 or even with the Crips and the Bloods after 
the L.A. riots in 1992. For the editor of Le Monde, “these 
were forms of violence, vandalism, the expression of 
a nihilistic rage, frequently from juvenile offenders. Very 
specifically, the stage before riots, which always have 
a defined goal, trigger looting, provoke deaths”. (9) It 
is noteworthy that almost no looting happened then 
and as mentioned before, only one accidental death 
was registered, almost no firearms were used. These 
youth asked for nothing, they made themselves visible. 
They are probably aware that there are no structures 
and no elaborated social proposals aimed at opening 
a dialogue with them. Protest is not enough. They are 
institutionally disempowered and politically ignored. 
Due to the disconnection of the centralized state 
and its elites from the meaningful and daily issues in 
marginalized areas, due to their “distant management” 
masked under a guise of repressive authority, due to 
society’s and political parties’ general indifference to 
segregated margins, due to a lack of plural political 
representation, disorders will erupt again.
The length of the disorders, their contagion and the 
impressive damages they caused revealed the depth of 
accumulated problems of these areas. Most adults did 
not support the offenders, but a lot of them said that 
(9) Après le choc, Le Monde, 11/29/05.
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they “understood” these violent reactions because, 
since the beginning of the 1980s, no governmental 
policy has efficiently alleviated the social and economic 
deterioration that these areas have experienced, 
given them more efficient institutions (the failure of 
public education is to be emphasized), dealt with the 
contempt, discrimination and racism that residents 
resent, nor has their participation been asked for in 
urban renewal policies. The images of these outbursts 
as seen on the media are not without consequences, 
even though their effect may not be voluntary. 
“This effect has produced something, like a “passive 
organization of revolt”, with the characteristics of 
a movement “à distance”. For its development, the 
movement indeed narrowly depended on the media 
reflecting its own image” (Balibar, 2006, p. 95.).
Did the events change anything? They were never 
a theme of debate during the Presidential campaign 
which took place the following year. Majorities 
supported the return of order, after a moment of 
‘normative fear’. With the formalization of insecurity as 
a unified and unifying category, a consensus seems to 
prevail.
Why does unrest not occur more often? It may be 
suggested that urban violence is catalysed through 
a maze of discreet and highly dispositional events 
which, at a defining moment, fold into one another. It 
is this combination of chance, context, and causation 
which should guide further research.
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Post-scriptum
Ten years ago, I ended my essay on the inability of 
French elites to increase the upward mobility of 
marginalized youths and to give a recognition to issues 
of humiliation, discrimination and racism making 
them feel second-rate citizens. I did not insist enough 
on religion, an issue that took a growing importance 
in the banlieues, after 2005. Inserting Islam’s values 
into France’s core values and giving a place to (rather 
than integrating) populations from the South was off 
the table then, partly due to the electoral strength of 
the far right in the 2007 elections and partly because 
of a strong belief in secularization in France. In the 
meantime, the Middle East and other conflicts took 
on localized, ethnicised and essentialised forms 
in neighbourhoods where Muslims are a major 
component or the population.
Since 2005, besides an urban renewal policy at a cost 
of 6,6 billion euros, no comprehensive governmental 
policy alleviated the downtrodden banlieues’ social and 
economic deterioration in providing more jobs and 
public services for impatient new generations. Visible 
minorities’ political representation hardly improved 
locally and nationally. The French model of policing 
of stop and search in the banlieue was reinforced with 
the threat of terrorism and the notion of policing by 
‘consent’ was never debated. On the contrary, the 
police were praised for experienced and firm order 
maintenance and more weapons of protection were 
allocated to the forces in December 2005.
After the terrorist attacks of January 2015 against 
a satirical newspaper in Paris, Charlie-Hebdo, the 
government paid attention to the banlieues which 
were politically perceived as a breeding ground for 
home-grown terrorism. The Prime Minister, a former 
banlieue mayor, denounced ‘a territorial, social and 
ethnic apartheid’ prevailing in those areas. Besides 
specific anti-terrorist measures targeting ‘violent 
public disorder’, anti-racist and anti-semitic measures 
were given a priority. But then, more lethal terrorist 
attacks hit Paris again in November 2015. Policemen 
who had received a strong support from the public 
in January when some of them had acted as heroes 
to save potential victims, were approved again by 
82% of the French, according to a poll (Le Parisien 
May 18, 2016), a 17% increase since 2014. 56% of the 
polled asserted that they trusted the police. However, 
a violent heterogeneous minority made of anarchists, 
ultra-radicals, politicized youths express hatred -and 
for some of them, a death wish- regarding the police. 
Not all of them come from the banlieues. Their violent 
emotions displayed in the public space are oriented 
against institutions, capitalism and mainstream 
society in general. As France is currently in a state of 
emergency, due to a very high risk of terrorism, the 
issue of the banlieues is no longer a priority on the 
political and media agendas.
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Introduction (1)
The very nature of public disorder means that it has 
always been a key component of the everyday work 
of the police, but the nature of public disorder varies 
markedly. It incorporates terrorism and politically 
motivated ‘single incidents’, riots and mass protest, and 
violence and disorder associated with mass events like 
the football World Cup or Olympic Games. However, in 
most countries the police are more regularly engaged 
in low level street disorder. The maintenance of 
order on the streets has long been regarded as one 
of the main priorities of policing (Wilson 1968), and 
its successful implementation may prevent isolated 
incidents escalating into more widespread disorder. This 
resonates, albeit in a rather different direction, through 
more recent US and British interest in zero tolerance 
policing, where punitive policing of public nuisances is 
alleged to prevent minor offenders gravitating to more 
serious crime (Kelling and Coles 1996; Innes 1999).
In the UK a number of government initiatives have 
addressed various dimensions of public disorder. For 
example antisocial behaviour (Burney 2009; Millie 
2008; Millie et al 2005) (1) and alcohol-related crime 
(Dingwall 2011; Secretary of State for the Home 
(1) See also The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, 
accessed 25/05/16 at https://www.gov.uk/government/collec-
tions/anti-social-behaviour-crime-and-police-bill
Department 2012) (2) have been prioritised. However, 
while antisocial behaviour clearly comprises many 
elements of public disorder, the terms are distinct. 
Essentially, antisocial behaviour incorporates two 
dimensions: the way people behave inappropriately 
in public (e.g. people being drunk or rowdy in public 
places), and the consequences of that behaviour for 
the environment (e.g. vandalism, graffiti and other 
deliberate damage to property). From a policing 
perspective, the former constitutes public disorder 
but the latter only sometimes and when the act is 
ongoing. For example, the act of setting fire to a car is 
clearly a matter of public order but the consequence, 
the burnt out car, is not.
Equally, many of the items listed as antisocial behaviour 
involve alcohol or drug misuse, but not all alcohol or 
drug related crime can be described as involving 
public disorder (Budd 2003; Dingwall 2011; Matthews 
and Richardson 2005; Richardson and Budd 2003). For 
example, alcohol or drug consumption may lead to 
other offences, such as burglary, that are unrelated to 
public disorder, whilst excessive alcohol consumption 
(2) See also: https://www.gov.uk/government/publica-
tions/2010-to-2015-government-policy-harmful-drink-
ing/2010-to-2015-government-policy-harmful-drinking, 
accessed 25/05/16. In 2014 the government also established 
20 local alcohol action areas to tackle the harmful effects of 
irresponsible drinking, particularly alcohol-related crime and 
disorder, accessed 25/05/16 at https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278742/
LAAAs.pdf
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and its consequences may be confined to private 
space. (3) In the latter context it is worth noting that 
urban violence in the night-time economy tends to 
occur in public areas around licensed premises rather 
than in the licensed premises themselves (Hobbs 2005). 
However, while public concern over alcohol-related 
disorder is considerable (Walker et al 2009), fuelled by 
debates over more flexible licensing arrangements 
(see Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an 
international journal 2009), the focus has been almost 
exclusively on metropolitan locations.
Nevertheless, locations away from the big cities may 
evidence high levels of public disorder, and present 
particular problems for the police. One that has 
remained largely absent from British government 
debates is the extent of disorder, especially alcohol 
misuse, in tourist resorts. This is particularly surprising, 
given an established body of research that demonstrates 
a close association between tourism and crime (Brunt 
and Hambly 1999; Pizam and Mansfeld 1996; Ryan 1993). 
Research suggests that many tourists areas experience 
relatively high levels of crime and disorder, and that 
within such areas the routine activities of tourists may 
lead to them committing crimes (Andrews 2011; Bellis et 
al 2000; Cohen 1980; Homel et al 1997; Prideaux 1996), 
becoming the victims of crime (Chesney-Lind and Lind 
1986; Mawby, Brunt and Hambly 1999; Michalko 2003; 
Stangeland 1998), or both. Of course, not all tourist areas 
are associated with high levels of crime and disorder. The 
nature of the tourist area has a direct impact upon crime 
rates and patterns, with those mass resorts marketed at 
younger tourists evidencing the greatest public disorder 
problems (Andrews 2011; Bellis et al 2000; Prideaux (1996).
The issue is, from a policing perspective, complex. 
Residents of major tourist areas are generally critical 
of the extent to which tourism generates crime and 
disorder problems (Davis et al 1988; Haralambopoulos 
and Pizam 1996; King et at 1993; Ross 1992). 
Demonstrations in 2009 by residents of the British 
(3) http://www.ias.org.uk/Alcohol-knowledge-centre/Crime-and-
social-impacts/Factsheets/UK-alcohol-related-crime-statistics.
aspx, accessed 25/06/16, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/20160105160709/, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/
crime-stats/crime-statistics/focus-on-violent-crime-and-sexu-
al-offences--2013-14/sty-facts-about-alcohol-related-violence.
htm, accessed 25/06/16, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
dcp171776_394516.pdf, accessed 25/06/16
youth tourist destination, Newquay, provide a graphic 
illustration of this (Mawby 2012). Similarly, recent 
demonstrations by residents of Barcelona against 
unruly behaviour by tourists, including Italian youths 
creating disturbances in the streets, has led the mayor 
to curtail tourist development. (4) But those involved in 
the tourism business, such as hoteliers, leisure industry 
managers, employees whose jobs depend on tourism 
etc., may be far more ambivalent. Tourist areas do not 
spontaneously emerge as centres of the club scene, 
locations where sex and alcohol are an expected part 
of the holiday ‘package’; they are specifically marketed 
as such and targeted at groups within the population 
to whom such holidays appeal. In consequence, the 
police may find themselves policing a contested aspect 
of public behaviour, where the local public at large hold 
very different perceptions of appropriate policing from 
key local businesses – and possibly local government – 
whose prosperity has been built on precisely that image 
(Barton and James 2003; Mawby 2012).
This article focuses on the policing of public disorder in 
such contested areas, by using four examples from the 
academic and wider literature:
 § The policing of street disturbances between ‘mods’ 
and ‘rockers’ in 60s’ Brighton.
 § Policing the ‘schoolies’ holidaying on Australia’s 
Gold Coast.
 § Responding to Amsterdam’s reputation as a center 
of drugs and sex tourism.
 § Faliraki revealed as the sex, drugs and alcohol 
destination for young people from Britain.
 § In the light of these examples, the paper concludes 
with an evaluation of a range of policy options that 
have been considered.
(4) www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/naked-italians-pro-
tests-drunken-tourists-barcelona, www.travelmole.com/news_
feature.php?c=setreg%c2%aeion=3&m_id=Y%21Y%21_rT_T_
mb&w_id=10423&news_id=2014023, accessed 25/06/16, www.
travelmole.com/news_feature.php?c+setreg&region=3&m_
id=Y%21Y%21vT_Y%21T_m&w_id=31029&news_id=2017470, 
accessed 25/06/16
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‘Mods’ and ‘rockers’ in  
60s’ Brighton
Stan Cohen’s (1980) seminal work on the ‘Mods 
and Rockers’ conflicts in England described the 
convergence on South and East coast resorts in 
the 1960s of groups of working class youths, whose 
behaviour was perceived as a threat to the established 
social order. However, Cohen was more interested in 
the amplification process than on Mods and Rockers 
themselves. Nor does the research focus on tourism; 
rather, the example of public disorder, what Cohen 
(1980, 180) calls ‘expressive fringe delinquency’ at 
seaside resorts is coincidental; any other example of 
reactions to youth cultures might have been taken.
The scene of the first confrontation was Clacton, an East 
coast resort and traditional holiday weekend venue 
for working class youths from the East End of London. 
During an especially cold and wet Easter weekend in 
1964, fighting broke out between groups of youths, 
some damage was done to beach huts, and windows 
were broken. Later confrontations occurred at resorts 
including Southend, Bournmouth, Brighton and 
Margate.
According to Cohen, the resorts at the centre of the 
Mods and Rockers drama had been traditional Bank 
holiday resorts for London’s working classes. They also 
shared a certain shabbiness, having lost their traditional 
family holidaymakers to the Spanish Costas. Their 
facilities were meagre and overpriced and the youths 
went with the hope, rather than the expectation, that 
they would experience some excitement, whether 
this involved sex, drugs or ‘aggro’. Following Downes 
(1966), Cohen saw their reaction as in part a response 
to the disjuncture between the leisure opportunities 
promised in the media and the reality of their situation 
as impoverished working class youths in dead-end and 
unrewarding jobs:
‘All that was left was to make a gesture, to deliberately 
enter into risky situations where putting the boot in, 
throwing rocks around, dumping a girl into the sea, could 
be seen for what they were. Add to this volitional element 
the specific desires for change and freedom over the 
holidays, to get away from home, the romance of 
roughing it on the beaches or sleeping four to a room in 
a grotty seafront boarding-house, finding a bird, getting 
some pills. One chose these things, but at the same time 
one was in a society whose structure had severely limited 
one’s choice and one was in a situation where what 
deterministic forces there were – the lack of amenities, 
the action of the police, the hostility of locals – made few 
other choices possible (Cohen 1980, 183).
However, as already noted, Cohen’s work emphasised 
societal reaction rather than explaining primary 
deviance. This was done in terms of concepts such 
as ‘moral panic’ and ‘deviation amplification’. A moral 
panic is defined as where:
‘A condition, episode, person or group of persons 
emerges to become defined as a threat to societal 
values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized 
and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral 
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians 
and other right-thinking people; socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways 
of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the 
condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates 
and becomes more visible’ (Cohen 1980, 9).
Cohen then used the concept ‘deviation amplification’ 
to explain ‘how the societal reaction may in fact increase 
rather than decrease or keep in check the amount of 
deviance’ (ibid., 18). Reaction to local conflict in resorts 
such as Brighton in part reflected concern over the 
changing nature of tourism in the area and a forlorn 
hope for a return to the past. But a localised conflict 
became redefined as a major social problem. The 
process whereby this occurred is illustrated by Cohen. 
For example:
 § Fights between loosely formed street groups, some 
local, were re-interpreted as confrontations between 
gangs of Mods and Rockers who had converged on 
the resort from London with the avowed intention 
of confrontation.
 § Essentially working class youths were redefined as 
affluent and drawn from a wide spectrum, with the 
assumption that their behaviour was typical of most 
youths.
 § Deliberate intent was accredited in cases where in 
fact most ‘young people present at the resorts came 
down not so much to make trouble as in the hope that 
there would be some trouble to watch’ (ibid., 36).
 § The impact was exaggerated, both in terms of the 
costs of damage and the loss of revenue to the resort.
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Cohen (1980, 77-143) then went on to assess societal 
reaction under three headings: sensitisation; the 
social control culture; and exploitation. Sensitisation 
referred to the way in which subsequent acts were 
interpreted and defined as further examples of the 
phenomenon; thus all resort conflicts and many 
examples of adolescent hooliganism were reclassified 
as Mods’ and/or Rockers’ activities. The societal control 
culture referred to political and penal response, with 
tougher policing, harsher sentences and disregard for 
due process, and clamours for draconian measures to 
stamp out the ‘evil’. The exploitative culture referred to 
the ways in which various agencies used the inventory 
for their own ends; for example, by claiming more 
resources, identifying the moral value of their own 
organisation etc.
In summary, the process of amplification was seen 
to involve five stages: initial deviance leading to the 
inventory and sensitisation which fed back on each 
other to produce an over-estimation of the deviance, 
which in turn was used to justify an escalation in the 
control culture (ibid., 143).
While Cohen’s work allows us to appreciate that disorder 
in seaside resorts is not a modern invention, the next 
example, the ’invasion of the schoolies’, demonstrates 
that it is not just a British, or indeed European, issue.
Invasion of the schoolies
Surfers Paradise, located in the centre of the Gold 
Coast region of Queensland, grew from a quiet seaside 
town in the 1960s to become the Australian mecca for 
young tourists. It is an international resort renowned 
for its nightlife. At the time of Homel et al’s (1997) 
research there were 187 licensed premises in the area 
and 22 nightclubs in the small central business district, 
and the problem of alcohol related disorder was widely 
acknowledged.
One aspect of this was the identification of Surfers 
Paradise with the annual ‘schoolies invasion’. In 
Australia, the end of the school year regularly sees 
thousands of school leavers (‘schoolies’) descend on 
coastal resorts to celebrate (Scott 2006). (5) Gold Coast 
resorts like Surfers Paradise are particularly favoured 
and indeed to a large extent promote themselves as 
catering for young singles.
In late November and early December 2002 a succession 
of schoolies from Queensland, New South Wales and 
Victoria took over resorts like Surfers Paradise, resulting 
in drink-related public disorder problems that spilt over 
into vandalism and violence. For example, on Friday 
night, 22 November, 67 people were arrested, mainly 
for assaults and disorderly conduct. This resulted 
in concern among locals and other holidaymakers, 
provoked claims that films such as the hit teen movie 
Blurred had encouraged the behaviour, and led to 
calls for the tourist industry that actively promoted 
the resorts to school leavers to fund crime reduction 
initiatives. (6) This resulted in a crime and safety audit 
and action plan in 2003. (7)
While clearly the initiatives described by Homel et 
al (1997) did not have a long term impact, they are 
worth revisiting, both because they demonstrate that 
a broad menu of policing initiatives can impact upon 
public disorder, and because the research identifies the 
limitations to such initiatives.
Fundamental to the situation on Surfers Paradise is 
acceptance that different constituencies have different 
perceptions of risk. Local residents were concerned 
about public disorder, with almost three quarters 
(5) See for example: http://www.schoolies.com/what-is-schoolies, 
accessed 25/06/16  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3329849/Schoo-
lies-carnage-continues-Australia-wild-photos-emerge-so-
cial-media.html, accessed 25/06/16 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=guL4yxSDy-4, accessed 
25/06/16
(6) David Fickling in Surfers Paradise, Guardian, November 29, 2003, 
accessed 25/05/16 at www.guardian.co.uk/australia/story/ 
0,12070,1095896,00.html 
The following sources were also used here. Accessed 21/11/03, 
they are no longer available on the internet: 
http://entertainment.news.com.au/common/print-
Page/0,6164,5517703%5E7485%5E%5Enbv,00.html 
www.themercury.news.com.au/common/story_
page/0,5936,5544472%255E421,00.html 
http://townsvillebulletin.news.com.au/print-
page/0,5942,5438850,00.html 
http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/t_news_item.as-
p?PID=2303&status=Archived
(7) http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/crime-safety-profile-of-surf-
ers-paradise-6066.html, accessed 25/06/16
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concerned at lack of safety at night and at public 
drunkenness, a view echoed by many retailers who had 
relocated elsewhere. However, owners of the pubs and 
clubs in the area saw the image of Surfers Paradise as 
the night-time leisure capital of Queensland as crucial 
to their success. The initiative therefore aimed to draw 
these various constituencies into an alliance, whereby 
a reduction in antisocial behaviour would be seen to 
benefit all those concerned. The mechanism whereby 
this was to be achieved involved the creation of a multi-
agency partnership incorporating licensees, local 
government, police, health and the public to focus on:
‘(T)he way licensed venues are managed (particularly 
those that cater to large numbers of young people); 
the “re-education” of patrons concerning their role 
as consumers of “quality hospitality”; and attention 
to situational factors, including serving practices, 
that promote intoxication and violent confrontations’ 
(Homel et al 1997, 266).
Specific examples included:
 § Security audits, using police and security firms’ data 
and observational approaches.
 § Registration and training of security personnel.
 § Joint patrols by police and private security personnel.
 § A shuttle bus service to enable patrons to leave the 
area safely.
 § Neighbourhood watch.
 § The creation of a Venue Management Task Group 
and separate Monitoring Committee.
The latter were seen by the evaluation team as crucial. 
The Venue Management Task Group was important 
in promoting standards whereby pubs/clubs would 
operate in ways that reduced the risk of alcohol-related 
disorder. For example: low alcohol drinks were promoted 
at discounted prices, rather than Happy Hours; problem 
drinking on the premises was better controlled; the 
availability and quality of food was improved; and 
there were restrictions on size and strength of drinks. 
Where licensees were seen not to be complying with 
this model, they were brought before a peer-based 
Monitoring Committee, which aimed to achieve 
a resolution that was acceptable to all parties. The police 
and licensing authorities were not represented on the 
committee, but the Monitoring Committee referred on 
cases that could not be resolved voluntarily.
Homel el al (1997) reported an impressive short term 
impact for the initiative, both in terms of outputs 
and outcomes. Licensees were assessed as operating 
according to the new standards, and the extent 
of alcohol-related disorder reduced appreciably in 
the first year of the initiative. However, a year later, 
problems were resurfacing, which the researchers to 
a large extent attributed to the reduced effectiveness 
of the Monitoring Committee. They argued that the 
initiative succeeded in that local communities came to 
recognise that it was in their interests to move away 
from cut-throat competition based around excessive 
alcohol discounting and towards upmarketing the 
resort, and that empowering these constituencies 
provided the most effective forum for achieving this, 
but that the withdrawal of central funding and a move 
to empower the Venue Management Task Group 
contributed to individual licensees flouting the rules in 
the interests of short-term profits. As a result, by 2002 
local people were once again calling on the police to 
win back the streets.
Certainly, the evaluation by Homel and his colleagues 
suggests that partnership work to enhance policing 
of public alcohol-related disorder can be effective. 
However, given the short term impact of the initiative 
it is worth considering how the initiative might have 
been improved. One aspect, for example, which is 
surprisingly absent from the discussion, is the impact 
that physical situational crime reduction measures 
such as improved street lighting and CCTV might 
have had on creating safer public space (Mawby 2014). 
Most importantly, though, the initiative appears to 
have ignored the infrastructure within which Surfers 
Paradise was, and continued to be, marketed as the 
place young people went for alcohol, sex and drugs. If 
tourists are encouraged to go to a venue for its night-
time economy, and then told when they arrive that it 
would be better if they behaved differently, resistance 
is scarcely surprising. If licensed premises on the Gold 
Coast are to promote more responsible night-time 
leisure pursuits this needs to be reflected in the ways 
in which areas like Surfers Paradise are marketed.
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Responding to Amsterdam’s liberal 
identity
The questions raised for public order by Amsterdam’s 
reputation as the European capital of sex and drugs 
tourism, on the face of it, appear somewhat different. 
However, where the result is that young males are 
attracted to the streets of the Netherland’s capital city, 
similar problems arise.
Both sex tourism and drug tourists can be defined 
either narrowly or widely. In the former case, tourists 
may choose a particular holiday in a particular location 
in order to engage in sexual activity as a major part 
of their holiday, or (as for schoolies on the Gold Coast) 
or young British tourists holidaying in Spain (Andrews 
2011) they may see sex as an important, but by no 
means necessary, ingredient (Jones 2001). Similarly, 
one might distinguish between drug tourists who are 
attracted to the area by the local culture, of which drug 
use is an intricate part, and those who are attracted 
exclusively by the opportunity to use drugs (Uriely and 
Belhassen 2005).
The expansion of foreign tourism and increased 
migration of impoverished women from poorer to 
more affluent societies have combined to fuel an 
expansion in sex tourism and tourist destinations 
defined by sex tourism. Amsterdam is a case in point. 
While prostitution in the city has been long established 
(Boutellier 1991; Brants 1998) and has been encouraged 
by what Brants calls the ‘fine art of regulated tolerance’, 
sex tourism is a comparatively recent phenomenon 
(Nijman 1999) but one that is crucial to Amsterdam’s 
(and the Netherlands’) income from tourism (Carter 
2000; Dahles 1998; Wonders and Michalowski 2001). 
However, the way that sex tourism develops in different 
societies is moulded by the structure and culture of the 
host (Carter 2000), as Wonders and Michalowski (2001) 
note in a comparison of Amsterdam and Havana.
While drug tourism is also associated with South 
America, and Asia (Uriely and Belhassen 2005; Valdez 
and Sifaneck 1997), nowhere is the association 
between drugs and tourism more evident than in the 
Netherlands. As Nijman (1999) explains, this is relatively 
recent and somewhat contrived, with Amsterdam now 
holding many of the characteristics of an alternative 
lifestyle theme park.
According to Gemert and Verbraeck (1994, 156):
‘By the early 1970s, Amsterdam had become a mecca 
for students, tourists and dropouts; the National 
Monument at the Dam square became a popular 
gathering place for hash-smoking “hippies”.’
While drug use is illegal in the Netherlands, the policy 
of ‘expediency’ allows key players in the local law 
enforcement system to enforce the laws differently. In 
Amsterdam and other larger cities, this has resulted in 
the condoning of the sale of soft drugs in the ‘coffee 
shops’. Jansen (1994) reported that in the early 1990s 
some 1,000 coffee shops in the Netherlands, and about 
300 in Amsterdam, were openly selling hashish. Many 
of these specialised in providing marijuana for tourists. 
Policy changes mean that marijuana can only be 
purchased and smoked within coffee shops and there 
are now about 200 licensed coffee shops in Amsterdam 
(Ross 2015). (8) In particular, the Damstraat district, at 
the heart of tourism in the city, became established 
as the main location for purchasing hashish and the 
centre of the coffee shop phenomenon (Gemert and 
Verbraeck 1994). Nevertheless, hard drugs had become 
increasingly available in the area, with tourists creating 
much of the demand.
The precise relationship between tourism and drug 
use was examined in some detail by Korf (1994). He 
argued that the spread of illicit drug use was primarily 
associated with youth tourism. Indeed, until the mid-
1970s the majority of arrests by the Amsterdam Narcotic 
Squad were of foreigners. The first drug tourists were 
mainly ‘hippies’, using cannabis and psychedelic drugs 
like LSD. The liberal policy of the Dutch government 
towards soft drugs, the provision of early support 
programmes, and a more sympathetic approach to 
treatment for addicts (compared with neighbouring 
Germany), encouraged foreign visitors in search of 
either supplies or help. However, by the early 1980s, the 
Dutch government, concerned that its policies were 
attracting foreign users, shifted emphasis: policing 
of foreign dealers was increased and methadone 
programmes made less accessible to foreign nationals.
With regard to crime, Korf (1994) found that most of 
his sample of drug users were significantly involved in 
(8) http://www.amsterdam.info/coffeeshops/, accessed 25/06/16; 
http://www.amsterdam.info/drugs/, accessed 25/06/16
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additional illegal activities as a means of supporting 
their habit. Nevertheless, a minority of this was 
property crime, with the drug business and sex markets 
providing the main sources of income. However, he 
noted that property crimes were more common in the 
main tourist season, suggesting that tourists may be 
targeted by drug users. Drug tourism may thus impact 
upon the likelihood of tourists becoming the victims of 
property crimes like robbery and theft from the person.
However, it seems to have been the impact of drug (and 
possibly sex) tourism on public order that has provoked 
a reaction to this tourism-generated identity from 
Amsterdammers (Nijman 1999), paralleling a move, 
in recent years, towards less liberal criminal justice 
policies. This incorporates the partial abandonment of 
‘limitless tolerance’ towards a ‘two track policy’ in which 
the interests of society are considered alongside those 
of the drug user. According to this, drug users would 
receive some well-defined assistance and would not 
be targeted by the police, unless they were seen to 
cause nuisances for their environment (Horstink-von 
Meyenfeldt 1996; Lemmens and Garretsen 1998; Leuw 
and Marshall 1994). It may thus be that the nature of 
drug tourism in Amsterdam will change. However, 
current estimates are that drug tourism significantly 
contributes to tourism revenue (Ross 2015). A similar 
situation applies to the sex industry.
Faliraki as the sex, drugs and alcohol 
destination for young people from Britain.
Faliraki is located in the north east of Rhodes. It 
is a small town, with all the bars and clubs being 
concentrated into two streets, each approximately 500 
yards long and running at right angles to one another. 
One street consists of bars while the other houses the 
clubs. The capacity is approximately 8,000–10,000 and 
the clientele is almost exclusively young (16-25) British 
nationals. The clubs and bars are generally owned and/
or managed by Greek nationals, but many of the staff 
are from the U.K.
Until the end of the sixties, Faliraki was just another 
agricultural area. Then at the beginning of the 
seventies and in common with many Mediterranean 
resorts, Faliraki started to attract more and more 
tourists from across Europe. (9) However, while much 
of Rhodes has remained targeted at family holidays, 
Faliraki rapidly developed into a resort marketed as 
a ‘hedonistic destination’ (Prideaux 1996), appealing 
to young single holidaymakers looking for a holiday 
based around alcohol and sex. Young tourists were 
attracted by advertisements by such organizations as 
Club Med, with an emphasis on alcohol and casual sex. 
The Club 18-30 website, for example, in its ‘What’s On’ 
section, promised:
‘You name it you can do it in Faliraki. Check out SPANK – 
the ultimate school disco experience, NymFOAMania – 
get lathered & leathered at the new foam party @ BED 
club and don’t miss ONE NIGHT STAND – the raunchy 
interactive cabaret – and they’re just for starters!’ (10)
The advert went on to would-be visitors that:
‘Event packages cost approx. £115 for 1 week and £165 
for 2 weeks… see your Clubrep for details.’
The problems of crime and disorder associated with this 
environment monopolised the British press over the 
2003 holiday season. However, before focusing on the 
events of 2003, it is important to stress two points. First, 
official crime statistics are misleading, even more so in 
Faliraki than in most of Western Europe. Many crimes 
are never reported to the police, and where they are 
recording is unpredictable. Second, crime and disorder 
problems were evident in earlier years. Yet despite – or 
perhaps because of its established reputation - Faliraki 
continued to thrive. The ITV Club Reps feature in January 
2002 that associated Faliraki with binge drinking 
and unlimited opportunities for sex accelerated the 
expansion of (young British) tourists and shifted the 
definitions of normal and acceptable behaviour. Later 
that year the Guardian featured under the headline 
‘Erotic Emma: drunk and at risk’ a story about the risk 
of rape in Faliraki, repeating a Home Office warning 
to females holidaying there alone (Gillan 2002). The 
Evening Standard, on June 28th 2002 reported:
‘GREEK police have launched a crackdown on British 
holidaymakers in the resort of Faliraki on Rhodes 
after a record number of arrests for “advanced sexual 
(9) The above details taken from www.faliraki-info.com/falinfo.htm 
accessed 19/11/03
(10) www.club18-30.co.uk accessed 28/11//03.
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activity”. Four holidaymakers have been thrown off the 
island and sent back to Britain. Six have been jailed for 
indecency and another three are being held in custody 
for drug offences. A senior police officer on the island 
said: “We have never had so many British cases at Faliraki 
within just one week. We are determined to clean up 
the resort. Sexual activity is out of control and it is the 
British to blame.” The drive was launched this week and 
already 13 British tourists have been arrested. Police 
patrols have been more than doubled in the town and 
on beaches. The police spokesman said: “There have 
been a number of rapes in Faliraki and they often go 
unreported. We are deeply worried.” ‘
However, 2003 was the year in which Faliraki appeared 
to monopolise the British news. Following the death 
of 17 year old Patrick Doran, stabbed with a broken 
bottle in a nightclub brawl, the British press directed its 
attention at the problems of violence, public disorder, 
drunkenness and overt sexual behaviour in the resort. 
Reports included accounts of local police attempts to 
clamp down on deviant incidents, local reactions to 
the problems, the involvement of senior police officers 
from Blackpool in attempts to restore order, and – 
ultimately - attempts to rebrand the resort.
On one level, the problem in Faliraki is described in 
terms of the public nuisance resulting from drunken 
holidaymakers annoying local people, creating 
excessive noise, and defacing the environment with 
the flotsam of their nights’ revelry – litter, vandalism, 
and the least palatable residues of urine and vomit. 
Such public disorder issues were accentuated by drug 
dealing that occurred openly in the pubs and clubs. On 
another level, this drunkenness resulted in more serious 
offences, where it increased aggression and reduced 
inhibitions among potential offenders and diluted any 
security concerns potential victims might have held. 
Pub brawls were a nightly feature, albeit they rarely had 
such tragic consequences as the death of Patrick Doran. 
Rapes, involving both British and Greek perpetrators, 
also appeared relatively common, if rarely reported and 
even less rarely recorded (Gillan 2002; McVeigh 2003).
The way the resort was managed appears to have 
contributed to the problem. The bars and clubs were 
poor quality and the total lack of any regulation 
meant that the risk from fire was dominant. The 
absence of trained door staff and the over-riding 
demand to maximize income led to there being no 
control on numbers admitted – indeed the door staff 
was commonly witnessed selling beer or collecting 
admission fees.
The style of policing, which in Greece still tends to be 
para-military, scarcely helped. There was no police 
station in Faliraki with police being sent from nearby 
Kalithies. Partnership working was an anathema – 
when a Blackpool officer on secondment mentioned 
Problem Oriented Policing this was met with hostility 
by older officers. There was also no attempt at early 
intervention or prevention by the police so that if 
there were early signs of a problem brewing neither 
the police nor the untrained door staff made moves to 
suppress it. When an incident required the presence of 
the police they were contacted but on arrival either did 
nothing or arrested people without discrimination and 
providing no reason. There was also no CCTV.
The extent of disorder in Faliraki was incontestable. 
The amount of crime resulting from it was more 
contentious. Undoubtedly, though, to the British 
press in 2003, Faliraki was a ‘Greek tragedy’ (McVeigh 
2003; see also Brunt and Davis 2006), a resort in the 
grip of a drunken mob. The bad publicity forced the 
authorities to seek out solutions, providing the next 
instalment in the amplification process.
In responding to the demonisation of Faliraki, the 
police adopted three policies aimed at reducing 
levels of public drunkenness and associated disorderly 
behaviour. Firstly, they attempted to restrict the 
practice of organised bar crawls. Secondly, they acted 
against public ‘displays of indecency’. Thirdly, they 
adopted a more proactive approach to drug misuse.
It had become common practice for holiday reps in 
Faliraki to organise bar crawls, billed as nights out to 
introduce newly arrived tourists to the local ‘attractions’. 
These involved tourists paying in advance for the night 
and being taken to about ten pubs and clubs, where the 
drinks were provided ‘free’. Drinks commonly include 
a combination of spirits, drunk from a communal 
‘goldfish bowl’. In some cases, male and female tourists 
were segregated but then met up at the last venue 
where the exchange of aggressive and sexually explicit 
insults was encouraged. While the pubs and clubs 
involved clearly benefited from this arrangement, 
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emphasis was placed on the commission earned by 
the tour reps. Police strategy involved arresting holiday 
reps involved in promoting ‘bar crawls’. For example, in 
August 2003 five reps, from First Choice 2wentys, Club 
18-30, and Olympic Holidays, were arrested and held 
in custody overnight. In fact, the cases were dropped 
and no reps were convicted of ‘the illegal conduct of 
the profession of tour guide’. However, the message 
seemed to get across to tour companies and the 
organised bar crawls were cancelled or rearranged as 
bussed events.
By no means all disorder arose as a result of the 
organised bar crawls, though, and the police 
correspondingly addressed the problem of public 
indecency associated with drunkenness. This involved 
the arrest and subsequent successful prosecution of 
males and females for exposing themselves in public 
arenas. In most cases, these were males, ‘mooning’ in 
the streets. However, the case that most caught the 
imagination of the British press featured, Jemma-Anne 
Gunning, who celebrated her victory in a ‘Beautiful 
Bottom’ competition by exposing her breasts. (11)
Finally, the police applied a more proactive approach 
to drug misuse. Deploying undercover operatives, they 
targeted particular clubs, arresting – sometimes on 
little or no evidence – those suspected of using illegal 
drugs.
While these responses were accorded a high profile in 
the British media, the sending to Rhodes of two senior 
British police from Blackpool, following a meeting 
between the police, tour operators and the British 
Consul, provided a tidy ‘conclusion’ to the saga, 
especially given that one of the officers was the aptly 
named Superintendent Andy Rhodes. However, while 
the message in the press was largely reassuring, our 
discussions with the officers concerned suggested 
that Faliraki has some way to go if it is to reinvent itself 
as a safe and orderly resort. Nevertheless, by 2015 
it appeared that most of the disorderly behaviour 
associated with Faliraki was a distant memory.  (12) 
Before focusing on the future, it is, however, crucial to 
(11) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/somer-
set/3164765.stm, accessed 19/11/03
(12) http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/decline-faliraki-af-
ter-10-year-clean-up-2103167, accessed 25/05/16
understand the past. That is, how did Faliraki achieve 
its 2003 reputation?
What is evident in Faliraki is that as tourism developed 
on Rhodes, Faliraki repositioned itself as a destination 
for mass tourism, especially marketed at younger 
British holidaymakers attracted by its promise of 
hedonistic heaven. This suited both the British travel 
industry and local tourism entrepreneurs. As Jeannette 
Hyde (2003) observed in a short but perceptive piece 
in the Observer:
‘The Greek authorities should be doing some real soul 
searching right now. Rather than flinging in jail or 
fining every girl who flashes her breasts, they should be 
asking themselves how they can destroy the monster of 
Faliraki in Rhodes that they have created.
‘If the Greeks had not marketed Faliraki as a “yoof” 
destination, they wouldn’t have the problems they have 
today. You can’t say “Let’s bring lots of youngsters to our 
shores to spend like crazy in clubs and bars making the 
owners handsome profits then complain about the 
type of business you have created. It’s like a lap-dancing 
club complaining about too many lairy drunken men 
on the premises.
‘Youth tourism based on the promise of sun, sex and 
sand is the business they have chosen to go into. 
Nobody forces hotels to sell loads of rooms to tour 
operators such as Club 18-30 and 2wentys. Faliraki hotel 
and bar owners obviously weren’t worrying about the 
problems of policing drunken, violent youths when the 
money was being dangled in front of them by British 
travel companies.’
Equally to blame are the British travel agents who 
‘dangled’ the promise of rising profits. Yet while there 
is some indication that Faliraki businesses have had 
a change of heart, the British tourist industry has been 
at pains to deny any responsibility.
Finally, the role of the media is important to 
understanding Faliraki’s developing reputation (Brunt 
and Davis 2006). On the one hand, the programme 
‘Club Reps’ shown on ITV in January 2001 is singled out 
as the catalyst that led to the increase in ‘yob culture’ 
in Faliraki. On the other hand, sensationalist reporting 
of public disorder incidents in the British press in the 
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following years made overnight, if temporary, celebrities 
of those arrested. The increased importance of social 
media since then adds a new dimension to this.
As in Surfers Paradise, only if this image can be 
reversed is it practical to adopt policing strategies 
that can adequately address the public disorder that 
is apparently endemic. These are discussed in more 
detail in the following section, which draws together 
the lessons from the four case studies.
Policy options: policing public disorder in 
tourist areas
In considering the various policy options open to 
agencies involved in policing public order in tourist 
resorts, I want to draw out five dimensions that have 
become evident from the case studies discussed. 
These relate to security personnel, security-related 
technology, criminalisation, effecting behaviour 
change regarding responsible behaviour, and 
challenging resorts’ images.
 § Security personnel: Cohen described public demands 
for tougher policing. In both Amsterdam and Faliraki 
a key response appears to have been a toughening 
up of police approaches. However, as the latter 
example illustrates, this may be counterproductive 
where the ‘sinners’ become ‘folk heroes’. Involving 
other agencies in policing, through getting other key 
players to accept that the problem is not one solely 
for the police, was seen as fundamental in Surfers 
Paradise; this comprised both the involvement of 
other ‘police’ (private patrols and club door staff) 
and a broader multiagency partnership engaged in 
the wider policing process.
 § Security-related technology: Apart from a noted 
absence in Faliraki, little mention of this is made 
in the case studies. While the research evidence is 
mixed (Farrington and Welsh 2002; Gill and Spriggs 
2005; Welsh and Farrington 2002), both CCTV and 
improved street lighting would appear appropriate 
in tourist areas where street crime is concentrated.
 § Criminalisation: In Amsterdam more emphasis has 
been placed on criminalising public aspects of drug 
misuse, while in Faliraki ‘mooning’ was defined as 
criminal. In each case, a distinction is drawn between 
behaviours that are acceptable in private space but, 
because of their impact on the wider environment, 
are unacceptable, and should be legislated against, 
in public. However, both Cohen’s work and the 
more recent example of Faliraki suggest that 
criminalisation alone is insufficient and, in focusing 
on individuals’ behaviour, may shift attention away 
from the wider environment that condones, or even 
encourages, that behaviour.
 § Effecting behaviour change regarding responsible (i.e. 
social as opposed to antisocial) behaviour: In Surfers 
Paradise the emphasis was more upon clubs 
and pubs cooperating in moves to change the 
environment within which drinking occurred.
 § Challenging resorts’ images: Cohen’s seminar work 
illustrates the dangers of hostile media reaction to 
the problems of public disorder in tourist areas, by 
identifying the ways in which the problem may be 
amplified; in the rather different era of Big Brother, 
the example of Faliraki indicates that far from acting 
as a deterrent, media publicity may allow problem 
drinkers the stage to justify their behaviour! 
Interestingly, though, only in the case of Faliraki 
do we find some outside commentators raising 
broader concerns about resort images.
While each of these aspects is important in addressing 
the policing of public order issues in tourist areas, here 
I want to conclude by focusing on just two: security 
personnel and challenging resorts’ images.
Security personnel
There have been at least three approaches to 
improvements in security personnel. Firstly, in 
a number of countries specialist squads of tourist police 
have become key features of resort areas. Secondly, 
other personnel have been incorporated into patrol 
work. Finally, the importance of partnership working in 
the policing enterprise has been acknowledged.
The creation of specialist tourist police reflects 
both a concern for tourist victims and recognition 
that conventional police are not always aware of 
the relationship between tourism and crime and 
disorder. In the USA, Muehsam and Tarlow (1995) used 
a questionnaire in five tourist areas to assess police 
attitudes towards tourists. In general they found police 
to be aware of the important financial contribution 
that tourism made to their communities, and positive 
about tourism and their involvement with tourists. 
However, they failed to appreciate the relationship 
between tourism and crime and were sceptical about 
the need for specialist training. Muehsam and Tarlow 
consequently went on to offer three day training 
programmes for the police to make them more aware 
of crime related tourism issues, introduce them to 
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multi-agency work with the tourism industry, and help 
them develop better skills for interaction with tourists.
Specialist units of tourist police have been established 
in a range of countries (D’Arcy 1995; Tarlow 2000; 
Mawby, Boake and Jones 2015; World Tourism 
Organisation 1996). One of the earliest and most 
ambitious developments was in Thailand. (13) However, 
whereas the internet is a prolific source of data on 
tourist police units, there has been little written in the 
academic literature. In one notable exception, Pizam, 
Tarlow and Bloom (1997) provide a review of police 
policy towards tourism in three major tourism areas: 
Orlando and New Orleans in the US and Cape Town in 
South Africa. All three sites had suffered the negative 
effects of crimes aimed at tourists and had responded 
by setting up specialist tourist units within the police. 
In South Africa, the nationally organised South African 
Police Service (SAPS) operated tourism units in five 
tourism centres, including Cape Town. It focused 
on crime prevention and worked in partnership 
with tourism assistance units arranged by the tourist 
industry to provide a ‘policing umbrella’ of support. 
(14) In New Orleans a special area based police unit 
was formed in 1985, concentrated in the main tourist 
area. Some 60 officers were specially trained to deal 
with tourist crime. The emphasis, again, was largely 
on working in partnership with the tourism industry 
and through increased patrols in hot spots. In Florida, 
Orange County Sheriff’s Department was one of the 
first in the country to form a specialist unit, the tourist-
oriented police (TOPS). Comprising some 60 officers, 
TOPS is involved in providing crime prevention advice 
to hotels as well as high profile police patrols. The 
sheriff’s department also operates a victim assistance 
programme, with an emphasis upon helping tourist 
victims. Gallivan (1994) provided an account of similar 
initiatives in Miami, where bad publicity led the police 
to establish a raft of initiatives, including TRAP (the 
Tourist Robbery Abatement Program) and STAR (the 
Sunny Isles Tourist and Resident Program).
(13) See for example: http://www.phukettouristpolice.go.th/in-
dex-eng.html, http://www.phuket-tourist-police-volunteers.
com/ 
http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/a-night-out-with-the-for-
eign-tourist-police-in-thailands-seediest-city-704, all accessed 
25/05/16
(14) See also George (2001).
One aspect of the development of specialist tourist 
police has been the incorporation of alternative 
policing agencies, including volunteers and private 
security, into patrolling public areas. It is possible to 
chart an expansion in private security across most 
western societies (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Johnston 
1999; Jones and Newburn 2002; ibid 2006). Clearly 
private security has come to play a significant part in the 
tourism industry, where resorts or holiday complexes 
may hire guards as protection. Local governments in 
many resorts also employ staff who have a general 
responsibility to support tourists, and this may 
incorporate a responsibility for aiding the police by 
dealing with tourist victims or reporting potential 
flashpoints to the specialist police. (15) However, there 
is, to our knowledge, no research evidence on the 
impact of any new forms of ‘multilateralized policing’ 
on disorder in tourist areas.
The creation of specialist tourist police has also added 
to a growing appreciation that crime prevention 
is not solely the responsibility of the police, and 
that community involvement and multi-agency 
partnerships are crucial. This applies equally to the 
tourist industry, where both the World Tourism 
Organisation (1995) and the US initiated White House 
Conference on Travel and Tourism (1995), for example, 
have urged the tourism industry to co-operate with 
the police in developing community safety plans. 
Although traditionally the tourist industry has tended 
to abdicate its responsibilities, a number of authors 
have identified a growing willingness for partnership 
work from, for example, hotels, travel agents and private 
security police (Pizam, Tarlow and Bloom 1997). The 
importance of implementing partnerships in tackling 
tourism security issues is further emphasised in a recent 
study by the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS 
2015; Mawby 2016). As we have seen, partnership 
work to enhance policing of public alcohol-related 
disorder also seems to have been effective in Surfers 
Paradise (Homel et al 1997). Nevertheless, Mawby and 
Jones’ (2007) evaluation of the Torbay Hotel Burglary 
initiative provides a salutary reminder of the difficulty 
of involving tourism bodies in partnership work.
(15) Shearing and Stenning (1996) provide an interesting account of 
the policing of Disney World.
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Challenging resorts’ images:
However, while the involvement of the public police and 
alternative security personnel in the policing of tourist 
areas is an important element of maintaining order, it is 
not sufficient. Policing does not exist in a vacuum; nor 
does public disorder. To assume that the police, even 
in conjunction with an impressive array of partners, 
can handle public disorder, in British seaside resorts, 
Australia’s Gold Coast, Amsterdam, or Faliraki, is to place 
too much faith in reactive policing. British lads and 
ladettes do not ‘happen to go to resorts like Faliraki or 
Newquay and get sucked into an alcohol driven culture 
once they arrive. Many tourists choose Amsterdam 
because of its reputation as a sex and drugs city that 
caters for the interests of specific types of tourist. Tourist 
areas, in most cases consciously, build up reputations and 
actively market themselves for designated audiences. 
Many workers in the tourism industry are drawn to seek 
employment in such resorts because they also identify 
with the image (Prideaux 1996).
Those involved in the tourist industry have invested 
heavily in their resort’s image and thus initially at least 
have a stake in maintaining that image. Equally, local 
and national governments also have a stake in the 
image, in so far as regional or national prosperity may 
depend on it. The same is true of the opium trade and 
child sex trade in different Asian countries. In order to 
successfully police the public disorder that certain types 
of tourism bring to many tourist areas, it is therefore 
imperative to change the image of such resorts and, 
correspondingly, the way that image is marketed. 
Homel and his colleagues provide an excellent 
example of how this might be achieved, by focusing 
on engagement and self-interest: engagement in that 
players are brought into the decision making process 
and empowered to become involved in change, 
and self-interest in that it is important to develop 
profitable alternatives, a lesson that appears to have 
been ignored in Faliraki. (16) However, the Gold Coast 
strategy appears to have been a reactive one: aimed 
at managing a resort that young tourists went to for 
alcohol, drugs and sex, rather than changing the 
resort’s image more fundamentally.
In many cases this also requires convincing 
governments. This may be a case of providing 
an alternative model of equally profitable tourist 
development. In other cases, as the examples of 
Amsterdam, Newquay and Barcelona suggest, it may 
be a case of demonstrating that local people (local 
voters) are highly critical of tourist developments and 
see the negative impacts as outweighing the positives.
What I am suggesting is that it is unfair to focus 
criticism on the police or tourists for public order 
problems in tourist resorts. Key players in local and 
national government and in the tourist industry create 
resorts that benefit themselves and market the resorts 
accordingly. Tourists who arrive to ‘live the dream’ that 
has been commodified can scarcely be blamed. Nor 
can the police, caught between the interests of local 
residents and those of tourism’s infrastructure, and 
often with their own agendas to balance alongside 
these. Policing tourist areas is too important an issue to 
leave solely in the hands of the police. In this respect, at 
least, it is no different to the policing of public order in 
general. Policing public order is a key task of the police, 
but maintaining public order is not exclusively their 
responsibility.
(16) http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/decline-faliraki-af-
ter-10-year-clean-up-2103167, accessed 25/05/16
173
Policing low level public disorder, antisocial behaviour and alcohol-related crime: from the metropolis to the tourist resort 
References
• Andrews H (2011) The British on Holiday: Charter Tourism, Identity and Consumption. Channel View Books: Bristol.
• Barton, A. and James, Z. (2003) ‘Run to the sun: policing contested perceptions of risk’, Policing and Society, 13.3, 259 -270.
• Bayley, D. and Shearing, C. (1996) ‘The future of policing’, Law and Society Review, 30.3, 585-606.
• Bellis, M.A., Hale, G., Bennett, A., Chaudry, M. and Kilfoyle, M. (2000) ‘Ibiza uncovered: changes in substance use and sexual behaviour 
among young people visiting an international night-life resort’, The International Journal of Drug Policy, 11, 235-244.
• Boutellier, J.C.J. (1991) ‘Prostitution, criminal law and morality in the Netherlands’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 15, 201-211.
• Brants, C. (1998) ‘The fine art of regulated tolerance: prostitution in Amsterdam’, Journal of Law and Society, 25.4, 621-635.
• Brunt, P. and Davis, C. (2006) ‘The nature of British media reporting of hedonistic tourism’, Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an 
international journal 8.1, 30-49.
• Brunt, P. and Hambly, Z. (1999) ‘Tourism and crime: a review’, Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an international journal 1.2, 25-36.
• Budd, T. (2003) Alcohol-Related Assault: findings from the British Crime Survey. London: Home Office.
• Burney, E. (2009) Making people behave: anti-social behaviour, politics and policy (second edition). Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
• Burrows, J., Ekblom, P. and Heal, K. (1979). Crime prevention and the police. London: HMSO (Home Office Research Study No 55).
• Carter, C. (2000) ‘Sex in the tourist city: the development of commercial sex as part of the provision of tourist services’, pp 131-153 in Clift, 
S. and Carter, S. (eds) Tourism and sex: culture, commerce and coercion. London: Pinter.
• Chesney-Lind, M. and Lind, I.Y. (1986) ‘Visitors as victims: crimes against tourists in Hawaii’, Annals of Tourism Research, 13, 167-191.
• Cohen, S. (1980) Folk devils and moral panics. (new edition). Oxford: Martin Robertson.
• D’Arcy, S. (1995) ‘Nairobi’s crime busters’, Sunday Times, 10 December.
• Dahles, H. (1998) ‘Redefining Amsterdam as a tourist destination’, Annals of Tourism Research, 25.1, 55-69.
• Davis, D., Allen, J. and Cosenza, R.M. (1988) ‘Segmenting local residents by their attitudes, interests and opinions toward tourism’, Journal of 
Travel Research, 27.2, 2-8.
• Dingwall, G. (2011) Alcohol and Crime, second edition. Abingdon, OXON: Taylor&Francis.
• Downes, D.H. (1966) The delinquent solution: a study in subcultural theory. London: Routledge.
• EFUS (European Forum for Urban Security) (2015) Security and Tourism: Concerted Local Policies. Paris: EFUS.
• Farrington, D.P. and Welsh, B.C. (2002) Effects of improved street lighting on crime: a systematic review. London: Home Office (Home Office 
Research Study no.251).
• Gallivan, J. (1994) ‘Looking for trouble with the Miami police department’, Guardian, 22 January, 42.
• Gemert, F. van and Verbraeck, H. (1994) ‘Snacks, sex and smack - the ecology of the drug trade in the inner city of Amsterdam’, pp 145-167 
in Leuw, E. and Marshall, l.H. (eds.) Between prohibition and legalisation: the Dutch experiment in drug policy. Amsterdam: Kugler publications.
• George, R. (2001) ‘The impact of crime on international tourist numbers to Cape Town’, Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an 
international journal, 3.3, 19-29.
• Gill, M. and Spriggs, A. (2005) Assessing the impact of CCTV. London: Home Office (HO Research Study no.292) (also available at www.
homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors292.pdf ).
• Gillan, A. (2002) ‘Erotic Emma: drunk and at risk’, Guardian, 22 June, 13.
• Hattersley, G. (2004) Welcome to Sin on Sea’, Sunday Times, 18 July (News Review), 1-2.
• Haralambopoulos, N. and Pizam. A. (1996) ‘Perceived impact of tourism: the case of Samos’, Annals of Tourism Research, 23, 503-526.
• Hobbs, D. (2005) Written evidence to Home Affairs Committee Anti-social behaviour, Fifth Report of Session 2004/05.
• Homel, R. et al (1997) ‘Preventing drunkenness and violence around nightclubs in a tourist resort’, pp 263-282 in Clarke, R.V. (ed) 
Situational crime prevention: successful case studies (second edition). Guilderland, New York: Harrow and Heston.
• Horstink-von Meyenfeldt, L. (1996) ‘The Netherlands: tightening up of the cafes policy’, pp 97-105 in Dorn, N., Jepsen, J. and Savona, E. 
(eds.) European drug policies and enforcement. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
• Hyde, J. (2003) ‘The folly of Faliraki’, Observer, 24 August accessed 25/05/16 at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/travel/
story/0,6903,1028229,00.html.
174
European Police Science and Research Bulletin · Special Conference Issue Nr. 2
• Innes, M. (1999) ‘An iron fist in an iron glove? The zero tolerance policing debate’, Howard Journal, 38.4, 397-410.
• Johnston, L. (1999) ‘Private policing: uniformity and diversity’. In Mawby, R.I. (ed) Policing across the world: issues for the twenty-first century. 
London: UCL Press.
• Jones, C. (2001) ‘Sex tourism’, Criminal Justice Matters, 44, 8-9.
• Jones, T., and Newburn, T. (2006) (Eds) Plural policing: a comparative perspective. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2002) ‘The transformation of policing?’, British Journal of Criminology, 42, 129-146.
• Kelling, G.L. and Coles, C.M. (1996) Fixing broken windows: restoring order and reducing crime in our communities.New York: Free Press.
• King, B., Pizam, A. and Milman, A. (1993) ‘The social impacts of tourism on Nadi, Fiji as perceived by its residents’, Annals of Tourism 
Research, 20, 650-665.
• Korf, D.J. (1994) ‘Drug tourists and drug refugees’, pp 119-143 in Leuw and Marshall (eds.).
• Lemmens, P.H.H.M. and Garretsen, H.F.L. (1998) ‘Unstable pragmatism: Dutch drug policy under national and international pressure’, 
Addiction, 93.2, 157-162.
• Leuw, E. and Marshall, I.H. (1994) Between prohibition and legalization: the Dutch experiment in drug policy. Amsterdam: Kugler.
• Matthews, S. and Richardson, A. (2005) Findings from the 2003 Offending, Crime and Justice Survey: alcohol-related crime and disorder’, 
Home Office Findings, 261.
• Mawby, R.I. (2012) ‘Public disorder, antisocial behaviour and alcohol-related crime: from the metropolis to the tourist resort’, pp. 93-107 in 
Jones, C., Barclay, E. and Mawby, R.I. (eds.) The Problem of Pleasure: leisure, tourism and crime, London, Routledge.
• Mawby, R.I. (2014) ‘Crime and disorder, security and the tourism industry’, pp 383-403 in M.Gill (ed.) Handbook of security. London: 
Palgrave-Macmillan.
• Mawby, R.I. (2016) ‘Policing policies in cities dependent on tourism: developing an evidence-based approach’, International Journal of 
Police Science and Management, 18.3, forthcoming.
• Mawby, R.I., Boakye, K.A. and Jones, C. (2015) ‘Policing tourism: the emergence of Specialist Units’, Policing and Society, 25.4, 378-392.
• Mawby, R.l., Brunt, P. and Hambly, Z. (1999) ‘Victimisation on holiday: a British survey’, International Review of Victimology, 6, 201-211.
• Mawby, R.I. and Jones, C. (2007) ‘Attempting to reduce hotel burglary: implementation failure in a multi-agency context’,  
Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an international journal, 9.3, 145-166.
• McNeill, A. (2005) Crime and Disorder, Binge Drinking and the Licensing Act 2003. St. Ives: Institute of Alcohol Studies.
• McVeigh (2003) ‘Faliraki: a Greek tragedy’, The Scotsman, 23 August.
• Muehsam, M.J. and Tarlow, P.E. (1995) ‘Involving the police in tourism’, Tourism Management, 16.1, 9-14.
• Michalko, G. (2004) ‘Tourism eclipsed by crime: the vulnerability of foreign tourists in Hungary’,  
Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 15.2-3, 159-172.
• Millie, A. (2008) Anti-social behaviour. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
• Millie, A., Jacobson, J., McDonald, E. and Hough, M. (2005) Anti-social behaviour strategies: finding a balance. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Nijman, J. (1999) ‘Cultural globalization and the identity of place: the reconstruction of Amsterdam’, Cultural Geographies, 6.2, 146-164.
• Pizam, A. and Mansfeld, V. (1996) Tourism, crime and international security issues. Chichester: Wiley.
• Pizam, A., Tarlow, P.E. and Bloom, J. (1997) ‘Making tourists feel safe: whose responsibility is it?’,  
Journal of Travel Research, Summer, 23-28.
• Prideaux, B. (1996) ‘The tourism crime cycle: a beach destination case study’, pp 59-76 in Pizam and Mansfeld (eds).
• Richardson, A. and Budd, T. (2003) Alcohol, Crime and Disorder: a study of young adults. London: Home Office.
• Ross, G.F. (1992) ‘Resident perceptions of the impact of tourism on an Australian city’, Journal of Travel Research (Winter), 13-17.
• Ross, W. (2015) ‘ Holland’s new marijuana laws are changing Old amsterdam’, NewsWeek, 22 February, accessed 25/05/16 at  
http://europe.newsweek.com/marijuana-and-old-amsterdam-308218?rm=eu
• Ryan, C. (1993) ‘Crime, violence, terrorism and tourism: An accident or intrinsic relationship’, Tourism Management, 14.3, 173-183.
• Schiebler, S.A., Crotts, J.C. and Hollinger, R.C. (1996) ‘Florida tourists’ vulnerability to crime’, pp 37-50 in Pizam and Mansfield (eds).
• Scott N. (2006) ‘Management of Tourism: conformation to whose standards?’, pp 54-61 in Prideaux B., Moscardo G. and Laws E. (eds) 
Managing Tourism and Hospitality Services: Theory and International Applications, Wallingford, Oxon, CABI.
175
Policing low level public disorder, antisocial behaviour and alcohol-related crime: from the metropolis to the tourist resort 
• Secretary of State for the Home Department (2012) The Government’s alcohol strategy, March, accessed 25/05/16 at https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224075/alcohol-strategy.pdf
• Shearing, C.D. and Stenning, P.C. (1996) ‘From the Panopticon to Disney World: the development of discipline’, pp 413-422 in Muncie, J., 
McLaughlin, E. and Langan, M. (eds) Criminological perspectives. London: Sage.
• Stangeland, P. (1998) ‘Other targets or other locations? An analysis of opportunity structures’, British Journal of Criminology, 38.1, 61-77.
• Tarlow, P. (2000) ‘Letter from America: a short history of tourism oriented policing services’, Crime Prevention and Community Safety: an 
international journal, 2.1, 55-58.
• Uriely, N. and Belhassen, Y. (2005) ‘Drugs and tourists’ experiences’, Journal of Travel Research, 43.3, 238-246.
• Valdez, A. and Sifaneck, S.J. (1997) ‘Drug tourists and drug policy on the U.S.-Mexican border: an ethnographic investigation of the 
acquisition of prescribed drugs’, Journal of Drug Issues, 27.4, 879-897.
• Walker, A., Flatley, J., Kershaw, C. and Moon, D. (2009) Crime in England and Wales 2008/09. London: Home Office (HOSB 11/09) (accessed 
on 12/11/09 at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs09/hosb1109vol1.pdf ).
• Walker, S. (1992). The police in America: an introduction. New York: McGraw-Hill.
• Welsh, B.C. and Farrington, D.P. (2002) Crime prevention effects of closed circuit television: a systematic review. London: Home Office (Home 
Office Research Study no.252).
• White House Conference on Travel and Tourism (1995) Proposed national tourism strategy. Washington DC: US Travel and Tourism 
Administration.
• Wilson, J.Q. (1968) Varieties of police behaviour. Harvard University Press: New York.
• Wonders, N.A. and Michalowski, R. (2001) ‘Bodies, borders and sex tourism in a globalized world: a tale of two cities – Amsterdam and 
Havana’, Social Problems, 48.4, 545-571.
• World Tourism Organisation (1996) Tourism safety and security: practical measures for destinations. Madrid: WTO.

177
Police patrol work in Norway  and the implementation of  community beat policing
Police patrol work in Norway  
and the implementation of  
community beat policing
Wouter Stol
The Netherlands
Helene I. Gundhus
Siv Runhovde
Karianne Rønning
Norway
(2010 Conference in Oslo)
Introduction
Police patrol work is key to understanding police 
management and police-citizen interaction. In this 
paper we present the methodological framework 
and some findings from a comparative study of police 
patrols in Europe. The motivation for this study is that 
people in society and those who are responsible for 
the management of police work, should know what 
officers do in order to be able to give a meaningful 
interpretation of police management and of the 
democratic control of the police.
In our study police patrol work is seen as constituted by 
police activities. We have observed what police officers 
do when they are out on patrol. The main question 
explored is what determines what is involved in police 
patrol work. But there is always something before the 
police officer’s activities, namely the contextual factors 
that explain why police officers do what they do, such 
as level of urbanisation, work load, group culture and 
police management. This context can be referred to as 
the ‘why’ of police patrol work. In this paper we will 
present a conceptual model capturing both the ‘what’ 
and the why’ of police patrol work.
The outcome of the police officer’s activities can be 
viewed as police effectiveness. However, this study 
is about police actions, about what police officers do 
when out on patrol, it is not about police effectiveness. 
In the end one should be concerned with the social 
effectiveness of policing. After all, the core issue in 
policing is to secure a satisfying level of safety; police 
action is the means to this end, not an end in itself. 
But since police actions are important elements in the 
constitution of police performance, one of the core 
issues in police management is to give direction to 
what police officers should do or do not do when out 
on patrol. Furthermore, within the framework of this 
study we are not interested in how fast police officers 
do what they are doing.
In this paper we will describe the methodological 
framework, and thereafter we will introduce some 
results from Norway. In a concluding section we 
use these findings to discuss various models of 
implementing community beat policing. 
Definitions
Before we describe the method we will define the 
central terms ‘emergency patrol’ and ‘community 
beat patrol’. The emergency patrols basic assignment 
is to supervise their patrol area and react to citizen 
calls. Most often they are uniformed police officers 
in a marked police car, usually two (in Norway, three), 
being supervised by a command and control centre. 
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What the officers should give attention to between 
citizens’ calls, differs from place to place. What officers 
actually do between citizens’ calls is remarkably the 
same in almost all places: they keep an eye on the 
traffic: they give attention to traffic violations and they 
carry out car stops and searches (Stol et al 2006).
‘Community beat policing’ is not as standardised 
as emergency patrol. While doing community beat 
policing the officers normally work alone; they usually 
do their patrol work in uniform but also regularly in 
plain clothes, for example when they are visiting citizens 
at home. As a rule a community beat officer’s basic 
assignment is to build up and maintain relationships 
with the public and/or to prevent or tackle law and 
order problems, preferably in close cooperation with 
other welfare agencies. In other words, the officers 
follow a problem-orientated style of policing. When out 
on the beat, they walk or cycle, but community beat 
officers also patrol with a car. Different from emergency 
patrol officers, community beat patrol officers are not 
supervised by a command and control centre and as 
a rule they will not be assigned to citizen calls.
Another core term is ‘incident’. An incident is each 
encounter between a police officer and a citizen. We 
also speak of an incident in cases of emergency calls 
that are passed on to the officers but that are not 
followed by an encounter between the officers and 
the public. An encounter is reported if a police officer 
and a citizen have verbal or non-verbal contact and the 
officer is performing in the role of the police.
Method
The research design is built on earlier research on 
police patrol work in the Netherlands and Belgium, 
in total seventeen observation studies (Stol 1996; Stol 
et al., 2006). The aim is to enlighten the characteristics 
and in particular the peculiarities of local police patrol 
work -emergency patrol as well as community beat 
policing. To do this we need a method of drawing 
a picture of patrol work and we need a frame of 
reference to distinguish between the more or less 
standard findings and the non-standard or unusual 
ones.
The method of the research is systematic social 
observation. Systematic, because observations are 
directed by structured protocols, including a list of 
variables that have to be recorded about each incident; 
social, since the method is based on participating 
observations in a police team. This method is basically 
a qualitative method. Since we make use of structured 
protocols, we could speak of a qualitative method with 
a systematic approach. The field worker is attached to 
a group of police officers, which means that he or she 
will be out on patrol with different police officers. The 
idea is not to draw a picture of the style of policing of 
one specific officer, but to draw a picture of policing in 
a certain area.
In total the team of experienced academics in the field of 
police studies, consisted of seven persons from the five 
different countries; the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany and Norway. They took care of getting access 
to police forces, the recruitment of qualified field 
workers and the writing of a book about this study. The 
‘we’ also includes thirteen field workers. In all of the 
five countries we wanted to make observations in two 
places: one place representing police work in an urban 
area and the other place representing police work in 
an area with a low population density. We also wanted 
to observe emergency patrols as well as the local form 
of community policing. We carried out the field work 
in twelve places (1). In four out of five countries we 
managed to get access to the type of police teams we 
were searching for (2).
Between September 2005 and March 2007 we observed 
emergency patrols as well as community policing 
in the twelve places, a total of 24 observations. Each 
observation consisted of us following the standard police 
duty schedule during twenty shifts. The field workers 
produced two key documents: their completely worked-
out field-work notes and SPSS code forms — one for 
each incident. Although the field workers were asked to 
describe every incident in their own words, they were 
also asked to take into account the SPSS variables when 
describing an incident. He or she made also notes about, 
(1) The twelve places are: Groningen (NL), Leeuwarden (NL), Assen 
(NL), Roskilde (DK), Hillerød (DK), Bochum (D), Münster (D), Brus-
sel (B), Dendermonde (B), Aarschot (B), Oslo (N) and Lillestrøm 
(N).
(2) Denmark is the exception here as both of the police teams were 
located in the countryside.
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for example, what police officers said about priorities in 
police work, and about what the officers did between 
the incidents. Management were interviewed, and the 
field workers wrote an additional field-work report with 
information about the city involved, the police force’s 
organisation structure and local police policy.
In various ways attention is given to the inter-observer 
reliability. Stol supervised the field work in all participating 
countries, and was also able to read the languages of 
the countries involved. Preceding each field-work, Stol 
discussed the working procedures to be followed on the 
basis of an observation protocol with the local research 
team. The protocol included definitions of key concepts 
and instructions on how to record the observations, and 
provided the field workers with guidelines about how 
many and what kind of duties should be included into 
the field-work. Every description of an incident together 
with the corresponding SPSS code form went through 
a working procedure that was designed to achieve the 
highest possible level of inter-observer reliability (3).
The basic idea with the frame of reference is quite 
simple, and, consequently, the instrument is easy to 
use. For example, observation of emergency patrol 
work in the twelve cities, may discover that 57 per 
cent of all the incidents from all places have to do with 
maintaining the law. This 57 per cent can function as 
a reference number. This kind of average appears to 
be quite stable over time and place, which means that 
the characteristics of police patrol work are quite stable 
over time and place (4). However, the average values 
are no more than a tool helping us to discover special 
characteristics of local police work. Average values are 
not norms. If some local police patrol work significantly 
deviates from the average values, it does not mean that 
this patrol work is better or worse than the average. It’s 
different. In this study we want to find an answer to the 
question of what causes the difference.
(3) Since we have observed 4 183 incidents and the SPSS form con-
sists of 62 variables. During the field work Stol checked about 
260 000 times if a specific piece of the field work notes matched 
with its corresponding SPSS-value. During the emergency patrol 
we observed a total of 1 166 hours police work on patrol. We 
recorded 2 089 incidents. We were on patrol with community 
beat officers during 809 hours. During these hours we recorded 
2 094 incidents. 
(4) Stol´s (1996, Stol et al., 2006) earlier research produced a data-
base about police patrol work, and the proportion of incidents 
that fall into the category ‘maintaining the law’ is 56 per cent.
Hence, we have a method for drawing a picture of 
police patrol work and we have a frame of reference 
that we can use to discover characteristic features 
of the patrol work in question (5). Systematic social 
observation draws a picture of patrol work using 
several characteristics that are derived from the kind of 
incidents the officers deal with. The characteristics are:
 § work load or the number of incidents per hour;
 § the sort of incidents police patrol work consists of, 
such as traffic, serious crime, networking;
 § the outcome of incidents: do police officers give 
a warning, fine someone or perhaps make an arrest?;
 § police mobilisation: do the police come into action 
because of a citizen call or was the incident a police 
initiative?;
 § the marginal persons the officers have to deal 
with, such as addicts, mentally disturbed persons, 
homeless persons;
 § police knowledge of people in the neighbourhood;
 § the use of information sources — since that is a key 
factor in the production of knowledge, which is 
a core issue in police work.
When certain characteristics deviate from average 
value, we search for an explanation in the conceptual 
model (6). The conceptual model consists of seven 
explaining factors, and is based on earlier research. As 
illustrated in figure 1, three factors on top and the one 
on the left refer to organisational issues. Three factors 
on the bottom of the model refer to aspects of the 
sociological environment of the organisation. These 
factors are explaining what is involved in local police 
patrol work, in the centre of the model.
(5) The method and the frame of reference are free. They are both 
well documented in English and they are known as ‘freeware’ 
because we believe that if we want to develop police studies 
in Europe, it is important that we can use each other’s research 
methods and that we, as a result, can compare our research 
findings and learn from each other.
(6) In 2004, on the basis of the work of Sherman (1980) and Bayley 
(1985, 1994), and methodologically mixed observational studies, 
Stol et.al. attempted to find a conceptual model for police pa-
trol work, to give impetus to the further development of a theo-
ry (2006: 170-5). After the study this model was redesigned and 
extended, and we revised the conceptual model of Stol et.al. 
(2006) into Figure 1.
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Figure 1: conceptual model of police patrol work
‘Basic assignment’ refers to the principal task or role the 
police officer in question has to fulfil. Basic assignment 
is the answer to the questions, ‘how do we structure 
our organisation?’ or ‘what kind of police roles do we 
wish to distinguish?’. ‘Basic strategy’ is the answer to 
questions such as ‘what are the principle elements 
of this police role?’ or ‘what are the basic ideas of this 
kind of police work?’. ‘Management control’ or ‘police 
leadership’ refer to everything that police chiefs do to 
stimulate or urge officers to undertake specific actions 
when out on patrol. ‘Information facilities’ refers to 
the databases the officers have access to and it refers 
to how easy it is for the officers to get access to the 
data. ‘National features’ refers to national peculiarities, 
such as specific pieces of legislation or cultural 
characteristics that are typical for a certain country. 
‘Local urbanisation’ refers to the number of inhabitants 
per square kilometre. ‘Exceptional local circumstances’ 
refers to phenomena that clearly dominate police work 
in a certain area.
Some results from Norway
We will now present some of the tables that follow 
from our observations and show how these tables 
lead us into the world of police management. Before 
we have a look at the data, it is important to emphasise 
that a table where 50 per cent of all incidents lie in 
the sphere of traffic, indicates a certain proportion 
of all incidents, not a proportion of time. We start 
with presenting some tables from observations of 
emergency patrol and community beat patrol, and 
compare these with our frame of reference. The results 
will lead us to a discussion about the implementation 
of community beat policing.
Emergency patrol
Let us first have a look at emergency patrol. Table 1 
shows how many incidents the emergency patrol 
officers are involved in per hour.
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Table 1 
Work load (incidents per hour)
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøm
Emergency Patrol
Incidents 1.8 1.4 **1.2
Citizen calls 0.8 0.6 0.6
Police initiatives 1.0 0.8 **0.6
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (independent T-test)
Table 1 shows that the Oslo figures do not deviate from 
the reference numbers. In other words: these figures 
do not indicate that emergency patrol work in Oslo has 
specific characteristics. There might be many specific 
characteristics with emergency patrol work in Oslo, 
but this table does not make them visible. The table 
for Lillestrøm shows us that emergency patrol officers 
are involved in few incidents per hour. Specifically, the 
officers in Lillestrom do not come into action on their 
own accord so often. Table 2 indicates an answer.
Table 2 
Proportion of traffic (%)
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøm
Emergency Patrol
All incidents 41.6 37.7 **30.1
Citizen calls 18.9 9.5 30.6
Police initiatives 62.9 69.1 **29.5
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (Z-score for proportions)
Table 2 shows that emergency patrol work in Lillestrom 
only has a small proportion of traffic incidents. Especially 
when police officers come into action on their own 
accord, the proportion of traffic is relatively small — no 
more than 29.5 per cent, while the average percentage 
is 62.9. In other words, Lillestrom emergency patrol 
officers do carry out significantly less car checks than 
the average proportion.
It is not immediately clear why this is so. This finding 
seems to be contrary to the fact that traffic is prioritised 
in Lillestrom’s activity plan. However, Romerike police 
district have a special traffic unit located at Lillestrom 
police station. Its main priority is to carry out roadside 
checks and take action against traffic violations. Four 
times a year the traffic unit organises a large-scale 
road-side check in cooperation with other agencies 
and with emergency patrol officers. We have observed 
such a happening but we did not include this shift in 
our analysis because during this shift the emergency 
patrol officers were not assigned to emergency patrol 
as defined in our study.
The fact that the emergency patrol officers have to 
cover a large patrol area also plays a role. As the chief of 
police stressed during an interview, the officers have to 
drive long distances from incident to incident. Maybe 
this can explain why the daily working routines in the 
Lillestrøm emergency patrol do not leave much room 
for incidents initiated by the officers. They are just too 
busy travelling from A to B. Instead of a ‘stop and search 
strategy’, which would cost them too much time, we 
saw them using a ‘check on the move’ strategy, with 
help from their colleagues from the incident room. 
Since traffic checks on the move do not include 
a police-citizen interaction, these police initiatives are 
not incidents in our study.
Another explanation is that emergency patrol officers 
are not asked by management to take action in the 
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sphere of proactive policing outside the area of traffic. 
It was the chief of police’s opinion that officers have no 
time left for police actions on their own initiative.
These findings point to a correlation between police 
numbers and the proportion of traffic in police patrol 
work. Stol et al. (2006) ran into this issue several times 
in the course of the observational studies on police 
patrol work. There is a connection between proportion 
of traffic and work load: the less occupied the officers 
are, the more traffic incidents (car stops and searches). 
The less citizen calls, the more police officers will come 
into action of their own accord in the sphere of traffic. 
Consequently: increasing the police numbers means 
that police management de facto gives priority to 
car stops and searches, unless police management 
is capable of ensuring that police officers do 
otherwise — which is rarely the case. Of course, police 
management are able to define other priorities than 
traffic, and they do. But the problem is that they do not 
translate priorities such as ‘violence’, ‘youth’ and ‘drugs’, 
into concrete activities that police officers can (and 
should) undertake when out on patrol. Consequently, 
police officers stick to what is easy for them to do: take 
a number plate and check it, stop a car and check its 
driver.
Community beat policing
Table 2 shows that community beat policing in Oslo as 
well as in Lillestrom have relatively few incidents per 
hour.
Table 3 
Workload (incidents per hour)
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøn
Community Beat Patrol
Incidents 2.6 ** 1.8 **1.5
Citizen calls 0.4 0.4 0.6
Police initiatives 2.2 ** 1.0 **1.0
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (Z-score for proportions)
This can be explained by the fact that the officers 
do not often come into action of their own accord. 
Community beat patrol (CBP) officers in both cities are 
quite reactive and not very proactive — compared to 
the average. How can this be explained?
The CBP in Oslo, as well as Lillestrom, is done by ‘regular’ 
police officers. They are focused on emergency patrol 
routines and other established police tasks; they are not 
CBP officers in the real sense of the word. When they 
are on the street in the role of ‘community beat patrol 
officer’ they perform this task as if they were officers 
in an emergency patrol car, waiting for headquarters 
to assign jobs. The consequence is that police officers 
assigned to community beat patrol are being assigned 
jobs by a command and control centre.
In all countries in our study a core issue in policing is that 
the police have to work on improving the relationship 
between the police and the public. A central strategy 
here is the implementation of community beat 
policing. Community beat patrol officers should 
establish and maintain relationships with the public. 
In our study we have noted when the police officers 
meet someone they know during the incidents. The 
idea behind this is that officers who have established 
good contacts in their neighbourhood, will often meet 
someone they know. Table 4 shows the results.
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Table 4 
Proportion of incidents in which police officers meet someone they know (%)
Average 12 cities Oslo Lillestrøm
Community Beat Patrol
Incidents 30.9 ** 1.3 18.3
Traffic 7.5 0.0 6.7
Social problems 57.5 ** 6.3 42.9
Other 38.3 ** 1.3 22.2
*: p<0.01; **: p<0.001 (Z-score for proportions)
Table 4 shows that the proportion of incidents in 
which the community beat patrol officers in Oslo meet 
someone they know is very small compared to the 
average: 1.3 percent while the average is 38.3 percent. 
The second-smallest proportion was observed in 
Aarschot, Belgium (13.6 %) and the third-smallest in 
Lillestrom, Norway (18.3 %). Even when the officers 
in Oslo deal with social problems — like domestic 
disputes, homeless persons, mentally disturbed 
persons — they meet an acquaintance in a relatively 
small proportion of all incidents. Population density 
may be of relevance here. But is not the decisive 
factor since the other cities in our study with a high 
population density do not have a proportion that is 
significantly smaller than the average: Brussels: 63.4 %, 
Groningen: 40.8 %, Leeuwarden: 30.8 %, Bochum: 
25.0 %. It is not possible to identify a specific type of 
incident that is responsible for this 1.3 per cent in Oslo. 
It seems an overall phenomenon.
Although in Lillestrom the proportion of incidents in 
which the officers meet someone they know is no more 
than 18.3 per cent, this proportion is not significantly 
smaller than the average. We came to the conclusion 
that a decisive factor here is that community beat 
patrol in Oslo, as well as Lillestrom, is done by ‘regular’ 
police officers. They perform the role of community 
beat officers as if they were emergency patrol officers, 
waiting for a call. Their mindset is towards reactive 
policing, not proactive community policing. Since 
Lillestrom is a smaller community, the police officers 
still meet someone they know once in a while. Oslo 
community beat policing has hardly any ties with the 
general public. It is more directed towards law and 
order maintenance.
Discussion
The style of community beat policing in Oslo as well 
as in Lillestrom was reactive and not directed towards 
improving the relationship between the police and 
the public. The intention of our observational study 
is not to evaluate the situation in a specific police 
team. The main goal of the study is to provide police 
management with better insight into police patrol work 
and its manageability. So, let us now move to a broader 
perspective and ask ourselves the question of how the 
police can implement community policing.
In essence there are two implementation philosophies. 
The philosophy we have observed in Oslo and 
Lillestrom is what may be called the philosophy of the 
wide movement. In this vision all police officers should 
move towards community beat policing at the same 
time. All police officers have to move simultaneously 
from a reactive to a proactive style of policing. The 
opposing strategy is what we could call the strategy 
of the pioneers. Some officers start with community 
beat policing, stimulating others to do their share in 
this movement. And we can imagine several strategies 
that lie somewhere between these two far ends.
Based on our observations we can distinguish between 
five models of community policing. The models are 
what one may call ‘ideal types’. They are analytical 
constructs grounded in empirical research. We have 
not observed one of these models in a pure form. 
However, if one looks at police patrol work in a certain 
place, it is quite easy to recognise one of these models 
as the main structuring principle behind community 
beat policing.
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(1) The first one may be called the support model. In 
this model, community beat officers are put at the 
service of other authorities, such as police chiefs 
and judicial bodies. We have observed this model 
to a certain degree in Belgium.
(2) The second model is what may be called a reactive 
model of community policing. Officers assigned 
to community beat policing are put at the service 
of local society. A part of their work consists of 
dealing with calls from the public. It is not difficult 
to recognise community beat patrol in Oslo and 
Lillestrom in this model.
(3) The third model is the POP model, from problem-
orientated policing. Perhaps we could better call 
this model POP-light. CBP officers conduct an 
analysis of criminological and/or social problems 
in their neighbourhood and then proactively try to 
solve these problems, preferably with the help of 
other welfare agencies.
(4) The fourth model is the full-POP model. This one is 
the same as POP-light but in addition to POP-light, 
emergency patrol officers are put at the service of 
the community beat officers. In other words, in this 
model community beat officers give direction to 
what emergency patrol officers undertake during 
the time between calls or during the time when 
they are not assigned to emergency patrol.
(5) The last model is the same as the full POP model 
but with no officers assigned to emergency patrol. 
Emergency patrol as such no longer exists. If there 
is an alarm call any officer may go to the scene to 
settle the incident. After the incident is settled 
he or she continues working on priorities in the 
light of problem-orientated policing. We have not 
observed this model in practice. So far, this model 
only exists in the mind of some police chiefs and in 
some policy documents.
To conclude, we will present three examples of 
organisational structures that we have observed in 
our study. Each represents one of the above models. 
The first is the situation we have observed in Oslo and 
Lillestrom (Model 2).
Different ways to 
organize CBP: 
Oslo and Lillestrom 
(‘wide movement’) 
Chief of 
Unit 
Deputy 
Chief 
Police officers assigned to 
basic police services 
Emergency 
Patrol 
Community Beat 
Patrol 
Model 2: 
Officers assigned  
to CBP are put at 
the service of local 
society (reactive  
model, like EP). 
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At the top of the organisational chart is the police 
management in the form of a police chief and a deputy 
chief. In the centre is the group of officers who are 
assigned to basic police services such as emergency 
patrol and community beat patrol. The officers 
rotate between these tasks. Since, in police culture, 
emergency patrol is the dominant role of the two, these 
police officers tend to do community beat policing in 
an emergency-patrol style. The results indicate that this 
way of organising community beat patrol is not the way 
to successfully implement this style of policing.
The second example is the situation we observed 
in, among other places, Groningen and Assen, the 
Netherlands (Model 3).
Different ways to 
organize CBP: 
Groningen and Assen 
(‘pioneering movement’) 
Chief of 
Unit 
Deputy 
Chief 
Police officers assigned to 
basic police services 
Emergency 
Patrol 
Community Beat 
Patrol 
Community Beat 
officers 
Model 3: 
CBP officers conduct 
an analysis of crimi- 
nological/social pro- 
blems in their area  
and act pro-active  
(POP model). 
At the top of this organisational chart is police 
management. Then there are two different lines 
travelling top-down. The one on the right is how the 
emergency patrol is organised, exactly the same as 
in the example above. The top-down line on the left 
shows how the community beat patrol is organised. 
Community beat patrol officers are located directly 
under the chief of the unit and it is these officers who 
are assigned to community beat patrol. To assure 
that the two types of officers cooperate, they have to 
consult with each other. The idea is that community 
beat officers inform the others about actual problems 
that need police attention. Since community beat 
patrol officers fall directly under the chief of the unit, 
they are seen as important. The effect of this, however, 
is that in daily practice no one manages community 
beat policing. The deputy chief is not in charge. The 
chief of the unit is too busy. In everyday practice we 
observed that community beat officers practice a style 
of policing that is different from the emergency-patrol 
style: more towards proactive policing, more towards 
problem-orientated policing, more towards building 
relationships between the police and the community. 
However, there is quite a distance between the two 
types of officers. It is very difficult for the community 
beat officers to push the other officers towards another 
style of policing.
The third and last example shows a variation on the 
second one. We observed this in the city of Leeuwarden, 
the Netherlands (Model 4).
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Different ways to 
organize CBP: 
Leeuwarden 
(‘CBP in command’) 
Chief of 
Unit 
Police officers assigned to 
basic police services 
Emergency 
Patrol 
Community Beat 
Patrol 
Community Beat 
officers 
Model 4: 
Same as 3 – in 
addition to which EP  
officers are put at the  
service of CBP offi- 
cers (full POP model). 
The main difference is that this third organisational 
chart does not have a deputy chief. Instead of this 
official, the chart shows the position of a community 
beat officer with executive powers. This community 
beat officer plays two roles. Firstly, he goes out on 
patrol, but only now and then since he has another 
and more important role to fulfil: he runs a group of 
police officers, and he assigns jobs to them in the 
sphere of community policing. In this way emergency 
patrol officers, if we still might call them so, are directed 
towards a community-policing style of policing. The 
effect of this is that police officers in Leeuwarden, 
patrolling the inner city, are less orientated towards 
traffic violations and more to other problems in the 
neighbourhood. For example emergency patrol in 
Leeuwarden consists of only a small proportion of 
traffic incidents. It is the smallest of all twelve cities in 
our study. The next-smallest was the one that we have 
observed in Lillestrom.
Conclusion
The outcomes of our study illustrate that the tables 
that constitute our frame of reference, such as the 
proportion of traffic, are indicators of important 
features of police patrol work.
What we learned during the course of this study, it that 
police management is strong on basic assignment — 
at designing a new organisation and at moving police 
officers from one department to another. Do we need 
to do more on youth problems? Just appoint ten 
more juvenile police officers. Do we want to improve 
police-citizen relationships? Let’s appoint ten more 
community beat officers. But police management 
is weak at the next step: basic strategy. What is our 
idea of community beat policing? What exactly does 
it mean to be a community beat patrol officer? Of 
course it is clear that community beat patrol officers 
should establish and maintain relationships between 
the police and the public. But police management 
need to express a clear picture of what a community 
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beat patrol officer should be doing on a day–to-day 
basis. How does one do ‘community beat policing’. 
Does a community beat officer have to write tickets? 
Does he or she visit schools? If so, to do what? Does 
such an officer walk the beat in uniform? There are so 
many questions about how one could and should fulfil 
a certain police role.
If the police want to move from an old-fashioned, 
reactive style of policing towards community policing 
or problem-orientated policing, they have to do 
more than just ask emergency patrol officers to also 
fulfil the role of community beat officer. And neither 
is it enough to appoint some officers as community 
beat officers. Although their patrol work is different, 
they do not have the power to change the rest of 
the organisation. Our study indicates that if one really 
wants to get a different style of policing off the ground, 
one should appoint community beat police officers 
with managerial powers.
We need police management that is capable of giving 
direction to what police officers do. After all, only 
then can it be useful to increase police numbers, and 
only then ‘more police officers on the streets’ will not 
automatically mean ‘more traffic checks’. Only if basic 
strategy is clear, is it useful to put ‘more blues on the 
beat’. It is the task of police management to keep the 
debate going about what are good practices in terms 
of police activities. It is their task to set goals and to 
evaluate police effectiveness. Consequently, in the 
end it is also their task to decide what kind of activities 
a certain type of police officer should or should not 
undertake — because police activities are a key factor 
of police effectiveness.
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To develop a common tactical approach in the 
protection of children, law-enforcement agencies are 
required to strengthen networks and relationships 
across Europe and the world (CEOP, 2010). What 
constitutes as a child pornography offence within 
Europe varies considerably, although there is 
a common understanding that a combined approach 
is needed to deal with the ‘explosive growth in child 
pornography’ (Schell, Martin, Hung & Rueda, 2007: 
47). Detections in child pornography offences are 
increasing at an alarming rate (Wolak, Finkelhor & 
Mitchell, 2009) requiring law enforcement officials to 
find new ways to manage the sexual exploitation of 
children. Perhaps the simplest question that the police 
currently face is whether an indecent image offender 
is committing, or is likely to commit contact sexual 
abuse against a child? (Eke, Seto, Williams, in press). 
From a European perspective the further question is 
whether cultural specificity exists? Recent studies have 
begun to explore the specific relationship between 
possession of the actual child pornography and the 
likelihood of being a contact offender (Long, Alison, 
McManus, McCallum, under review; McCarthy, 2010). 
These studies were based on a corpus of knowledge 
which has effectively examined three questions: 
(1) what are the key features of ‘Indecent Images of 
Children’ (IIOC) offending? (2) how do offenders use 
IIOC within their offending? (3) how prevalent are 
contact sexual abusers within indecent image offender 
samples? This paper will therefore present an overview 
of the three questions and then describe the current 
issues within contemporary studies around the ability 
to prioritise child pornography offenders.
Defining child pornography: indecent 
images of children
In terms of defining ‘child pornography,’ several 
researchers (e.g., Calder, 2004; Beech, Elliott, Birgden & 
Findlater, 2008) have adopted the definition proposed 
by Edwards (2000: 1): ‘child pornography’ is a record 
of the systematic rape, abuse and torture of children 
on film, photograph and other electronic means’. 
However, according to Beech et al. (2008: 219), abusive 
imagery of children can also include what they refer to 
as ‘everyday or ‘accidental’ naked images of children’. 
Some individuals with a sexual interest in children 
possess images and videos that are legal (e.g. magazine 
photographs of children). Thus, it may be more 
productive to consider child imagery on a continuum, 
ranging from legal imagery to those at the extreme 
end, depicting sexual assault (Taylor, Holland & Quayle, 
2001; Quayle, 2004). Indeed, solely concentrating on 
the illegal content of an individual’s collection limits 
understanding of the meaning applied by the offender 
to specific material that may be indicative of a sexual 
interest in children. For instance, individuals may gain 
pleasure from obtaining legal images to complete 
a series or ‘story’ (Quayle & Taylor, 2002). It should be 
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noted that throughout this paper the preferred term 
indecent images of children (IIOC) is used as the 
authors believe this term best reflects the illegal and 
indecent nature of this crime.
There is significant variance in the legal definitions 
of child pornography within Europe and the world. 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the Sexual Offences Act 
(2003) extended the Protection of Children Act (1978) 
introducing new offences to deal specifically with 
the exploitation of children through indecent images 
of children (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2007). 
Formalised in a Court of Appeal case, the Sentencing 
Advisory Panel (SAP) introduced guidance on the levels 
of IIOC, which in ascending order depict the seriousness 
of the offence. Table 1 represents the five ‘types’ or 
‘levels’ of IIOC (in ascending order) cited by the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003: Definitive Guideline (Sentencing 
Guidelines Council, 2007: 109).
Table 1 
SAP Image levels indicating levels of indecent images of children (IIOC).
Level Description
1 Images depicting erotic posing with no sexual activity
2 Non-penetrative sexual activity between children, or solo masturbation by a child
3 Non-penetrative sexual activity between adults and children
4 Penetrative sexual activity involving a child or children, or both children and adults
5 Sadism or penetration of, or by, an animal
Unlike other typologies (e.g. the COPINE scale (1); see 
Taylor et al., 2001), the levels set out by the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council do not include legal images of 
children or material that does not depict erotic posing 
(but nevertheless portrays children either fully clothed 
or in their underwear). This is because, under UK law, 
such content is not illegal and would not be used for 
sentencing offenders (Beech et al., 2008).
In addition, the Sentencing Guidelines Council (2007) 
stipulates the importance of the victim’s age when 
assessing the seriousness of the offence. It states that 
images which portray children under the age of 13 
should incur a higher starting point for sentencing 
than those images featuring 13-15 year olds. Similarly, 
images possessed of victims aged 16/17 years carry 
a lesser starting point for sentencing than IIOC 
depicting children aged 13-15 years. Taylor et al. (2001) 
suggest that the age of the child, the amount of IIOC, 
the way it is organised and whether it contains private 
material should also be considered when defining IIOC. 
Indeed, these considerations are reflected within the 
(1) The COPINE Scale is a rating system created in Ireland and 
used in the United Kingdom to categorise the severity of child 
pornography.
Sentencing Guidelines as aggravating factors within 
UK law (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2007).
Within the academic literature three key questions were 
addressed in an attempt to explain the relationship and 
whether IIOC offenders constitute a new type of offence 
or new way of offending (Bourke & Hernandez, 2009).
(1)  What are the key features of IIOC offending?
Internet World Stats (2008) state there are currently 
over 1.5 billion Internet users across the world. Since 
there is no single, regulatory body governing its use, 
the ability to control its content is limited (Beech et 
al., 2008). Individuals who have a sexual interest in 
children are free to form social networks, referred to 
as virtual communities (Renold, Creighton, Atkinson & 
Carr, 2003) with other like-minded people. Quayle and 
Taylor (2002) state that this can potentially empower 
and justify sexual interest in children. The internet also 
functions in such a way that it allows individuals to 
engage with others who share the same pro-offending 
attitudes (Beech et al., 2008). The quantities and ease 
of access to indecent images and other like-minded 
individuals around the world enables an offender 
to normalise child sexuality, and subsequently they 
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begin to objectify the child and the actual harm that 
takes place (Beech et al., 2008). The immediacy of the 
internet may act as reinforcement with the behavioural 
response likely to develop. If this is combined with 
masturbation the behaviour can become highly 
reinforcing (Gifford, 2002) and can encourage an 
individual to further disengage in social interaction 
with the real world, potentially increasing any social 
problems that originally existed (Morahan-Martin & 
Schumacher, 2000; Quayle, Vaughan & Taylor, 2006).
(2)  How do offenders use IIOC within their 
offending?
The role of IIOC within an individuals’ offending 
behaviour (i.e. in terms of its function and relationship 
to contact offending) has been the subject of much 
debate, with no conclusive answers being drawn 
(Taylor & Quayle, 2003). One argument postulates 
that IIOC are part of the development of offending 
potentially leading to contact sexual behaviour with 
a child (Buschman, Wilcox, Krapohl, Oelrich & Hacket, 
2010; Sullivan, 2002), while others state that the IIOC act 
as a diversion from escalating their behaviour (Riegel, 
2004). Another perspective considers that some 
offenders are already contact abusing children and use 
IIOC as another part of their paedophilic lifestyle, when 
for example, access to children is restricted (Bourke & 
Hernandez, 2009).
IIOC as part of development of offending
Quayle and Taylor (2002) suggest IIOC may provide 
a blueprint educating an offender how to abuse a child. 
It has been argued that those who view pornography 
can become de-sensitised to the material with repeated 
viewing conditioning arousal resulting in the individual 
seeking out more violent, explicit images (Zillman & 
Bryant, 1986). Sheehan and Sullivan (2002) refer to this 
within IIOC as fantasy escalation effect. It has been 
suggested that IIOC are an aid to fantasy enabling 
internet offenders to search and select material they 
find most arousing (Quayle & Taylor, 2002). One aspect of 
the fantasy is the creation of an unrealistic expectation 
of child sexual encounters. The images often portray 
children smiling and somewhat complicit in the activity 
enabling offenders to cognitively distort children 
as sexual beings (Howitt & Sheldon, 2007). This can 
increase cognitive distortions reducing inhibitions to 
contact abuse against a child (Print & Morrison, 2000), or 
as Sullivan (2002) posits, spiral their offending behaviour 
by fantasising with images. The images may serve as 
a motivational factor ‘triggering subsequent grooming 
behaviours’ (Buschman et al., 2010: 208).
IIOC as diversion from contact offending
Riegel (2004) conducted an anonymous survey and 
found that 84.5 per cent of participants stated that 
viewing erotica did not increase any desires to contact 
abuse, with 83 per cent believing it acted as a substitute 
for contact abuse. More generally, research agrees that 
not all offenders who use IIOC to facilitate arousal will 
inevitably develop into contact offenders (Seto, Hanson 
& Babchishin, in press; Sullivan & Beech, 2004; Osborn, 
Elliott, Middleton & Beech, 2010).
The increased ability of IIOC offenders to relate to 
fictional characters may somewhat hinder them from 
progressing onto contact abusing a child regardless of 
their failure to desist collecting (Elliott, Beech, Mandeville-
Norden & Hayes, 2009). A recent meta-analysis by 
Babchishin, Hanson and Hermann (in press) examining 
characteristics of IIOC offenders stated that increased 
self-control and other psychological barriers may be the 
difference between offender groups that inhibits these 
offenders from acting out their paedophilic fantasies.
IIOC used as part of an already established 
paedophilic lifestyle
An American study by Bourke and Hernandez (2009) 
suggested that a new type of offending exists where 
the child sexual offender uses IIOC as an extension of 
their already paraphilic lifestyle. Their self-disclosure 
data suggested that most offenders were already 
contact abusing before becoming involved in IIOC. 
Similarly, Sheehan and Sullivan’s (2010: 164) recent 
study on producers of IIOC also concluded that the 
internet may provide ‘post-hoc justification rather 
than a primary precipitating factor’ for contact abuse. 
Nevertheless, the 2 369 % increase in the overall 
number of contact sexual offences disclosed within 
Bourke and Hernandez’s (2009) study may suggest 
that sexual fantasies using IIOC to stimulate and reach 
masturbatory fantasy are rarely limited to fantasy.
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(3)  How prevalent are contact sexual abusers 
within indecent image samples?
Contact sexual abusers do exist within IIOC offenders. 
The ongoing debate is in what proportion and at what 
stages. A recent meta-analysis found approximately 
12 % of IIOC offenders have historically contacted 
offended against a child, increasing to 55 % when using 
self-report data (Seto et al., in press). Interestingly, they 
found the Bourke and Hernandez (2009) self-reporting 
data that 84.5 % of IIOC offenders had contact offended 
against a child was a statistical outlier. European studies 
have reported significant variance with 4.8 % of child 
pornography offenders having previous convictions 
for contact abuse of a child (Endras, Urbaniok, 
Hammermeister, Benz, Elbert & Rossegger, 2009), 
however when using self-report data this has increased 
to rates such as 47.8 % (Quayle & Taylor, 2003). This 
questions whether the differences in prevalence rates 
of contact offenders is due to methodological variations 
or whether there are cultural differences. It could be 
argued that there is a subgroup of IIOC offenders who 
pose a high risk of contact offending. The task for the 
police, irrelevant of geographical boundaries, is to 
determine who poses significant risk, and prioritise the 
protection of those children.
Can offenders be differentiated according 
to their use of IIOC?
There is a lack of research that has examined the 
differences between contact and non-contact 
offenders in terms of their IIOC possession. Research 
that does exist has tended to concentrate on IIOC 
offenders without contact offences rather than 
comparing them to contact offenders. In a recidivism 
study with a follow-up period of 1.5 to 4 years, Osborn 
et al. (2010) used the risk matrix 2000 revised and found 
none of their internet sex offenders went on to sexually 
re-offend regardless of their risk categorisation. None 
of the high-risk offenders were found to possess 
images at SAP level five. They concluded that the level 
of image possessed had no impact on their potential 
risk of re-offending. This finding may not be surprising 
as Gallagher et al. (2006: 63) found the ‘most serious 
images were the least numerous’. Furthermore, they 
found when examining video IIOC, level-four IIOC 
as the highest percentage with level five the lowest, 
indicating the format of the image may have an 
impact on possession. Conversely, Laulik, Allam and 
Sheridan (2007) reported that the majority of internet 
offenders possessed images at level four or five. 
These two studies illustrate the variety of findings in 
emerging research in relation to IIOC type and level. 
Larger studies concentrating on the level of IIOC 
available for offenders have reported a continuing 
trend with a significant proportion of websites (58 %) 
showing images at levels four and five (Internet Watch 
Foundation, 2008). Although it is unclear whether these 
trends are related to risk, research has acknowledged 
the importance of understanding how the possession 
of images at any image level relates to risk of harm to 
children (Carr & Hilton, 2009).
Does cultural specificity exist?
There is no research which has compared child 
pornography offenders across several countries 
distinguishing contact offenders from non-
contact offenders. However, it is accepted that an 
understanding of potential cultural differences is 
required to effectively protect children from harm 
(CEOP, 2010). Studies are only now emerging which 
examine how child pornography possession relates to 
risk of contact sexual abuse within their own countries. 
A recent American study that has examined how 
IIOC possession relates to risk is McCarthy (2010). She 
sampled 110 offenders (56 non-contact offenders; 51 
contact offenders) convicted of IIOC offences in the 
aim of identifying potential risk factors associated with 
contact sexual abuse. She found that contact offenders 
were significantly more likely to possess larger child 
pornography collections than non-contact offenders. 
She also concluded that contact offenders were more 
likely to engage in grooming behaviour than non-
contact offenders (such as sending adult pornography 
to potential victims; however this would constitute 
a different offence within the UK). Usefully, McCarthy 
(2010) has attempted to establish that differences 
between the offender groups and their IIOC offending 
behaviour exist however, as with Long et al. (2010) 
caution should be exercised with small effect sizes.
From a UK perspective, Long et al. (under review) 
examined the differences between contact and non-
contact offenders within their IIOC offending behaviour 
and possession. This study examined 60 offenders, 30 
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contact and 30 non-contact offenders who had been 
convicted of possession, making, or downloading IIOC 
in both still and video format. The aim of the study was 
two-fold. First, was to examine whether there were 
difference between contact and non-contact offenders 
in terms of their IIOC possession. Second, was to examine 
whether images possessed by contact offenders related 
to their contact offence. Contact offenders were found 
to have significantly less IIOC (still and video IIOC). This 
pattern was also found when analysing still images 
and videos separately. Contact offenders possessed 
a significantly lower proportion of level-one videos (i.e. 
IIOC depicting erotic posing with no sexual activity). 
On the other hand, contact offenders were significantly 
more likely to own a greater proportion of level-three 
still IIOC (i.e. images depicting non-penetrative sexual 
activity between adults and children) and level-four 
IIOC (penetrative sexual activity between adults and 
children). In summary, contact offenders possessed more 
severe imagery proportionally. The Long et al. (under 
review) hypothesis is that the behaviour depicted in the 
IIOC could relate to the offences known to have been 
committed. This may suggest that contact offenders 
preferred IIOC at similar levels of abuse to those offences 
they are committing, a notion hypothesised by Quayle 
and Taylor (2002). In terms of whether images possessed 
by contact offenders related to their contact offence, the 
more severe the contact offence committed, the higher 
the level of IIOC in the offender’s possession. The gender 
and age of the children in the IIOC was associated with 
the gender and age of the contact offence victims. 
Furthermore, contact offenders were more likely to 
display polymorphic behaviour (those who possessed 
IIOC depicting children of both genders also contact 
offended against both genders) and a smaller age range 
within their IIOC possession. Finally, when examining 
criminal histories, contact offenders were significantly 
more likely to have a conviction for non-sexual offences 
(i.e. theft) when compared with non-contact offenders. 
Similar results have been found with stranger rapists 
(Davies, Wittebrood & Jackson, 1998). In summary, 
contact offenders appeared more specific in their IIOC 
possession and it related to their contact offending.
Conclusions
A clear European and global picture is needed to 
understand cultural specificity and the links between 
child pornography and contact offending. This paper 
has described the three questions relating to IIOC: (1) 
what are the key features of IIOC offending? (2) How 
do offenders use IIOC within their offending? (3) 
How prevalent are contact sexual offenders within 
IIOC samples? It has also examined whether cultural 
specificity exists and concluded that significant further 
research is required.
The conclusions of this paper are that child pornography 
is widely available, affordable and has global social 
networks associated with it. Due to the criminogenic 
environment that the internet often represents 
(Wortley & Smallbone, 2006), these social networks 
frequently ignore geographic boundaries. In these 
cases diplomacy, continual liaison and understanding 
of differences in legislation will assist in protecting 
children from harm (CEOP, 2010). There are debates as to 
how child pornography is used but essentially they are 
used as part of the contact offending, to complement 
it or to divert from it. This focuses law enforcement 
responses to build and develop networks to tackle 
those offenders that commit the most serious offences.
Finally, in terms of prevalence of contact offenders in 
IIOC offender groups, while there is little agreement 
in how many IIOC offenders are contact offenders it is 
agreed that a subgroup exists that presents a real risk 
to children. In terms of policing, the real question is 
how do the police identify those that present a high 
risk? Any empirical research that can assist with this will 
allow the police to deliver the requirement to ‘focus 
the available resources in a way which best protects 
the public from serious harm’ (MAPPA, 2009, p. 32).
In many respects the fact that the high-risk subgroups 
do exist may encourage further research and police 
activity to try to ascertain and understand where 
the risk lies. This is increasingly important where laws 
may differ, but research is needed to understand 
if the behaviours remain the same. Whatever the 
conclusion, research of this type will assist a European 
and potentially international approach to safeguarding 
and multi-jurisdictional law enforcement. As Glasgow 
(2010) emphasises, police and researchers have a rich 
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source of data available with a golden opportunity 
to develop risk assessments. The exploratory studies 
outlined in this paper have taken tentative steps 
towards identifying factors that suggest likelihood of 
contact offending. These studies have only reviewed 
a single country perspective. The obvious gap that 
needs to be filled is empirical research that considers 
cross-border, European and international offending. 
By examining the details of child pornography cases 
and identifying factors that suggest the likelihood of 
contact offending, there is the possibility of preventing 
and ceasing contact sexual abuse. It is acknowledged 
that there are difficulties in using such data with issues 
of undetected contact offences (Buschman et al., 
2010; Bourke & Hernandez, 2009) and differences in 
recording information (Alison & Canter, 2005).
The need to manage risk may be one of the most 
significant changes in policing and law enforcement 
generally in recent years (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). 
Policing now has a tighter focus on risky offenders 
(Kemshall & Wood, 2008). Practical police-led research 
has begun to assess likelihood factors and, with 
increased research and understanding, will hopefully 
progress to the development of risk assessments. In 
the meantime, such studies provide policing with 
an empirical basis to assist and inform decisions 
with the aim of safeguarding children. The issue of 
cultural specificity and working together to identify 
contact offenders Europe-wide is now a focus of the 
European partnerships. At present, projects are under 
way between countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Estonia, Ireland and the Netherlands to explore these 
research questions and hopefully provide likelihood 
factors that may protect children across Europe.
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Introduction
Throughout Europe and North America, police services 
are increasingly turning towards proactive, problem-
orientated approaches. Some cultivate what is called 
‘intelligence-led policing” — even down to the local 
level. The research hinges on this general trend in order 
to renew the understanding of the practical relations 
of local knowledge and organisational knowledge, 
especially in the field of security. It focuses on an important 
aspect of practical police work and scientific research 
alike: the translation and mobilisation of ad hoc (local) 
knowledge into organisational knowledge. The CODISP 
project analyses and compares the knowledge cultures 
that evolve with the prevalent demands of preventive, 
proactive and problem-orientated policing. It does so 
in order to initiate and support actual organisational 
investments into the strengthening of the ‘intelligence 
function’, as well as into the professionalisation and the 
‘infostructure’ (Pan and Scarbrough 1999) of this now 
omnipresent branch of police work
Our research looks at the ways in which local knowledge 
is gathered and translated — or should at times not 
be translated — into intelligence that matters for local 
security networks and policies. And, conversely, we aim 
to determine how and to what extent this intelligence 
that is rendered available organisationally can be 
subject to learning and appropriation by professionals 
who undertake operational and supervising missions. 
Moreover, the research assesses the impact of the 
practical implementation of organisational process, 
tools and systems, which can be considered as 
components of the ‘intelligence function’ inside 
police services, as well as the effect of the use by 
police organisations of knowledge which has been 
produced by other local actors who share information 
with the police. To put it simply, the project studies 
to what extent and how, within Germany and France, 
knowledge-led policing tools and systems can make 
their way into various epistemic cultures of police 
units, and how these tools and systems are employed 
by police to respond to new demands of problem-
orientated, preventive and proactive policing?
Intelligence doctrine in context
According to the literature, collecting, managing, 
analysing and exploiting information related to 
security has become a central aspect in daily police 
work: to the extent that sociologists now describe 
police officers as ‘knowledge workers’ (Haggerty & 
Ericson, 2005, 2000, 1997). Similarly, information is 
considered as a ‘general paradigm of ordinary police 
activities’ (Brodeur, 2003). Police agencies are assessed 
as ‘learning organisations’ that cultivate more or less 
restricted knowledge economies. However, the police 
cannot be preconceived as one homogenous body. 
‘Personal knowing’ and ‘organisational knowledge’ 
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(Hughes & Jackson 2004) remain distinct and necessary 
epistemic qualities within the organisation.
A new police doctrine
Since the beginning of the 2000s, a research 
movement on police activities has been specifically 
focusing their studies on the relationship between 
knowledge and action when dealing with security 
problems. This collection of works, essentially Anglo-
Saxon, proclaimed a new police doctrine: intelligence-
led policing. Until today, however, this doctrine caused 
conceptual problems. Is it a separate mode of policing? 
Or is it a component next to others in rather traditional 
modes (Ratcliffe 2003)? Is it just a new managerial 
discourse which remains largely disconnected from 
the common ‘case approach’ process of knowledge 
construction in law enforcement organisations? What 
is more: are there functional equivalents of the Anglo-
Saxon notion of ‘law enforcement intelligence’ in terms 
of knowledge management within the French and 
German police, such as local knowing or knowledge 
networks? Our research envisages these conceptual 
matters as empirical questions: how do the French and 
German police services respond to the new knowledge 
demands/offers that come about especially with 
preventive and proactive police work?
The academic studies on the doctrine of intelligence-
led policing emphasise the role of information 
gathering and analysis in the management of police 
activities and in the governance of security policies. 
They focus on how police organisations discover, 
recognise, categorise, interpret and understand the 
various issues relating to safety, crime and disturbance 
of public order. They examine how the development of 
an ‘intelligence function’ can influence the functioning 
and outputs of police organisations, but also, more 
broadly, the governance of local security policies. The 
research moves these approaches back to daily police 
work and, in doing so, considers the potentials and 
limitations of new forms (and doctrines) of knowledge-
management practices.
These knowledge-management practices within the 
police involve a range of activities which aim to:
 § collect and manage relevant information for the 
actors in charge of prevention and security issues;
 § assess the threat level represented by these issues 
in order to determine what problems have to be 
targeted as a priority;
 § produce and distribute knowledge about these 
issues to elaborate practical solutions and their 
implementation;
 § evaluate the impact of the actions taken.
Knowledge management should confer upon local 
actors a pragmatic understanding of situations and 
problems that can be turned into action strategies 
(Lemieux, 2006). It should also solicit suggestions and 
approaches to crime reduction. The knowledge, or 
intelligence, should increase the capacity to anticipate 
critical situations, misdemeanors and disorders. They 
should also allow stakeholders to rationalise the use of 
their resources. The latter should focus their attention 
and efforts on the problems that most contribute to the 
deterioration of security. Knowledge management not 
only aims to increase the quality of information released 
to decision-makers, but also to increase their ability to 
use the analysis results elaborated especially for them.
As Jerry Ratcliffe (2002) indicates, the introduction of 
intelligence-led policing initiatives seem to encourage 
police organisations to go beyond a narrow and 
reactive conception of raw information exploitation, 
characterised by the predominance of information 
that derives from citizen complaints and criminal 
enquiries, which are both are collected after incidents 
have happened. The doctrine, in line with problem-
centred policing, prefers a comprehensive and 
proactive conception, which allows for a preventive 
attitude towards various forms of criminality and 
public disorder.
Beyond the police force, all public actors likely to 
contribute to insecurity reduction are to evolve towards 
more ‘proactive’ and ‘strategic’ action modes. In such 
a system, there is a great need for active information 
research and scientific problem analysis, just like there 
is a need to calculate the best value costs/advantages 
for operational measures set up to respond to the 
problems (Maguire, 2000; Maguire & John, 2006). In 
general, the new forms of policing demand security 
management where profitability and performance 
have become essential parameters (Lemieux, 
2006). This evolution fits into a wider movement of 
‘managerialisation’ of public policies (Delpeuch, 2006), 
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and brings about new legal, professional and practical 
problems caused by rising bureaucracy and formality.
The implementation of the doctrine in various 
countries
Great Britain is in the vanguard of the international 
movement of intelligence-led policing doctrine. In 
2004, it set up a National Intelligence Model (NIM, the 
result of a study started in 2000) whose task was to 
standardise and promote new knowledge practices 
and tools. Information ought to be processed at three 
interconnected levels: local, regional and national. 
Each level has been equipped with its own intelligence 
management tools — intelligence units, various 
committees where police chiefs can gain knowledge 
about the ‘burning problems’ from analysts and 
from representatives of other public and private 
organisations. Additionally, each level has been asked 
to adopt a learning attitude towards its own routines 
and work practices. The police services are expected to 
function as branches of a learning organisation.
In the United States, since the 11 September 2001 
attacks, police forces have been encouraged by 
federal authorities to carry out reforms based on 
the intelligence-led policing doctrine. A national 
development programme has been set up with the 
aim of modernising equipment, improving professional 
training, generalising good practices, and sharing 
information between police agencies at different levels. 
The American doctrine implies that all local police 
forces — whatever their size and organisation mode — 
should develop the ability to manage and efficiently 
exploit the information gathered from an extensive 
range of open and closed sources, as well as transmit 
the knowledge generated from that information to the 
internal and external actors who most need it to carry 
out their security tasks. Local police must also be able 
to receive, manage and build on information coming 
from external institutional sources. All the components 
of police organisation are hard-pressed to acquire 
a culture of information (Carter, 2004). The intelligence-
led policing doctrine in the United States is in line with 
the problem-solving approaches that came about in 
the 1990s and which consist of identifying the causes 
of security problems using tools and analysis methods 
that enable the development of responses towards the 
actual causes of criminality and public disorder. Some 
experts criticise problem-orientated policing for failing 
because of a lack of analytical capacities inside police 
organisations (Eck and Spelman, 1989). Intelligence-led 
policing promised to overcome these shortcomings.
By contrast, in France, the interest in intelligence-
led policing has only emerged recently and partially. 
Interest arose when the system of national security 
intelligence was reformed in 2007 and 2008. Since 
then, new intelligence tools were created to provide 
local police services with analytical products which 
are supposed to improve decision processes for 
operational and tactical purposes. However, the 
efficiency of the tools and methods largely remains 
to be assessed until today. And, the know-how that 
has been constituted either at the central level or 
in the context of local initiatives, needs in order 
to be spread across the country, a broad and rich 
conceptual apparatus that allows any assessment to 
identify functional equivalents in police knowledge 
management. Here, our heuristic distinction of local 
and organisational knowledge and the analysis of 
their translation into each other marks out a valuable 
starting point for grounded research.
One of the prominent aspects of French intelligence 
know-how, which should be carefully compared 
with similar German experiences, is the emergence 
of deliberative forms of information aggregation and 
problem analysis which have gradually emerged 
from the development of local security partnerships 
since the beginning of the 1980s. These forms of joint 
production of law enforcement intelligence take place 
in various local security committees, information-
sharing networks and bilateral inter-institutional 
cooperations. These partnerships associate actors 
such as municipalities, courts, social services, schools, 
public transportation and housing projects etc. Their 
degree of formalisation and institutionalisation varies 
depending on the sites and on the issues. On the whole, 
they have allowed actors characterised by different 
knowledge cultures, professional interpretation 
frameworks and institutional interests to learn how 
to exchange information and how to discuss possible 
responses to the issues. In many French localities, the 
inter-organisational sharing of information and analysis 
has become an established practice which influences 
the decision-making process in the organisations 
which are integrated in security networks. In some 
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territories, these practices have strongly contributed to 
improving the outcomes of local security policies.
In the case of Germany, the research is confronted with 
another diverse picture. The police is administered 
on the state level, complemented by self-organised 
networks in the municipalities. Here, local security 
concepts gave rise to an enormous diversity of projects, 
themselves specialised on ‘burning issues’, on ‘ hotspots’ 
with a mix of security/criminality matters or on ‘target 
groups’. Through these initiatives, preventive/proactive 
policing grew to be an important part of daily police 
work. Now, it does not just collaborate with social work, 
but shares some of its social properties, including its 
client-centred perspective. This transformation of police 
work caused new demands on the level of education, as 
well as new demands for the organisational culture as 
such. In terms of knowledge work, these developments 
towards proactive policing have been managed rather 
on the project level, less within the police organisation as 
a whole. German police schools aim to meet these new 
demands in terms of social learning and reflection (such 
as anti-racism training). The dimensions of knowledge 
work and ‘learning organisations’ — plus their inherent 
limitations — await further attention.
In the German context, because of the heterogeneous 
and decentralised structure of the police services, 
intelligence-led policing never turned into a paradigm 
or doctrine in the first place. If at all, intelligence-led 
policing has been reserved for special analytical units 
at the federal level. For instance, the German Federal 
Criminal Police Office (BKA) — together with European 
partners — developed techniques of ‘geographical and 
strategic early detection’ in order to ‘reveal connections 
between different phenomena’ and ‘to prepare 
the police force to make steps in terms of setting 
objectives, planning strategies and prioritising policies’ 
(www.cepol.europa.eu). However, such scenario 
techniques, differentiated by types of delinquency, 
seem to overburden local security networks. On 
a daily level, ‘intelligence’ seems restricted to ad hoc 
risk assessments involving an intimate understanding 
of participants and their ‘normal’ actions. Local police 
work focuses on — careful, acceptable, operational — 
networking, the building of trust relationships, and at 
times the advancement of its applied, organisational 
knowledge economy. It is more knowledge-led than 
intelligence-led.
Analysing knowledge-led policing in 
France and Germany
Some sociologists see knowledge-led or intelligence-
led policing as a managerial discourse which, deep 
down, is unlikely to alter mundane vision and thinking 
in the police force. In their opinion, the police force is still 
a profession orientated more towards coercive action 
than towards analysis and reflection. Police activities 
essentially remain focused on reactive responses to 
occasional events reported to them or detected by 
them. The function of intelligence, as these researchers 
observe, is only effectively instrumental in a minimal 
number of police events and cases (Brodeur & Dupont, 
2006). Several authors doubt it would be possible to 
rationalise information circulation and exploitation 
in police organisations, as intelligence is traditionally 
exchanged in an informal and personal manner 
often reproduced by the dominant mechanisms 
in professional learning and transmission practices 
(Manning, 2003; Shearing & Ericson, 1991).
But there are several reasons to consider the emergence 
of knowledge-led policing as a major expression of 
a paradigm shift in the field of security policies. Local 
networks in public security have evolved significantly. 
Hypothetically, they render intelligence systems 
more useful and applicable: territorialisation of public 
action, generalisation of contractual and partnership 
initiatives and widening (through different forms of 
mediation, prevention and citizen involvement) of the 
range of responses to be used in dealing with security 
problems. In such a context, for local security policies 
to be effective, the knowledge economy needs to fulfil 
a number of requirements: the capacity to understand 
local specificities, the aptitude to share pertinent 
information with local public and private partners, 
collective deliberation of the significance of collected 
data, as well as the capacity to use shared information 
and knowledge for the joint elaboration of coordinated 
action strategies. Moreover, the doctrine expects 
police organisations to improve their effectiveness 
despite their decreasing means, which invites them 
to equip themselves with knowledge tools in order to 
make better use of the resources already obtained by 
members of the organisation on various levels.
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A comparative approach to studying 
knowledge-based policing and the ways 
to improve it
Our comparative study take on these managerial 
changes will contribute to these debates on 
a substantial basis: firstly by comparing the various 
national articulations of an international doctrine 
as such; secondly, by showing how exactly the 
status of various knowledge in institutionally diverse 
police organisations; thirdly, our grounded research 
will specify the practical relevancy of knowledge 
environments and knowledge tools beyond mere self-
descriptions of the respective police services. Our aim 
is to come close to the complex and integrated police 
work and to introduce basic improvements for these 
situations.
Comparing the French and the German cases lies at the 
heart of this endeavour. The comparison is performed 
in four steps:
(1) Mapping the fields: we map our respective fields 
according to the organisational structures, hierarchy 
levels, programmes of good practice and formal/
procedural paths. The institutional maps are used as 
patterns of possibility, meaning as a framework that 
shows how certain modes of knowing and forms 
of knowledge are feasible at certain sites within the 
respective organisation. This includes prescriptions 
for the aggregation, storage and compiling of data, 
the use of electronic format versus paper copies 
and reports, etc.
(2) Grounded practice research: on these grounds, 
we organise our practice research. We place field 
researchers in selected sections of policing, where 
they will conduct a lengthy thorough ethnographic 
observation of the daily knowledge work (4-6 weeks 
in each setting). These sections are confronted 
differently with the requirements of knowledge-led 
policing. They serve these requirements differently 
according to the practical, local limitations that are 
themselves to be taken seriously as pragmatic tactics 
and rationales. Only on these informed grounds 
do we develop semi-standardised interviews in 
other cities and on various hierarchy levels: we 
conduct a series of 1-2 week ‘short studies’ of 10-
15 particular localities in each country, mainly based 
on interviews and documentary analysis, as well 
as a series of visits in police academies in France, 
Germany, Great Britain and the United States.
(3) Thick comparison: grounded in the local police 
work, we discern relevant patterns and factors 
of knowledge-led policing. This assures that the 
research is empirically driven; that it links up on 
the actual experiences and competencies of 
practitioners. This way, we will thicken our research 
in this bottom-up methodology: from real cases 
(fieldwork research) to general organisational 
patterns (semi-standardised interviews).
(4) Integrating basic analytical perspectives on 
knowledge in learning organisations: the literature on 
learning organisations starts from two basic analytical 
perspectives. It focuses either on knowledge 
production or on knowledge consumption. Our 
research integrates these two directions in order 
to compare the info- and infrastructures in diverse 
police organisations. The analytical questions are: 
what local knowledge is produced within security 
networks and how, if at all, does this knowledge 
circulate in the police organisation? Is knowledge 
produced for, or consumed by ways of geo-coding 
analysis, criminal investigative analysis, tactical 
crime analysis (pattern identification relevant for the 
deployment of the patrols) and strategic analysis (for 
resource allocation of personnel and materials), etc.?
(5) Comparing practical solutions: our joint research 
projects aims for best practice cases in order to 
analyse in detail the practical solutions that made 
these successes possible. The practical solutions will 
be presented in workshops to academics and, more 
so, police practitioners from France and Germany. 
By narrating and analysing these positive cases, 
we aim for new intern organisational publics that 
allow knowledge to circulate more freely to those 
members that are in need of a broader repertoire of 
practical solutions.
(6) Results, diagnostic and applied: as a result we will 
be able to characterise the respective epistemic 
cultures of policing beyond mere national 
containers. Parts of these cultures are programmes, 
techniques, professional solutions and attitudes 
towards knowledge production/consumption. 
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Knowledge-led policing is put in context(s) by 
then and can be reformulated as a doctrine in 
more realistic and embedded terms. Rather than 
celebrating doctrines, we will downsize them to 
their actual potential and limitations.
Identifying good practices in the field of public 
security intelligence
Scientific works dedicated to the doctrine of 
intelligence-led policing have underlined four types of 
pitfall for organisations that try to increase the role of 
the intelligence function in managing their everyday 
activities: (1) the agents’ reluctance to adopt formalised 
and standardised modes of information conservation 
and transmission; (2) tensions between operational 
and specialised police forces on the level of empirical 
methods and data assessments; (3) the difficulty of 
obtaining resources in order to implement intelligence-
led infrastructures in organisations already saturated 
by multiple demands, and finally, (4) the difficulty 
of producing valuable information and up-to-date 
diagnoses for day-to-day policing.
Our research investigates these tensions between the 
doctrines and the ground work plus the ways in which 
these tensions are translated into everyday dealings 
and routines. More generally, our research will renew 
the understanding of public action development and 
behaviour processes in the security field, focusing 
on an aspect of local management that is often 
overlooked in police management literature: the 
institutional processes of (ad hoc) fabrication, (biased) 
interpretation, (limited) circulation and (pragmatic) 
utilisation of operational knowledge, including the 
paradigmatic conflicts and paradigms accompanying 
these processes.
In addition, we isolate the conditions and processes 
which enhance learning and allow the use of concepts, 
thinking modes, work methods and technical tools 
inherently linked to public security intelligence, 
by local security actors. The comparison of these 
components will assist the grounded modelling of 
learning organisations in the field of policing.
Moreover, our joint research will qualify the human 
dimension of the processes by which the knowledge 
systems of the function of intelligence operates. 
Previous research suggests that even if more and 
more sophisticated tools are made available to agents 
involved in this function, improving professional 
capacities constitutes the first condition necessary 
for the enhanced production/consumption — and 
circulation — of knowledge.
In order to analyse the organised processes of 
knowledge production/consumption, we aim to 
answer rather detailed research questions:
 § Within the organisations and services taking part, 
how do the different types of concerned agents 
mobilise the resources given by the function of 
intelligence? In the solving of which situations and 
problems is organisational knowledge considered 
in-/appropriate?
 § What actors are receptive to the offered knowledge 
and methods? How do they justify the use of 
organisational knowledge and what drives/delimits 
their knowledge production for the organisation? 
How does career profile, training and professional 
experience matter?
 § Conversely, which actors passively or actively resist 
the development of the function of intelligence? 
How do they explain and justify this resistance? How 
can we utilise the critique in order to offer more 
appropriate knowledge systems that meet the 
ethical, legal and social requirements highlighted 
by these local critiques?
We ask the same questions in our two respective fields 
and we endeavour to determine the practicalities 
and local conditions that promote or, on the contrary, 
inhibit the coproduction of knowledge in prevention 
projects, municipal initiatives and task forces.
The reconstruction of knowledge practices and 
processes implies that there is a limited and ordered 
range of principles, rules and procedures applied by 
the police forces. They acquire certain rules and sources, 
appreciate them in their local relevance, turn situated 
experiences into decontextualised data, bring some 
(not all) data into circulation, share some (not all) data 
with other units, update some knowledge in the light 
of new insights and demands, and frequently reflect on 
the limitations of their methods — at times by using 
scientific support. Furthermore, knowledge processes 
are subject to forms of accountability as a technique to 
render them available to organisational and managerial 
oversight. We study these realms as distinct epistemic 
sub-cultures that are only partially integrated on an 
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organisational and systemic level. The recurring urge 
for transparency within the intelligence doctrines is 
a forceful expression of these fragmentations, including 
micro-politics and the struggles accompanying it.
In police organisations, the quality of knowledge and 
analysis processes depends on the weight given to 
them by its factions and sub-cultures. Knowledge 
is itself objected to interpretative struggles and 
competing schemata. The factions qualify or disqualify 
knowledge — and allow for additional enquiries or 
upfront usage. In particular, units who have special 
access to the best sources (e.g. operational units) must 
get used to transmitting information to knowledge 
systems: in a selective manner (screening out unreliable 
or useless information), in the necessary format, with 
the adequate level of detail, while observing a certain 
number of precautions. All this refers to the wider, but 
fragmented epistemic culture, in which knowledge and 
knowledge processes are weighed against each other.
Our own attempts to stabilise and rationalise 
knowledge-led policing in public security refer 
to an existing nexus of research in the workplace, 
management, information and policing studies. In 
terms of its development at the level of local actor 
networks, several works (Donzelot & Wyvekens, 1998; 
INTERSECTS study) have shown that the viability of 
partnership systems depend on their aptitude in 
stabilising and sharing procedures that encourage 
exchange productivity, fuel trust and direct inter-
organisational conflicts. The latter involves efforts to 
assess the needs and capacities of network partners 
and to establish exchanges within such a system 
(diagnosis, consultation, performance monitoring, 
implementation of adequate technical tools, 
conditions to be respected in terms of confidentiality 
and compliance with the rights and liberties of citizens, 
etc.). However, the formalities and complexities of 
these knowledge exchanges encourage an ‘underlife’ 
(Goffman 1961) that crosscuts the procedural realm for 
pressing purposes.
Our research contributes to these demands by adding 
up an inventory of the good practices (more or less) 
effectively implemented by interior security forces and 
partnership bodies, both French and German, in the 
public security intelligence sector. It will examine in 
detail the functioning of units, services, organisations 
and partnership networks which have demonstrated 
a strong capacity to obtain, analyse and efficiently exploit 
information and knowledge in local security problems. 
Moreover, it will draw lessons for both countries on 
the reflections and experience developed in the other 
country. This inventory in both countries will constitute 
a repertoire of ‘ready to use’ elements in the elaboration 
of a general public security intelligence doctrine. The 
communication of this inventory to professionals in 
local settings will take the form of a ‘practical solutions 
and best practices directory’.
Any knowledge-led policing involving both local and 
organisational knowledge, implies a whole range of 
professional skills: organising and stimulating knowledge 
sharing within police services and partnership networks, 
knowing how to deal with and exploit information 
provided by partners, being capable of a constructive 
dialogue with partners with regard to information 
interpretation, knowing how to identify the likely 
characteristics of problems in a perspective of prevention, 
defending the viewpoints of one’s own institution and 
collectively assessing the results of taken actions, etc. 
These skills need to travel within the organisation in order 
to provide a solid and broad foundation for a knowledge 
system to work.
The objective of the research is, thus, to supply police 
services with a professional arena and public dedicated 
to turning knowledge processes and the involved 
methods into objects of internal reflection and 
collective design. To that end, the research will assess 
the existing training courses in France and Germany in 
the public security intelligence sector, so as to supply 
police schools with practice-informed elements to 
enrich training modules. The emphasis and the critique 
of knowledge-led policing thus involve the early stages 
of human resources development: recruitment, job 
descriptions, skill standards career profiles. It involves, 
moreover, a critical culture that involves boundary 
work within the organisation and towards potential 
partners and audiences ‘outside’.
204
European Police Science and Research Bulletin · Special Conference Issue Nr. 2
References
• Brodeur, J.-P. (2003) Les Visages de la police. Pratiques et perceptions. Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal.
• Brodeur, J.-P. & Dupont, B. (2006) ‘Knowledge Workers or ‘knowledge’ Workers?’. Policing and Society, vol.16, No 1.
• Delpeuch, T. (2006) ‘ Les nouvelles politiques de sécurité en trompe-l’œil? Les réformes dans le champ de la sécurité publique à l’épreuve 
des recherches en sciences sociales ’. Droit et Société, No 61.
• Carter, D.L. (2004) Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies. Washington DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
• Donzelot, J., Mével, C. & Wyvekens, A. (2003) Faire société. La politique de la ville aux Etats-Unis et en France. Seuil.
• Eck, J. & Spelman, W. (1989) ‘Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing In Newport News’. in R. G. Dunham and G. P. Alpert (eds.) Critical 
Issues in Policing. Prospect Heights, IL, Waveland Press.
• Ericson, R.V. & Shearing, C. (1986) ‘The Scientification of Police Work’. in G. Böhme, N. Stehr (eds.) The Knowledge Society: The Impact of 
Scientific Knowledge on Social Structures, Reidel.
• Goffman, E. (1961) Asylums. Doubleday.
• Haggerty, K. & Ericson, R. (1997) Policing the Risk Society. Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
• Haggerty, K. & Ericson, R. (2000) ‘The Surveillant Assemblage’. British Journal of Sociology, vol. 51, No 4.
• Haggerty, K. & Ericson, R. (2005) The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility. University of Toronto Press.
• Hughes, V. & Jackson. P. (2004) ‘The influence of Technical, Social and Structural Factors on the Effective use of Information in a Policing 
Environment’. The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management, 2(1), p. 65-76.
• Lemieux, F. (2006) Normes et pratiques en matière de renseignement criminel: une comparaison internationale. Les presses de l’Université 
Laval.
• Maguire, M. & John, T. (2006) ‘Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism and Community Engagement: Competing Priorities and the Role of 
the National Intelligence Model in the UK’. Policing and Society, vol.16, No 1.
• Maguire, M. (2000) ‘Policing by Risk and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence-Led Crime Control’. Policing and 
Society, vol.9.
• Manning, P.K. (2003) Policing Contingencies. The University of Chicago Press.
• Pan, S. L., Scarbrough, H. (1999) ‘Knowledge management in practice: an exploratory case study’. Technology Analysis and Strategic 
Management, 11(3), p. 359-374.
• Ratcliffe, J.H. (2002) ‘Intelligence-Led Policing and the Problem or Turning Rhetoric into Practice’. Policing and Society, vol.12, No 1.
• Ratcliffe, J.H (2003) ‘Intelligence led policing’. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, April 2003 (248), p. 1-6.
• Ratcliffe, J.H. (2008) Intelligence-Led Policing. Cullompton UK: Willan Publishing.
205
Chapter V: Organised Crime meets research — introduction
Chapter V: Organised Crime meets 
research — introduction
Hans-Gerd Jaschke
From a political and a policing point of view, organised 
crime is a dark spillover-effect of globalisation. The 
collapse of the cold-war-confrontation between East 
and West after 1990, the beginning of a new world order 
and disappearing borders in Europe after the Schengen 
agreement have intensified international cooperation 
of criminal groups in many fields. New possibilities 
of developments in communication technology and 
quick communication all over the world are offering 
new perspectives in the main fields of organised 
crime, such as trafficking of drugs and human beings, 
piracy of products and money laundering. Improving 
cross-border policing is a main answer to the threats 
of transnationally operating criminal groups. However, 
what can be assumed on the research and knowledge 
level, what do we know about ‘organised crime’ and the 
operating groups behind it?
The opening contribution of this section scrutinises 
organised crime research from a general point of view. 
Hans-Jörg Albrecht points out that the understanding 
of ‘organised crime’ has moved from the ‘Sicilian style’ 
towards meaning a network of structures. It is diverse, 
complex, less organised and less hierarchical. Most of the 
research is initiated by the police and driven by topics 
around the organised crime phenomena. Little research 
interest can be identified in the field of policing organised 
crime. Regarding the whole area Albrecht highlights 
the ‘lack of empirical research on organised crime’. The 
use of intelligence and cross-border police cooperation 
are strategic answers to modern organised crime. With 
regard to EU resolutions highlighting that monitoring 
telecommunications may help in investigating organised 
crime cases, the political dimension appears quite clearly 
as a growing tension between freedom and security.
László Salgó, at the time of the conference in 
Traiskirchen Assistant Director of Europol, gives an 
introduction to the Europol ‘Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment’ (OCTA), a continuous report about the 
development of organised crime in the EU, produced 
from 2006 to 2011. He gives information about the 
history of OCTA, the sources of the data collection 
and the environment of intelligence-led policing. 
As Albrecht had emphasised before, Salgó reports 
that criminal markets and regions are focused on by 
OCTA. Thirdly, operating groups, their typology and 
their possible clusters are part of the OCTA report. 
By combining different factors, such as destination 
markets, criminal group types, migration processes 
and others, OCTA identifies five ‘criminal hubs’ in the 
EU: North-West, North-East, South-West, South and 
South-East. Each of them is related to specific criminal 
flows from other parts of the world, from South 
America, Asia and Russia. Trends in 2008 showed that 
organised crime groups were ‘transnational, multi-
ethnic and poly-crime’ and ‘increasing their influence 
in the economic, social and politic environments’. 
Salgó draws a picture of organised crime that confirms 
existing studies of the phenomena but asks once again 
for further research strategies.
‘The OCTA is only the first step on a long journey’ - 
Michael Levi argues in his comment. He questions the 
‘threat assessment’ as a procedure as well as both terms: 
‘Threats to whom and what and from where?’ And: 
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‘How do we really prioritise threats?’ There is a need for 
more clarification for the other term ‘assessment’. What 
activities are covered by an ‘assessment’? Thus, Levi’s 
meritorious approach leads to raising questions to be 
discussed both now and in the future.
It is not only a problem of terminology; we also have 
to start organised crime research by accepting an 
uncertain world. Tom Vander Beken is in favour of 
the application of scenario techniques which might 
anticipate plausible futures. He argues that the 
mainstream of organised crime assessment is directed 
towards risk-calculation models, which are based on 
uncertain quantitative frameworks. Possible risks or 
threats cannot be measured by data calculation only; 
other factors are part of the game. ‘It is argued’, he 
continues, ‘that scenario exercises in which uncertain 
elements are accepted contain promising possibilities 
for crime assessments to address and prepare for 
multiple futures.’
Didier Bigo, James Sheptycki and Han Jaffel pick up 
again the term and the meaning of ‘organised crime’. 
Following their approach, it seems to be impossible to 
give an exact definition, because it has meant different 
things over time. There is a historical dimension but also 
a geopolitical dimension: South American, European 
and Russian historical developments have created 
different forms. Sometimes and somewhere organised 
crime is more or less ‘disorganised’, deregulated and 
connected with local frameworks. With regard to the 
organisation structures the authors distinguish — 
following von Lampe — five main ideal types:
 § criminal networks with, firstly, ‘no social support 
structure in the milieu of operation’;
 § those ‘rooted in marginalised subcultures’;
 § those ‘rooted in mainstream society’;
 § those with links ‘in power elites’;
 § ‘criminal alliances between underworld and upper 
world or mafia-like organisations’.
Thus, the authors offer a very different and complex 
picture of what organised crime means today. Their 
contribution presents some suggestions for building 
future organised crime threat assessments.
SOCTA (the serious and organised crime threat 
assessment) is developed and operated by Europol. The 
follow-up to OCTA starts in 2013 and will finish in 2017. 
Tamara Schotte summarises, at the end of the section, 
brief information about SOCTA. The programme is in 
line with the organised crime situation reports (OCSR), 
the first Europol reports from 1994, when Europol 
was still the Europol Drugs Unit, the organised crime 
reports (OCR) from 2002 and OCTA from 2006 up to 
2011. SOCTA will be ‘a forward-looking document, 
with a primary focus on future developments in 
criminal threats’. Schotte emphasises the separation 
between the SOCTA methods of analysis and scientific 
research: the SOCTA approach is ‘to facilitate effective 
interventions’, moreover there is ‘the need for speed, 
secrecy and professional trust’. The final ideas of the 
section may generate new discussions about scientific 
research and intelligence-led policing data collections.
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Police, policing and organised 
crime: lessons from organised 
crime research
Hans-Jörg Albrecht
Germany
(2008 Conference in Traiskirchen)
1.  Introduction: research on organised 
crime and organised crime policies
Over the last three decades organised crime has been 
assigned a top priority on the European Union’s crime 
policy agenda. This parallels international concerns 
for organised and transnational crime which is also 
expressed in the ‘Transnational Crime Convention 
2000’ providing a normative framework for (global) 
anti-organised crime policies. Anti-organised crime 
policies have been devised on national, European 
and international levels. A dense network of 
conventions not only deals with organised crime per 
se but also with single elements like corruption, money 
laundering, human trafficking and the trade in illicit 
drugs. Investigation of organised crime is entrusted to 
specialised police units - within the European Union 
Europol has been given the task of supporting member 
countries’ police forces in investigating organised (and 
cross-border) crime.
Lessons from organised crime research, which can 
be drawn for the purposes of policing, require first 
of all a summary of what is known about organised 
crime (UNODC, 2010). Research on organised crime 
evolves around various phenomena of transaction 
crime, social control of organised crime, performance 
of police in containing organised crime, cross-
border police cooperation and interactions between 
organised crime as well as organised crime policies 
and control practices (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). Research 
is encouraged by a growing interest in intelligence-led 
police and policing. However, what can be observed 
is an extremely skewed distribution of research on 
organised crime. Organised crime research in Europe 
is skewed along countries, types of crime, research 
methods, leading research questions and interests. 
Most organised crime research originates from a small 
number of European countries where criminological 
research is well developed.
The bulk of research on organised crime is based on 
police measures and statistical accounts drawn from 
official sources. Most research is also initiated by 
police. There are few ethnographic and field studies 
on organised crime; research is focused on selected 
phenomenon of organised crime, among them drug 
trafficking (1) and more recently human trafficking 
(UNODC, 2009). Policing organised crime is under-
researched. Police cooperation, cross-border policing, 
Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) have found but little 
research interest (2) (see Rijken and Vermeulen, 2006; 
Maguer, 2004). As regards performance of police in 
the investigation of organised crime and evaluation 
of organised crime policies, extremely little academic 
research can be found (Kinzig, 2004).
Organised crime remains a controversial issue. This is 
due to problems of definition, the politically mobilising 
nature of the concept of organised crime, unresolved 
(1) The establishment of the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs 
(EMCDDA) is an expression of the European Union interest in 
systematic data collection as regards all aspects of illicit drugs.
(2) So far only one empirical study has been carried out on JITs.
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conflicts with regard to the issue of jurisdiction and 
the question of which instruments should be adopted 
in tackling it. Conflicts emerge around the question 
of whether the concept of organised crime should 
play a role in designing normative and organisational 
frameworks of policing, law enforcement and cross-
border cooperation. The view that the concept 
of organised crime is too restrictive and excludes 
a significant and relevant share of cases in need of cross-
border cooperation is gaining support. Instead of the 
concept of organised crime, a harm-based approach is 
suggested — through adopting the concept of serious 
crime. Serious crime is considered to be better suited to 
identify crime and concrete situations where European 
(and international) police and judicial cooperation is 
warranted (Dorn, 2009). In fact, with serious crime, 
various forms of economic crime, environmental 
offences, terrorism, serial murder and serial rape, 
distribution of child pornography may fall under the 
mandate of Europol (House of Lords, 2008b, p. 18). The 
spread of undercover policing and other measures of 
secret investigation, as well as far-reaching financial 
sanctions responding to organised crime, trigger 
conflicts with fundamental rights and basic principles 
of procedural fairness. Security becomes a leading 
goal in organised crime policies generating tensions as 
regards freedom and privacy. Moreover, conflicts arise 
around European institution building.
2.  What does research tell us about 
organised crime and how can 
organised crime be measured?
The emergence and the course of transnational 
organised crime are closely associated with basic 
changes in modern societies. These changes affect 
labour markets, the economy and basic mechanisms of 
social integration. Transnational crime is also linked to 
migration and immigration and those processes which 
have led to multicultural or multi-ethnic societies in 
both Europe and North America, and with that towards 
a trend to a horizontal social order. Changes concern 
not only the emergence of transnational enterprises 
and a globalised economy but also the emergence of 
transnational communities which bridge borders and 
cultures. Transnational crimes, that is crimes affecting 
more than one country or nation at a time, as well 
as crimes characterised by their cross-border nature 
certainly are not new. Transnational crimes have always 
been part of the crime phenomenon. What has changed 
is the quantity and quality, as well as the structures, 
of transnational crime which today are determined 
by market and political economy, organisation and 
networks, rational choice and migration.
The concept of organised crime can be traced to two 
theoretical approaches. The first views organised crime 
as linked with the traditional subcultures of the modern 
metropolis. These subcultures are also dependent on 
shadow economies which on the one hand provide 
for the economic basis for what once was called the 
professional criminal (in particular the professional 
thief) (Sutherland, 1937) and on the other hand 
provide an environment for a network of professional 
criminals on the basis of deviant norms and values (see 
Fijnaut, 1990, p. 54). In fact, what is described in much 
of contemporary literature on these subcultures of 
organised crime is the underworld, which sometimes 
is even conceived as a competitor to conventional 
society. However, as we observe in many societies 
there exists a multitude of arrangements between 
these underworlds and conventional society, which are 
functional insofar as the underworld and the shadow 
economies operating within provide the supply which 
is demanded in conventional society. The demand 
for drugs, prostitution or gambling emerges outside 
shadow economies and keeps these economies alive. 
The arrangements vary and also include various types 
of corruptive relationships (Williams, 1995, p. 5).
The second theoretical approach necessary to 
understand organised crime refers to crime as 
a rational enterprise. It is obvious that the enterprise-
related characteristics of organised crime prevail today 
and that subculture-based characteristics are on the 
retreat. Organised crime thus comes in the forms 
and with the structures of ordinary and conventional 
economic behaviour. Visible differences have faded 
away and organised crime becomes indistinguishable 
from other types of economic behaviour. This can 
be demonstrated for example for various forms of 
economic crime, in particular money laundering where 
nothing in the offender or in the act itself lends itself to 
a clear identification of the act as criminal or deviant. 
The offender and the acts do not carry any signs of 
crime or deviance that we are used to relying upon 
with respect to conventional crime. The significant 
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difference between organised and conventional crime 
today therefore essentially concerns the emergence of 
new problems in criminal investigations, which are the 
consequence of adjustments and changes in rational, 
organised and enterprise-like crime. Adjustments 
consist of getting closer to conventional society and 
abolishing subculture-related and therefore visible 
differences. Organised crime creates problems of 
law enforcement because the forms and procedures 
of conventional society are used (which make 
identification of criminal acts and suspects a difficult 
task). What contributes to these law enforcement 
problems certainly is new types of criminal legislation 
which — like for example money-laundering 
statutes — as a point of departure take perfectly 
legitimate behaviour (handling assets or money) with 
illegality invoked only by the criminal origins of assets.
Knowledge about organised crime stems mainly from 
police accounts which are published on a regular basis 
by police forces in some European Union member 
countries (Savona et al. 2005). While in the past such 
accounts were based on case-counting practices 
similar to regular police statistics, more recently the 
focus is placed on Organised Crime Threat Assessments. 
Since 2006 Europol publishes such threat assessments 
as a result of The Hague Programme (Presidency 
Conclusions, 2004) and the implementation of The 
Hague Programme (Commission Communication 
to the Council and the European Parliament, 2005). 
Advantages of threat assessments are seen as providing 
a tool which is not restricted to a retrospective view 
of organised crime cases but allows for an assessment 
of trends and emerging dangers. However, published 
organised crime threat assessments do not go beyond 
simple descriptions of where centres of organised crime 
are assumed to be located (‘organised crime hubs’) 
and which do not provide for substantive information 
on how various criminal markets will develop and 
which organised crime groups will participate in such 
markets. Moreover, European organised crime threat 
assessments are faced with the general problem of 
comparative crime and justice data in Europe.
Despite the obvious lack of empirical research on 
organised crime (see Kleemans, 2008, p. 5; van Duyne 
and Vander Beken, 2009) policy-makers continue to 
make statements on an increase of organised crime 
activities and in particular on the increasing threat 
coming with such activities. In the EU Strategy on 
Organized Crime 2000 it was stated that „the level of 
organised crime in the EU is increasing‘(Official Journal 
of the European Communities 2000/C 124/01, p. 3). 
The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention declared in 1999 that „organized crime 
groups have expanded their dimension and activities 
worldwide and are currently a global threat posing 
a concrete danger to the international community’ 
(Centre for International Crime Prevention, 1999, p. 4). 
The European Parliament — just months away from the 
credit crunch and the collapse of financial markets as 
a consequence of licit banking activities — insisted that 
„organised criminal groups are becoming increasingly 
complex and structured business organisations 
capable of penetrating economic and financial 
markets and of distorting them” (European Parliament 
recommendation to the Council, 2007). Europol warns 
that „the OC environment in the EU is evolving and 
dynamic‘(Europol, 2008, p. 18) The most recent global 
transnational organised crime threat assessment 
presented by UNODC reiterates the assumption that 
‘organised crime has diversified, gone global and 
reached macroeconomic proportions‘(UNODC, 2010, 
p. ii).
Official assessments of organised and transnational 
crime thus still convey a picture of organised crime 
that is not different from the picture which at the 
beginning of the 1990s served to create the impression 
that exceptional crime threats need to be responded 
to by exceptional (substantive and procedural penal) 
measures. This picture of organised crime conveys 
messages of threats to social, economic and political 
stability, assumes doubtful causalities and presents 
doubtful solutions. The 2010 UNDOC report on global 
organised crime lists six consequences of the analysis 
(consequences which were stressed already in the 
1990s): (1) purely national responses are inadequate; 
(2) states have to look beyond borders to protect 
their sovereignty; (3) since transnational organised 
crime is driven by market forces, countermeasures 
must disrupt those markets, and not just the criminal 
groups that exploit them; (4) since traffickers follow the 
paths of least resistance — characterised by corruption 
instability and underdevelopment — it is essential 
to strengthen security and the rule of law; (5) since 
criminals are motivated by profit, the key is to go after 
their money; (6) since the wide-open window of trade 
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is letting criminals in, it is essential to install filters (filters 
evidently shall replace borders and — going beyond 
that — control the flow of information through the 
internet) (UNODC, 2010, pp. ii-iii).
Organised crime assessments and policies derived 
from such assessments detach themselves from those 
policies that have emerged in the areas or markets 
which are closely linked to organised crime activities. 
However, the analysis of policing organised crime is 
dependent on and part of the analysis of the markets 
where criminal groups and networks operate. The field 
of policing illicit drugs provides a good example. There 
is consensus that drug policies have to be evaluated as 
regards implementation and outcomes and that drug 
policies should be based on evidence (Bennett and 
Holloway, 2010) which provide learning opportunities 
and adjustments. It is also fair to say that process and 
outcome evaluation are considered to be a cornerstone 
of a rational drug policy. However, the question arises 
of what indicators are suited to measure the success or 
failure of drug policies and at what cut-off point should 
drug policies be regarded as a success or a failure and 
therefore be subject to changes (see in this respect 
for example the Report on Global Illicit Drugs Markets 
1998-2007 (Reuter and Trautmann, 2009)). The debates 
on the policy of the United Nations which pursued 
the vision of a drug free world to be achieved over 
a certain period of time may serve as an example for 
far-reaching goals which create great expectations 
but evidently cannot be achieved (as a crime-free or 
a violence-free world cannot be achieved).
Indicators used in evaluation research and research on 
the implementation of drug policies concern drug-
related death, admissions to treatment, treatment 
success, prices of illicit drugs, drug-use rates (in particular 
among young people) and rates of problem drug users 
etc. (Reuter and Trautmann, 2009). However, what has 
been neglected so far concerns indicators related to 
drug markets. Supply reduction, although a main goal 
of the law enforcement part of national and European 
drug policies (and in fact a main goal in policing 
organised crime), evidently is difficult to achieve (and 
of course also difficult to measure). However, if policing 
organised crime shall be subject to evaluation, then 
more detailed data on various aspects of interdiction 
and law enforcement are needed (see Beau Kilmer and 
Hoorens, 2010, outlining the need for systematic and 
detailed data collection on drug seizures, the amount of 
drugs and the context of seizures in terms of particular 
investigative practices). A main problem which is rarely 
addressed in debates on how to police drug markets 
(and only rarely in general crime policy) concerns the 
continuing replacement of small-scale and large-scale 
traffickers as well as street retailers, a characteristic 
of most transaction crime. Where a drug-trafficking 
operation is dismantled and traffickers are imprisoned 
there is obviously no shortage of individuals and groups 
to replace those who have been taken out of the market. 
The consequence of successful law enforcement 
operations is rather an increase in violence because of 
conflicts coming with the re-ordering of drug markets 
(see Moeller, 2009, pp. 337-345 (3); Reuter, 2009). Policing 
drug markets (and organised crime groups operating in 
these markets) evidently results in various side effects 
and has — during the last 40 years of increasing efforts 
to contain the flow of illicit drugs over borders — not 
resulted in significant reductions of supply nor in an 
increase in the price of drugs (Reuter and Trautmann, 
2009). Control and policing illicit drugs and drug 
trafficking today then are placed within broader 
agendas which focus on markets of violence (Karstedt, 
2002), the systemic use of violence in drug markets 
(Friman, 2009), the role profits from drug trafficking 
play for insurgencies and terrorist groups (Wennmann, 
2005, p. 486) and the relationship between organised 
drug trafficking and terrorism (Shelley and Picarelli, 
2002; Oehme III, 2008). Illicit drugs represent ‘conflict 
resources’ which receive more international attention 
since the 1990s (Elwert et al., 1999; Security Council 
Resolution 1625/2009 which recognises the relevance 
of natural resources for ‘new’ wars and crimes against 
humanity). Heroin fuels the war economy in Afghanistan 
as is cocaine driving violence in Columbia, Mexico and 
other Latin American countries (Reuter, 2009). The 2008 
report of the EMCCDA mentions among the costs of 
illicit drugs also the destabilising effects of drugs on 
countries of production and transit (EMCCDA, 2009, p. 5) 
and points to the role of drug policies in international 
relationships and foreign policies.
Organised crime is first of all related to red-light 
districts, shadow economies and black markets which 
(3) An example is provided by Moeller describing how effective 
police interventions in Christiana and the retail markets for 
cannabis has resulted in structural changes of the drug markets 
that brought also more violence.
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are structured along varying conditions established 
through more or less strict prohibition and regulation 
of services and commodities. Organised crime thus 
refers to a category of crime that is shaped by the 
political economy and decisions on which dangers 
or threats in a society should receive priority. Drug 
markets, markets in stolen goods, human trafficking 
etc. point to transaction crime. Transaction crime 
poses particular challenges for law enforcement due 
to the lack of victims and information provided by 
victims. Immigration and migration play a certain role 
in discourses on organised crime.
Another discourse emerging around organised crime 
refers to its transnational and cross-border character. In 
Europe, the opening of borders has fuelled debates on 
security challenges provoked by criminals capable of 
roaming freely across Europe (Faure Atger, 2008).
Concerns about limits to local law enforcement are 
raised. Global networks through which drug and human 
trafficking is organised, cyber criminals and international 
terrorism are contrasted with criminal law and law 
enforcement confined to a state’s territory and not 
capable to pursue effective containment policies (Kinzig, 
2004, p. 77).
Rationalisation evidently is a core element of organised 
crime. The view on crime as a profit-generating 
activity is linked to the persistent involvement in 
illicit markets. Particulars of illicit markets concern 
operation without and against the state. This in turn 
explains why illicit markets operate in different ways 
than licit markets. Market orientation is expressed in 
the minimisation of specific transaction costs (risks 
associated with law enforcement). Such transaction 
costs concern detection and the loss of drugs or other 
commodities and criminal conviction and a criminal 
sentence. Transaction costs may be reduced through 
reducing the number of customers and employees 
(perpetrators), through incorporating transactions 
into kinship and friendship networks or reducing the 
probability of complaints. The latter may be achieved 
by threats and violence, making victims accomplices or 
by bribing enforcement staff.
Research on organised crime reflects a basic change 
in concepts. Organised crime today is understood 
as operating through networks (and not through 
hierarchical organisations with physical infrastructures 
and large investments). Networks provide criminals 
with diversity, flexibility, low visibility and durability (in 
particular through redundancy). While network cores 
are characterised through strong bonds and trust which 
stem from shared experiences and common narratives 
(prison and youth gangs), common ethnicity, clan/
family ties or shared values (religion), the peripheries of 
networks display less dense patterns of interaction and 
weaker relationships than the network s´ core. These 
characteristics play a critical role in networks, exhibiting 
and exploiting ‘the strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter, 
1973). The periphery allows the network to operate at 
a geographical and social distance. This facilitates more 
extensive operations, more diverse activities and the 
capacity to carry out effective intelligence collection. It is 
most probably through these peripheries that contacts 
are facilitated, common interests are identified and illicit 
market operations are prepared. Hawala-based financial 
transactions demonstrate the effectiveness of such 
networks. In particular ethnographic research would 
be needed to understand the functioning of criminal 
networks.
Summarising the change, it can be stated that the 
understanding of organised crime moved away 
from organised crime ‘Sicilian style’ towards an 
understanding of organised crime which is less 
organised, less hierarchical, smaller than imagined, 
less profitable than imagined, more diverse and 
more complicated, embedded in local environments 
through markets and local policing. Moreover, there 
are no signs of influence on administration or politics 
through corruption (with some known exceptions). 
However, the phenomenon of transnational organised 
crime itself is part of a trend towards the integration 
and convergence of social, cultural and economic 
systems, it is in particular subcultural systems which 
display symptoms of globalisation and integration, 
with transnational terrorism being insofar an exception 
as it aims at disintegration. The process of integration 
is based upon well-known general trends such as 
mobility and globalisation of economy. Smuggling and 
trafficking in goods, services and humans represent 
the ‘underside’ of the (global) legitimate trade, these 
activities are driven by laws (defining the scope and 
content of trafficking and smuggling, or the goods and 
services that are provided) as well as by demand (which 
emerges from conventional society and for example 
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from the established sex markets) (Andreas, 1999, p. 86-
87; Kelly and Regan, 2000, p. 1).
Transnational organised crime thus also concerns 
sensitive topics as it raises ideological questions in 
terms of responsibility and explanation (Le Breton and 
Fichter, 2001) and it is linked to human right issues (in 
particular when it comes to secret investigations and 
profiling) (Senior Coordinator for International Women’s 
Issues, 1998). The attachment of global public bads and 
threats (corruption, money laundering, infiltration of 
the licit economy and the political system) to organised 
crime magnifies the threats seen in organised crime 
itself. Discourses on global bads point to an increase 
in heterogeneity of European societies, the weakening 
of social bonds, the weakening of informal social 
control and the growth of mistrust in the state and 
state institutions. The concerns for global bads have 
also resulted in defining common (global) interests in 
disrupting continuing criminal enterprises that feed 
on illicit markets of drugs and human trafficking, in 
protecting the licit economy against threats resulting 
from criminal groups investing dirty money likely to 
result in distorted competition and corruptive effects, 
preventing infiltration of financial institutions through 
organised crime groups, protecting the social fabric 
against economic and political influence of criminal 
organisations, protecting the integrity of the financial 
system and reducing the impact of markets of violence 
(blood diamonds, conflict resources) and contributing 
to the rebuilding of failed or weak states.
3.  A two-pronged approach of policing 
organised crime: intelligence and 
cross-border cooperation
The emphasis in organised crime policies is placed 
on repression. The main pillars of repression consist 
of following the money trail with dense control 
of money laundering and asset forfeiture, new 
investigative techniques which are based on secrecy 
and internationalisation of control. A new architecture 
of security for Europe is emerging which brings with 
it institution-building and networking with a particular 
focus on the collection of intelligence and cross-
border cooperation. A wide range of working groups 
today is dealing with issues related to organised crime 
and policing organised crime within the framework 
of the European Union. The complexity of the 
networks increases when looking beyond Europe 
at the international level. In the European Union, 
a contact network of police was established through 
the European Police Chiefs Task Force (EPCTF) which 
has adopted operational and strategic tasks. The Police 
Cooperation Group (PCWP) is responsible for general 
and technical matters of cooperation. The Terrorism 
Working Group (TWG) deals with issues concerning 
counter-terrorism through exchange of information 
and the analysis of threats. A Multidisciplinary Group 
on Organised Crime (MDG) is entrusted with the task 
of developing guidelines on how to coordinate control 
of organised crime. The Horizontal Narcotics Group 
(HNG) coordinates police cooperation with third 
countries and works on measures aiming at reducing 
supply and demand for illicit drugs. The Europol 
Working Group has been established to negotiate 
regulations applicable to Europol. The implementation 
of the Action Plan on Organised Crime is monitored by 
a Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime (which 
today goes by the name ‘Working Party on General 
Matters, including Evaluation’ and brings together 
police, prosecutors and policy-makers). COSI (Standing 
Committee on operational cooperation on internal 
security) adds to the density of networking as do 
further working parties and groups which deal with 
border and immigration issues, data exchange, the 
Schengen Information System etc.
Most important in European Union approaches to 
controlling organised crime is a focus on information 
and intelligence as well as the exchange of intelligence 
between police forces. According to ‘The Future 
Group Report 2008’an ‘information tsunami’ has 
occurred which has to be exploited effectively in order 
to improve law enforcement. The conviction that 
‘information is the key to protecting the public and in an 
increasingly connected world in which public security 
organisations will have access to almost limitless 
amounts of potentially useful information’ (The Future 
Group Report, 2008, p. 43) is guiding the development 
of policing organised crime. Automated data exchange, 
the elaboration of a European Criminal Intelligence 
Model (ECIM) and a focus on intelligence-led policing 
are the key elements of crime-control strategies. 
However, numerous problems are encountered in the 
implementation of the second-generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II). Besides technical problems, 
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there seems to be some obstacles in information 
exchange and information sharing. Member States of 
the European Union are accused of not being prepared 
to share information in all cases (Hojbjerg, 2004, p. 53), 
a practice certainly explained by the differences in 
legal frameworks and cultural determinants of the 
relationship between intelligence on the one hand and 
law enforcement on the other hand (Hojbjerg, 2004, 
p. 53). Therefore it is demanded to make Europol a centre 
of information collection both from law enforcement 
and intelligence sources in order to be able to generate 
a ‘full and comprehensive picture‘(Hojbjerg, 2004, p. 56). 
The question which then arises, however, concerns 
whether such full and comprehensive pictures will be 
helpful to understanding organised crime (and other 
forms of serious crime) and to respond effectively.
Control of organised crime adopts a significant role 
in the process of establishing an area of freedom, 
security and justice. The promise of a European model 
which convincingly balances mobility, security and 
privacy, however, seems to be difficult to achieve 
as the goal of establishing a high level of security 
evidently dominates and moves security to the centre 
of policy-making. Security is related to risk, dangers 
and trust. Security refers to a basic human need and to 
a complex idea. Essentially, security follows from trust 
(or confidence) that risks will not turn into damage and 
that the consequences of risks can be coped with by 
society and individuals. The core of security concerns 
normative structures which define which extent of 
security can be expected, how security is achieved 
and how failure of security is dealt with. Concepts of 
security in the context of policing have changed over 
the last decades (Krauß, 2008). A move away from 
a comprehensive concept of social security (which is the 
very basis of personal freedom) to a concept of public 
security and from there to the assessment and response 
to threats can be observed. This includes a move 
away from the prevention of concrete dangers and 
investigation of concrete suspicion to the prevention 
of risks and precursors of dangers. The move towards 
risks and threats comes with an emphasis on collecting 
intelligence and exploiting the ‘information tsunami’.
Assigning security a high priority in European Union 
policies has consequences for police and policing. The 
demand for security is (in principle) unlimited and will 
never be satisfied (Hassemer, 2006). Evidently a paradox 
becomes visible as with security increasing, the 
demand for security increases, too. The United States 
Presidents Commission 1967 stated that there would 
always be too much crime (Report by the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, 1967, p. 22); the same applies to security as 
there will be never enough security (or there will be 
always too much insecurity).
Police and policing are assigned a crucial role in the 
achievement of security through the control and 
containment of organised (or serious) crime. Policing 
organised crime can in principle be evaluated along 
different lines. However, the most important question 
to be put forward concerns: How do those illicit 
markets develop which are subject to various forms 
of policing and law enforcement (and what are the 
effects of successful investigations and prosecutions 
of organised crime cases)? Other questions are related 
to specific policies implemented to counter organised 
crime. Besides the use of secret investigative measures, 
forfeiture instruments and ways to improve European 
and international police cooperation, it is of course also 
of interest to know how cases defined as organised 
crime are investigated and prosecuted and what 
outcomes can be observed.
An in-depth study on investigating, prosecuting and 
adjudicating cases defined by police as organised crime 
was carried out in Germany (Kinzig, 2004). The analysis 
shows that the core elements of the (police) concept 
of organised crime (division of labour, commercial 
structures, threat or the use of violence, corruption) 
were only present in a small share of the cases (Kinzig, 
2004, 714-715). Interviews with offenders adjudicated and 
sentenced in organised crime cases underline what was 
outlined earlier, loose networks and the ad hoc formation 
of groups on the basis of needs and interests. Although 
a large share of organised crime cases are international 
and cross-border, crime investigation problems due to 
cooperation with foreign law-enforcement agencies are 
not significant (Kinzig, 2004, 381); more problems arise 
out of attempts to actively generate information and the 
implementation of secret and undercover operations 
(Kinzig, 2004, p. 792).
Policing organised crime concerns in large parts 
policing shadow economies and international 
trafficking. Performance therefore should be measured 
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primarily by the development of key indicators in such 
markets. While drug markets in this respect have been 
studied in various aspects extensively during the last 40 
years, much less research is available for other markets 
(illicit forms of pornography, labour trafficking, sex, 
stolen goods etc.). Even for drug markets, however, 
a lack of reliable data is deplored which results in rough 
estimates on various indicators of supply and demand 
with large error margins. Recently, an in-depth study of 
the drug market and the effects of drug policies was 
carried out for the European Commission (Reuter and 
Trautmann, 2009). The study summarises the evidence 
on the wholesale and retail markets of heroin, cocaine, 
cannabis and amphetamine-related substances and 
how various policies influence these markets. The 
data demonstrate clearly that interdiction efforts 
and law enforcement neither affected the prices of 
heroin, cocaine, cannabis and amphetamines, nor did 
they affect the availability of these drugs (Reuter and 
Trautmann, 2009 15-21). Interestingly enough, despite 
a significant increase in the rate of cocaine and heroin 
seizures (cocaine seizures up from 23 % in 1998 to 42 % 
in 2007; heroin seizures from 13 % in 1996 to 23 % in 
2006 (from the estimated global output of heroin and 
cocaine) (Reuter and Trautmann, 2009, p. 18)) a long-
term decline in drug prices can be observed (Reuter 
and Trautmann, 2009, p. 20). The study also concludes 
that the overwhelming majority of those involved in 
drug markets only make modest incomes (Reuter and 
Trautmann, 2009, p. 15) (which in turn sheds some light 
on the role that forfeiture and confiscation policies will 
play). Policing and prosecution have effects though. 
These effects, however, concern the modalities of drug 
trafficking and drug distribution. Trafficking routes 
and trafficking methods are changing constantly, 
interacting with law enforcement operations.
Investigation and prosecution of organised crime 
cases rely heavily on secret investigative measures, 
in particular the interception of communication. This 
is plausible as much of organised crime concerns 
transactions which are based on communication. Wire-
taps, telecommunication transaction data and their 
retention, data mining, informants and undercover police 
are among the investigative techniques that have been 
added to the catalogues of police powers since the 1970s 
(Marx, 1988, 4-5). When putting forward the question 
of ‘how are new investigative measures implemented 
and with what consequences?’, there is not much in 
terms of socio-legal research on the use and results of 
new investigative techniques, despite their use being 
justified as a last resort, falling under the principle of 
proportionality and representing an effective instrument 
in containing organised crime.
The European Union has in several resolutions 
and documents highlighted that monitoring 
telecommunication is particularly helpful in 
investigating organised crime cases (Council Resolution 
OJ 4/9/1996; Council Conclusions of 19 December 2002). 
The Council of Europe has voiced similar conclusions 
(Conseil de l’Europe, 1996). However, the salience of 
monitoring telecommunication and the benefits drawn 
from such controls for law enforcement follow from 
the covert and secret penetration of citizen’s privacy 
and therefore from the infringement of fundamental 
rights (Bacigalupo, 2001, p. 132) that are protected 
by national constitutions, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and International Human Rights 
instruments. Hence, wire-tapping and eavesdropping 
have to be balanced against rights that are enshrined 
in Article 8 I, II of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (and that are also mentioned in Articles 7, 8 of 
the European Union’s Human Rights Charter, in Article 
12 of the General Declaration of Human Rights as well 
as Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights) (OECD Council, 1993; Council of 
Europe, 1981). Various decisions of the European Court 
on Human Rights have dealt with legal requirements 
of telecommunication control. According to these 
decisions first of all a statutory basis must be made 
available by parliaments (ECHR, 1984) which is seen 
to be legitimate only if the necessity to infringe on 
privacy by way of wire-taps or eavesdropping can 
be established in a democratic society. Then, the 
European Court on Human Rights confirms that Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
may be restricted only with the goal of pursuing 
national and public security, the economic well-being 
of the nation, prevention of crime and social unrest, 
protection of public health as well as the basic rights 
of others (Kopp. vs. Switzerland, 25.3.1988; Valenzuela 
Contreras vs. Spain, 30.7.1998). These principles are also 
underlined in Directive 2002/58/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council which says in Article 15 
I that the fundamental rights of privacy and data 
protection may be restricted only if such restrictions 
amount in a democratic society to necessary, adequate 
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and proportional measures to protect national and 
internal security and to prevent and to repress crime.
Surveillance of telecommunication and retention of 
telecommunication data points also to the request 
of balancing security and privacy in creating the 
envisaged area of security, freedom and justice. In 
particular Directive 2006/24 EC obliging Member 
States to introduce retention of telecommunication 
data for a minimum of 6 months and a maximum 
of 24 months has resulted in an ongoing debate on 
how much personal information may be collected 
legitimately and whether control of organised crime 
(and other serious criminal offences) justifies retention 
of personal data without prior suspicion of having 
committed a criminal offence (see Albrecht, Grafe & 
Kilchling, 2008).
In general, there is not much known about the use 
and the results of secret surveillance technologies 
in organised crime cases. Few studies have been 
carried out which demonstrate that surveillance of 
telecommunication is focused on drug trafficking, that 
significant variation exists as regards its deployment in 
crime investigation (Albrecht, Dorsch & Krüpe, 2003; 
Dorsch, 2005; Krüpe-Gescher, 2005; Meyer-Wieck, 2005) 
and that illicit markets adjust to secret investigations.
When turning to the question of what can be expected 
from specific strategies that aim at money laundering 
control, forfeiture and specific offence statute that 
target either conspiracy or membership in a criminal 
association, we find also that evaluation research is rare 
and that not much is known about police performance 
in implementing such policies.
Evaluation of the effects of money laundering and 
forfeiture policies is difficult as outcomes will be 
dependent on the size of drug trafficking proceeds 
which cannot be identified without accepting large 
error margins. However, internationally, estimates on the 
rate of confiscated proceeds do not amount to more 
than marginal taxes on illicit goods and services (which 
indeed are modest compared with ordinary taxing). 
(Reuter and Truman, 2004; Yeandle, Mainelli, Berendt, 
Healy, 2005)
While collection and analysis of intelligence as well 
as cross-border exchange of intelligence are seen 
to be key elements in successful approaches to 
organised crime (Block, 2008), it is also evident that 
implementation of related policies come with various 
problems. It was stated that the vast majority of 
information exchanges between police forces occur 
outside the formal systems and outside Europol 
which provokes the question of whether Europol in 
fact may play a convincing role of serving as a centre 
of collection and exchange of information (House of 
Lords, 2008a, p. 12). It is then reported that up to 80 % 
of bilateral engagement occurs informally and outside 
Europol. Lack of ‘confidence and trust’ in handling and 
protecting the data is evidently a crucial obstacle to 
establishing formal information channels.
Information on how and to what effect cooperation 
is implemented in the form of Joint Investigation 
Teams or other ways is scarce; in particular systematic 
evaluation research is not available (Block, 2008, p. 74). 
Knowledge in general comes from case studies as well 
as national reports which summarise information from 
various sources.
4.  What lessons should be learned?
The concept of organised crime is not used as an 
element in criminal law and criminal procedure. Its 
value for police and policing seems to be small at best. 
It should be replaced by either a general reference 
to serious crime or crime catalogues which can be 
brought in line with those crime catalogues that 
authorise secret investigations.
Policing organised crime essentially means policing 
markets and sometimes marginal, minority and elite 
groups. Research and policies need to address illicit 
markets.
Policing organised crime is linked to demand emerging 
in conventional society. Repression alone is therefore 
insufficient. Administrative preventive responses have 
to be included and alternatives to penal prohibition 
have to be considered as well.
There is need for information on police cooperation, 
practices and legal as well as practical problems arising 
from cooperation. This also includes the need for 
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information on causes of problems, in particular the 
role of trust (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2003).
Performance of police in dealing with organised crime 
policies has to be measured through various indicators, 
among them indicators related to enforcement (arrests 
and convictions) but also indicators related to illicit 
market related (prices, availability).
(Organised) crime therefore is always local. Local police 
most often do not recognise their crime problems 
in national, European or global accounts. Local 
experiences and local knowledge therefore should be 
given greater attention.
Threat assessments are inherently normative. Threat 
assessments cannot be reduced to a data-based 
analysis.
There is an urgent need for independent evaluation 
research and a research programme which focuses on 
the key elements of collection of intelligence, exchange 
of data, operational cooperation, organised crime case 
investigation and processing as well as its outcome 
and those police powers which have been introduced 
specifically for the containment of organised crime.
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1. Background
Whilst distinct in its origin, ownership, scope and 
structure, the current OCTA is a reflection of the 
uninterrupted continuity of a linear evolution since 
1993, when the European Council decided that an 
annual strategic report should be published to provide 
an insight into organised crime (OC) within the EU. This 
decision instituted the production of the Organised 
Crime Situation Report (OCSR); at first, by the Presidency 
and later by Europol. This decision was formalised in 
Enfopol 161 as ‘a mechanism for the collection and 
systematic analysis of information on international 
OC’ (1).
In Enfopol 35, the Council gave a binding, more solid 
structure to the OCSR and requested that Member 
States demonstrate a higher level of commitment (2). 
In 2001, some Member States (3), aware of the limited 
prognostic value of a situation report, proposed to 
evolve the OCSR into a threat assessment. Europol 
agreed with the proposal, complementing the 
document with an empirical assessment of the threat 
analysis and changing its name to an Organised Crime 
Report (OCR). However, in order to modify the structure 
outlined in Enfopol 35, it was necessary to have a new 
Council document unanimously agreed upon by all 
Member States.
(1) Document 12247/1/94 Enfopol 161 rev 1.
(2) Document 6204/2/97 Enfopol 35 rev 2.
(3) Belgium, Spain and Sweden.
The painstakingly slow process of agreeing upon and 
drafting a new Council document was cut short by the 
sudden eruption of The Hague Programme.
2. The task
The Hague Programme was finalised by the European 
Council in November 2004, and emphasised the need 
for a future-orientated assessment of organised crime 
(OC) to support law enforcement efforts in the EU. The 
Organised Crime Report (OCR) had therefore to be 
replaced with the Organised Crime Threat Assessment 
(OCTA). Whereas the OCR primarily focused on the 
description of the OC situation in Europe, the OCTA 
puts an emphasis on the qualitative assessment of this 
complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. The OCTA, 
being a forward-looking document, helps decision-
makers to identify strategic priority areas in the fight 
against serious and organised crime and initiate an 
intelligence process to define operational targets. By 
doing so, the OCTA also supports the streamlining of law 
enforcement activities at a European and regional level.
As such, the OCTA is a core product of the intelligence-
led policing concept and its drafting is one of Europol’s 
top priorities.
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3.  Data collection and sources
The sources used by Europol to draft the OCTA are 
many and varied. The first and foremost are the 
Member State contributions. Such contributions are 
drafted in line with precise intelligence requirements 
(IR) in the form of questionnaires. The transparency of 
the process lies in the fact that the IR are approved by 
the Member States’ representatives within the OCTA 
Working Group, by MS central authorities and by the 
Management Board of Europol.
Other questionnaires, less detailed, are sent to third 
countries (such as Norway, USA, Switzerland, Colombia, 
Croatia, Turkey, etc.) and third bodies (for example 
Interpol, FRONTEX, OLAF, UNODC, etc.), and the 
resulting contributions provide a much-needed wider 
perspective to the document.
Another fundamental source is Europol itself, with 
its experts and the wealth of information — also of 
strategic value — contained within its AWF’s. Specific 
questionnaires are sent to Europol’s experts, AWF 
project managers and analysts.
A well-developed public and private partnership allows 
Europol to collect information on a wide array of fields in 
which public and private sectors can complement and 
integrate law enforcement findings. Also in the delicate 
and ongoing methodological phase, the input given 
by the public and private sectors, and in particular by 
academia, has been and is of the utmost importance.
The given deadline for all contributions is 31 October.
From 1 November, the drafting of the OCTA begins.
On the basis of structured intelligence requirements, 
the Member States contribute information on their OC 
environment.
It was decided to split the subject ‘organised crime’ into 
two parts: OC groups and criminal activities, so that the 
contributions from the Member States focus on these 
two topics. However, such division was operated with 
the understanding that, at the end of the analytical 
process, these two paths must meet in order to reach 
a synthesis, taking into account all facets of organised 
crime.
Europol uses this information to develop a complex 
assessment of the threat from organised crime in the 
EU that is built upon sub-assessments concerning 
the structural and functional features of OC groups, 
the role of facilitating factors and the geographical 
dimension of crimes and criminals.
4. Criminal markets
The threat from OC, with regard to criminal markets, 
is assessed in the light of the following horizontal 
indicators:
 § Document forgery and identity fraud;
 § Technology as a facilitating factor;
 § The misuse of the transport sector;
 § The exploitation of the financial sector;
 § Globalisation and borders.
These five horizontal facilitating factors present 
opportunities to OC. Changes within them could 
change opportunities into threats, as may law 
enforcement bodies attempts to tackle these issues.
For example, technology is a facilitator in various 
traditional crime types ranging from fraud to theft 
and trafficking in human beings, but its abuse has also 
created completely new forms of crime.
Through the said facilitating factors, criminal markets 
are analysed, in particular the following areas:
 § Drugs;
 § Illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings;
 § Fraud;
 § Counterfeiting (documents, commodities and 
money);
 § Money laundering.
5. Regions
The OCTA covers the EU, however, it cannot be ignored 
that Europe, due to its geography and cultural, social and 
historical differences, is not a homogeneous entity so it 
may also require a regional priority setting. Therefore, 
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although the European dimension is the primary focus, 
the OCTA also accounts for regional divergences.
Much focus is provided for the geographical dimension 
of OC in the EU, to complement the relationship 
between crimes and criminals and provide a context 
for their whereabouts. Four regions of the EU have 
been outlined:
 § South-West;
 § South-East;
 § North-East;
 § Atlantic.
6. Analysis
The collected information is analysed from the two 
perspectives outlined above, i.e. criminal markets and 
regions.
In order to explore OC from the ‘criminal markets’ 
perspective the following tools are used:
 § Geographical spread of criminal activities;
 § OC groups involved;
 § Facilitating factors providing opportunities.
In other words, the tools of the OCTA conceptual 
model are applied to the single criminal markets. This 
criminal-markets perspective can only provide a partial 
understanding of the threat from organised crime to 
the European Union.
The same approach is applied to the EU regions. Four 
regions of the EU have been analysed: the North-
West (or Atlantic), the North-East, the South-East, and 
the South-West regions. The aim is to highlight their 
peculiarities through the already-mentioned common 
lens that are the tools of this conceptual model:
 § Criminal markets;
 § OC groups active there;
Main facilitating factors providing opportunities.
The information analysed and the tools used are 
always the same but the perspective is changing 
(from criminal markets to regions). This allows the 
identification of dynamics that would otherwise 
remain unnoticed or unfocused, thereby improving 
the understanding of the threat from organised crime 
to the European Union.
7.  The Third Dimension: OC Groups
After having examined the OC phenomenon from 
the criminal markets and the EU regions perspectives, 
a third dimension is still missing.
This is the reason that the next OCTA(s) will aim at 
assessing OC through a third, fundamental perspective: 
that of OC Groups, their typology and their possible 
clusters.
As already known, intelligence-led policing mainly 
focuses on criminals and not on crimes. One of the 
reasons for this resides in the simple assumption that 
90 per cent of crimes are perpetrated by 10 per cent of 
criminals: while it is impossible to effectively prosecute 
each individual crime, by focusing on repeat offenders 
it is possible to dramatically reduce the impact of crime 
on society.
However, even with such knowledge, for many years 
OC groups have been examined through lenses more 
apt to filing OC groups than to fighting them.
Within a general, rough separation in two huge and 
vague fields (hierarchical structures vs. networks) 
the most commonly chosen indicator has been the 
ethnicity of the group.
While ethnicity is certainly an important factor, it 
cannot be decisive to reach the final objective of police 
action, which is the dismantling of the OC group.
For the above reasons, the OCTA identifies OC groups 
using a different set of indicators, which will permit 
fighting them more efficiently and effectively.
Such indicators are:
 § Use of legitimate business structures (LBS);
 § Use of countermeasures;
 § Influence and corruption;
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 § International dimension;
 § The groups structure;
 § Use of specialisation;
 § Use of violence.
A first, general typology derives from the international 
dimension, through which OC groups can be divided in:
 § Non-EU-based OC groups;
 § OC groups in an intermediary situation;
 § EU-based OC groups.
Non-EU-based groups have leaders and assets located 
outside the EU. These groups can be regarded as ‘visitors’; 
in most cases only cells of the group are present and 
visible in the EU. Although these cells are in most cases 
led from outside the EU, the level of organisation of these 
groups inside the EU is still relatively low. Contacts with 
the countries of activity are kept to a minimum and the 
international dimension is used to its fullest extent for 
shielding purposes and to support the criminal activities.
The intermediary situations are relatively independent 
structures and not only cells of larger OC groups 
controlled from abroad. The location of the centre of 
gravity of these groups depends on their assimilation 
process so that in the end, the level of presence in 
the EU grows while the possibility to hide behind the 
international dimension decreases. In general these 
groups are developing along the lines and direction of 
EU-based groups.
EU-based groups have both their leaders and at least 
a substantial part of their assets inside the EU. They 
tend to use legal business structures, to actively employ 
specialists in their criminal activities and, in most cases, 
to use corruption inside the EU. The use of violence is 
in many cases not a defining characteristic of this type 
as they use more sophisticated and less conspicuous 
means to facilitate their criminal business. However, 
there are significant exceptions to this rule.
In the 2009 OCTA, the main effort will be to reach 
a new and thorough OC group typology, trying to 
identify the set of characteristics that makes types of 
OC group more threatening than others.
Such an OC group perspective should help the Council 
to better prioritise its own and MS actions, in full 
accordance with the main aim of the OCTA.
That OC group perspective will give the third 
dimension to the overall OC picture. Through the 
interaction of criminal markets, EU regions and OC 
groups it will be possible to identify actual hotspots and 
criminal centres of gravity, and where to concentrate 
operational efforts.
8. From regions to hubs
The concept of the ‘criminal hub’ was introduced 
for the first time as a development of the ‘regional 
approach’, trying to understand the facts that influence 
the dynamics of OC in the various parts of the EU.
The ‘criminal hub’ is a conceptual entity that is generated 
by a combination of factors such as proximity to major 
destination markets, geographic location, infrastructures, 
criminal group types and migration processes concerning 
key criminals or OC groups in general. A criminal hub 
receives flows from a number of sources and spreads 
their effects in the EU thereby forging criminal markets 
and creating opportunities for the growth of criminal 
groups that are able to profit from these dynamics.
The following criminal hubs can be identified: North-
West, North-East, South-West, Southern and South-
East hubs.
‘Criminal hubs’ can be seen as ‘routers’ attracting and 
re-directing external flows, e.g.:
 § Cocaine from South America, coming to the 
European Union directly or through West Africa;
 § Human beings smuggled or trafficked into the 
European Union from Eastern Europe, Asia and 
Africa;
 § Counterfeit goods from China.
The ability to connect diverse international hotbeds of 
criminality with EU illegal markets must be considered 
as a major threat.
In order to clarify the concept of criminal hubs, which is 
sometimes confused with that of EU regions, it can be 
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useful to underline the differences between the two 
concepts.
In describing a region, a list of characteristics pertaining 
to that area is usually drafted, without in-depth analysis 
of their mutual relationships: it is a variety of things that 
are inside a geographical boundary.
On the other hand, a criminal hub is made up of the 
interaction between all criminal factors having their 
centre of gravity in the area: OC Groups, criminal 
markets and the geographical dimension are examined 
thoroughly. The focus is on the relationship between 
the things (actors and activities) that are inside and 
outside the hub’s area.
Furthermore, a region is usually outlined with some 
neat and neutral strokes of pencil over a map, artificially 
encompassing all realities related to that designated 
area.
Conversely, a criminal hub is originated by a combination 
of criminal factors and existing facilitators, so it naturally 
stems from the field, and is not artificially created from 
above.
9. EU criminal hubs
Within the EU, five criminal hubs (NW, NE, SW, S and SE) 
have been detected.
Opportunities given by large airports and harbours, 
well-developed road infrastructures and financial 
systems contribute to forge the North-West criminal 
hub, which revolves around criminals and OC groups 
active in the area approximating the Netherlands and 
Belgium.
The presence of the North-West criminal hub can be 
noticed with reference to cocaine, heroin, hashish, 
synthetic drugs and counterfeit goods criminal fields.
Criminal groups active in the North-East criminal hub, 
which is located in the Baltic countries, work as a bridge 
between criminals operating, in particular in Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine and the EU criminal environment. 
They look both towards the West and the rest of the 
EU, and towards the East and beyond the borders of 
the EU.
The South-West criminal hub is based on links of the 
Iberian peninsula with South America and north-west 
Africa. However, its focus is shifting towards the latter.
The Southern criminal hub is centred on the role 
played by the main Italian OC groups and their control 
over certain social and economic dynamics in some 
geographic areas. Opportunities are provided by ready 
criminal markets in the Balkans, the Middle East and 
Africa. Criminal groups based in Italy have important 
links all over the world.
The recent eastward expansion of the EU borders to 
the Black Sea has permitted the detection of a South-
East criminal hub in this area. National borders lacking 
sufficient protection in the South-East region and 
important waterways (e.g. Bosphorous and Danube 
rivers) make it very attractive for illegal shipments. 
Romania happens to be in the most favourable 
geographic position, making it a point of entry for illicit 
flows from Eastern Europe and Asia.
10. 2008 OCTA: trends
As for the outcome of the 2008 OCTA, without going 
into too much detail, it is possible to draw some general 
trends and threats.
As far as the OC Group typology is concerned, it 
has been noted that some groups in intermediary 
situations are increasingly featuring members from 
a mixed background. That is particularly true for some 
Nigerian networks, whose characteristic is made by 
cells manned by citizens of the country in which the 
cell is active: thereby, in that Nigerian network the 
Spanish cell is manned by Spaniards, the French one 
by the French, the Italian one by Italians, etc.
A characteristic of established OC groups is that they are 
transnational, multi-ethnic and poly-crime.
A disturbing emerging trend is the tendency of OC 
groups to act as service providers, which is considered 
more profitable and less dangerous than being 
aggressive and exploitative towards their victims. For 
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example, some OC groups involved in THB lately treat 
their human merchandise — especially in the field of 
prostitution — in a non-violent, professional way, taking 
care of visas, transportation, rent and accommodation, 
clients, protection and even remittance of revenues to 
the country of origin, and finally of the trip back, ensuring 
that their victims do not overstay beyond their visas. Such 
an attitude brings the trafficked women to voluntarily 
seek the ‘services’ of that specific OC group again in 
the future, creating a solid bond between victims and 
exploiters that presents obstacles to police action.
Another notable trend is the OC group leaders’ 
constant quest for public recognition. The high levels 
of OC groups are not satisfied in making a lot of money: 
they want the people to believe they are rich because 
they are clever and gifted businessmen. Together with 
their money, they want to launder their image.
11. 2008 OCTA: threats
The immense wealth of high-level criminals is 
increasing their influence in the economic, social and 
politic environments.
That situation is facilitated by the modern, subjective 
interpretation of rights and obligations, following the 
idea that whatever pleases the individual is inherently 
right, regardless of ethical values and the common 
good. Following that trendy notion, normal and self-
proclaimed honest citizens have no problem in dealing 
with OC in order to save some money in their purchases 
or to obtain illegal, rare or too expensive commodities.
Certainly delays in law-making are not new, also 
because law-making is frequently reactive towards 
a new threat and — as all reactions — it comes when 
something bad has already occurred. However, far too 
often law-making is needlessly delayed by political 
skirmishes between government and opposition, 
where the common good is overtaken by short-
sighted partisan agendas.
The infiltration of OC groups into private and former 
public markets is an increasing and constant trend. 
A few fields are under serious threat: real estate, power 
plants and telephone companies are clear objectives 
of OC groups, which are managing to increase their 
share in such sectors and are looking for future, vital 
fields in which to expand.
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I have changed my title from the programme slightly 
because I make no claim to speak for academia 
generally. As for theoretical perspective, I think I would 
argue that my perspective is not wholly theoretical 
because occasionally I have tried to jump down from 
my ivory tower and to speak to people in the real 
world. I have adapted it slightly in my favour.
The growth of the threat assessment
I think something is relevant for Austria. The philosopher 
and kindergarten teacher from Austria, Wittgenstein 
said ‘das wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss 
man schweigen’ — which we may translate as ‘that 
whereof we cannot speak thereof we must remain 
silent’. If we apply this to organised threat assessments 
the Europol, the NCA and every other threat assessment 
would be very short. Indeed if we had to apply to it the 
logical reasoning that Wittgenstein tried to impose, we 
would be in great difficulty. I have done a little summary. 
It is incomplete and I apologise to any of the Member 
States that I have missed out, but my command of 
languages is not that great. But apart from the OCTA 
there is the Bundeskriminalamt, the Dutch National 
Threat Assessment, and the UK Threat Assessment by 
the Serious Organised Crime Agency. There are also the 
Organised Crime Group Analysis for the UK as a whole, 
but there is also the US National Intelligence Council 
that produced a report which mentions the threat of 
governmental-level corruption of one Eastern European 
country, there are the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
the CIA and other intelligence bodies.
In the private sector there is the federation against 
copyright theft; and others are thinking about 
producing threat assessments. On the horizon we have 
the financial action task force and other anti-money-
laundering bodies, and there is OLAF. Clearly we are in 
a kind of popular swing towards threat assessments. 
This makes our and your tasks even more important 
in working out what the strengths and limitations of 
these exercises are. Is it a kind of glorified journalism? Is 
it a self-interest of bodies pursuing particular agendas? 
Is it science? Or is it a mixture?
If we do examine the scientific value in composition, 
which is one part; then what about the impact — 
what is the actual impact of publishing these reports? 
For most communication we aim at an audience, to 
persuade it towards a point of view. How successful is 
it? Or is it just policing for an accountability body? What 
are the aims of the threat assessment?
There is a tendency towards the risk management of 
everything. If you compare policing today — not just 
in UK or the Netherlands or other EU countries — it 
is quite different from when I started with research. 
People did not risk assess projects, they did not risk 
assess police operations, they did not fill out policy — 
they just went ahead. Nils Bohr, a great Danish 
scientist, once commented: prediction is a difficult 
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thing, especially about the future. If you look at all the 
economists who are employed at very great expense 
to work for financial services companies, you can see 
the value of this argument. Many economists are 
brilliant at predicting the past. But what we want is 
some assessment. What do we mean by prediction 
here? An assessment of what is likely to happen?
In the first place, this is a theory behind the 
transformation of the OCTA from the organised crime 
situation report. For some years I had the difficult job 
of compiling the Council of Europe Organised Crime 
Situation Report. I know how painful an experience that 
was. So it is partly to make it more future-orientated, we 
have to try to work out what we are trying to achieve 
with threat assessments, with risk assessments, with 
most of the things that we actually do. Sometimes we 
do things with multiple purposes; sometimes we do 
things because we are told to do.
Organised crime threat assessment: an 
academic’s perspective
I also slightly reject the separation between academic 
and practitioners’ perspectives. Many of us working in 
the academic business for a long time also do research 
for governmental bodies — as I do. Unless you 
understand something about the political environment 
in which you are operating then you do not know 
what is the value and its likely political impact. Does 
that matter? Well it does matter quite a lot, because 
why bother to do it well if there is no point? We usually 
do things because we want have some kind of effect. 
There may be an element of voyeurism as well, to work 
in normally inaccessible places. But we want to try and 
make a contribution.
Academic skills include detachment and rigour of 
definition and also observation. These are also qualities 
of good intelligence, collators and analysts. So CEPOL 
and Europol should be academic in that sense.
Being detached does not mean being unfriendly, 
just respecting evidence like the people doing the 
assessment of whether or not there were weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq. It requires a judgement call 
and when you are put under a lot of pressure, it is hard 
to remain detached about that judgement call. This is 
something that academics have an advantage over 
because in general we cannot be fired or moved to 
some unpleasant country or sent back from a mission 
or assigned to an unpleasant job if we hold a view that 
is inconvenient to senior people.
Respect for independent analysis, whether in 
academies or in departments, is on a decline in the 
world generally and in Europe as well. That is one thing 
that I see as a threat to the threat analysis, because it 
is quite hard sometimes to sustain an independent 
perspective.
Key difficulties in threat assessment
One of the difficulties is: what activities does the 
assessment cover? Is it based around what institutions 
we are? You know if you are doing something on 
crime, it is just what the police do or does it cover the 
environment agency. After all, one of our problems 
might be toxic waste dumping, which is a problem 
in many parts of Europe. Or is it MTIC fraud (Missing 
Trader Inter-community fraud) or VAT fraud — even 
Bulgarians for example have been hit very badly by 
this. If we look just at our own agencies then we should 
really look a little further on the map.
Should a threat assessment only cover crime threats? 
If we take seriously the announcements that many 
struggles are going to be over water or energy — not 
just for those who live in Georgia or Ukraine — a lot 
of the struggles in Western Europe also are going to 
be over clean water, access to energy supplies etc. 
Those conflicts over those things are going even 
though they might not currently be police issues, they 
are certainly part of the PEST analysis that we need to 
make because they may spill over into disorder; they 
may spill over into fraud or corruption. From that point 
of view current crime threats are too narrow a focus. 
The trouble is, if you go on endlessly, what is covered? 
You can lose yourself very easily.
What groups, networks and individuals does the 
assessment cover, especially since Europol changed its 
mandate to ‘serious’ crime and no longer just ‘organised’ 
criminality? Well, a serious crime does not need to 
be committed by three or more people involving 
a transnational dimension — perhaps the threat of 
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wireless. But it is the question again if you say well it 
applies to all individuals, then it is broader than most 
organised crime bodies are concerning themselves 
with.
There is a very uneven evidential basis for assessments: 
both geographically and types-of crime. We all know 
that different Member States and countries outside 
our Member States have very different resources. 
What geographically should we cover and what types 
of crime? Everything? Or should we exclude some? 
Market-based crimes like supply of illegal drugs are 
crucial, but there are also some pretty big predatory 
crimes — I mean the Colombian population has 
been rioting in relation to investment frauds just as 
the Albanians did some years ago and other Eastern 
European countries. That should make it quite a high 
priority for everybody.
And there is the politicisation and diplomacy of 
comments. It is easier to blame countries outside the 
EU than countries inside the EU. Let us be truthful 
about this, partly because you have to get it signed 
off by all the Member States. So in the real world we 
have to deal with that as a problem in how clear the 
meaning of our threat assessment is. Some countries 
would find difficulty in getting enough people capable 
of demonstrating security clearance to be entitled to 
share NATO secrets or work at Europol. These are quite 
big issues within the EU as well as outside of it. We 
cannot neglect these issues entirely.
There is also the slow adjustment to impact or follow-
through: For example, if European Chief of Police 
Strategies neglect key features of OCTA and Justice and 
Home Affairs priorities, e.g. MTIC fraud and intellectual 
property crimes identified in the OCTA and in the 
threat assessments. How will anybody know what is 
the corrective action that we can take within the EU, 
if European Police Chiefs do not follow the OCTA? So 
it seems to me that there are not scientific issues so 
much, but they are certainly important issues.
One more scientific issue is: can we ensure the 
consistent application and observation of organised 
crime within and between EU countries? If not — and 
I suggest the answer is no and I think that everybody 
really pretends that it is yes — then we are not doing 
real science. Now I would argue that there is nothing 
wrong with making judgements based on imperfect 
knowledge. After all, if we knew about all the crimes 
and the people that commit them the threat would be 
low, but our society would be totalitarian, or it would 
be extremely high, because it would mean that society 
was so corrupt that it would not do anything about it.
We cannot know everything. It is not possible to make 
this a 100 % scientific task. It requires judgement. 
But where are the attempts to improve trend data 
on existing and new criminal markets? And we have 
to think not just about data on the markets but data 
on the intent and capability as well as vulnerability: like 
military analysts do. The Belgians have done some very 
interesting vulnerability studies — e.g. Tom Vander 
Beken in collaboration with the Max-Planck-Institute — 
but we must also look at intent and capability.
How do we really prioritise threats? What is the 
reasoning that should lie behind this prioritisation? 
How would we defend it, if challenged? Or do we 
just smuggle it in implicitly into our answer? Those 
are difficult questions. I do not think that scientists or 
academics can do this by themselves. They can only 
argue about this which helps to clarify and makes for 
a more reasoned prioritisation exercise.
I went to an interesting session in Frankfurt recently 
with the director of Europol, the Director of OLAF, the 
head of the UN and the chairman of Interpol. They 
all were making speeches about the importance of 
economic crime. I wondered why they had not been 
so explicit a year ago, before the financial collapse. And 
what has happened to much of the money from that 
collapse?
When rich people and companies are in trouble they 
usually lie to keep themselves going. They make 
confident statements about current solvency, or their 
firms will go bust. And as we know from witness 
testimony research there is no correlation between 
confidence and accuracy. This also applies sometimes 
to statements that we might make in organised 
threat assessments and that is one cultural difference 
between practitioners and academics. We academics 
are more comfortable with uncertainty; we do not 
feel under pressure, we are not under such pressure 
to be confident. If we want to persuade people, 
usually you have to be confident, as Americans are 
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often compared with more sceptical Europeans. 
But statements like ‘money laundering or organised 
crime are becoming more sophisticated’ are a really 
weak evidential basis without systematic analysis of 
behaviour. It seems plausible or may even be true. But 
it is not science, because we do not have a before and 
after measurement of either organised crime in general 
or laundering in particular. We might be able to find 
more examples of more complicated arrangements, 
but court cases suggest that most of the identified 
money laundering is actually quite crude. People only 
need to be as sophisticated as we make them be and 
as controls increase, you will expect them to be more 
sophisticated, but we may not know.
The final point here is: threats to whom and what and 
from where? Is Europe itself or is the EU a coherent 
threatened target? It is a question that we also might 
pose about our national threat assessments. I live in 
Cardiff which is a civilised place in general. Why should 
a threat assessment of the UK based on ‘tough’ places 
like London, Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham be 
relevant for us in Cardiff? The Europol problem is just 
a broader example of the national threat assessment 
problem. Is it the case — coming back to my impact 
question — that people in Cardiff will feel more insecure 
because of the national threat assessment, which does 
not say, ‘don’t worry people in Cardiff you are OK’.
These are quite big questions about fear of crime and 
insecurity which are quite difficult about what threat 
assessments actually cover, but obviously for Europe 
it presents questions of scope — fraud against the 
European Community is an example that is something 
specifically European.
What other aspects of contemporary life are attacking 
Europe as a whole? I think illegal immigration. That is 
something that affects the EU. So we have to think 
about this. We should always split the analysis up into 
what are the things that threaten the EU as a Union and 
what is it that threatens different parts or different bits 
of the Member States.
If there is some high-level corruption in Sofia, how 
might that effect the European Community budget? 
How does this affect other parts of the EU? These 
are tough questions for an organised crime threat 
assessment to address.
Measuring harm: key problems
It is especially difficult to agree the terms in which 
harm is expressed. Do we mean physical injuries or 
collateral damage? That is only one component. We 
can measure this just as civil lawyers do in medical 
negligence claims. Feelings, including lost hopes? For 
instance: I thought that my retirement pension would 
go up but it did not, therefore I am upset, because 
some crooks stole it. Measurable financial losses in 
absolute terms or as a proportion of profits or savings? 
A small loss to somebody living in a rural Bulgarian area 
may be far more significant in terms of its impact than 
the same-size loss to me or my pension fund. It also 
depends on how old you are. If you are near retirement 
age then a loss to you might be harder to recover, 
because you have less working life left, or it may be 
less painful because you are nearly dead anyway. So 
you have less time to be measurable. So should we just 
look at direct losses alone, or also response costs?
We might also try and measure the frequency of 
offences against organisations and against transient 
or socially excluded people in living in hard-to-reach 
areas — that’s an area where victimisation surveys are 
very poor — giving us some measure of impact.
It is also hard — to come back to the OCTA question — 
to agree the terms in which we are going to describe or 
define the organisations’ offending. We tend to use the 
terminology of networks rather than organised crime 
groups. In the old days we used to count organised 
crime groups, but this can be a very artificial exercise 
and does not mean very much.
I am more worried if there is only one group than when 
there are 150 groups. Do we call them gangs? Do we 
call them networks? How do you decide what the end 
of a network is? Theoretically that is a very difficult 
question. How do you work out where a network 
ends and begins. If you have very good social network 
analysts, who deal with this — but how often do we 
have good enough data to do a proper social network 
analyse?
One of the big improvements in OCTA and in the SOCA 
efforts and elsewhere is the focus upon enablers. Other 
questions include how we might try to operationalise 
some of these concepts — where we look for some 
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relevant data on them and what are the differences 
in approaches that we can take, using special survey 
data, using open source material, and using criminal 
intelligence, using interviews with offenders and the 
occasional ethnographies.
There are various ways to try to address this problem. 
The OCTA is doing some of them. But what we have 
to understand is that we are relatively speaking at the 
beginning of this journey, or as Churchill might have 
said, are we at the end of the beginning rather than 
at the beginning of the end as far as this process is 
concerned? I think we should acknowledge that and 
realise that although we will be doing a much more 
interesting and better job than used to be the case, there 
is a long way to go. It can never be wholly science. It 
will always require judgement. But we should continue 
and there is in fact no conflict between doing this on 
a European level or doing it on a national or a local 
level. We have just to work out what the different cuts 
of evidence are and what is the utility of these different 
methodologies and perspectives.
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1. Introduction (1)
In 1997, the Weberian perspective on contemporary 
Western police that focused on order maintenance 
and coercion as the defining capacity of police, mainly 
exercised by low-ranking officers (Bittner, 1970) was 
challenged by Ericson and Haggerty (1997). They 
provided a comprehensive theoretical alternative 
beyond coercive policing (Brodeur, 1998; Sheptycki, 1998) 
situating police in a post-modern, complex and diverse 
environment orientated towards the detection and 
management of all sorts of risks. The police are only one 
of the institutions engaged in monitoring and managing 
risks and therefore have to communicate and exchange 
information with others. As a consequence, police 
structures, strategies and intelligence requirements 
have been profoundly influenced by this risk orientation 
and have developed into institutions with an insatiable 
demand for data on all sorts of activities and events.
In such an environment traditional intelligence models 
that are focused on ‘knowing’ what has happened in order 
to be able to respond, are challenged (Kessler and Daase, 
2008). A clear shift can be discerned in that respect: reports 
describing the past criminal (and law enforcement) 
(1) A previous version of this paper was presented at the Workshop 
on Forecasting, Warning and Political Response, King’s College 
London, 18-19 September 2009 and published in De Franco, 
C. and O. Meyer, C. (eds), Forecasting, warning and responding 
to transnational risks: is prevention possible?, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010.
activities are being replaced by assessments that have 
much more forward-looking and future-orientated 
ambitions. Prevention and multidisciplinary actions are 
key words in such a discourse. Policy-makers no longer 
focus on repressive aspects, but want to be informed 
about coming challenges and threats to anticipate, take 
appropriate preventive action and target their reactive 
response better (Zedner, 2007). The (retrospective) crime 
situation is not considered of interest, but the possible 
risk or threat that a phenomenon poses to society (Levi 
and Maguire, 2004: 401-402). The question remains, 
however, if it is possible to know exactly what is relevant 
and understand what will or could happen with a view 
to developing (preventive) strategies. These questions 
are not only of an academic nature, but affect policy-
makers and field workers within law enforcement. 
Making rational choices on what to do (first) and aligning 
these choices to a policy design concerns all participants 
in a system. And this always includes questions about 
what information and data are needed (and thus looked 
for) and how they can be found and known in order to 
use them to take action.
In this paper two possible answers to these questions 
are discussed and applied to the case of the assessment 
of organised crime. First, the position and discourse 
of those who believe that it is possible to collect 
relevant data about all sorts of issues and use this to 
assess and manage contemporary security risks in an 
objective manner (Innes et al., 2005) is analysed. This 
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believer approach has led to the introduction of more 
technocratic and expert-based forms of risk calculation, 
generating quantitative estimates of the probabilities 
and impacts of crime events. Such analyses seek 
to make estimates of probabilities, using various 
conceptual models, known past cases and available 
historical data. There is, however, a second non-believer 
approach in which it is accepted that not everything 
can be known or predicted and that not all risks can be 
known or calculated. Especially since 2001, uncertainty 
and unpredictability seem to have found their way 
into discussions on policing (Gill, 2006). How should or 
can police agencies think and respond to risks which 
contours can only vaguely be known? In this paper it is 
argued that the uncertainty approach has many merits 
but has seldom been developed consistently in the 
area of crime analysis and intelligence.
2.  The believers: organised crime 
assessments about the future
2.1. A risk-based approach
Traditional organised crime assessments contain 
data and statistics about perpetrators and criminal 
activities. This information is mainly retrieved from 
what has been collected in specific investigations. 
A major critique to such assessments is that they 
often report on law enforcement activity than on 
the phenomenon itself. Indeed, enhanced activity to 
fight organised crime may lead to more investigations 
and more data about perpetrators and activities and 
thus a lengthier annual report the following year. 
Such organised crime assessments risk becoming self-
fulfilling prophecies. Moreover, the usefulness in policy 
terms of these assessments is questioned. What does 
quantified information about the number of criminal 
groups or offences and their nature contribute to the 
decision-making process about the seriousness of 
the phenomenon and the priorities to be taken? The 
consequence of this is that simple questions — so 
obvious to an outsider — are hardly answered: is there 
much organised crime? Is the situation serious? Is it 
bad that we think there are more criminal groups now 
than in the past? Which criminal groups are the most 
dangerous? (Vander Beken, 2004).
As a response to this, risk-based approaches for the 
assessment of organised crime have been developed. 
The purpose of this was twofold: (1) collecting and 
systemising existing data about criminals and activities 
in a (better) way to allow priorities to be set; (2) and 
identifying new sorts of data that can be relevant for the 
assessment of organised crime. A risk-based approach 
is believed to be a suitable framework to realise both 
ambitions. In this context, concepts like risk, threat, 
harm and vulnerability are used. Risk is then defined as 
the chance of something happening that will have an 
impact upon law enforcement objectives. Threat arises 
when a source of risk has an intent to occur or has the 
capacity to do so (Vander Beken, 2004). Harm is described 
as the damage occurring should a threat be realised and 
vulnerability as an aspect of the environment offering 
opportunities to the threat to cause harm. In such an 
approach, risk is considered the combination of threat 
(focusing on the abilities and willingness of offenders — 
linked to the likelihood of crimes to be committed) 
and harm (orientated towards the negative impacts 
or consequences of criminal activities on the society 
in general and victims in particular) (Black et al., 2001). 
Vulnerability can be considered as a factor to be placed 
between both threat and harm as it encompasses the 
weak points in the legitimate environment that allow 
criminal intentions and capabilities to cause harm to 
society (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Relationship risk, harm, threat and vulnerability
Threat (offenders)
Vulnerability (environment)
Harm (society/victims)
Risk
Organised crime risk assessment approaches, or parts 
of it (threat, vulnerability or harm assessments — see 
below), have been introduced in a growing group of 
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countries. Australia (see e.g. QCC, 1999) and Canada 
(see. e.g. RCMP, 2000) can be considered as important 
forerunners in this, whose influence on the European 
research and policy cannot be underestimated. The 
risk approach, not always explicitly labelled as such, is 
more visible in west and north European countries like 
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, 
United Kingdom) (Vander Beken et al., 2004) (2).
2.2. Threat assessments
In a threat assessment, the likelihood of a threat can be 
considered as a function of the intent and capability 
of identified actors to achieve specified aims and 
where intent refers to the ‘likely desire of a subject to 
engage in activities…and their confidence that they will 
be successful’ (Brown 1998). Likewise capability can be 
seen as the function of the resources and knowledge 
available to the subject in this pursuit (Figure 2). To each 
of these elements in the sets of relationships described 
above, can be attributed a value — either quantitative 
or qualitative.
Figure 2: Threat assessment matrix, based on Brown, 1998
Intent
Capability
Desire
Resources
Expectations
Knowledge
Threat
There are various ways in which the threat of organised 
crime groups can be assessed. Most approaches, 
however, are inspired by what has been developed 
in the Canadian Sleipnir project (RCMP, 2000).In this 
project the development and ranking of salient 
attributes of criminal groups is combined with the 
use of a four- or five-point qualitative scale for each 
attribute. Comparable exercises have been developed 
elsewhere (Klerks, 2000; Black et al., 2001) and applied 
in practice. Such an approach is advocated by 
the European Union in its Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (OCTA) (Europol, 2008). A closer look, 
however, reveals that the nature and methodology 
of this report is rather hybrid and too diffuse to be 
(2) For critical reviews on these applications and developments see 
Zoutendijk (2010) and Hamilton-Smith and Mackenzie (2010).
instrumentally used as a common threat assessment at 
European scale (Van Duyne and Vander Beken, 2009).
2.3. Harm assessments
Some assessments focus on the consequences caused 
by organised crime in attempting to rank phenomena, 
groups and vulnerabilities in order of the harm they 
(might) cause. An accurate costing of organised crime, 
however, poses similar difficulties. Considering that 
organised crime exists, at least to a large extent, to 
supply the demand for goods and services that are 
either illegal themselves, or whose production and/or 
supply is illegal and thus hidden, the ability to accurately 
assess these areas is considerably reduced. Thus, while it 
seems appropriate to use broader descriptors of affect, 
the actual application of a value is difficult. As a concept, 
harm covers economic, emotional, physical, intellectual 
and political damage. The determination of harm is not 
something that should be done in isolation. Ideally, 
in the case of determining the impact of organised 
crime on society, it needs to be defined by as broad as 
possible a range of interests, and must depend upon 
the offences being committed in the various markets. 
An interesting calculation of the (economic and social) 
costs of organised crime activities was presented by 
Dubourg and Prichard (2007). They distinguish between 
costs in anticipation of crime, costs as a consequence 
of crime and costs in response to crime, and express 
them in monetary terms. This is not always an easy and 
transparent exercise — for example, what is the cost 
of corruption or of child pornography? — for which 
strong caveats have to be formulated.
2.4. Vulnerability assessments
The first to realise the importance of analysing the 
context in which organised crime operates was 
Smith (1980), who partially abandoned the traditional 
approach embraced until then (which concentrated 
on the characteristics and the activities carried out 
by organised crime groups) to move towards a wider 
approach where attention was paid to the same 
markets in which such groups operate. In his ‘spectrum 
of enterprises’, Smith (1980) concentrates on the 
structural forces that determine the logic of organised 
criminal forms and activities and theorises that legal 
and illegal activities do not operate on parallel and 
distinct levels, but rather that they are connected and 
interdependent. Following this reasoning, the next step 
is to acknowledge that there is a point where the two 
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businesses, legal and illegal, necessarily meet. This point 
is profit, which is the main driver of the activities of 
both. Smith’s theory was picked up by Albanese (1987), 
who made ‘an exploratory attempt to predict ‘high-risk’ 
business conditions’, rendering businesses vulnerable 
to organised crime infiltration (Albanese 1987: 103). 
Albanese stresses that his model is designed to predict 
an intermediate condition (i.e., high-risk business), rather 
than the ultimate behaviour of concern (organised 
crime). In other words the predictive variables that he 
identified in his study can be understood as variables 
that once again attempt to define vulnerability, rather 
than predicting organised criminality (see Figure 3).
Predictors Low Risk High Risk
Supply Few available, small, financially weak businesses. Readily available, small, financially weak businesses.
Customers Elastic demand for product Inelastic demand for product
Regulators Difficult to enter market Easy to enter market
Competitors Monopoly/oligopoly controlled market Open market with many small firms
Patronage Entrepreneurs are professional, educated managers Entrepreneurs are non-professionals ill-equipped to deal with business problems
Prior Record No prior history of organised crime involvement in market Prior history of organised crime infiltration in industry
Figure 3. Predictors of low-risk and high-risk businesses (from Albanese, 1987: 109)
Recognising that there are probably going to be 
some necessary refinements, Albanese cautions 
that the model serves as a starting point rather than 
a comprehensive analytical tool. Possible problems 
identified included concern that the study may have 
been based on atypical examples, thus skewing both 
the model and its subsequent utility.
The idea of a vulnerability study has explicitly been 
taken up in research on a risk-based approach to the 
assessment on organised crime (Black et al., 2001, 
further specified in a MAVUS (Method for Assessing 
the Vulnerability of Sectors) road map (Vander Beken 
et al., 2005) and applied to specific economic sectors 
such as the diamond sector (Vander Beken et al., 2004), 
the European transport sector (Bucquoye et al., 2005), 
the European music industry (Brunelli and Vettori, 
2005), the European pharmaceutical sector (Calovi and 
Pomposo, 2007), the fashion industry (Calovi, 2007) and 
the European waste management industry (Van Daele 
et al., 2007).
In identifying the weaknesses of the sector that could 
be exploited for criminal purposes, MAVUS embraces 
both an economic (e.g. Porter, 1990) and a social and 
criminological perspective (Smith, 1980) that leads 
to an analysis carried out on different levels. The 
methodology developed comprises several steps 
grouped in two broader phases, a descriptive phase 
and an analytical phase. This description takes place 
on various levels and provides information on the 
sector itself (meso-level), the cluster around it (macro-
level) and the business activity within the sector 
(micro-level). Building on some specific criminological 
models, especially Albanese (1987) and, for business 
process vulnerabilities Rozenkrans and Emde (1996), 
some vulnerability indicators have been developed 
(Vander Beken and Van Daele, 2008).
Besides vulnerability studies as such, environmental 
scans are conducted to gather and subsequently 
process information about the external environment 
of organised crime. It is a process that requires limited 
dedicated resources to identify major trends affecting 
an entity and enabling analysis to define potential 
resultant changes. As such it contributes to the 
development of a proactive focus and makes more 
transparent the relationships between identified trends 
(convergence, divergence, change in speed etc.) and the 
posture of the organisation. The goal of environmental 
scanning is to alert decision-makers to potentially 
significant external changes before they crystallise 
so that they have sufficient lead-time to react to the 
change. Consequently, the scope of environmental 
scanning is broad (Morrison 1992). There are numerous 
ways in which environmental scanning is done and 
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its success depends predominantly upon providing 
a structure that reflects the broader environment. The 
most common method for examining the macro-
environment capable of affecting organisational 
interests’ (directly and indirectly) is to consider its 
theoretically discrete components or sectors. This 
generally means scanning for developments that fall 
under the broad headings of the political, economic, 
environmental, social and technological sectors.
Williams and Godson (2002) suggest that as opposed 
to prediction, anticipation of organised crime 
developments is possible using such an approach. 
They state that anticipation stands for analysis based 
on an effective knowledge base, the use of underlying 
warning indicators, and intelligence that is timely and 
actionable. As believers of the risk paradigm, they 
argue that while the future of organised crime cannot 
be predicted ‘careful use of models and extrapolations 
from past experiences enable us to contend that if certain 
conditions are present then there is a serious probability 
that particular kinds of developments will occur’ (Williams 
& Godson, 2002: 314).
3.  The non-believers: assessing organised 
crime in an uncertain world
3.1. Accepting uncertainties
The belief that it is possible to collect all relevant data (of 
past situations) to assess the organised crime situation 
of tomorrow, is not shared by everyone. The idea that 
evolution is underpinned by laws and is determined has 
been criticised by Popper who called this ‘historicism’ 
a misunderstanding of the methods of physics (1957; 
2002: 2-3; 149). Historical prediction, which would have 
to be attained by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the 
‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the 
evolution of history, can and should not be the aim of 
the social sciences. In his essay ‘Describing the Future’ 
(1998) Luhmann argues that we can neither learn from 
history, nor can we hope to anticipate the future: ‘We 
can only be certain that we cannot be certain whether 
or not anything we remember as being past will in the 
future remain as it was’ (Luhmann, 1998: 67). According 
to Luhmann, modern societies can only describe their 
future in the present. The future is not pre-destined but 
the uncertain, contingent, outcome of human action 
and decision-making. We can only make decisions 
in the present about an uncertain future. Modern 
societies therefore experience their future in the risk 
of deciding. Anticipating or preparing for possible 
directions in organised crime is then no longer about 
calculating probabilities. It is about making decisions, 
which may have unintended outcomes, in the light of 
an uncertain future. The future of organised crime is 
the outcome of human action and decision-making.
The consequences of this disbelief on the assessment 
of organised crime cannot be underestimated. While 
some argue that the fundamental uncertain nature of 
our contemporary environment can be overcome by 
new methods to collect more and other information 
about the environment (see e.g. ‘neighbourhood 
policing’ (Innes, 2006), ‘third party policing’ (Ransley 
and Mazerolle, 2009)), we believe that the acceptance 
of uncertainties implies a fundamental reshuffle of 
the methods for (organised) crime assessments. The 
application of scenario techniques or a resilience 
approach might be examples of that.
3.2.  Scenario techniques: anticipating plausible 
futures
Schwartz and Ogilvy (2004: 2) describe scenarios as 
‘narratives of alternative environments in which today’s 
decisions may be played out. They are not predictions. Nor 
are they strategies. Instead they are more like hypotheses 
of different futures specifically designed to highlight the 
risks and opportunities involved in specific strategic issues’. 
Scenario thinking is not new (see e.g. Ringland, 1998). 
Even though scenarios remain a much-debated issue, 
they have proven to be valuable in the context of 
corporate strategy building, catalysing change and 
action, stimulating collaborative learning and creating 
a shared vision and increased alignment around 
strategic direction (Verfaillie and Vander Beken, 2008a).
Scenarios have their origins in the military planning 
process where they are used to imagine what the 
opponent might do and to subsequently help 
organise a more rapid and efficient response to enemy 
strategy. It was not until the 1960s, under the impetus 
of Herman Kahn, that scenarios were introduced to 
the corporate world. One of the first companies to 
accept the development of scenarios as part of its 
strategic planning process was Royal Dutch/Shell 
which had scenarios that allowed anticipation of the 
oil embargo, and the ability to anticipate and prepare 
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for the dramatic drop in oil prices in the 1980s. Since 
then, scenario thinking has become a popular tool for 
the development of strategy in the private sector.
Applied to the field of organised crime assessments, 
these considerations give new meaning to anticipating 
or planning for organised crime developments. 
Instead of trying to assess what organised crime 
developments will occur, it is wiser to reflect on what 
has the potential to significantly change or have an 
impact on economies, societies, or public services 
or organisations. Scenario planning thus deals with 
strategic risks and opportunities in a very different 
manner than traditional organised crime assessments. 
It shifts the focus from historicist reflexes, from making 
estimations or calculating probabilities about the future 
of organised crime, towards imaginative and flexible 
reflections on the consequences of public (criminal) 
policies, and social or contextual developments. 
Scenarios are thus more than arbitrary, imaginary 
stories about future organised crime developments 
and can thus stimulate policymakers to reflect on the 
foundations of their choices, make choices based on 
more than law enforcement data alone and reflect on 
issues which are vital to societies (Verfaillie and Vander 
Beken, 2008a).
3.3.  Resilience: focusing on uncertain high-impact 
events
Scenario exercises indeed have the interesting feature 
that they allow for (organised crime) assessments that 
accept uncertainty and move away from analyses in 
which the likelihood of certain events is addressed. 
In practice, however, the belief that the future (of 
organised crime) cannot be known or predicted is 
not completely overturned. The purpose of scenarios 
remains anticipation of multiple, but plausible, futures. 
Scenarios therefore only accept and use uncertainties 
for some of the driving forces used. Some elements 
of the scenarios are considered predetermined and 
thus stable over a given future timeframe and are 
used as ‘certain’ building blocks of the story. Other 
forces are labelled as uncertain, volatile or highly 
dynamic and have the potential to change the issue 
at stake in significant ways. Only driving forces of the 
latter nature that are ‘critical’ to the issue at stake, are 
the uncertainties used in scenario work. This implies 
that scenarios about the future of criminal markets in 
Europe will, for example, accept that it is uncertain to 
what extent globalisation will impact on dualisation 
(thus allowing for scenarios on the two extremes of the 
continuum of possibilities), while globalisation as such 
is considered as a certain building block supporting 
each of the scenarios developed (Verfaillie & Vander 
Beken, 2008b).
Since 9/11, further stimulated by the 2008 credit crunch, 
attempts are made to move the uncertainty approach in 
(organised) crime assessments one step further. Rather 
than trying to evaluate the likelihood of events (risk) or 
to make statements about uncertain but plausible future 
situations (scenarios), the future is seen as fundamentally 
unknown and uncertain. In such an approach the focus is 
turned to the worse imaginable events, not only including 
the ‘known unknowns’ (events that are known to exist but 
whose timing or magnitude is not predictable) but also 
the ‘unknown unknowns’ (what is not imagined until the 
moment they cause impact) (Longstaff, 2005: 13). These 
highly unlikely or even unimaginable events stay under 
the radar of all risk-based (organised crime) assessments 
or scenario work. Assessments focusing on such high-
impact Black Swans (Taleb, 2007) have a resilience purpose 
(how to recover from a serious attack), rather than the 
ambition to calculate the likelihood and impact of criminal 
events. Especially in anti-terrorist policies, like in financial 
market developments, an enhanced awareness of the 
uncertainties attached to systemic turning points can be 
seen. This new approach, developing alongside the more 
traditional risk approach, opens interdisciplinary debates 
between scholars from different disciplines like natural 
science, environmental studies, disaster-management, 
business, markets, etc. (Klima, 2009), as shown in anti-
terrorist policies, that precautionary interventions taken to 
forestall possible future, uncertain but big-impact events 
may carry with them their own risks (Sunshein, 2003). 
Did the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan trigger 
unexpected difficulties which may have magnified 
political dissatisfaction and hence threats? And how can 
such precautionary interventions, and their costs, be 
evaluated since nobody actually knows what would have 
happened if the action had not been made? (Klima, Dorn 
and Vander Beken, 2011).
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4. Conclusion
During the past decades, the nature, purpose and 
methodologies of organised crime assessments have 
changed significantly. We have seen that the traditional 
situation reports listing numbers of criminals and 
criminal activities are being replaced by assessments 
that claim a risk-based approach in which concepts like 
threat, harm and vulnerability are used. Since September 
2001, assessments that start from the assumption that it 
is useful to prepare for the probable, have become the 
subject of criticism as well. Calculating probabilities and 
risks in relation to activities like terrorism and organised 
crime in order to prepare for future events, is increasingly 
considered as mission impossible. The uncertainties 
of contemporary society and the criminal activities it 
induces, push assessments on organised crime in new 
directions. It is argued that scenario exercises in which 
uncertain elements are accepted contain promising 
possibilities for crime assessments to address and 
prepare for multiple futures. Applications of organised 
crime assessments of approaches that focus on 
unpredictable high-impact events and on the resilience 
of the environment after such impact, are, however, still 
in their infancy. Much is still to be learned from other 
disciplines engaged in comparable challenges (Klima, 
2009). Future research may help to identify conditions 
and parameters for the successful employment of 
scenarios for the purpose of controlling crime and 
terrorism by police organisations throughout Europe.
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Transnational organised crime: an 
evolving label encapsulating different 
forms of crime through time
The theme of organised crime is not new. It emerged 
during the prohibition period in the United States in 
correlation with the corruption of local police or local 
mayors by groups producing illicit alcohol. When the 
Italian mafia was involved (even if most of them were 
American citizens), a tradition began to name organised 
crime groups by the name of the diaspora to which 
they belonged, and to speak of international organised 
crime as soon as trans-border activities were involved 
in either the traffic of products or in the recycling of 
money. By the late 1970s, drug trafficking analysts, 
especially those analysing cocaine trafficking, turned 
their eyes towards Latin America, and the terminology 
they used moved from international to transnational 
organised crime, or trans-border crime. This tradition 
still continues today.
It was during the eighties that EU Member States 
considered using the generic term of TOC instead of 
drug trafficking, money laundering, financial crime 
and corruption, under the influence of the United 
States. Journalists developed the terminology of narco-
terrorism to characterise different situations: Columbia 
with narco traffickers using violence, Peru with Sendero 
Luminoso controlling the territory where farmers were 
harvesting and producing coca and also Afghanistan 
and Burma. But, for most of its examples inside the EU, 
TOC was related only to examples of local groups and 
drug trafficking, with the exception of the Italian mafia. 
Italian magistrates insisted that the Italian mafia was 
expanding with the freedom of movement of Schengen 
and was contaminating France, Germany and beyond. 
UK conservatives publicised this discourse to justify the 
refusal of Schengen in the name of a security deficit. 
Most researchers working on transnational policing 
challenged this vision of TOC at the European scale and 
insisted on the instrumentalisation of the notion in the 
name of certain political agendas. They insisted that if 
organised crime in Europe had a certain relevance, it was 
more for this previous meaning insisting on corruption 
of local authorities permitting crime (Bigo 1993). But the 
main media preferred simple stories where it was easy 
to describe the good and the bad, and were reluctant 
to describe complex situations where public actors and 
police could be on the ‘wrong side’.
A strategisation of TOC: the confusion of 
geopolitics when speaking of crime networks
Following the end of the Cold War, the situation favoured 
the popularisation of the notion of TOC. The label 
became fashionable not only among criminologists, 
but also and mainly among strategists who were ‘out 
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of a job’. Kremlinologists chose a new suitable enemy: 
instead of the Soviet Union, the ‘ Russian and Italian 
mafias ’. They continued with the same reasoning and 
the same forms of visualisation. Authors of geopolitical 
atlases have changed their maps of conflicts, and 
have changed what they called conflict downsizing, 
the number of casualties, and they have included as ‘ 
new conflicts ’ terrorism and drug trafficking as serious 
threats, interpreting them through the same world 
maps. They attempted to apply the kind of reasoning 
developed in the field of military strategy to organised 
crime, assuming that criminal groups had a structure 
and strategic goals such as the invasion of territories 
and markets. But, is it true? Is it possible to consider that 
the mafia are a criminal army of a country and that they 
obey to the government from where they come from 
in terms of nationality or region? Does it make sense to 
speak of African or Asian organised crime, as if the fact 
to be Asian would create a link between individuals? By 
applying a geostrategic reasoning, these analysts have 
de facto homogenised the diversified groups involved 
in criminal activities as if they were instruments under 
the authority of a foreign command, as if they were an 
‘army ’. The maps produced in this way have multiplied 
over time, and, given their ‘simplicity’, have been used 
as evidence of criminal activities. Thus they tended to 
justify demands on the police services to find the roots 
and ‘routes’ of organised crime (see maps in annex).
These maps, however, fundamentally distort the 
reasoned representation of serious criminal activities in 
the European Union with at least four serious faults of 
reasoning.
Firstly, considering the size of the map, and the size 
of the arrows in the map, crime is over-represented 
in these depictions, which induces reactions akin to 
those involved in confronting a quasi-military threat. 
They become tools generating a feeling of fear into 
the population of the receiving countries, and no map 
puts in perspective the number of individuals involved 
and the number of the diaspora of the same labels to 
decrease this fear.
Secondly, and correlatively, these maps seldom refer to 
criminal organisations by their name, but rather often 
associate them with a specific nationality or even ethnic 
group in the name of ‘simplicity’. This association poses 
problems as it implies the criminalisation of a national 
or ethnic group and it works against the duty of anti-
discrimination. Thus, they fuel suspicion towards entire 
communities, whereas only a handful of persons are 
responsible for criminal activities.
Thirdly, these representations emphasise a marginal 
aspect of the phenomena, i.e. crimes committed 
by foreigners, but simultaneously obscure its most 
important component, i.e. the relations with local 
societies, particularly on a municipal scale. It is 
especially true in media reports that ‘ exotise ’ organised 
crime, as if their nationals are always innocent and the 
foreigners are the ‘ evil ’. Who speaks of the nationality 
of consumers and money launderers? Do we speak 
of a United States mafia or European mafia or of the 
Colombian mafia in the United States?
Fourthly, contrary to the geopolitical narrative, mafias 
have not sent their diaspora as bridgeheads, as soldiers 
of crime, but they have tried more or less successfully 
to use existing local networks as footholds.
Against this trend of ‘strategisation’ of crime, academic 
criminologists have been researching and theorising 
phenomena associated under the rubric ‘transnational 
organised crime’ since the early 1990s (e.g. Beare, 2004; 
Edwards and Gill, 2004; Fijnaut and Jacobs, 1991) in 
a different way. The notion of network is here important. 
A series of links used once is not an organisation. 
Organisation supposes continuity, structuration by 
the same nodes over time. Additionally, research on 
network theory shows that everybody in the world is 
linked by six degrees of separation to another person. 
So we have to differentiate organised crime from crime 
done through a constituted network.
Serious crime in Europe is not always organised, 
and mafia-like: it is most often disorganised and 
mutable
The foci of such academic studies have been to insist 
on four criteria:
(1) the disorganised nature of illicit markets and the 
scarcity of examples where they are organised and 
territorialised;
(2) the relationship between local ‘groups’ and 
the constitution of stable ‘networks’ in the 
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consolidation of ‘criminal enterprise’, showing that 
these permanent features are rare;
(3) the local dimensions of organised criminal activity 
and what has been called ‘trans-local’, i.e. the limited 
structuration of intermediaries, but the possibility 
of linking places of production and consumption 
through very small networks;
(4) the civil liberties implications of the policies of 
repression chosen to tackle these practices.
The structures of illicit markets, mutability and 
adaptability: organised or disorganised crime?
The concept of ‘organised crime’ to be operational 
supposes some permanent features in time and space 
permitting to speak of an ‘organisation’. But, often, in 
terms of financial crime, connections between terrorist 
and criminal activities or between corrupt politicians 
and crime, the practices are more linked with local 
opportunities, deregulation or changes in laws than 
with a strong organisation having a huge territorial 
base and challenging the state (mafia-style). Noting 
that the volatile nature of the criminal market creates 
an economic milieu, which is discordant and rather 
anti-thetical to long-term organisation, whether of 
a distributed, organic and stable ‘network’ variety or of 
the more old-fashioned depiction of organised crime 
hierarchies, Hobbs eschews the easy label ‘organised 
crime’. He insists in his work on the mutability of markets 
and the limited importance of intermediaries (Hobbs, 
1998). He is one of the few criminologists to conduct 
ethnographical research independent of the police, 
and has been increasingly critical about police views 
which, according to him, project onto criminal activity 
its own hierarchical structure instead of analysing it as 
a market, an illicit one. Peter Reuter, drawing on police 
files, confiscated records and interviews with police, 
prosecutors and criminal informants in the United 
States, systematically refutes the notion that ‘the 
mafia’ — i.e. a centralised and hierarchical organised 
crime syndicate — controls the major illegal markets. 
Instead, he opts for the notion of disorganised crime, 
suggesting that the cost of criminal groups trying to 
suppress competition, together with the effects of 
law enforcement countermeasures ensures that these 
markets are populated with mainly small enterprises, 
many of them marginal and ephemeral (Reuter, 1985 
and 2008). This notion of disorganised crime and the 
strong evidence supporting it, blocked the possibility 
of an agreement on the definition of ‘organised 
crime’, even when the pressure of the United States 
administration on police forces across Europe was at its 
maximum. Many European countries have refused to 
agree on a definition imported from the United States, 
which may apply to certain countries, like Italy, but 
which certainly would not encompass the situation 
of other Member States, such as the Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands or the UK. The discussions in the 
1990s concerning an EU definition of organised crime 
were central in that domain. This explains why the 
terminology of ‘serious crime’ has often been preferred, 
as the crime may be very serious but nevertheless 
disorganised, and related to specific opportunities.
For example, the study of illicit trade in licit commodities 
strongly suggests that legal enterprises are the primary 
facilitators of action at the wholesale level where 
significant economic ‘hubs’ act as central points from 
which mid-market ‘brokers’ feed into the illicit market 
at the retail level where these commodities reach 
the consumer. The opportunities depend on the 
disjunction of national legislations or of voluntary global 
deregulations of markets. The distinction between licit 
and illicit, criminal and non-criminal activities is more 
complex than supposed (i.e. tax evasion by individuals 
and firms or the role of states facilitating investment 
in their country, while creating offshore havens). 
Disorganisation is as present as organisation in the 
most common practices, subsumed under the term 
‘organised’ crime.
The notion of organisation is then often reduced 
to ‘intermediation’ between market places. But 
analysts of police organisations do not have a clear 
understanding of network theories (see below) 
and want to say that stable patterns exist, as well as 
a central role of intermediaries as soon as they have 
an illicit product connecting two territorial places that 
they call different markets, and it explains why they 
focus so much on ‘routes’.
The organisation and existence of intermediaries in 
a network are not the same concepts. Intermediaries 
may exist for only one occasion, to be replaced by 
others to perform mediation. Pearson and Hobbs 
continually stress the business- like nature of these 
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markets, citing various examples of mutual support 
between what otherwise could be market competitors 
(2003, p. 341-42).
The terminology of organisation has been in crisis 
and is contested by a majority of researchers from 
the disciplines of criminology, medicine and social 
city planning. Yet it continues to be used in policy 
and police circles. To solve the difficulty of the 
criteria of organisation, the terminology has been 
‘downgraded’ to sometimes very limited interactions 
involving more than two persons. It implies that three 
persons committing a crime together can be labelled 
‘organised crime’. The terminology of ‘organisation’ 
has also been applied to those cases where there is 
a familial link. It has maintained the level of activities 
of the police squad specialised in organised crime (for 
example in Germany, which has seen a multiplication 
of these squads at the Länder level). Organised crime 
has become petty crime committed by foreigners and 
diasporas.
This level of organisation is so weak that, after debate, 
an additional factor has been added to qualify 
‘organised crime’: that of violence.
Crime and violence: organised crime and mafia
1. One of the questions is whether organised crime 
is the equivalent of violent crime perpetrated by 
more than two persons (preferably from another 
ethnicity). It depends on the definition and its 
degree of precision. It is clear that politics is at work, 
trying to confuse organised crime or serious crime 
with crime committed by foreigners, which leads 
to a criminalisation of migrants and citizens with 
foreign origins. But, for the moment, this political 
agenda has been combated in both police circles 
and policy circles, even if this narrative is common 
in media representations of organised crime. If the 
answer is negative, if TOC is related not only to violent 
crime committed by foreigners, but also to financial 
crime, money laundering and corruption, then it is 
important to put in perspective the social harm for 
a society of these different forms of serious crimes, 
adding for example environmental crimes. Most of 
these serious crimes ultimately produce structural 
violence, massive destruction, economic disruption 
and job losses, but they do not induce spectacular 
killings during the process. It is only when TOC 
concerns drug trafficking, human trafficking and 
racket/protection that serious violence occurs. It 
is also why the media confuses serious crimes and 
violent crimes. In this case of association between 
serious crimes and violence, four types of violence 
may be associated with illicit markets:
2. Racket/protection for market share (probably rare 
as it is supposed to be a control of population on 
a territory);
3. Debt enforcement (probably more common than 
acknowledged);
4. Criminal predation on illicit market operators 
(unmeasured, since actors in these markets cannot 
report victimisation);
5. Expressive cultural stereotypes related to the 
need to garner ‘respect’ — violence against 
women and children, against minorities and poor 
people because the risk of retaliation is very small 
(perceived insults and affronts to self-esteem can 
lead to violence that has no economic rationality 
and is dysfunctional to the criminal market).
The racket/protection type where the mafia occupy 
a territory and challenge state functions and legitimacy 
is by far the most spectacular, but is also rare. In Europe, 
Italy has been more of an exception than a rule in terms 
of the process of state-making (Tilly 1972). However 
now the debate has been re-launched with the notion 
that foreign mafias coming from Russia, China, Japan, 
Turkey and Nigeria are invading Europe. Beyond the 
noise of geopolitics, do we have evidence of this 
phenomenon?
Is transnational organised crime in Europe an 
expression of the transplantation of foreign mafias?
First, it is important to highlight that this definition 
would be very restrictive if the definition of TOC was 
just the activities of mafia linked with foreign countries. 
These activities exist but they are a small part of the 
range of activities that are labelled serious crime. 
Focusing on them is certainly important in terms 
of social harm considering their danger, but it is also 
a form of blindness considering other forms of crimes, 
and an exaggeration of the mafia-like qualities inside 
the overall criminality.
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Contrary to easy stereotypes against foreigners and 
diasporas, the evidence suggests that the migration 
of some mafia-type groups can take place, but that 
it is rare and highly localised. Varese, explains why in 
his recent seminal book ‘Mafias on the move: how 
organised crime conquers new territories’ (Princeton 
2011). Contrary to what is implied by the title of this 
work, Varese demonstrates that mafias struggle to 
make an impact in a foreign country where they 
don’t speak the language; there is little interest in the 
protection they have to offer. The empirical evidence 
underpinning these findings relates to organisations 
such as the Calabrese ‘Ndrangheta, Sicilian Cosa Nostra, 
Italian-American Mafia, the Russian Solntesevskaya, 
Japanese Yakuza and the Chinese Triads. According to 
Varese’s study, mafia transplantation has been limited 
since the end of the Cold War, but cooperation along 
the lines of production, distribution and retail of 
prohibited products has increased between criminal 
organisations based in Moscow and Bulgaria, Italy, as 
well as Colombia, and the United States. ‘Mafia type’ 
organisations are rare. They can be defined as ‘groups 
that aspire to govern others by providing criminal 
protection to both the underworld and the upper 
world on a specific territory’ (Varese, 2011, p. 6). Their 
current growth, when it exists, is located in countries 
such as Mexico, Honduras, Salvador and Guatemala. In 
other places, because of the state and market controls, 
when they try to move out of their territory, they 
change their structure and lose control, even against 
smaller local groups in the ‘destination’ country. They 
become dependent and prefer to deepen their control 
on a specific place rather than extending it abroad 
and possibly losing it. As Misha Glenny summarises 
in his book review of Varese in the ‘London Review 
of Books’ published in June 2011: ‘If Varese is right — 
and it would be hard to dispute his evidence — most 
mafia groups seeking new turf eventually either go 
back home with their tails between their legs or give 
up being gangsters and take up a less disreputable 
profession’ (p. 25).
So, it is not because a diaspora exists in a country that 
this diaspora will automatically serve as ‘soldiers of 
crime’ of a mafia, and it is not because drug trafficking 
exists that we can infer a mafia exists. The popular 
image of Colombian individuals carrying small amounts 
of drugs inside their bodies ‘(known as ‘drug mules’) 
has certainly invaded the media, but in terms of the 
market it bears little relation to the large quantities of 
drugs transported through containers in boats, planes 
or lorries. It is shocking, but not as significant. Networks 
of commercial activities run by the diaspora as such are 
not more criminal than others, even if they are under 
more surveillance. Large firms, including national ones, 
stand a greater chance that a small part of their activities 
could be illicit (with or without their knowledge that 
these activities are illicit). This small part is nevertheless 
often more significant than the diaspora markets. In 
addition, even if these illicit practices in the shadow 
of licit ones are less obviously violent, they may have 
more destabilising effects in general, as shown by the 
real estate market of 2008 and the financial crisis.
Global, transnational or translocal groups of 
serious criminals?
Criminal network analysis reveals that criminal 
connections evolve into complex chains involving 
connections between various groups and actors, being 
‘local at all points’. Successful criminal entrepreneurship 
requires intimate knowledge of the territories in which 
it is undertaken. To what extent can particular sets of 
actors, whether conceptualised as groups or networks, 
be said to extend themselves internationally? The answer 
that Hobbs gave to this question was that organised 
crime is ‘local at all points’. That is to say we ‘experience 
crime as a local phenomenon’ and the empirical 
evidence suggests that the organisation of crime is that 
of ‘ever mutating interlocking networks of locally based 
serious criminality’ (Hobbs, 1998, p. 419). Diagrams of 
‘criminal networks’ where intermediaries are the central 
actors produced by police criminal intelligence analysts 
are often analytical fictions that leave out the density 
of the network at different points and which forget the 
discussion of the broader social-structural features that 
make organised crime possible. These social-structural 
features are essential for thinking about ways to change 
the circumstances that produce organised crime. 
Bruisma and Bernasco (2004) for example describe 
the nature of criminal networks in relation to three 
different kinds of criminal entrepreneurship: large-scale 
heroin smuggling, trafficking in women and trading in 
stolen vehicles. They try to lend some specificity to the 
theoretical notion of ‘crime networks’ and show that 
the differences in the social networks they describe 
primarily have to do with the nature of the legal and 
financial risks that are particular to each form of criminal 
enterprise. Without belabouring the specifics of social 
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network analysis, suffice to say that ‘networks as such 
are not criminal’ and that ‘both offenders and non-
offenders maintain non-criminal relationships with 
other criminals and non-criminals’ and that ‘if we 
only filter out the criminals and their mutual criminal 
collaborative relationships, then a ‘criminal network’ 
arises that does not do justice to the other relationships 
within larger social networks’ (p. 92). In other words, 
the diagrams of ‘criminal networks’ produced by police 
criminal intelligence analysts are analytical fictions if 
they focus on routes and intermediaries presupposing 
a ‘global’ environment, without demonstrating that 
it exists and shapes the practices of the actors. More 
often their practices are shaped by local opportunities, 
but some of them depend effectively on global (de)
regulation. What tends to shape the order of the three 
types of criminal entrepreneurial collaboration is the 
regulatory environment within which the collaboration 
is enacted.
Evidence suggests that weak regulatory regimes allow 
criminal markets to flourish. A mixture of enforcement 
and regulatory strategies is necessary to reduce the 
opportunities for criminality to develop in the shadows 
of licit economy. Unregulated markets (as with illicit 
drugs) or poorly regulated economic activity enhances 
the criminal opportunity structures that professional 
crime depends upon. In James B. Jacobs et al’s 
influential book ‘Gotham Unbound: How New York 
City Was Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime’ 
(1999), it was shown that a mixture of enforcement 
and regulatory strategies was necessary to reduce 
the opportunities for organised criminality in that 
jurisdiction, where decades of purely enforcement-
based tactics had previously failed. Lessons for Europe 
have to be learned from this specific study.
Defining the notion of serious crime at the 
European level
We need a comprehensive approach and not 
a dogmatic one. The model in Europe is not the mafia-
like model that Italy and Bulgaria may know. This model 
is more the exception than the norm. This is why the 
notion of serious crime, including disorganised crime, 
is more useful than TOC. Serious crime requires looking 
at legislation and how the multiplication of legislations 
simultaneously supposes the multiplication of 
possibilities of not respecting them, giving an unfair 
advantage for those who do not respect the law. 
It could be a criminal organisation, but often it is 
a perfectly legal organisation playing on a non-regular 
base, a tactical move beyond legality; the boundary 
between legal and illegal being often easy to cross, 
when it is not a systematic behaviour. This is why the 
research of Von Lampe speaking of five different types 
of serious crimes - organised or not - may be more 
useful than the notion of TOC as mafia.
Von Lampe (2008), in order to define the notion of (dis)
organised crime and in order to avoid stereotyping, 
distinguishes five ideal manifestations of criminality by 
differentiating them along three social strata: marginalised 
subcultures, mainstream society and political/economic 
elites. The five ideal types are as follows:
1. Criminal networks with no social support structure 
in the milieu of operation (e.g. predatory gangs 
engaged in ‘crime sprees’ of theft and robbery). 
One example was the Albanian ‘attacks’ on Greece, 
conducted as ‘razzia’.
2. Criminal networks rooted in marginalised 
subcultures (either with a class/territorial or ethnic 
basis — one illustrative example being family 
networks of Kurdish and Turkish drug smugglers).
3. Criminal networks rooted in mainstream society 
that are outwardly law-abiding (typically involved 
in organised business crimes such as investment or 
health insurance fraud). Such groups have a strategic 
advantage ‘including ‘natural’ interaction with office 
holders that may translate into crime opportunities 
or reduce risks of law enforcement interference.
4. Criminal networks in power elites (involving abuse 
or misuses of official competences for personal 
profit and power). Obvious examples are ‘scandals’ 
involving the ‘abuse or misuses of competencies 
for profit and power by networks of public officials, 
politicians and business leaders’. These kind of 
scandals involve complex relations between highly 
placed individuals in business and finance in at 
least two countries. Examples may be found in Italy, 
France and the UK or Canada and often involve 
armament markets where secrecy of the reason 
of state sometimes implies strange relations with 
intermediaries of the underworld.
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5. Criminal alliances between underworld and upper 
world or mafia-like organisations. Von Lampe 
observes that ‘where alliances between underworld 
and upper world exist, for example in Southern Italy 
or Russia, it is important to note that this appears 
to be less the result of criminals infiltrating business 
and government and more an outgrowth of elites 
in power being unchecked by moral and legal 
restraints, and operating beyond effective control 
by civil society, so that they are in a position to freely 
employ and co-opt criminals in pursuit of economic 
and political interest’.
He notes that there is a positive correlation between 
the social position of criminal actors and the quality of 
criminal opportunities. In other words: the higher the 
social position of the offenders in question, the more 
serious the impact of the criminal activity and the less 
likely the threat of apprehension or conviction.
Von Lampe also argues that the first and second types 
unduly receive more attention from law enforcement 
bodies and the public than the third and fourth. The 
focus on mainstream society and powerful elites’ 
illegalities is weaker than the one on foreigners and 
poor people. But the fifth category attracts attention 
because of the link between violence, crime and the 
corruption of elites. This attraction nevertheless does 
not mean results, and often the knowledge of these 
crimes surfaces when the structure permitting them 
has disappeared. Police then have a tendency to focus 
on those underworld activities and to a much lesser 
degree on the criminal actions of the upper world.
Like the authors of this report, von Lampe is critical of 
media and law enforcement depictions of organised 
criminality as monolithic, coherent or static. According 
to him, the empirical evidence lends itself to the view 
that some organised criminal activities are hierarchical 
in form, but they are the ‘exception rather than the rule’. 
His typology suggests finally that regulatory structures 
and governance strategies broadly conceived are 
important elements of counter-organised crime 
strategy since it is the quality of governance, and 
not merely the strength and capacity of criminal 
law enforcement, that fundamentally shapes the 
conditions allowing for the organisation of crime.
To identify the practices to be targeted at the 
European level by specific organisations and agencies 
like Europol, it would be better to acknowledge 
that the notions of international organised crime or 
transnational organised crime are not the most useful 
ones, and that the terminology of serious crime at the 
European level may be more accurate. The ‘seriousness’ 
in question does not imply violence as such, but it 
does imply an analysis of the impact of such crimes on 
European societies. As we will see, environmental and 
financial crimes are often far more serious than some 
violent criminal acts committed by marginal groups. If 
resources are scarce, such considerations are important 
in order to define the right priorities.
European policing structures: fighting 
transnational organised crime or serious 
crimes?
The development of European policing and its 
link with organised crime
The enhancement of European police cooperation has 
usually been articulated with ‘cross border crime’ and 
vaguely defined ‘organised crime’. Cross-border police 
cooperation is nothing new. In fact, operational cross-
border policing has been documented going back at 
least to the 1960s (Bigo 1992, 1996; Sheptycki, 1997, 
1998). But past lessons were forgotten after the impact 
of United States imperatives in the 1980s and even 
more after 2001. It has created a tendency for police to 
be obliged to focus on ‘headline issues’ and to follow 
what the national professionals of politics consider as 
the fear and insecurity feelings of their citizens. The 
result is a view of policing that exaggerates the exciting 
and unusual, while systematically downplaying the 
more mundane aspects of the job (Alain 2000, 2001; 
Sheptycki, 2001). Media attention on TOC and terrorism 
is higher than on other subjects, and it has the effect of 
putting police under pressure to communicate more 
and more instantaneously, sometimes to the detriment 
of effective research of evidence.
While it is undoubtedly the case that organised and 
serious forms of criminality are an important part of 
what police do, it is equally important to recognise 
that other functions — from helping recover lost and 
stolen property, to emergency and disaster response, 
and much else — are not less important. This is partly 
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because police, at least in democratic societies, tend 
to be the emergency service of first resort when 
things go wrong and hence an important resource 
for the general public (Cumming and Edell, 1963; 
Kleinig, 1996; Punch and Naylor, 1973). The focus on 
‘prevention’ tends to mask what is still the central 
ground for policing. The European Union level is then 
in difficulties as its functioning is less operational and 
in contact with everyday citizen interest, and it is under 
pressure to communicate on the most difficult crimes, 
while being in danger of displeasing some political 
professionals, if the services focus too much on some 
cases instead of others. Thus, instead of looking at 
the national participation in serious crime, especially 
financial crime, it is easier to look at cross-border 
crime committed by foreigners and to exaggerate 
its importance, as if it corresponded to all organised 
crime. This is not a deliberate strategy on the part of 
police to shift emphasis onto these forms of crime, but 
rather a reaction to media and public pressure.
De facto European policing highlights the ‘high 
end’. Thomas Mathiesen (2000) observed that ‘while 
governments and other authorities emphasise the 
struggle against traditional, serious, international crime 
[…] all of the empirical and documentary material 
available clearly shows that the goal is to be found at 
the cross-point between the shutting out of aliens and 
the protection of vaguely defined public order and 
State security’ (p. 175). Seeing this emphasis on serious 
and organised crime when writing in the mid-1990s, 
Malcolm Anderson et al. observed ‘a gradual transfer 
of internal and external security control […] from the 
nation state to international institutions’. Moreover, they 
suggested that as these themes came to dominate the 
European policing terrain ‘the more secretive and elitist 
ethos of the security services would gain ground and 
the ideal of a transparent, rule-governed and politically 
neutral system would become no more than a remote 
possibility’. More than a decade ago it was already 
clear that intelligence services across Europe were 
‘increasingly penetrating fields which used to belong 
to the realm of ‘ordinary policing’, such as organised 
crime and right-wing extremism, while the police 
services also started beginning to shift their priorities 
away from local crime and to the use of pro-active (i.e. 
clandestine and undercover) methods’ (Anderson et 
al., 1995, p. 175 and 179).
European policing forums concentrate their efforts 
of coordination, informally and formally, around the 
tropes of drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism 
and illegal migration (Bigo, 2000). The convergence 
around these perceived threats and security risks 
was considered by many to be the main justification 
for innovations in policing structures and ‘special 
techniques’, giving more leeway to the police 
regarding judiciary control than other domains. At the 
same moment, the special squads of each Member 
State wanted to keep the operational powers and 
specific techniques for themselves and have blocked 
any form of real integration leading to a European FBI. 
In light of this uneasy situation, European ‘clubs’ and 
organisations like Europol have to follow the same 
road as the central services of the UK, struggling 
against the independence of local police. They have 
insisted that they did not want operational powers 
(or not many) but that these would be vital to address 
the central threat of interconnecting TOC, terrorism 
and illegal migration, a threat so complex that it was 
beyond the reach of local or national police, not least 
because these interconnected threats were not only 
European, they were global. Through this narrative, 
their future as organisations has therefore been 
dependent on convincing that the threats of TOC and 
terrorism were more and more dangerous, more and 
more global, more and more unpredictable (except 
for them, because they have the capacities in terms 
of technologies and human competencies to do so).
The rise of the professional discourse of so-called 
‘intelligence-led policing’ in tandem with the ‘new 
security threat agenda’, comes from this double 
move of analysing more and more the global 
interconnections while having no operational powers 
to display. In line with the idea of applying new public 
management to police forces, it has created a culture 
of statistics, of general categorisations and profiling, 
but which is rarely in touch with specific criminal 
individuals. It was nevertheless considered by the 
political professionals and the public to be a substantial 
innovation (Innes and Sheptycki, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008, 
2009). In conclusion, it was the ‘rise to prominence 
of ‘transnational organised crime as an object of 
governance (globally, nationally and subnationally) 
that has changed policing architectures everywhere’ 
(Sheptycki, 2007, p. 70). In fact, to be more precise, the 
two dynamics were reinforced simultaneously: on the 
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one hand, the interest in the change of policing; and, 
on the other, the development of new techniques 
influencing the perception of threat (Bigo 2002).
Analysis of OCTA reports
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 
methodology and logic
From the mid-nineties, even before its official birth, 
police liaison officers stationed within Europol 
considered that one of their key missions and their 
added value regarding the national police squads 
would be on tackling European and more global 
forms of crime. They have dedicated their energy to 
‘connecting the dots’ between the different national 
police specialised in terrorism and between those 
specialised in organised crime. Working files have 
been set up so that a suspect in different criminal 
cases cannot escape surveillance by moving between 
countries in Europe, and that the different cases in 
which the individual was involved were also connected.
In addition to the working files, Europol, using its 
own analysts, not dealing directly with personal 
data, will develop a cognitive map of the know-how 
and techniques of criminal networks transversing 
more than two countries, and will set up patterns to 
understand the ‘routes’ they use, their ‘profiles’, their 
tendencies in order to anticipate their behaviour and 
to have a real-time picture of organised crime at the 
European level, connecting the information inside the 
EU and with those third countries which form part 
of the routes of the networks. The model has been 
taken from the TREVI methodology on drug trafficking 
and imported into Europol with minor modifications, 
as the responsible were analysts, but the goal has 
been to develop on the a European level what the 
Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) has done in Germany in 
relation to the Länder. It is not a coincidence that the 
two former directors of Europol came from the BKA. 
This idea of a strategic planning by analysts concurring 
to the effectiveness of police on the ground has 
been coined in a more Anglo-American terminology 
‘intelligence-led policing’, even if most of the Germans 
responsible consider that they are not doing what 
their British counterparts in the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS) and Serious and Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) were doing.
Intelligence here means developing data gathering, 
including and integrating covert and open sources, 
personal and non-personal information, to rely on 
an expert system (software or group of experts) in 
order to discover patterns of behaviour of a special 
group, from whose past behaviour future steps can be 
deduced. It pushes towards methods of intelligence 
policing more than detective and criminal justice 
policing. The model is orientated towards the present 
and the future actions committed by suspects more 
than the discovery of past events and the conviction 
of criminals.
For the model to work, the patterns need to be stable 
in space and time, the groups need to be organised 
and stable in terms of persons involved and to be easily 
identified through one or two main characteristics (for 
example nationality or ethnicity). If these conditions are 
not met, the accuracy of the prediction is diminished.
But if the accuracy is diminished, because it does not 
reach the specificities useful for national police or 
because it is always repeating the same patterns, the 
relevance of the institution itself is at risk.
Europol has been prisoner of this structural 
contradiction. Europol insists on the quality of its 
reports, their effectiveness in helping national police 
and leading to convictions which would not have 
been possible otherwise, insisting that they are 
always enlarging and deepening their knowledge and 
accuracy. The new director of Europol has developed 
means of communication in order to convince 
about the success of its reports. He has introduced 
new features in the Europol organisation (which 
replicate those in SOCA), placing greater emphasis on 
communication, advertisement, and what he considers 
as transparency because it is more diffused. But either 
they more or less always repeat the same or they are 
too narrowly focused.
Scepticism concerning Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (OCTA) methods
Beyond the self-assessment of Europol concerning its 
own work, and beyond an impact assessment done 
mainly in terms of proper management style and 
accountability, but not in terms of quality of knowledge 
production, it seems that scepticism exists in police 
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circles who are the first users of this data; in policy-
making groups, which have the view that the reports 
are not innovative and look too much like ‘copy and 
paste’ of previous reports (because they repeat the 
same patterns); and in academic circles, who are asking 
for openness and more transparency concerning the 
methodology used to reach the results. These are then 
visualised through maps whose accuracy is not much 
better than the ones used by journalists, and that are 
far from what geographers and sociologists would 
expect from a map.
The problem has been centrally to publish reports 
trying to convince a large public as well as specialists 
of the usefulness of Europol. For the general public, 
communication was conceived in graphic designer 
and advertisement terms, and was therefore very close 
to journalistic narratives. The academic specialists, who 
did not receive the more confidential detailed reports, 
were shocked by some features.
Mapping is an exercise which supposes a geographical 
knowledge where the scale is central, the size of the 
arrows has to be proportional to the numbers at stake 
and not enlarged for ‘ a better visibility ’. If the ‘ map ’ 
does not follow the proportionality principle in terms 
of size, is it still a map or just a drawing?
On the whole, academic criminologists in Europe and 
UN circles are highly critical of Europol OCTA methods 
and findings. They consider that they assume more 
than they demonstrate the preconditions for their 
model to work. They assume that organisations exist, 
that they are permanent, that they have stable links 
between them and that they do not change in terms 
of space and time. In brief, their model may work for 
an old-style mafia type of crime, but is not relevant for 
most of what constitutes serious forms of crime.
Among many Van Duyne and Vander Beken say that 
‘current European organised crime (threat) assessments 
are not reliable and relevant instruments to make 
meaningful statements about organised crime’ 
(2009, p. 261) because they do not map it properly. In 
addition others have discussed the inappropriateness 
of reports when it concerns volatile and disorganised 
forms of crime in financial, cyber-crime and in other 
forms of crime and they consider that it is one of the 
causes of the reduction of serious crimes to drug 
trafficking of mafia type in OCTA reasoning.
Klerks (2007) remarks on the Dutch system of organised 
crime threat assessment also apply to OCTAs reports: it 
should be conceded that the final synthesis remains 
to some extent a matter of interactive subjectivity and 
professional debate among the researchers involved, 
rather than a formal, explicit and ridged evaluative 
methodological process. The task of synthesising 
so many reports on a wide range of issues and with 
varying levels of detail still appears to be very hard to 
capture in a feasible methodological approach. Added 
to this comes the challenge of having to weigh the 
seriousness of organised crime’s societal consequences 
on a number of aspects and on a strategic level (p. 97). 
Remarking on Europol’s contributions to organised 
crime threat assessment — ‘supposedly the apex of 
organised crime analysis in Europe’ (p. 98) — Klerks 
goes on to say that ‘the rather superficial character of 
OCTA’s public version withholds most of the analytical 
meat … avoids all analytical depth and lacks any 
reference to sources’ (p. 98). We may have a less stern 
judgement on OCTA, and on the efforts done by SPCTA 
new methodology, but we follow nevertheless the 
judgement of Klerks that, at least, the methodology, 
sources and precise methods of visualisation for 
mapping need to be explained in more detail. While 
acknowledging the sensitivity of the data used to make 
these threat assessments, Klerks suggests that: ‘Europol 
should be challenged to make better use of the wealth 
of information available to its analysts, when producing 
public strategic assessments’ (p. 98). The origins of the 
data content may be confidential. However, the lack of 
transparency about the used statistical methods and 
analysis shouldn’t be, as it creates doubts about the 
legitimacy of these data. It leads to over-generalisation 
concerning large zones (see annex in map) and to 
a confrontational image of the North West versus 
the other regions which is not the product of data 
but of a specific construction of them, that does not 
pass the test of evidence-based policy in terms of 
correlation between the data collected, the graphics 
of arrows done and the selection of data, which creates 
an image of invasion and victims of the North West, 
where a selection of data concerning major money-
laundering operations or just a more complex picture 
of drug trafficking will show reverse arrows.
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Commenting on the history of EU Organised Crime 
Situation Reports (ORCS) — produced from 1994 until 
they were replaced by the OCTA in 2006 — Edwards 
and Levi remark that it ‘provides an insightful archive 
on development in the official conceptualisation of 
organised crime’ (2008, p. 370), but they are sceptical 
that such documents provide the necessary insights 
as to practical policy responses to reduce the 
phenomena. Citing Van Duyne and van der Beken, 
they argue that these documents confuse elements 
of threat assessment, impact and vulnerability in the 
analysis and point to contradictions. They go on to 
argue that the ‘central point remains, it is the actor-
centred framing of the problem in terms of ‘OC groups’ 
that produces such contradictory outcomes for both 
analysis and policy development’ (p. 373). The framing 
of the issue matters and the exclusion of other kinds 
of expertise and experience that can enhance the 
analytical rigour for studying the problem of organised 
crime systematically distorts the policy process.
This over-dependence on insider knowledge and 
police sector data is a problem. It confirms Ericson’s and 
Haggerty’s (1997) general observation about police 
communications formats -that they set police up to 
‘claim to broker consciousness and social existence, 
defining what should be taken as objective reality with 
respect to risks’ (p. 430).
These critiques are anything but new. Nevertheless 
they are always dismissed, even if they have been 
developed as soon as 1993 at the first international 
conference of its kind in the United Kingdom, hosted by 
the then relatively new (and now defunct) UK National 
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) (OICJ, 1993). Among 
the participants, Shepticky and Gregory warned about 
the methodology and its limits. We have to ask why 
the group thinking of the network of multiple national 
polices is so strong? Maybe it is because of their diversity 
of nationalities. They think they are open, even if they 
all share the same professional views of the world and 
form a ‘guild’ of professionals (Bigo 2010). In addition, 
when they make an effort at openness, it seems that 
the different police services only choose as analysts 
people, who already accept their own methods and 
logic. Moreover, the different police services are ready 
to receive critiques about results, but not methods and 
ways to frame the problems.
Alternative methodological thinking about 
organised crime threat assessment techniques
Criminologists have not simply criticised OCTA 
reports - they have also proposed alternatives. In 2000, 
a group of academic criminologists based in Belgium 
attempted to develop a risk-based methodology for 
measuring the phenomenon of serious crime that, in 
many respects, has not been improved (De Ruyver, 
et al., 2000). One of the virtues of the approach put 
forward by this team was the willingness to go beyond 
strict law enforcement-based data sources. The model 
propounded attempted to combine cognisance 
of a variety of factors. In addition to the traditional 
preoccupation with identifying and counting OC 
‘groups’ and the nature and scope of ‘illicit markets’, 
the approach adopted in this scheme also attempted 
to bring into focus an emphasis on different economic 
systems (the grey, the black and the legitimate 
economy), as well as an understanding of the complex 
effects of their interaction in geographical terms. The 
analysis showed the potential to move OCTAs away 
from the entrenched paradigm. Had such new thinking 
been extended within the professional grouping 
undertaking large-scale threat assessments (and had 
that professional group been extended beyond the 
narrow world of law enforcement to include other 
well-informed experts in academia and elsewhere), it is 
even possible that this methodology could have been 
extended to the entire range of organised criminality 
identified in von Lampe’s typology.
If this approach seems too innovative, it is at least 
possible for the EU to learn from the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police’s Sleipnir methods, which have taken 
a first step in this direction. The RCMP’s Sleipnir method, 
widely acknowledged in professional policing circles, 
has been considered as a highly innovative attempt 
at organised crime threat assessment, even if it is not 
exempt from criticism either (Sheptycki, 2003).
For example OCTAs work on the basis of the circulation 
of (more or less) standardised questionnaires among 
strategically placed individuals within the police sector 
(crime analysts, counter-organised crime tactical team 
leaders and other specialists) who return completed 
forms to a central point for strategic evaluation 
and analysis (Klerks, 2007). Such questionnaires are 
designed to elicit and develop individual responses 
to the problems posed and reflect an elaborately 
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organised, mediated, but nevertheless collective 
‘group thinking’ process.
But close-up scrutiny of this method showed that 
it tended to focus on the already high profile and 
spectacular kinds of organised criminality, particularly 
when it involved criminal gangs and an element 
of violence. White-collar crimes, crimes against the 
environment and other crimes that may be ‘organised’ 
but which do not conform to this picture of organised 
crime are less likely to be captured as a result by this 
methodology. Despite being well known in police 
circles, they nevertheless follow the old patterns of 
information gathering and do not discuss their biases. 
If the notion of ‘social harm’ of each kind of serious 
crime has to become a central feature for evaluation, 
then it is important to take into account all the 
different forms of serious crime and not only the ones 
generating spectacular violence or the ones who have 
more stable patterns and are then easier to describe. 
The limitations of the methodology chosen cannot 
be an excuse to redefine the seriousness of crime 
along these limitations. In terms of social harm, serious 
crimes are primarily environmental crime and financial 
crime. This also seems to be the case of some forms of 
cyber-crime — at least potentially (CEPOL discussions).
If the suggestion to analyse serious crime through 
social harm is taken into consideration, is it only 
possible to measure harm by quantifying the various 
phenomena in terms of financial indicators? UN and 
Canadian methods have tried that. Based on these 
monetary quantifications of ‘impact’ these documents 
categorised OC activities in terms of three levels. At 
the high end were such things as drug trafficking, 
various forms of fraud (including benefit fraud) and 
intellectual property theft. In the middle range were 
illegal immigration, art and antiques theft, vehicle and 
plant theft and paedophilia. At the low end was a long 
list of items including armed robbery, arms trafficking, 
hooliganism, kidnapping and extortion. But close 
critical examination of this ranking scheme reveals the 
difficulty of quantified expected social harm (Sheptycki 
2008). Social science cannot be reduced to accountancy 
and economics. Ericson has considered social harm as 
a social distribution of bad in a society; as such, finding 
a definition is a highly politicised process. It cannot be 
a financial exercise. The discussions at the European 
Parliament may help to frame the problem and to limit 
group thinking by insisting on a democratic control of 
the objectives, definitions and methodologies at work, 
which will not undermine the data confidentiality of 
the organisation.
OCTAs reports indicate a lack of concern for 
the socio-structural features that facilitate the 
development of crimes
The focus in OCTAs on organised crime groups 
or networks, with traditional law enforcement or 
even with intelligence-led policing and situational 
prevention ends and means as the guiding principles, 
leads to a lack of concern for the social-structural 
features that facilitate the development of other forms 
of serious crimes (environmental, financial, corruption), 
and even to such phenomena like drug trafficking and 
human trafficking.
All serious crimes are dependent on macro socio-
structural features.
The requirement that OCTAs seek to provide a more 
thorough understanding of social- structural 
conditions that enable organised crime has the 
objective of providing an informed understanding of 
how such crimes are constituted.
Conclusion: the need for general 
governance capacity building in areas as 
diverse as education, health and welfare
The policy implications of such observations indicate 
the need for general governance capacity building 
in areas as diverse as education, health and welfare. 
Policing policy within this frame would shift attention 
away from an exclusive concern with ‘high-end’ 
policing and back towards the capacity for ‘full-
spectrum policing’ implying better communication 
between specialised squads and local policemen. But it 
will also imply connections with local cities, regions and 
other administrations than ministries of interior. In drug 
policy for instance the European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) has managed to 
include a wider perspective than a purely police one, 
even when the main question is the fight against drug-
related crime. EMCDDA has relationships with Europol 
and Eurojust, but they have not been invited as far as 
we know to OCTAs. It is certainly complicated to link 
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local activities and European activities, as it always takes 
another dimension in Europe, where the European 
organisations themselves are not directly connected 
with their local counterpart organisations and often 
pass through national hubs to join them, as is the case 
in policing. But it is not impossible at all. For example, 
if some reports like the new SOCTA associate a larger 
group of participants, in a deeper analysis, and maybe 
with a different timing, it will help Europol and OCTAs 
reports in general to gain legitimacy and efficiency. 
As far as models are concerned, Europol should be 
given more time to produce its reports, possibly one 
every four years. The reports would comprise expert 
opinions beyond the police forces, including doctors, 
sociologists or ethnologists, to avoid the tropism that 
characterises the work of specialised police units.
Without general governance, policing alone may 
occasionally be counter-productive. For example, 
a growing body of research indicates that law 
enforcement activity targeted at the retail and end user 
of the illicit drugs market has substantial potential to 
produce harmful health and social impacts, including 
disrupting the provision of healthcare to injection 
drug users (IDU), increasing risk behaviour associated 
with infectious disease transmission and overdose, 
and exposing previously unaffected communities 
to the harms associated with illicit drug use (Kerr 
et al., 2005). Other negative outcomes include the 
increased frequency of associated fraud (because 
of destabilisation of trust within the market) and 
therefore violence. Such outcomes should be read 
as outweighing supposed positive impacts of law 
enforcement deterrence-based prevention, which are 
achieved at significant public expense. Public health 
provides an alternative paradigm to this police-centric 
model for managing heroin problems and detailed 
evaluation studies have shown it to be very effective. 
The dominance of the law enforcement paradigm 
with respect to the governance of domestic heroin 
issues was radically undermined by the Swiss heroin 
maintenance experiments in the 1990s (National 
Families in Action, 1999; Ribeaud, 2004). There are 
many examples from around the world where public-
health perspectives, harm-reduction thinking, crime 
prevention and regulatory strategies have been 
reconfigured to provide an alternative to the dominant 
law enforcement paradigm (e.g. Bouloukos, et al., 2003). 
Many of these have been the focus of EMCDDA work 
in the last years. These innovative ways of thinking 
extend beyond drug markets and, theoretically, 
could be adapted to thinking about organised crime 
prevention as well.
Contrary to the prominent view that organised crime 
is an enemy external to society, recent research has 
shown that it emerges in conditions of unstable, 
poorly regulated or underground market economies, 
where there is a lack of legal structure that can reliably 
protect property rights or settle business disputes and 
where there is a supply of people trained in violence 
who are otherwise unemployed in socially useful 
activities. The habits and beliefs enculturated within 
social structures go from top to bottom. Policy-makers 
concerned to reduce the effects of organised crime 
within the European Union and on its periphery need 
to look back into European history for lessons in the 
civilising process (Elias, 1969) and then look for ways to 
generalise such processes more globally.
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Source: EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment OCTA 2008, European Police Office, p. 43
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In 2010, the EU established a multi-annual policy 
cycle (1) on serious and organised crime in order 
to tackle the most important criminal threats in 
a coherent and methodological manner. This 
would be through optimum cooperation between 
the relevant services of the EU Member States, EU 
institutions and EU agencies, as well as relevant 
third countries and organisations. The next cycle 
starts in 2013 with the delivery of the SOCTA 
(Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment) 
and the development of the EMPACT (European 
Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats) 
(see below) for the period 2013 -2017.
SOCTA
The starting point of this four-year EU policy cycle is 
thus the SOCTA. In the SOCTA, Europol will deliver 
criminal analysis findings that can be translated into 
political priorities, strategic goals and operational 
action plans in order to implement EU policy. The link 
between the SOCTA conclusions and the definition 
of priorities is very important. Taking this step in an 
intelligence-led way ensures that analysis directly 
informs political decision-making, and that the EU’s 
most-relevant criminal threats are addressed.
(1) Council Conclusions on the creation and implementation of an 
EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime, 
doc. 15358/10 COSI 69 ENFOPOL 298 CRIMORG 185 ENFOCUS-
TOM 94.
The full policy cycle will start in 2013 and will last for 
four years. It consists of four key steps, which are:
 § Step 1: SOCTA — the serious and organised crime 
threat assessment, developed by Europol, will 
deliver a set of recommendations based on an in-
depth analysis of the major crime threats facing the 
EU. The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council will 
use these recommendations to define its priorities 
for the next four years (2013-2017).
 § Step 2: MASP — Multi-annual Strategic Action 
Plans (MASP) will be developed from the priorities 
and will define the strategic goals for combating 
each priority threat.
 § Step 3: EMPACT — will set out concrete operational 
plans (OAPs) for combating the priority threats. 
OAPs will include Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) and 
target analysis followed by investigations.
 § Step 4: review and assessment — the 
effectiveness of the OAPs and their impact on the 
priority threats will be judged by COSI (2). In 2015, 
an interim assessment (SOCTA) will be prepared by 
Europol to evaluate, monitor and adjust (if required) 
the efforts to tackle priority threats.
(2) COSI: Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security.
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The role of the SOCTA in this policy cycle is thus an 
important one. The JHA Council will base its decisions 
on a limited number of priorities defined in this 
assessment, both regional and pan-European. These 
priorities will thereupon again play a role in Europol’s 
activities, through the organisation’s involvement in 
the resulting Operational Action Plans.
As such Europol has come a long way from the 
organised crime situation reports (OCSR) produced 
from 1994 when Europol still was the Europol Drugs 
Unit, via the organised crime reports (OCR) from 2002 
that, for the first time, included a section on threats, 
and the organised crime threat assessments (OCTA) 
produced from 2006 to 2011. This development is 
reflecting the increasing confidence of Member States 
in Europol both as an organisation, and as a provider 
of sound analytical products in particular, to which the 
role as a policy advisor can be entrusted.
The SOCTA will, like its immediate predecessor the 
OCTA, be a forward-looking document, with a primary 
focus on future developments in criminal threats. 
Europol will both analyse trends and patterns in current 
crime data and look further, scanning the environment 
for other factors that will influence crime across the 
four years of the policy cycle. This will provide the basis 
for an evidential forecast of future threats to EU internal 
security.
The analysis underpinning the development of 
priorities will also support the planning of operational 
actions.
Intelligence analysis versus scientific 
research
Intelligence analysis, and thus the SOCTA analysis, 
is different from scientific research. In the latter the 
principal aim is to acquire knowledge on a chosen 
subject. With intelligence analysis the objective is 
to facilitate effective interventions. Here the aim is 
to find out what has happened, is happening now 
or could happen in the future. This has a bearing on 
the recognition and interpretation of indicators for 
specific situations and developments. There are other 
differences which set analysis apart from research, such 
as the need for speed, secrecy and professional trust.
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EMPACT — where we are today
For the interim period, prior to the full policy cycle of 
2013-2017, an initial, reduced cycle has been initiated. 
The 2011 OCTA provided the basis on which the Council 
decided on eight serious and organised crime (SOC) 
priorities for 2011-2013. In line with the full cycle, these 
priorities have been translated into MASPs, EMPACT 
(OAPs) and ultimately coordinated and ongoing 
actions by EU Member States and EU organisations 
against the identified threats to EU security.
Improvements in cooperation are already being seen 
in the current priority areas with joint operations and 
investigations now being increasingly run.
Information from these investigations is sent to Europol 
via its secure system, SIENA, to be analysed via Europol’s 
unique system of the Analysis Workfile (AWF) (3). This 
will help inform the conclusions of the 2013 SOCTA.
The data for the SOCTA is originating from Europol’s 
AWF on serious and organised crime, MS and third-
partner contributions. The SOCTA uses a holistic 
approach towards open-source material. Not all 
available sources will be used, but none is immediately 
(3) AWF: an AWF is a database on a specific crime area, which is in-
trinsically linked to specific forms of operational support offered 
by Europol. In effect an AWF is the only existing legal tool at 
European level to store, process and analyse factual information 
(‘hard’ data) and in particular ‘intelligence’ (or ‘soft’ data) at the 
same time, including personal data of a sensitive nature. Once 
information is received within an Analysis Work File, Europol will 
make sure that all the data is made available for analysis. This 
means, to start with, that data is processed in a structured way 
so it can be continuously exploited and enhanced.
discarded, except for suspicious sources, tabloid press 
articles or similar. At the beginning of August 2012, 
a questionnaire was forwarded to all partners, with 
a deadline for contributions of end of October 2012.
The work to be done for the SOCTA will reach 
a crescendo in the last months of 2012 and the months 
immediately preceding the launch date, when all 
the information from Member States, third countries 
and other contributors needs to be collected, 
evaluated, collated, integrated and interpreted, and 
then translated into a report that will clearly identify 
the most important challenges for law enforcement 
authorities in Member States in the coming years. The 
SOCTA report will be published at the beginning of 
March 2013.
Postscriptum:
The SOCTA 2017 will be published (or ‘was published’ 
depending on the date of the publication) on 9 March 
2017. 
The EU Justice and Home Affairs Council will 
decide on the new crime priorities in June 2017. The 
implementation of the new operational actions will 
start January 2018.
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A major task of the CEPOL Research and science 
conferences has been dealing with and presentation of 
scientific analyses of contemporary and prognosticated 
challenges of policing. The events should contribute 
to overcoming existing deficits and obstacles in 
acceptance of the importance of police research for 
dealing with these challenges. They should help in 
raising awareness of the need to respect research 
findings for efficient police reforms.
In the field of contemporary and emerging challenges 
close linkages are essential between practical needs for 
police and policing on the one side and theoretical/
scientific efforts on the other. Therefore the organisers 
of the CEPOL Research and science conferences were 
eager to invite police trainers and practitioners as well 
as police researchers to present their perceptions of 
the emerging challenges for police and policing and to 
expose their approaches/ideas on how to meet these 
challenges to scrutiny.
The following contributions collected in this chapter 
deal with contemporary and predicted challenges from 
the viewpoint of consequences for the organisation of 
police and policing. In addition the articles underline 
that the challenges have to be seen through the prism 
of permanent changes in the relation between police 
or other institutions/persons charged with policing 
matters and citizens, as well as in the relationship of 
police to the domain and logic of scientific research. 
Another aspect of the contemporary and emerging 
challenges is identified in the need for strengthening 
(international and institutional) cooperation.
To sum up all the contributions in this chapter, it 
could be said that the described challenges and 
their consequences for police and policing (will) have 
a strong influence on police training/education — 
and therefore in consequences for CEPOL. However 
a proper adaptation of police training/education 
should be based on research findings — as explained 
in the general introduction. In summary, the articles 
are a good case in point for the importance of police 
research dealing with contemporary challenges of 
policing for strategies and activities in CEPOL.
Based on the upheaval in the contemporary policing 
landscape, Peter Neyroud, familiar with high-
level hands-on police management as well as with 
proper academic research standards, is portraying 
the shifts in policing, police professionalism and 
police organisation. He comes to the conclusion that 
‘Great challenges now face policing, but the uncertainty 
of the contemporary landscape also promises a real 
opportunity for police leaders to shape a profession that 
can withstand the demands of tomorrow.’
Neyroud’s conclusions can be taken as a solid and 
well-informed basis for further future research projects. 
From a forward-looking vantage point, they can serve 
as a constructive starting point for reconsidering 
and challenging the existing national police training 
systems — in particular for police managers, including 
the implementation of the Bologna Process — as well as 
international cooperation in the field of police training.
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Tore Bjørgo makes the point that there is a widely 
held view in CEPOL circles and among many police 
researchers that there is a great need for more 
comparative policing research in Europe. As a case-in-
point he presents the research design of an ongoing 
comparative and longitudinal study of recruitment, 
education and careers in the police. The fundamental 
questions in this study are the following:
 § what characterises the kinds of people recruited to 
police work?;
 § how are they shaped by police education and 
socialisation into the profession?;
 § how do different systems of police recruitment and 
education impact on the attitudes and views on 
police work of the new police officers produced by 
these systems?
Bjørgo describes the project design and content of the 
used questionnaire but he was not yet able to present 
findings — because in 2010 the project was in the 
phase of collecting survey data. However, he assures 
us that the core questions can be studied by police 
research — and to a large extent will be answered– 
in the presented study. He is convinced that the 
project may facilitate practical collaboration between 
police researchers in many European countries. The 
comparative study, based on shared methodological 
instruments, used to collect and produce truly 
comparable data, is necessary for further development 
of police science as a discipline.
Graham Hooper states in the introduction of his 
contribution ‘Cooperation in policing in Europe — 
current trends and future challenges’: ‘The only thing 
that we can be certain of in the policing environment in 
which we work today is uncertainty, unpredictability and 
challenge. They are the constants that we all face.’ He 
illustrates the range of current and future challenges 
for European policing as follows:
 § organised criminals continue to operate faster, more 
flexibly and on a truly global scale;
 § the market in drugs, illegal immigration and money 
laundering will probably continue to grow but 
will become more complex because of the use of 
technology;
 § illegal migration is likely to grow and become an 
ever-increasing problem;
 § the use of the internet and electronic 
communications will grow and be exploited by 
criminals and criminal networks;
 § changes and developments to the banking, finance 
and information technology sectors will create 
demands on police organisations in terms of 
securing the employment of people.
He is convinced that police will have to strengthen 
international cooperation for tackling these challenges. 
He underlines that international cooperation is a key 
element for successful and effective policing not only 
in the field of operational policing but also in the areas 
of police training/education and policing research.
Sabine Vogt presents in her paper ‘Innovation in 
European Police Forces’ new approaches, instruments 
and techniques which are used by the German Federal 
Criminal Office in order to meet new challenges. 
Particularly she describes the ‘early detection approach’, 
criminalistic-criminological research and technological 
monitoring, and the ‘STEP (Social, Technological, 
Economic, Political) approach.
One of the major new challenges in policing is 
cybercrime — a fast mutating phenomena of truly 
global character — particularly testing for international 
police cooperation. Tatiana Tropina analyses the 
role of police in fighting cybercrime. In the first part 
she describes the role of police in fighting this field of 
crime and highlights the problems and challenges. In 
the second part she deals with the unique challenges 
of cybercrime for policing cyberspace, which require 
a review of traditional approaches to the concept of 
policing, application of new tools, both legislative 
and technical, for investigation, development of 
skills of working with electronic evidence, and last 
but not least, the ability to cooperate with industry 
players. One of the critical issues is also capacity 
building (special training for police experts), because 
the mere possession of new technologies for the 
investigation and detection of crime does not mean 
the ability to utilise them. In her conclusion she says 
inter alia: ‘Despite the number of challenges that need to 
be addressed, police units and organisations as one of the 
main stakeholder on the scene of fighting cybercrime can 
act as a central spin-off for building links between different 
stakeholders, establishing cooperation with private 
sector, and developing the national and international 
approaches to tackle the problem of ICT misuse.’
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Chapter VI: Contemporary and emerging challenges of policing — introduction 
Almost demonstrating the fast pace of change 
of emerging police issues, social media has been 
becoming an increasingly challenging and complex 
topic for police forces in Europe and elsewhere during 
the last few years. Police officers are confronted with 
the emergence of a new virtual public sphere and they 
must try to deal with it in a diverse and sometimes quite 
contested ways. P. Saskia Bayerl, Gabriele Jacobs and 
Kate Horton conducted a study to better understand 
the disparate attitudes towards social media in European 
police forces and their underlying reasons. They aim to 
obtain a clearer picture of current social media usage 
and the degree of general acceptance within European 
police forces. They report on their findings from the 
Europe-wide project ‘Comparative Police Studies in the 
EU’ (COMPOSITE) in which they asked police officers 
from different European countries about their attitudes 
towards social media. All in all this contribution has 
the ability to meet contemporary and future expected 
challenges of policing as a result of technological 
advance and its consequences for changes in our 
societies. It can be seen as a strong motivation for 
further research in this fast-growing environment.
Technological, demographical, economic and 
political developments, as well as progress in many 
scientific fields pose central challenges to policing and 
particularly for police — and they will continue to do 
so even in the future. In fact, expected developments 
contain elements of uncertainty and risks. Dealing 
with uncertainties (expectations, imminent dangers, 
security risks) — and therefore how to take the 
correct actions and reactions — is a special challenge 
for politicians and managers/experts active in the 
field of policing. Prognoses based on scientific and 
comparative analyses of the current environments/
conditions for policing and predictions (using 
approved methods and short- and medium-term 
models) might help them in their decisions. It will be 
an important task for (the further developed) CEPOL 
to offer/deliver scientific and comparative findings and 
approved methods for prognoses to stakeholders/
decision-makers in policing for enabling them to deal 
with challenges in a professional way and with good 
prospect for success.
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Across the international community a great deal of 
thought is currently focused on the shape of policing in 
the near future. In Europe, the Dutch Politieacadamie’s 
‘Pearls in Policing’ add to the work of the UK’s National 
Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) in developing 
best practice, while in the United States the Harvard 
Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety has 
brought together an international cross-section of 
academics and practitioners to explore the future 
shape of policing. If a common thread runs through the 
work of these bodies and others, it is the recognition 
that the moment has arrived for a new professional 
model in policing. The challenges that policing faces 
are changing apace, and in addressing these changes 
there is a need to move beyond the practices that have 
dominated over the last decade.
Upheaval in the contemporary policing landscape 
has been rapid and widespread. In the UK, the NPIA 
is currently working around five core themes: cost-
effectiveness, leadership, information systems, 
protective services and local policing. Chief among 
these is the pressing need to reduce costs in the midst of 
a global recession. The challenge of providing improved 
service with fewer resources is European-wide, but in 
a UK context policing now faces three years of (at best) 
flat-cash, with a strong possibility of five per cent cuts to 
police budgets. However, the impact of the economic 
downturn cannot be addressed in isolation. Patterns of 
crime are changing dramatically, and the effects of the 
recession are not as clear cut as they might be. Virtually 
every statistician in the UK was predicting an impact 
from the recession on crime that has so far failed to 
materialise. Crime has not increased outside of very small 
pockets, and the majority of forces in England and Wales 
are still reporting significantly reduced levels. In part, this 
reflects the shape of the UK workforce. Thus far, many of 
those laid off in the recession are highly skilled and will 
not be anxious to commit minor property offences for 
fear of unemployment. Equally, though, crime has been 
shifting into spheres where traditional methods of police 
recording do not capture the activity. Crime recording 
systems generally focus on geography, constructing 
information around a postcode or a zip code. By its 
nature, e-crime is not a geographical activity, a fact 
that municipal-based policing is finding hard to cope 
with. This is particularly true in the United States, where 
the Los Angeles Police Department’s Bill Bracknell has 
been exploring the challenges posed by the increase 
in e-crime: decentralised forces lack the means and 
mechanisms for addressing it, and with the FBI distracted 
by terrorism, there is a gap in the response to e-crime.
The policing community is coming to terms with the 
changing criminal landscape. The reality of e-crime, 
for example, is that it does not take on a single form, 
but comprises a multitude of different schemes. So 
much time is now spent in e-space that, unsurprisingly, 
criminal activity is developing in the online world 
much as it has in the physical world. Equally, viewing 
organised crime as a business, it is to be expected that 
in times of recession professional criminals diversify 
their portfolios. In the current economic climate, it will 
be interesting to see in what direction they head.
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Responding quickly to the criminal population that’s 
moving across boundaries, the UK has shared DNA 
database scene matches with the Dutch DNA database, 
identifying 22 matches for serious crimes between 
the two countries. One match is of particular concern 
because it relates to an individual who has committed 
a homicide in both countries and is, as yet, unidentified. 
While neither country has so far sought to match this 
particular profile against other European databases 
(though professional intuition suggests the individual 
concerned has probably committed offences in others 
among the 27 EU Member States), the infrastructure 
for information sharing is developing rapidly. The UK 
recently agreed to share crime scene matches with 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
on a regular basis, with the eventual development of 
a DNA watch-list in mind. Similarly, the implementation 
of the Prüm treaty, once the necessary infrastructure 
has been developed, will allow for databases to be 
searched on a more routine basis in Europe.
Increased data sharing inevitably raises privacy and 
security issues. When the Schengen system is switched 
on across thirty countries, or the Prüm system goes 
live across twenty countries, the privacy and security 
debate over who holds information and how it is 
used will become a great deal louder than it is even 
now. The issue may be particularly pressing for those 
new democracies in the eastern part of Europe, 
where information held by the state has a completely 
different cultural and political meaning than for those 
of us in the western part of Europe and, particularly 
from an Anglo-Saxon perspective where we have 
fundamentally permissive regimes. But these issues 
pose challenges everywhere, not least of all in the UK 
where the Police National Database is due to go live 
in 2010, making 120 million items of information about 
people, objects, locations and events available to every 
frontline police officer at the touch of a button. In 
addition, the UK also holds ten million fingerprints and 
six million DNA profiles, which is massively greater per 
head of population than anywhere else in the world. 
Explaining the necessity of a system that operates on 
such a grand scale can sometimes prove difficult, but 
the transformation such technologies bring about 
in terms of the quantity and quality of information 
available to policing is indisputable.
Uptake of such systems is expanding: Australia and 
the United States are planning similar systems, while 
Canada is expected to go live at the same time as the 
UK. And databases are just starting to go international. 
The UK is about to share DNA and fingerprint 
samples with the five Anglo-Saxon countries, and is 
preparing to systematically do the same with Europe. 
Discussions have been taking place between the G8 
DNA and fingerprints group about broadening and 
deepening the level of sharing between countries 
that are involved in Interpol. While governments 
are rapidly making headway in terms of information 
storage and sharing, it is not always clear that they 
have the support of their publics in doing so. But there 
is a balance to be struck. The logic of data exchange 
speaks for itself through cases like the murder of Piet 
Peeman, an 82-year-old murdered in Schiedam in May 
2006. The UK-Dutch DNA exchange identified the killer 
as a Lithuanian man, then living in Poland, who was 
arrested for shoplifting in Oxford Street. In December 
2009, he was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment by 
a Rotterdam court. With the increased permeability of 
borders, and the technology now available to policing, 
such crimes ought to be detectable. In terms of 
European policing, the ratification of the Lisbon treaty 
holds some substantial implications on this front.
The rollout of Prüm will see the release of a quantity of 
information quite unlike anything before at European 
level, driving cooperation in a way that information 
has not done previously. Cooperation with the Dutch 
required the establishment of detailed protocols 
for gathering evidence and dealing effectively with 
serious crime on a routine basis, because cooperation 
became increasingly necessary. Based on the Dutch 
experience, practice in Europe will be driven by the 
discovery that police services are dealing with the 
same homicidal maniacs and serious criminals. The 
policing community realises that this is the case, but 
information has not yet been made available to officers 
in a way that would demand action. Changes will only 
take hold once data sharing starts to shape responses 
at the operational level.
Broader changes are taking place in the policing world. 
Pieter Tops argues that the COMPSTAT era has run its 
course, not only in Europe but also in the United States. 
There is a general recognition that the public are 
looking for more confidence-based local policing, and 
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it is difficult to capture confidence data in a COMPSTAT 
form, both because improvement takes longer to 
become visible and because hitting crime detection 
and reduction targets, certainly in the UK, actually 
has relatively little impact on the public’s confidence 
in local policing. It can make a substantial difference 
where there are poor crime figures, but there is a mid-
range in which confidence and crime levels do not 
relate to one another as expected. The UK recently 
launched a national crime mapping service which 
shows little difference in confidence between relatively 
high-crime areas and relatively low-crime areas. The 
criminological community has been aware of this 
for some time, but it has taken time for practitioners 
and policy-makers to respond. Swedish policing, as in 
the UK, is now increasingly talking about confidence 
as the key driver of performance. The connection 
between confidence and legitimacy is confirmed by 
a growing literature, and this relationship will be critical 
to shaping interaction between police and public in 
the near future.
There is a growing awareness of just how localised 
people’s real understanding of crime and disorder is. 
Perception of crime levels is generally not city-wide, 
nor is it connected with a whole suburb; by and 
large, perception of crime focuses on an individual’s 
street and an area extending 125 metres either side 
of it. People’s experience of crime is very local, which 
means the response has to be localised. Similarly, the 
criminological evidence on what constitutes a hotspot 
points to an area equivalent to two houses on one 
corner. Much as keyhole technology revolutionised 
surgery, policing must move towards greater precision 
in dealing with problems of localised criminality. From 
a politician’s perspective local policing may not appear 
to require a great deal of intelligence, largely involving 
uniformed officers who are committed to their 
community and perform a social function. But even at 
the local level, that sort of policing is outmoded for the 
challenges facing policing; the development of a skills-
base among uniformed officers is of great importance. 
In the UK, the NPIA is currently pouring resources 
into capability support of this kind. It can comprise 
assistance with anything from the development of 
information systems through to dealing with problems 
in performance.
Policing everywhere is seeking better dialogue with 
the public to improve confidence and effectiveness. 
On the issue of stop and account, for example, 
a brief survey of the literature reveals a number 
of studies going on in Scotland, Southern Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Bulgaria and Hungary, with 
a view to improving the ways that police do stop and 
account and foster confidence from the public. The 
entire sector is interested in how the police can go 
about their day-to-day job in a manner that is efficient 
and professional, and which thereby establishes 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. It is this shift from 
punishing law-breaking to encouraging law-keeping 
which makes this moment so critical in the future of 
policing. But there is still a fantastic paucity of evidence 
on effective policing. This is particularly true of the 
responses to public disorder. The UK recently saw 
a review of public-order policing following the death 
of a member of the public during the G20 protests. In 
the wake of the incident Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary published a major report, to which the 
NPIA contributed a review of the existing research on 
public-order policing. It is not a very long study, owing 
to the lack of quality international research on what 
good public-order policing is. While there is a great 
deal of opinion, there is very little evidence. The same 
could be said of much of the work on serious and 
organised crime, though the police are often reluctant 
to publicise what research there is. All this is not to 
deny the emergence of an evidence-base in policing. 
In the field of counter-terrorism, for example, research 
is beginning to emerge on effective strategies for anti-
radicalisation and preventative policing.
Similarly, accountability has become more complex. 
The demand for greater accountability at local levels 
seems to be a universal one in most countries, and 
poses substantial challenges for both government 
and policing. But calls for more effective democratic 
accountability at national and supranational levels 
present greater difficulties still. Certainly, a lack 
of accountability mechanisms is one of the great 
vulnerabilities of European policing. From a UK 
perspective, democratic engagement with some of 
the structures that are developing for international 
cooperation will prove a central challenge in the 
immediate future. Across European polities, the 
picture of diversity is infinitely more complex than 
20 years ago, and it continues to grow more so. The 
268
European Police Science and Research Bulletin · Special Conference Issue Nr. 2
fastest-growing groups within virtually every European 
country are immigrant populations, a fact which poses 
a whole series of challenges for policing. The UK very 
likely possesses the highest threat from home-grown 
terrorism. This in itself provides a constant source 
of political and community debate. But there is also 
a wider debate about cross-border migration which 
bleeds into a debate about what the police are for. 
There is a danger that policing ignores the assumption, 
from the public perspective, that border police 
and local police are joined up. Even in the United 
States where there are hard lines drawn between 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and local 
police, the public still expect the two to cooperate fully 
in dealing with particular issues. Misunderstanding the 
public’s expectations of social controls can be quite 
problematic. Of course, the nature of the policing 
response to public opinion will depend on the issues 
of concern. Distinctions must be drawn, for example, 
between migration-related crime and public concern 
about migration, which may not reflect the reality, but 
nevertheless drives feelings of insecurity and a demand 
for more ‘law and order’ policing. Further, as European 
police cooperation continues to develop, it begs the 
question of whether there is a European public with 
a consistent set of views and expectations in relation 
to policing. While there are a number of EU-wide crime 
surveys, there has not until recently been a serious 
attempt to pull the data together. Dutch research on 
policing culture demonstrates both north-south and 
east-west differences of tone and tenor, but there are 
nevertheless common themes, particularly in regards 
to expectations. Balancing central, regional and local 
responsiveness — and drawing connections between 
the three — poses substantial challenges to European 
policing, particularly when the visibility of frameworks 
for collaboration within countries is often so low.
There are major accompanying shifts in the policing 
profession. Historically, one of the most resistant 
areas to reform has been the criminal investigation 
bureau; it is now one of the fastest moving. By way 
of example, 2010 will see the introduction in the field 
not just of accelerated fingerprint identification, but 
also of accelerated DNA analysis, allowing for the 
processing of crime-scene samples in under an hour. 
These innovations alone have the potential to radically 
alter the role of investigator. It will also necessitate the 
restructuring of the entire information framework that 
sits behind investigative work, along with the way in 
which analysts operate and resources are coordinated 
at major crime scenes. The last year has witnessed 
investigators attending major crime scenes — one 
example being the large-scale theft of IT equipment 
in Sussex — and, through the remote transmission 
of fingerprints, arriving at the offenders’ addresses 
before they returned home. The police workforce is 
diversifying, and policing organisations increasingly 
include people with scientific qualifications, ranging 
from crime-scene investigators through to analysts. The 
need for the service to develop these professions and 
their impact on the wider police community is critical.
Scientifically conducted experiments are taking place, 
such as current research into the effectiveness of 
crime mapping in the UK. But it is still a wildly under-
developed field. There is no systematic method of 
evaluation, although bodies such as the Campbell 
Crime and Justice Coordination Group are starting 
to bring together individuals in the field. There is no 
register where research programmes across police and 
research institutions are recorded or made publicly 
available, with the result that practitioners conduct 
very useful studies and then fail share them with 
anyone. Too often, research sits on shelves as part of 
PhD and Master’s theses, because practitioners, on the 
whole, do not publish. The issue of risk aversion, for 
example, is an area in which there is not a great deal of 
evidence-based practice in the UK, but there is a vast 
quantity of practice written down, resulting in the 
paralysis that such levels of knowledge can create. At 
present, the right course of action is often obscured by 
the sheer quantity of bureaucracy involved in making 
a difficult decision. The situation is changing in the 
UK after the criticism of officers for a lack of action in 
circumstances where it was urgently required. Perhaps 
public outcry is sometimes necessary to prompt 
wholesale institutional reform.
Similarly, predictive policing is fast becoming a reality. 
The NPIA recently held a conference with the National 
Institute of Justice, the LAPD, and a number of larger 
United States forces, exploring how theory can be 
turned into practice in the field of predictive policing. 
Scientific method is creeping into the policing field, 
most obviously in the tools already applied to specific 
disciplines, including forensics, identification and less 
lethal force. Recent studies suggest, for example, that the 
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introduction of tasers has led to a 60 per cent reduction 
in serious injuries to police officers, although the lack 
of randomised control trials prior to the introduction 
of tasers shows that the profession is still not quite 
where it ought to be. The problem is not limited to the 
policing community. The topics that academics choose 
to look at are generally of little value to policing. They 
may be useful to society, but they are rarely useful to 
practitioners. The result is that practitioners are often 
barely acquainted with the academic literature.
The contrast between the health and policing 
professions is stark, because in healthcare best practice 
is established entirely around randomised control trials. 
Studies are sometimes small, but they are a necessity 
for establishing the efficacy of new techniques. The 
ratio of studies in healthcare to those in policing is 
striking. It is an astonishingly poor position for such 
a major public service to be in. The current state of 
policing is reminiscent of the 40-year gap between 
the discovery of a cure for scurvy by British doctors 
and the wide-scale implementation of it by the Royal 
Navy; change needs to pass through the entire culture 
of policing before practice catches up with theory. 
A viable framework for scientific research has yet to 
emerge. Carrying the healthcare analogy forward, 
equivalent bodies to university hospitals are entirely 
absent from the policing infrastructure, while the 
academics attached to police academies lack the 
status they deserve. Until the profession arrives at 
the point where it has clinical professors of policing, 
driving practice from an understanding of practitioner 
knowledge, it cannot advance much further.
However, partnership presents new opportunities for 
education. Significant shifts are taking place within 
European governments in terms of shaping institutions 
that were effectively created for a particular purpose, 
but are now coming to shape European policy. 
CEPOL, among others, offers valuable opportunities 
to exchange knowledge and develop an overview of 
policing across the continent. Other collaborations 
range from opportunities to gain qualifications in 
different countries to emerging research partnerships, 
such as the North Sea Collaboration that the Scottish 
Institute of Policing Research is driving. Partnership is 
becoming uniquely important in European policing, 
but there remains a need to move to a position where 
any significant piece of research in Europe is available 
to the entire profession, using replicated data to 
strengthen the knowledge-base across Europe.
Police leadership is equally in need of change. Leaders 
are required who publish and understand research, 
because it is no longer possible to lead an organisation 
from a position of ignorance. The shortest meeting in 
the UK Association of Chief Police Officers was once 
the information management meeting, in which 
papers that no one could understand — and which 
were often devoid of meaningful content — were 
simply waved through. But contemporary policing 
demands that leaders are clear about their information 
needs; driving a different sort of practice and creating 
a different sort of outcome. Leaders must understand 
that the complex organisations of policing now require 
highly effective business skills, a highly developed 
sense of moral leadership, and a strong understanding 
of people, information and resource usage in their 
organisation. This requires an understanding of 
performance in a broader sense than the restrictive 
terms of the COMPSTAT era. It means understanding 
the demands on the organisation and how they are 
changing, in addition to understanding the needs of 
the people who are expressing those demands.
There are serious financial challenges to police 
leadership. Most European police services will find 
themselves facing cuts of between five and ten per 
cent. Politicians will want to protect the front line, 
but this begs the question of where the front line is 
in terms of modern policing. The last 30 years have 
demonstrated that uniformed officers cannot carry 
policing by themselves; analysts are required to task 
them effectively. So there is a sense in which analysts 
constitute the front line. But an integral part of the 
legitimisation agenda taking a professional approach 
in the administration of custody and detention suites. 
Working through the organisational structure of 
the modern police force, one might soon reach the 
conclusion that the only non front-line services are 
finance and human resources functions (although 
financial ineptitude is probably the fastest route to 
dismissal for a police chief). The situation does not 
lend managers a great deal of flexibility. Nevertheless, 
shrinking budgets will mean doing less in certain areas. 
Police leaders now face the challenge of weighing the 
quality of a given strategy, which proves particularly 
difficult in fields such as organised crime, which 
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currently lack a convincing framework for measuring 
the quality of response.
If the leaders of tomorrow are to successfully navigate 
a period of transition, they will require strong mandates; 
they will need to know where to get those mandates 
from, and how they are to be refreshed. They will 
also need to know how to establish strong networks, 
at both national and international levels. With these 
requirements comes a different professionalism for the 
organisation more generally. Policing still possesses 
traditional organisational hierarchies, along with the 
military symbols inherited in the 1820s. While some 
states are encouraging direct entry, it is still direct 
entry into a rigid management structure, where rank 
comes with an expectation of particular privileges and 
responsibilities. With predictive policing and radical 
changes in the way policing uses information, the 
profession requires flatter, more flexible organisations 
to confront the challenges that it faces.
This is the time for a new professionalism in policing. 
The profession is at a point where the industrial model 
of leadership, the military model of leadership, and 
the technical model of leadership employed over 
generations are no longer fit for purpose. Tomorrow’s 
police chiefs will be expected to successfully 
balance the demands of crime, cost, confidence and 
community. This new professionalism requires four 
things: it needs a leadership that understands and 
embraces accountability; it must have at its core 
a strong focus on legitimacy, understanding the 
evidence about how it is delivered and how to provide 
a responsive service; it must successfully combine both 
innovation and an evidence base; and it must foster 
a degree of coherence across European policing. Great 
challenges now face policing, but the uncertainty 
of the contemporary landscape also promises a real 
opportunity for police leaders to shape a profession 
that can withstand the demands of tomorrow.
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What characterises the kinds of people recruited to 
police work? How are they shaped by police education 
and socialisation into the profession? And how do 
different systems of police recruitment and education 
impact on the attitudes and views on police work of 
the new police officers produced by these systems? 
These are fundamental questions for police science as 
well as for institutions providing police education.
However, at least until recently, there has been 
surprisingly little systematic comparative and 
longitudinal research on recruitment to the police and 
the impact of police education and police practice on 
new police officers. Until now, there have only been 
longitudinal studies of police students and new police 
officers limited to single countries or cities: in the USA 
(Van Maanen 1973), in the UK (Fielding, 1988), in France 
(Monjardet & Gorgeon 1999), in Australia (Chan 2003), in 
Canada (Alain & Grégoire 2008), and in Sweden (Lauritz 
2010). Unfortunately, although these different national 
studies are all longitudinal, they have used different 
methodological designs, questionnaires or interview 
guides, thereby producing data which are not directly 
comparable. It is, of course, possible to compare and 
discuss the findings from these different national 
studies, and then the fact that methodological designs 
are different may even be a strength, as quantitative 
and qualitative studies with different questions and 
time spans may provide complementary insights. Still, 
these studies do not provide comparable data.
A comparative and longitudinal research 
design
It is a widely held view in CEPOL circles and among 
many police researchers that there is a great need 
for more comparative policing research in Europe. 
However, it is not always clear what comparative 
research really means. In the CEPOL study on Police 
Science Perspectives: Towards a European Approach 
(del Barrio Romero, Bjørgo, Jaschke, Kwanten, Mawby & 
Pagon 2009) two very different views on comparative 
research on policing were expressed. One position 
held that comparison in the field of policing is 
mainly ‘exchange of information and experience 
into systematic ways of learning from each other’ 
(pp. 181-182). The other position held that:
What is needed is not more ‘comparative seminars’ 
where representatives from different countries tell 
their stories about how policing is in their countries. 
Without comparable data, such exercises are of limited 
value. A far more ambitious approach is to develop 
systematic comparative studies based on shared 
methodological instruments, used to collect and 
produce truly comparative data. National differences 
can then be used as variables to test hypotheses, build 
theory and evaluate practices in policing (1).
The research project presented in this paper is clearly 
an example of the latter approach to comparative 
(1) This statement was written by the author (Tore Bjørgo), as one 
of his contributions to the joint CEPOL study, which incorporat-
ed opposing points of view on several issues, on p. 93.
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research (2). Our research design is based on 
a longitudinal survey instrument developed by the 
Centre for the Study of Professions at Oslo University 
College, the so-called StudData survey (3). Their 
original design was to present the respondents with 
partly identical sets of questions during different 
phases of their careers to register a development of 
attitudes, preferences and adoption of norms. The 
questionnaires are distributed to the students in four 
phases: at the beginning and end of their education, 
and three years and six years into their professional 
life. Thus, some core questions are repeated in the 
various phases, and other questions are added to 
relate to their specific professional situation. The 
respondents are anonymous to the researchers, 
identifiable only through a coded ID key (kept secure 
and separate from their questionnaires) to protect 
their identity and privacy. The methodology makes 
it possible to trace changes at individual as well as at 
group levels.
So far, 20 professional (mainly Bachelor’s) programmes 
and 11 Norwegian universities and university 
colleges have participated in the project, comprising 
students from professional educations as diverse as 
teachers, social workers, engineers, librarians, nurses, 
journalists and medical doctors. A large database 
with comparable longitudinal data is now available 
for researchers. For some of the programmes, two or 
three panels (cohorts with some years in between) 
have been studied.
Hence, the original StudData design makes it possible 
to compare students from different professional 
educations, how their values and attitudes change 
through the four phases of their education and careers, 
and also compare how different cohorts may differ.
The idea to adapt the StudData design to police 
students/officers was first presented by this author in 
the original 2007 CEPOL report Perspectives on police 
science in Europe (pp. 80-81; p. 93 in the expanded 
(2) Other good examples of truly comparative studies are Johannes 
Knutsson’s study of the police use of fire arms in the Nordic 
countries (Knutsson 2005) and Wouter Stol’s study of ‘Policing 
the streets of Europe’ (included in this volume).
(3) See the StudData homepage: http://www.hio.no/Enheter/
Senter-for-profesjonsstudier-SPS/StudData (2010-12-14). 
A longitudinal research design is a study that involves repeated 
observations of the same items over long periods of time.
2009 version). In that initiative, the original StudData 
design was pushed one step further by introducing 
an international comparative dimension. This is of 
particular interest in European police research, since 
we know that systems of police education and training 
varies considerably throughout Europe, with three-year 
Bachelor’s degrees for all new police officers in some 
countries, and ten weeks of formal training combined 
with on-the-job training in some other countries. 
The status and trust of the police in the population 
also differs much in various European countries. The 
StudData research design with an added cross-country 
comparative dimension would then be the perfect 
methodological instrument to test the impact of these 
different systems of police education on who are 
recruited to the police, how their education/training 
shapes their values and views on policing, and how 
exposure to the field of practice and socialisation into 
police culture impacts on their attitudes and outlooks.
Since 2008, a group of researchers has worked together 
to develop this design into an ambitious European 
comparative and longitudinal study of recruitment, 
education and careers in the police. The initial group 
consisted of researchers from institutions providing 
police education in Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
Selecting the most relevant parts of the original 
StudData questionnaire, they added a number of 
police-specific questions to bring in some of the core 
issues of police science into the questionnaire (4).
A draft version of the questionnaire for new police 
students (phase 1) was tested in Norway and Sweden 
in 2009 (5). Researchers from similar institutions in other 
European countries were also invited to join the project. 
By autumn 2010, institutions of police education from 
ten European countries were committed to take part 
in the project:
 § Norway
(4) Some questions taken from from the European Social Survey on 
political orientation and trust in other people were also includ-
ed in our questionnaire, to allow for a comparison between the 
attitudes of police students/officers and the general population 
in the relevant countries.
(5) The first study based on data from the pilot study was pre-
sented at CEPOL’s Research and Science conference in Oslo 
in October 2010, by Silje Bringsrud Fekjær on ‘Police Students’ 
Social Background, Attitudes and Career Plans’. The study is now 
submitted for review in an international journal.
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 § Sweden
 § Finland
 § Iceland
 § Estonia
 § Germany (Hessen, Thüringen, Brandenburg, Hamburg)
 § Belgium
 § Hungary
 § Slovenia
 § Spain (Catalonia) (6).
By including this wide range of European countries 
with different systems of police education, police 
organisations and styles of policing into the project, it 
will expand the range of differences and thereby the 
possibilities for fruitful comparative analysis. These 
data collected on the basis of our research design will 
make it possible to do comparative analysis along at 
least four dimensions:
 § Longitudinally — how individual police students 
change over time as their careers progress
 § Between different cohorts — e.g. before and after 
educational reforms
 § Between countries (and institutions within countries)
 § Between professions — how police students differ 
from e.g. teacher/nurse/social work students
How can this project contribute to the 
development of police science?
Police science is a new interdisciplinary and applied 
discipline, emerging in response to the development 
of the police as a knowledge-based profession rather 
than as a craft. Police science has been described as 
‘the scientific study of the police as an institution and 
of policing as a process’ (7). How can the police version 
of the StudData project contribute to the development 
of police science? Which core questions and issues of 
police science may then be addressed (and possibly 
(6) The two first participant countries carried out data collection for 
Phase 1 during August and September 2010: Norway (N=637, 
response rate 88 %) and Catalonia (N=1282, response rate 98 %). 
The other countries will follow suit in 2011.
(7) This definition is provided by Romero, Bjørgo, Jaschke, Kwanten, 
Mowby & Pagon (2009). Police Science Perspectives: Towards 
a European Approach. Extended Expert Report. Frankfurt: Verlag 
für Polizeiwissenschaft, p. 30.
answered) by this kind of comparative and longitudinal 
data? Here are some examples (8):
What characterises persons recruited to the police 
education and profession? This may be analysed by 
such dimensions as gender, age, geographic (urban/
rural) and ethnic origin, class background, prior 
education and work experience, values and attitudes 
in relation to general political issues as well as issues 
related to views on policing and crime, motivations 
for joining the police and expectations of their own 
future in the police profession. In what ways do police 
students differ from students seeking other types of 
professions (such as social workers, teachers, nurses or 
journalists) in terms of motivation or identification with 
the profession?
How does the police education process influence the 
values/attitudes, motivations and expectations of the 
police students? In what ways are police education and 
training socialising them into a police role? Do their 
values, motivations and expectations change during 
their time of study? Measurements at the beginning 
and end of their education may provide some answers.
How does experience with the field of practice by 
working in the police and among police colleagues 
influence their values/attitudes, motivations and 
expectations after three years or six years of police 
work? Are they able to maintain their idealism or do 
they become cynical towards the public and their 
organisation or leaders? There are strong reasons to 
expect that socialisation into such a strong ‘community 
of practice’ as the police force will have a powerful 
impact on the values, attitudes and outlooks of the 
individuals. To what extent do new police officers 
become less trustful in other people as they gradually 
integrate a police role as part of their personality? Does 
this exposure to the field of practice make a stronger 
impact than police education did? To what degree 
do the new police officers take further education 
or academic degrees? What are their professional 
ambitions? Do they end up in the positions and 
specialisations they aspired to at an earlier stage? Is 
there any link between what attracted them to the 
police education early on and what they actually end 
(8) Ibid, p. 93.
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up doing? Do they stay in the police force or do they 
leave the profession?
Are there significant differences between the types of 
persons recruited to police education in the various 
European countries in terms of background and 
motivations? If so, to what extent can this be explained 
in terms of different types of police education? If 
measurements are made before and after a major 
reform in police education in the direction of a more 
academic Bachelor’s education, as will take place in 
several European countries during the next few years, 
it might be possible to study the impact of major 
changes in police education on the backgrounds and 
motivations of the new students (9). To what extent may 
such reforms in police education also impact the police 
and police culture in the long run? Findings might be 
of considerable interest to police organisations in other 
European countries who are considering reforming 
their police education systems.
How can police education improve police practice? 
Significant parts of the StudData questionnaire have 
an evaluative purpose: to improve the pedagogical 
quality of the teaching and learning methods; the 
social experience of the police students at their place 
of study; and the relevance of their study in relation to 
their future profession as police officers. By comparing 
different curricula at different police educations in 
different countries it might be possible to identify 
better (if not ‘best’) practices.
(9) When Norway in 1993-1995 changed its police education from 
a two-year vocational type of education into a three-year col-
lege education (eventually to become a bachelor degree under 
the Bologna system in 2005), there was a clear impression that 
after this educational reform, the Police University College re-
cruited a different type of students with a different background 
and somewhat different attitudes than before. The general view 
is that the change was for the better. However, there was no 
effort to study systematically whether this was actually the case, 
which was obviously a missed opportunity for evaluating the 
reform. Other countries planning for educational reform may 
seek to capitalize on the outcomes of an extensive evaluation of 
their police educational system by joining the StudData project, 
which provides an excellent tool for this task.
Does diversity in policing matter? In most European 
countries, there are strong efforts to change the 
gender and ethnic composition of the police to reflect 
the population better and provide better police 
services to all segments of the population. Do female 
police students/officers experience their education 
and professional practice differently from the way men 
do? Do students with an ethnic minority background 
experience this differently from police students/officers 
with an ethnic majority background? How do gender 
and ethnic background impact on other variables in 
the survey, such as values or expectations for future 
employment?
Final remarks
These core questions in police research can be 
studied — and to a large extent answered — through 
the data sets that will be collected in this comparative 
and longitudinal study of recruitment, education and 
careers in the police. The project will also facilitate 
practical collaboration between police researchers in 
many European countries. These kinds of comparative 
studies, based on shared methodological instruments, 
used to collect and produce truly comparable data, 
are necessary if we want to develop police science as 
a discipline. National differences can then be used as 
variables to test hypotheses, build theory and evaluate 
practices in policing in Europe.
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Postscript (January 2017)
RECPOL, as the project is now named, has evolved 
considerably since the article above was originally 
written in late 2010. The list of participating countries (on 
page 260) has changed. Finland, Germany, Estonia and 
Hungary dropped out of the project for various reasons. 
On the other hand, Denmark joined the project in 2012 
<check>. Thus, in the end seven countries actually 
participated: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, 
Scotland, Belgium, and Catalonia in Spain. Most of these 
countries started data collection for phase 1 in fall 2010. 
By spring 2016, phase 1 and phase 2 data have been 
collected in six of the seven countries. The exception is 
Scotland where data has only been collected for phase 
1. Phase 3 data (three years into practice) is now being 
collected in several countries but not yet analysed. After 
tedious checking, a complete data file (SPSS) with phase 
1 and phase 2 data of all participant countries was made 
available for comparative analysis for the research team 
in May 2016. The first results were presented at the 
European Society of Criminology (ESC) conference in 
Münster in September 2016, in the form of nine papers 
presented at two consecutive panels. Some of the 
findings were also presented at the CEPOL conference 
in Budapest in October 2016. Revised versions of these 
(and some additional) papers will be published in a 
forthcoming edited volume with the working title 
“Police Officers in the Making”. A second volume is 
planned at a later stage, when we have collected and 
analysed data from phase 3 and 4, where the new police 
officers have gained three or sex years of experience 
from the field of practice.
The presentations at the ESC and CEPOL conferences 
aroused interest among police researchers from 
several countries in Central and Eastern Europe and 
some of them decided to join the RECPOL project. 
This includes at least Georgia, Hungary and Slovenia, 
possibly more countries as well. This will be of great 
comparative importance as the original group of 
participant countries were predominantly from 
Northern and Western Europe. A broader range of 
countries, representing a greater variation in police 
cultures and political contexts, will provide significant 
added value to the RECPOL database and to police 
research in Europe. Although these countries came on 
board too late to be included in the first edited volume, 
their results might be included in the second RECPOL 
volume. Furthermore, the RECPOL data will eventually 
be made available to other scholars. Thus, the RECPOL 
data base will be a treasure for police researchers in 
years to come.
Tore Bjørgo 
Coordinator of the RECPOL project
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Introduction — some points to bear  
in mind
This is but one view — a UK view — although it is 
grounded in research and professional input from others 
across policing. Some of the issues touched upon are not 
predictions and forecasts, but they are based on scenario 
thinking and serious analysis of future trends which may 
be important and relevant for all police organisations 
across Europe. They are put forward to stimulate 
discussion and debate, not to seek to direct policy.
The only thing that we can be certain of in the policing 
environment in which we work today is uncertainty, 
unpredictability and challenge. They are the constants 
that we all face.
Within this context, the areas the following areas will 
be addressed:
 § Challenges for European policing
 § Cooperation in policing — what to do
 § Other areas of potential EU cooperation
 § Policing — the direction in England & Wales
 § Areas where the police research community may be 
able to help
 § The relevance of evidence-based policing
Challenges that may face policing 
agencies and organisations across Europe 
in the next decade
First, organised criminals continue to operate faster, more 
flexibly and on a truly global scale. This has important 
consequences for cooperation and collaboration 
between policing organisations, particularly in the 
areas of drugs, fraud, illegal immigration, and money 
laundering — internationally inclined crimes. These 
kinds of crime types will be driven increasingly 
by changes in world population and through the 
continuing integration of the global economy.
Illegal migration in particular is likely to grow and 
become an ever-increasing problem. The principle 
destinations for these markets, both in illegal migration 
and drugs, are likely to remain in the developed world, 
including Europe. Organised crime will show its ever 
present ingenuity and flexibility to identify new markets 
and readily fill any vacuum or opportunity that exists. 
The inventiveness of criminals to find ways to exploit 
situations and to create ill-gotten gain for themselves 
is astonishing. One need only look at the way in the 
UK there has been a massive rise in the production 
of cannabis through hydroponic factories in ordinary 
domestic homes. These are now a major source of 
drug production in the UK. It has a global dimension 
too, evident by the fact that many of these cannabis 
factories are operated by Vietnamese illegal immigrants. 
This is a good example how cross-cutting dynamics and 
trends in crime are challenging us all in policing.
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Many traditional forms of organised crime will continue 
though, although new ways of committing them and 
new ways of exploiting them will emerge, particularly 
through the use of technology. It is also conceivable 
that new crimes will arise and new markets will 
emerge, sometimes through the consequences of new 
legislation or enforcement. For instance, competition 
around resources, land, water and food create new 
criminal opportunities. Efforts by governments to 
tackle global warming create opportunities through 
trading of emission schemes and the opportunity 
for fraud. And variations between enforcement and 
approaches to tackling these problems generate 
the opportunity for criminals to exploit them. There 
are new opportunities for exploitation around man-
made and natural crises. The potential around illegal 
migration and fraud (through false insurance claims) 
in post-disaster situations is something that we should 
particularly be aware of.
Evidence exists too of organised criminal tactics by 
mixing several markets at the same time, often illegal 
and legal together. The merging of logistical and 
financial systems together can cover and obfuscate the 
illegal side of operations.
Law enforcement officers need to be careful about 
building and sustaining silo operations, be it in drugs, 
people trafficking or fraud. These are entirely artificial 
constructs in the criminal world and sometimes — 
perhaps in more instances than we may care to 
acknowledge — simply cause barriers to the way that 
police organisations operate to combat international 
crime. This is one area where the research community can 
perhaps play a part — to look at the increasing merging 
and general metamorphosis of criminal operations, and 
see how international and national police structures 
match against that in terms of effectiveness.
Suggestions on how to better cooperate 
and better tackle the problems of 
international crime
The need to share and collect intelligence together on new 
crime trends and new types of crime that are developing 
across Europe and beyond is particularly crucial. This is 
a way of stopping new crimes at an early stage of their 
evolution and to frustrate new enterprises by criminals. We 
also need to think about how we can better work with other 
partners across Europe, particularly with organisations that 
are not police related. The financial sector is crucial here; 
we should be working together to frustrate the ability of 
criminals to use legitimate mechanisms to further their 
own criminal activities. There is still more that can be 
done on improving our understanding of how legitimate 
businesses are at risk to being unwittingly merged and 
intertwined with criminal activities.
There are things that we can do to protect legitimate 
businesses from being infiltrated by criminals. In the UK 
this is referred to as ‘target hardening’ and in one sense 
it is really no different to the approach that one might 
take to protecting a domestic house against burglary. 
There are opportunities to do this across Europe — to 
make vulnerable legitimate businesses less of a target 
to criminals.
There is also scope for cooperation in preventing 
criminals from assuming legitimate business positions, for 
example as company directors. Government and police 
organisations are pushing hard on seizing the assets of 
convicted criminals and one of the more lateral ways 
of doing this is to use the taxation system as a weapon 
against criminals. The UK is exploring ways in which this 
can be used to frustrate and penalise those who are 
engaged in serious and organised criminal activity.
Enforcement agencies can link together to look at disaster 
situations and to stop them from being vulnerable to 
criminal exploitation. It would be interesting to take 
that kind of issue away and look at what happens in 
certain disaster situations — to see how criminals exploit 
them, either by fraud, siphoning off aid or using other 
innovative ways of illegal exploitation.
And of course, a perennial plea on cooperation is to 
continue to look for ways to bring new legislation and 
operational procedures together in Europe to tackle 
these kinds of problems.
Challenges for European policing
The market in drugs, illegal immigration and money 
laundering — what is sometimes referred to as ‘old 
crimes’ — will probably continue to grow but become 
more complex because of the use of technology. Such 
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criminal activity will also be aided (inadvertently) by 
the general phenomenon of globalisation.
The use of the internet and electronic communications 
will grow and be exploited by criminals and criminal 
networks. The fact that ever-increasing amounts of 
public data are stored by government bodies and 
police agencies also creates new opportunities 
for criminal exploitation. Safeguarding these huge 
sensitive databases presents enormous problems for 
the police and other public bodies in terms security 
and preventing criminal attack.
In the UK there have been serious problems with regard 
to data leakages and information security lapses. Some 
instances occur simply through accidental exposure, 
but whatever the circumstances they cause immense 
public insecurity and concern. This is perhaps another 
area where the research community could bring its 
expertise to bear — to look at the issues surrounding 
information security and how to protect sensitive data 
in a complex world.
Other challenges include social networking sites and 
online ‘worlds’ which grow apace. There are clearly 
opportunities here for criminals to exploit this area both 
in terms of finding new victims of crime, but also to 
meet, plan and execute their crimes.
One other challenge exists here and it is perhaps one 
which we are not yet giving sufficient thought to at the 
moment. It is internal to our organisations and it revolves 
around having the right people with the right skills to 
tackle the new trends in international crime. Changes and 
developments to the banking, finance and information 
technology sectors will create demands on police 
organisations in terms of securing the employment of 
people with the necessary expertise to assist police 
officers/investigators in tackling these kinds of crimes. 
Recruiting and retaining such staff in a very competitive 
employment market will require much attention.
Cooperation in policing — what to do
The desire for real-time, cross-border intelligence and 
enforcement operations remains as high as ever and 
there are still things that we can do better, perhaps 
smarter, in that area. It is not without its difficulties 
of course, but some of the infrastructure is in place 
now and we should be able to operate much more 
effectively with regards to intelligence now some of 
those building blocks are in place.
Aligning legislation and laws, criminal investigative 
procedures and interoperability generally is still very 
much at the top of the agenda for European police 
cooperation. It certainly is of very high importance 
in the UK. This is a difficult and sensitive area, but the 
more we can do, the more likely we are successful in 
tackling organised and serious crime across Europe.
More information sharing and joint analysis of 
intelligence in criminal trends is unquestionably also 
still required. We have some things in place; the Swedish 
initiative is just about to take off with the sharing of 
intelligence between Member States. Schengen, of 
course, offers the opportunity to better tackle crime 
as do some aspects the Prüm Treaty. But more still 
needs to done and one way to do that is to look at 
how we exploit new technology in policing. There 
may be potential to share costs for both development 
and procurement. Experience in the UK has shown our 
own ability to integrate systems of intelligence and 
criminality information remains highly problematic 
and we still have work to do to achieve a fully joined-
up system. To do it across Europe is even more 
complex and challenging, but it is certainly something 
we should look to for the future.
Other areas of potential EU cooperation
Joint investigation teams have much potential and there 
is legislation in place now that provides for these to 
operate. However, there appear to be some issues around 
that are impacting upon their effectiveness. Perhaps if 
we are looking for areas within policing research that 
could help European police practitioners, then joint 
investigation teams may be a good one to examine.
On police training and exchanges, there is still more 
that could be done. Suggestions have been made of 
increasing the number of exchanges between police 
officers particularly in areas where there are high 
numbers of tourists. This could help in terms of dealing 
with instances of crime and problems between short-
term visitors to a particular location in Europe. The 
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European Police College (CEPOL) continues to provide 
a number of training and networking opportunities 
for police officers across Europe. We believe that 
CEPOL could look to broaden and expand its training 
opportunities through involving police officers and 
police staff at other levels.
As mentioned, the Swedish initiative is clearly an 
important step in information exchange between 
EU countries at the law-enforcement level. It will be 
interesting to see how it embeds itself in terms of 
exchanges of intelligence between Member States.
In relation to police equipment and communications, 
there are some interesting areas that could be examined 
around the joint development of equipment, be it 
technical or otherwise between police forces across 
Europe. There is a feeling in the UK that if we could 
get greater standardisation of the use of equipment 
between our own existing individual police forces, it 
would be a strong and powerful enabler towards the 
goal of interoperability. More generally, it would also 
facilitate much closer and frequent joint-operations 
between police forces.
Although it may appear to be a less important 
area of development, we should not overlook the 
way the standardising equipment — particularly 
communications and other critical operational tools 
used by police officers in their day-to-day work — may 
in itself draw police agencies and organisations much 
closer together. This approach can sometimes actually 
work faster and be more effective than working on 
large, set piece, cross-European policing protocols.
Policing — the direction in England and 
Wales
The UK government recently published a consultation 
document on the future of policing in England and 
Wales. The title itself gives you a clue as to where 
things are going in England and Wales — ‘From 
the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing our 
Communities together’. There is a strong emphasis in 
this consultation document on linking crime at a very 
local level, right up to the national problems of counter-
terrorism and major and serious and organised crime. 
There is a very conscious effort in the UK to see where 
areas of criminality link together and to match policing 
resources and capability to deal with these challenges. 
Strong emphasis is also placed on meeting public 
expectations around tackling crime. A whole section 
of these proposed reforms deals with improving the 
connection between the police and the public, for 
example the introduction of a new ‘policing pledge’ to 
the public about minimum services to be expected by 
police in a number of key areas.
There is also a desire to professionalise and free-up the 
police from unnecessary bureaucracy, streamlining 
national police processes, and allowing police officers 
and police staff who support them to be able to get on 
and do the job they need to do.
Mobile technology and mobile data is a prominent area 
in our police reform and modernisation efforts. Hand-
held mobile devices have been introduced recently to 
allow police officers to have better information and 
instant access to data and intelligence. We wish also 
to develop our workforce further; to pluralise it. By this 
I mean we intend to continue to challenge the long-
held notion that the police officer (only) should hold 
such a wide range of operational roles, and instead to 
look at how police staff can fulfil some of these, thus 
allowing police officers to concentrate upon the areas 
in which they are most effective and for which they 
have been specially trained.
There are also significant changes to the performance 
management of the police in England and Wales. In 
particular the government have swept away many 
of the targets that were set for police forces and are 
now concentrating on just one indicator of the success 
of the police — public confidence in them to tackle 
crime and disorder. Public confidence will be the only 
performance target that the government will look at in 
terms of the success or otherwise of the police. It will 
be interesting to see how that affects the way in which 
policing operates in England and Wales.
Finally, there is an interesting debate going on in Britain 
about risk in policing. There is a feeling in the UK that 
the police service became, over time, preoccupied with 
risk and risk aversion; that our general approach became 
predominated by risk in a negative way. This culminated 
in an ever-growing amount of bureaucracy and 
proliferation of processes around policing operations 
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and activity. But now there is a possibility that we 
might challenge this approach and put in its place 
a more sensible response to risk which is, after all, an 
inevitable part of policing. This is another area which is 
most fertile for researchers to examine. Risk is a complex 
phenomenon and one which has very interesting 
consequences on decision-making in policing. It is one 
we are keen on exploring further in the UK.
The relevance of research and evidence-
based policing
The goal for all of us is for there to be greater levels 
of cooperation and integration between social 
researchers and policing practitioners.
Despite the fact that there continues to be a certain 
amount of indifference, sometimes even resistance, by 
some police officers to evidence-based research, there 
is unquestionably a need for the research community 
to continue to be assertive and prevail in the aim of 
getting good, relevant, research findings firmly into the 
domain of operational policing.
No area of policing policy — be it tackling crime (minor 
right through to the most serious) or bearing down on 
public disorder and antisocial behaviour — should be 
without a strong body of supporting evidence-based 
research to underpin it. There is a school of thought in 
policing in the UK now which is growing all the time, 
that research should have the same place in policing 
as it has in its sister public sectors of medicine and 
education. This is very difficult to achieve, but the idea 
of bringing a discipline and rigour to policing, that one 
would, for example, find in medicine, is very important 
and is gaining greater recognition in the UK all the 
time. The term evidence-based policing is now not an 
unfamiliar one in police circles.
Police training and education though still needs to be 
more scientifically orientated. UK initial police training 
remains quite dominated by legal and procedural 
input, with some behavioural teaching also included. 
There is little opportunity in police training to explore 
proper social research although it is growing and 
evidence-based policing is a much more familiar term 
amongst practitioners. Research, though, does still 
need to be based in the real world of policing and it 
needs to recognise too how fast moving policing is 
nowadays.
As much as one requires it to be thorough and 
methodologically sound, what social researchers in the 
policing arena must also recognise is that for their work 
to be truly valued by policing practitioners (as opposed 
to being just appreciated for its scholarly achievement), 
their work needs to deliver something of value quickly 
within a dynamic operational environment. Too often 
police colleagues dismiss good research because the 
problem has either gone away or developed into 
something else. This does create challenges for social 
researchers but somehow we must bridge the gap. 
Research and analysis needs to be timely if they are to 
get the kind of credence and ‘connection’ to policing 
that so many of us desire.
But most important of all, research should become 
a natural part of police education and day-to-day police 
activity — at the centre and not on the periphery. 
The underpinning of approaches to supporting 
improvement in policing in England and Wales is 
increasingly based upon good, evidence-based 
research, tested by practitioners and peer reviewed. 
The input of the police researcher is an increasingly 
valued one and can only help in all our efforts to tackle 
crime in Europe.
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‘Being one step ahead of the situation’ — this has 
always been the wish of police leaders.
In a globalised world that faces new crime phenomena 
and worsening threat situations at a time of limited 
resources, the demands placed on police leadership 
are increasing. Decisions have to be made quickly, 
should take the situation, the circumstances and the 
environmental factors into consideration to a large 
extent — it would be best to anticipate developments.
The good old ‘gut feeling’ or pure intuition no longer 
suffice — or never sufficed in the first place. A clear 
analysis is necessary.
How do we, as the persons responsible, reach decisions? 
On what basis can we take them and what instruments 
are available? And how can future developments be 
taken into consideration?
The BKA has ventured many experiments in this 
context — and, in my opinion, this is a story of ‘trial 
and error’ with a happy ending.
More than 20 years ago, for example, a so-called 
‘prognosis body’ was set up at the BKA which 
consisted of high-ranking representatives of this office 
and was tasked with analysing trends and preparing 
a ‘prognosis’. Feasibility? This question remains 
unanswered — the body has been discontinued. The 
future remained a secret.
Later, in the mid-1990s, a unit called ‘Strategic Crime 
Analysis’ (SCA) was set up. Here, attempts were made 
to identify foreseeable trends and subject them to 
examination by using a systematic approach. The 
topics dealt with included the introduction of the 
euro etc.
However, a more comprehensive approach was 
lacking which mainly considered the planning needs 
and requirements of an internationally functioning 
criminal police office.
Consequently, the BKA decided to take a further step 
by newly founding the ‘International Co-ordination’ 
division in 2004 and to establish future-orientated 
corporate planning, taking into account relevant future 
developments of criminality within the European and 
international context.
I would now like to introduce two approaches with 
which the BKA attempted to take these requirements 
into consideration: early detection and environmental 
scan.
What do we understand by the term ‘early detection’?
Early detection provides a comprehensive, systematic 
overview of the influencing factors relevant to the 
tasks carried out by the BKA. The significance of early 
detection for the BKA is important both for internal 
command and planning processes (in bodies as well as 
in the ‘Planning and Target Establishment Conference’) 
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and for external processes. Thus, early detection 
substantiates and promotes:
 § the strategically correct prioritisation in connection 
with diminishing resources;
 § the conceptual pioneer role of an authority — 
especially in the federal system of the German 
police;
 § the future orientation of the authority.
The factors influencing crime development as well as 
the opportunities and risks for the BKA’s activities were 
carefully analysed on a broad basis during the process 
of early detection. This is also done by identification 
and analysis of ‘weak signals’, also from the open-
source segment.
In connection with early detection, we distinguish 
between two fields: geographic and strategic early 
detection.
Geographic early detection consists of the country 
reports and analyses and the regional analyses. 
The analyses are made up of various sources and 
information that have to be compiled systematically. 
The purpose of geographic early detection is to 
evaluate a country or region’s significance regarding 
security-situation and criminal-politics, to recognise 
developments in that field which might interact with 
the security-situation in Germany and finally to develop 
proposals of measures to act.
Strategic early detection in its current form is a relatively 
new instrument at the BKA. It has been developed 
systematically since 2004 and has been integrated into 
a process that encompasses the whole authority.
The early-detection approach of the BKA is made up of 
four fields and concentrates on developments which 
will determine the next five years. All four elements 
form the basis for ‘setting objectives, strategy planning 
and prioritisation’ at the BKA.
The first field is ‘situation reports and analyses’ — 
these situational tasks are covered by the operational 
fields such as trafficking in human beings, drug crime, 
international terrorism etc.
This information is supplemented by phenomenon- 
and offence-related information obtained from the 
operational fields which forms the second element.
Both aspects are the basis for the expert strategies.
The third subject areas are the field of criminalistic-
criminological research and technological monitoring. 
While technological monitoring predominantly 
recognises technological developments relevant to the 
police in good time and should check them for further 
development and use, it is the task of research to also 
address long-term assertions and developments (over 
a period of five years).
The fourth element is the environmental analysis which 
is the (product) basis of strategic early detection formed 
by the environmental scan. Here, the environmental 
scan topics society, technology, economy and politics 
(the STEP approach: social, technological, economic, 
political factors) are monitored continuously and 
systematically. New developments, tendencies and 
trends — but also ‘weak signals’ from other aspects 
than the above STEP factors — are detected at an early 
stage (environmental scan).
This STEP approach deals in the sociological scan (‘S’) 
with aspects like demography, matters on families, 
religion, migration and integration. The technology (‘T’) 
issue relates to influences of future technologies and 
data networks while the economical (‘E’) developments 
include the economic and social situation of the 
population. The political scan (P) includes questions of 
political understanding and participation, fear of crime, 
private security agencies, international police missions 
and developments of European internal security.
The challenge of the strategic early detection lies in 
the specification of relevant key factors, their relevance 
to the current situation and the problem of how to 
measure often weak signals. Other issues are the 
collection of well-founded data, the abstraction level, 
the different time horizons and, in an organisation, the 
involvement of decision-makers in this process.
The STEP approach is performed by a team of BKA 
researchers and experienced police officers. They 
collect, analyse and evaluate the necessary information 
and data. Furthermore they interact constantly with 
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the operational departments and the research and 
technology units within the BKA. Of course the process 
involves a lot of time and effort. It is repeated annually 
and is implemented in every organisational unit of 
our office. The ‘top down — bottom up’ principle is 
actively lived as a principle of countervailing influence.
One of the instruments used for this whole process is 
the scenario technique. The technique which is well 
established by big companies around the world consists 
of different systematic steps. For a police organisation 
using the scenario technique is still something quite 
new and the results and consequences of it are 
often under discussion. One reason for that is that 
expectations for concrete results sometimes might be 
too high.
For using the scenario technique a lot of challenges 
have to be faced. It starts with a definition of the 
problem, then the relevant key factors have to be 
extracted, a projection must be formed and then, 
finally, the relevant scenarios must be developed. 
The scenarios are created in the form of a best-case 
scenario, a worst-case scenario and a trend scenario. 
For each of them different options for acting then have 
to be developed.
As mentioned before, the early-detection process 
forms the basis for ‘setting objectives, strategy planning 
and prioritisation’ at the BKA. This is one of the most 
important matters for leading a big police organisation 
with a broad range of tasks.
As a recommendation for organisations considering 
implementing such a process the exchange of 
knowledge and experience with other agencies like 
the BKA should be sought. This might help to avoid 
mistakes and to invest money and personnel in the 
right place. Also for the use of scenario technique it is 
recommended to look for professional support from 
specialised companies. The BKA is still using external 
support from the private sector when it comes to this 
technique. Everybody familiar with the market situation 
knows that this is quite an expensive investment. So the 
definition of the key questions must be well set.
I was often asked for what reasons we as a police force 
are putting so much effort into this approach which 
seems to be time-consuming, expensive and expects 
no clear results.
The answer is simple: we want to do better!
A large number of factors and underlying conditions 
determine our actions. The environment for policing 
is much more complex than years ago and our current 
decisions lay the grounds for our future success as 
a police organisation.
Early detection and the environmental scan based 
on this offer the police management a possibility of 
gaining analytically supported principles for decision-
making.
Thank you for your attention!
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Introduction
The recent growth of ICT (1) has brought all the 
opportunities provided by its global character and easy 
usage of new technologies for the development and 
facilitation of business processes or communications in 
the legal sector and within wider society. At the same 
time, it has also provided new possibilities for criminals 
who can exploit the same advantages offered by 
these technologies. The growing number of internet 
users offers society the perspective to speed up 
communications in everyday life and for commercial 
purposes, to lower the transactions and the costs 
of doing business, to increase the availability of 
information for educational purposes and to facilitate 
the development of such services as e-government. 
However, with the creation of new opportunities for 
economic and social development, the distribution 
of new technologies changes the criminal landscape 
and generates challenges for government and society 
with regard to the use of these instruments for criminal 
purposes. Cyberspace constantly remains the greatest 
source of different illegal activities that include not only 
new types of crime, such as hacking or malicious codes 
and programmes, such as ‘spam’, but also the migration 
of traditional crime, such as child pornography, fraud 
and copyright infringements to the ICT networks.
The fight against cybercrime requires the adoption of 
effective substantive criminal legislation and procedural 
instruments that allow for the investigation and 
(1) Information and Communication Technologies.
prosecution of the misuse of the ICTs for committing 
crime. In addition, the international dimension of 
internet-related crime and the cross-border nature of 
ICT networks also evoke the need for harmonisation 
of legislative approaches and coordinated actions in 
preventing and investigating cybercrime on different 
levels: national, regional and international (Gercke, 
2006, 2009). Furthermore, since the networks are 
mainly privately owned, the comprehensive strategy of 
addressing cybercrime also includes the development 
of the tools for effective cooperation with industry, 
the private sector, encouraging the application of 
co-regulation and self-regulation tools. Every actor in 
this multi-stakeholder environment of fighting and 
preventing crime in cyberspace faces a number of 
challengers, that could be either general problems 
emerging due to the global nature of internet or 
unique issues related to the changing nature of duties, 
responsibilities and functions of the stakeholders 
which used to operate in the real world and are now in 
charge of addressing crime in cyberspace. The police 
as a body responsible for maintaining public order and 
detecting, monitoring and preventing crime is one 
of the actors on this scene that faces great number 
of challenges (Wall, 2007) related to the migration of 
old crime to the ICT environment and the emergence 
of the new forms of criminal activity (Quille, 2009; 
Kozlovski, 2005; Wall, 2007).
This chapter provides an analysis of the problems that 
police organisations are currently facing as a result of new 
threats emerging with the spread of communication 
technologies; and investigates the opportunities for 
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addressing the problem of policing cyberspace. The 
first section examines the role of the police in fighting 
cybercrime and the problems of addressing the new 
threats in this area, while the second part focuses on 
the opportunities for developing new tools to meet 
the challenges, capacity building and possibilities for 
cooperation. Finally, conclusions are drawn to highlight 
the need for reviewing the concept of police activity 
in the real world to address the challenges emerging 
in cyberspace, as well as the necessity for capacity 
building and cooperation in a multi-stakeholder 
environment.
The role of the police in fighting 
cybercrime: problems and challenges
The existing approaches to fighting crime in the real 
world often do not work in cyberspace or cannot be 
applicable to the misuse of ICT for criminal purposes. 
The development of a comprehensive approach 
addressing different aspects of cybercrime goes along 
with the unique challenges that are new for legislators 
as well as for investigatory bodies, and must be taken 
into consideration when developing strategies to fight 
crime in virtual world:
 § Number of users. The spread of internet use in 
people’s everyday lives and as a way for doing 
business is the driver for dramatic growth in 
the number of users in recent years. In 2005 the 
number of first-time internet users in developing 
countries exceeded the number in industrialised 
states. (Development Gateway’s Special Report, 
Information Society — Next Steps?, 2005) The 
increasing number of users connected to the global 
communications network represent a challenge 
for policing cyberspace because, firstly, one of the 
main weak points which presents an opportunity 
to criminals is the lack of the understanding of 
individual security online along with the application 
of social engineering techniques (Rash et al., 2009); 
and, secondly, while identity theft, spam and 
phishing activities can be performed automatically 
(Berg, 2007; Ealy, 2003) without investing much 
money or effort, it is very hard to automate the 
process of investigation (Gercke, 2009, p. 65).
 § The availability of tools and information. The 
internet was designed as a network with open 
access to information, and nowadays criminals can 
easily find either information or tools to commit 
crimes online (Gercke, 2009, p. 65). The availability of 
software and devices that allow hacking password 
protection, automating attacks, the possibility of 
using search engines and robots for illegal purposes 
(Long, Skoudis and van Eijkelenborg, 2005; Dornfest, 
Bausch and Calishain, 2006) and instructions on how 
commit crime offline facilitate the development of 
crime both in the real world and in cyberspace.
 § Difficulties in tracing offenders. The different 
possibilities for hiding identity in the global ICT 
networks, and the various tools and ways for 
anonymous access, surfing and communications 
make it really difficult for law-enforcement agencies 
to trace offenders (Lovet, 2009). The opportunities 
for using proxy servers, anonymisers, unprotected 
public wireless networks (or breaching the 
passwords of wireless networks) and the use of 
anonymous communication services (Gercke, 2009, 
p. 75) are widely exploited by cybercriminals. When 
criminal activity involves different states, it is very 
hard to investigate such offences involving both an 
international aspect and hidden identity.
 § Missing mechanisms of control (Gercke, 2009, 
p. 75). The internet was not designed to be 
governed vertically. The horizontal structure and 
decentralised architecture of the network impede 
control over activity on the internet and hamper the 
investigation of crimes committed in cyberspace. 
The co-regulatory and self-regulatory approaches 
of the private sector and cooperation with owners 
and operators of the infrastructure as well as with 
internet service and host providers are necessary 
when addressing the problem of ICT misuse (Sieber, 
2010; Sieber 2000, pp. 319-399).
 § The absence of borders in cyberspace and the 
international component of cybercrime. Criminal 
law and criminal investigations are considered 
a question of national sovereignty, while the 
protocols applied for internet data transfers are 
based on the most optimal routing meaning that 
data transfer processes go through more than one 
country (Sofaer & Goodman, 2001, p. 7). Moreover, 
since cyberspace has no borders, criminals and 
victims can be located in different countries 
or even different continents, which requires 
the cooperation of all countries involved in an 
international investigation (Putnam & Elliott, 2001, 
p. 35 et seq.; Sofaer & Goodman, 2001, p. 1 et seq.). 
However, the permission of the local government 
when exercising investigations on other states’ 
territories is required under the principle of national 
sovereignty (2) (Roth, 2005). While it takes time to 
meet formal requirements for cooperation, the 
investigation could be often hindered (Gercke, 2006, 
p. 142; Sofaer & Goodmann, 2001, 16), evidence and 
traces are usually very vulnerable and can disappear 
(2) National sovereignty is a critical principle of international law.
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a very short time after a crime is committed. The 
states, which have no frameworks for cooperation 
on cybercrime issues, can become safe havens 
for offenders that want to hamper the process of 
investigation. Furthermore, the internet still makes it 
possible to be physically present in one state while 
committing a crime in another state; offenders can 
also exploit gaps in substantive criminal law, by 
operating from countries that have no effective 
cybercrime legislation.
The role that the police are supposed to play in fighting 
cybercrime, is challenged by all these issues. Not only 
investigation of crimes in cyberspace is complicated, 
but also policing of cyberspace in general tends to 
be impeded. It is very hard for police units to start 
investigations because of the low visibility of such 
crimes and the lack of reporting (Lovet, 2009, p. 69) 
that could happen due to different reasons: from 
the unwillingness of commercial entities, especially 
financial companies to report to the police on account 
of reputational questions and negative publicity to the 
lack of knowledge that such a crime could be reported 
or lack of trust in the police (CSI and FBI, 2004, 19; 
Wall, 2007, 193). Because of the low reporting rate, lack 
of resources and under-reporting law-enforcement 
agencies have no possibility to investigate and 
prosecute more than a ‘tiny fraction’ (Vogel, 2007) of 
what is happening in cyberspace. Moreover, it is very 
hard for police units to justify the impact on public 
interest of initiating an investigation, especially in 
the case of a low impact, single crime with the one 
victim (Wall, 2007, p. 191). Since use of internet and ICT 
technologies provides offenders with the opportunity 
to create aggregated revenue with low impact on one 
victim (e.g. stealing 1 euro millions of times rather than 
millions of euros only once), one of the most important 
challenges for the police is the justification of a public 
order breach and the initiation of investigatory 
procedures.
Furthermore, the next biggest challenge is the principle 
Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege (Hall, 1937, p. 165) 
that plays a critical role in policing transnational and 
borderless cyberspace. Differences in criminalisation of 
various offences, cultural dissimilarities in consideration 
of the seriousness of the crime, the great disparity in 
what should be considered illegal, especially with 
regard to some sensitive areas like religious offences 
harden the process of cross-border investigations, 
sometimes even making it impossible. The issues of 
jurisdiction and dual criminality are usually considered 
a problem for legislators as well as the challenges of 
harmonisation of cybercrime legislation, however, 
police units are among those which are most affected 
by these challenges (Wall, 2007, p. 191).
In addition, finding the right balance between 
investigatory power and human rights, applications 
of safeguards and maintaining the open nature of 
the internet remain very serious problems of internet 
policing. On the one hand, the missing mechanisms 
of control, the initial design of the internet and the 
architecture of the network require the development 
of tools for policing cyberspace, mechanisms for 
monitoring ICT networks, prevention and detection of 
illegal activity in the internet. On the other hand, the 
initial idea of the internet as a room for open discussions, 
exchanging and sharing opinions and views, as well as 
the free flow of information should not be abandoned; 
thus, the challenge is also to maintain the openness 
of the network and its further developments that can 
benefit the legal sector.
Taking into account the demand for new skills to 
investigate crimes in cyberspace, the necessity to 
review policing concepts, such as the justification of 
a breach of public order, the applicability of techniques 
in policing the real world to the maintenance of order 
in virtual space, implementation of these instruments 
in a practical environment remains the highest priority. 
For instance, according to the Interpol National Central 
Bureau’s (NCB) poll data issued in April 2009, 83 % of 
national bureaus had dedicated cybercrime units but 
lack capacity for high-profile incidents (Interpol, 2009, 
p. 11). Furthermore, the poll shows that 79 % of NCBs 
have no accreditation standards for advanced skills, 
52 % have no national reporting system, only 40 % 
use Interpol tools such as I-24/7 and 32 % are still 
outsourcing capability for forensic activities (Interpol, 
2009, p. 11). These figures clearly show that even the 
availability of international tools for cooperation 
being the prerequisite for addressing the problem of 
cybercrime, the required next important step is the 
development of effective mechanisms of utilisation of 
these tools and preparedness for participation in global 
mechanisms of cooperation on the national level.
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Policing cyberspace: future agenda for 
addressing the problem
The unique challenges from cybercrime for policing 
cyberspace require reviewing traditional approaches 
to the concept of policing, application of new tools, 
both legislative and technical, for investigation, 
development of the skills of working with electronic 
evidence, ability to cooperate with industry players. 
One of the critical issues is also the capacity building, 
because the possession of the new technologies for 
investigation and detection of crime does not mean 
the ability to utilise them.
The global context of cybercrime calls for international 
cooperation and provides the opportunity for 
a stronger role of international and regional police 
organisations, such as Interpol and Europol, firstly, in 
facilitating trans-border cooperation between police 
units in different countries in policing cyberspace. This 
area of activity focuses on maintaining the mechanisms 
allowing effective operational cooperation, that is now 
conducted in the form of contact points (I-24/7 Network 
(Interpol, 2008a); ICAID (Interpol, 2008b)) and created 
the channels for information exchange and sharing 
(regional working parties, training). International and 
regional police organisations can assist countries in 
investigating individual cases (3) where higher-level 
help is needed due to the transnational character 
of the crimes or because of the lack of capacity in 
a particular country, or because of the necessity for 
independent expertise. Apart from helping police units 
in investigations, capacity building and information 
sharing, the focus should be also be directed towards 
the development of strategic partnerships with the 
private sector and ICT industry.
The existing initiatives of Europol and Interpol 
highlight the importance of fighting cybercrime by 
policing cyberspace, developing the ability to conduct 
investigations of online crimes and, which is even more 
(3) E.g. in 2008, Interpol was asked by Colombia to carry out an 
independent forensic analysis of computers and hardware 
seized during an anti-narcotics and anti-terrorist operation on 
a Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) camp, in 
order to establish whether the equipment had been tampered 
with following its seizure. Interpol’s team of forensic experts 
conducted an independent technical study and issued a report, 
which concluded that there was ‘no evidence of modification, 
alteration, addition or deletion’ in the user files. See: Interpol, 
Cybercrime, Factsheet, COM/FS/2008-07/FHT-02.
important, by participating in different projects with 
the private sector to address current threats propelled 
by cybercrime. For instance, Europol introduced the 
agenda for fighting cybercrime that includes the 
establishment of hi-tech crime centres, the creation of 
the European Cybercrime Platform (Europol, 2008, 14) 
consisting of analytical work file on cybercrime (Cyborg), 
a common online reporting system at European level 
(I-CROS) and a knowledge management platform 
(exchange of best practices) (Quille, 2009). As part of 
the agenda, Europol in cooperation with the private 
sector, conducts a number of training programmes 
such as Falcone, AGIS and ISEC programmes that are 
aimed at building capacity among police units; and 
operates a working group on the harmonisation and 
coordination of cyber crime training (OSCE, 2008).
On the global level police initiatives are represented by 
the activity of Interpol (Gonzales, 2006) which regards 
the fight against cybercrime as a part of a global 
security initiative (Interpol, 2009), which includes 
computer forensic, online investigation, training, 
public-private partnership, review and evaluation of 
technology and law enforcement. As part of the agenda 
for the creation of effective mechanisms for policing 
cyberspace, Interpol intends to operate both on the 
level of regional working parties (Africa, the Americas, 
Asia and the South Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East 
and North Africa) and on the global level, facilitating 
sharing information within participants. The mandate of 
Interpol includes the functioning of global 24/7 network 
which represents an early-warning system between 
IT crime investigation units in different countries and 
aims to facilitate operational contacts between Interpol 
National Central Reference Points (NCRP) for computer-
related crime (Interpol, 2008a).
Furthermore, Interpol runs and maintains the Child 
Abuse Image Database (ICAID (Interpol, 2008b)) that 
facilitates the sharing of images and information to 
help law-enforcement agencies identify victims and 
offenders (4). The database contains hundreds of 
thousands of images. Moreover, the system uses image-
recognition software to compare details of where the 
abuse took place to connect images from the same 
series of abuse or images taken in the same location 
with different victims (Interpol, 2008b). One of the 
(4) http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/InterpolAtWork/iaw2008.
pdf.
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successful examples in which Interpol has exercised its 
mandate in child protection is the so-called Vico Case 
that represents an instance of effective international 
cooperation in solving problems related both to the 
technical side of ICT and the transnational character 
of the issue. The work of German police computer 
experts allowed successful production of clear images 
of the face of a paedophile, which had been digitally 
manipulated to mask his image in more than 200 
images of child sex abuse posted to the internet. The 
global appeal launched by Interpol after unscrambling 
the suspect’s face identified him after 11 days as 
Christopher Nail and facilitated his arrest in Thailand. 
The identification of the suspect and his arrest required 
coordinated activities between Interpol and police in 
several countries (Interpol media release, 2008).
As well as the unique Vico case that combined both 
legal and technical challenges, there are some long-
term projects for police cooperation established to 
fight child abuse online. For example, the Virtual Global 
Taskforce (VGT) project was created with the aim of 
cooperation between Interpol and law-enforcement 
agencies (police organisations in Australia, UK, Italy, 
Canada and United States) to address the problem of 
child pornography and other forms of abuse of minors 
in cyberspace (5). At the European level, cooperation 
between Interpol, Europol and national police 
authorities in 14 countries across the EU is facilitated 
by CIRCAMP, a European Commission-funded network 
of law-enforcement agencies across Europe, including 
Europol and Interpol, operating with the aim of fighting 
child abuse in cyberspace (6).
In addition to the projects intended to increase the 
online safety of minors and investigate cases of crimes 
committed against children, a number of public-
private partnerships have been created on various 
(national, regional, international) levels with the 
participation of police organisations to tackle different 
aspects of cybercrime, cybersecurity and policing 
cyberspace. Among them are forensic software 
development projects (e.g. Microsoft’s COFEE software 
designed to help police in conducting investigations 
(5) http://www.virtualglobaltaskforce.com/.
(6) http://circamp.eu/.
of cybercrimes (7)), the IMPACT project (8), cooperation 
with social networks such as Facebook, different 
educational programmes, e.g. cooperation with IT-
industry players, such as eBay (9) and academia, various 
universities conducting training courses and building 
capacity among police units.
Public-private partnerships nowadays can be 
considered one of the most promising ways of future 
policing cyberspace. Since private actors have played 
a dominant role in driving ICT sector development 
and innovation, and, as owners of infrastructure or 
possessors of direct access to it, industry plays a key 
role in fighting cybercrime. While governments have 
the power to establish legal order and to enforce it 
through police and law-enforcement agencies, the 
private sector has an in-depth understanding of 
various aspects of infrastructure and communications 
networks (10), expertise in the changing and converged 
ICT environment and greater adaptability to the new 
technologies and their utilisation. The competences 
and resources of both parties mutually complement 
each other, creating the ground for voluntary 
cooperation.
Cooperation between public and private sectors on 
investigating crimes in ICT networks creates a platform 
for better understanding of the issue of addressing 
and preventing cybercrime because neither police 
nor industry can effectively fight cybercrime alone 
(Legal manual for combating cybercrime, 2003). 
Law-enforcement agencies need the industry’s 
expertise in complex ICT issues because police and 
prosecutors often suffer a lack of knowledge in this 
area, especially in comparison with ICT sector experts. 
Furthermore, police units often have no capability 
(7) Microsoft COFEE http://www.microsoft.com/industry/govern-
ment/solutions/cofee/default.aspx
(8) The International Multilateral Partnership against Cyber Threats 
(IMPACT) represents initiatives of training and skills develop-
ment, security assurance, research and international coopera-
tion programmes. It has the support of key intergovernmental 
organisations such as the ITU, UN and Interpol. See: IMPACT, ITU 
calls for borderless cybersecurity http://www.networkworld.
com/news/2009/072009-impact-itu-calls-for-borderless.html; 
IMPACT and ITU’s cybersecurity agenda www.itu.int/cybersecu-
rity/gca/impact.
(9) See e.g. Freedom, security and justice: what will be the future? — 
Public Consultation, response from eBay/PayPal, December, 
2008
(10) ITU Cybersecurity Gateway.
292
European Police Science and Research Bulletin · Special Conference Issue Nr. 2
and resources to monitor all volume of suspicious 
internet communications 24/7 or to collect and store 
all ICT data. Criminal justice and successful crime 
investigations therefore depend to great extent on 
the ICT industry and internet service providers (Vogel, 
2007) In turn, the private sector needs government 
expertise and enforcement power because no matter 
how big and powerful a corporation is within the ICT 
market, and its level of expertise and familiarity with 
the internet, it cannot investigate cybercrimes, network 
attacks and prosecute offenders because that requires 
the power of the state. Public-private partnerships can 
be conducted either as operational cooperation in 
specific cases or long-term campaigns (for example, 
cooperation on training courses, or monitoring and 
blocking illegal content in the internet, or setting up 
networks of contact points in both the private and the 
public sector (Vogel, 2007)).
The shared responsibility and cooperation between 
police and the private sector promises to be an effective 
way of enhancing the effectiveness of addressing cyber-
related threats and also in the fight against cybercrime 
(Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Committee of the 
Regions, 2007). As has been pointed out in a number of 
studies and publications, such cooperation along with 
developing co- and self-regulation could deliver even 
better results than criminal law enforcement (Sieber, 
2000, 319-399; Sieber, 2010).
Conclusions
The fight against cybercrime needs a comprehensive 
approach including the development, application and 
revision of technical and legal measures, along with 
the building of organisational structures to address 
the problem. Furthermore, addressing cybercrime 
requires effective international coordination on cyber-
related issues that must be built on policy coordination 
at the national level. (WGIG Report, 2005) The multi-
stakeholder approach implemented on the national 
level has to be coherent with the international 
harmonisation of tools for addressing cybercrime in 
order to be efficient. Efforts of national governments 
in establishing policies and legal measures need to be 
supported (WSIS Declaration of Principles, 2003) (11) by 
the technical and economical expertise of the private 
sector, the readiness of civil society, and facilitated by 
the activity of intergovernmental and international 
organisations developing common standards and 
harmonising approaches. Despite the number of 
challenges that need to be addressed, police units and 
organisations, as one of the main stakeholders on the 
scene of fighting cybercrime, can act as a central spin-
off for building links between different stakeholders, 
establishing cooperation with the private sector and 
developing the national and international approaches 
to tackling the problem of ICT misuse.
(11) The importance of roles of all stakeholders is especially high-
lighted in the WSIS Declaration of Principles, 2003, available at:  
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html
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Social media has been accused of many things — 
from causing ‘Facebook riots’ to ‘gadgifying’ and 
‘disorienting’ people. At the same time, they have also 
been lauded for enabling ‘Twitter revolutions’, ‘unifying’ 
people and even for ‘democratising’ societies’.
Social media are ‘a group of Internet-based applications 
[…] which allow the creation and exchange of 
user-generated content’ (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). 
Compared to previous internet services, social media 
enable the direct participation of large groups of 
people in the development of online content. It is this 
‘participativeness’ that creates the proverbial double-
edge of this specific technology.
How to deal with the ‘double edge’ of social media is 
also an issue for police forces around Europe. Individual 
cases, on how applications such as Twitter or Facebook 
led to the conviction of criminals or prevented crimes 
show the potential of social media for police work. In 
October 2008, for instance, a status note on Facebook 
helped solve a case of first-degree murder in the 
Canadian town of Edmonton, while the Belgian police 
had a positive experience in using Facebook to prevent 
violent attacks between hostile groups. No wonder 
police organisations worldwide have started to adopt 
social media. According to the latest survey of the 
International Association of Chief of Police, currently 
92.4 % of United States police forces employ social 
media, and 74 % claim that social media has helped 
them to solve crimes (IACP, 2012).
Yet, social media also raise serious questions and 
concerns. The rapid spread of social media services 
means continuous scrutiny for police forces by a critical 
public. (As only one example, a search for ‘police brutality’ 
on YouTube on 18 March 2013 resulted in 531 000 videos, 
some with up to 12 million views.) In some European 
countries approx. 50 % of citizens are members of 
social networks (e.g. Facebook use in Norway: 55.4 %; 
United Kingdom: 51.6 %; Macedonia (FYROM): 48.6 %; 
Netherlands: 45.2 %, as of April 2013) (1). In many societies 
social media is thus widely accepted and used to replace 
more traditional communication and information 
channels such as newspapers, TV and radio.
This trend has consequences for police work and the 
standing of police within the societies they operate. 
One may remember the fallout after the ‘pepper spray 
cop incident’ on 18 November 2011, which saw a single 
picture of campus police officer John Pike ‘casually’ 
pepper-spraying protesting students become the 
centre of a viral storm against the seeming mistreatment 
of peaceful protesters and of democratic values more 
generally (2). This would not have been possible without 
the social media services of reddit, which first posted 
the picture on its site the same day, and thus provided 
the seed for its further spread through social media 
(1) http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/.
(2) Bayerl, P. S., & Stoynov, L. (2016). Revenge by Photoshop: Meme-
fying police acts in the public dialog about injustice. New Media 
and Society, 18 (6), 1006-1026.
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networks resulting in hundreds of new pictures (3) and 
even a Wikipedia entry for the event (4).
In social-media themed workshops organised 
within the COMPOSITE project, as well as informal 
conversations at conferences and meetings, we 
encountered many different voices and views about 
the possibilities of social media — from enthusiastic 
to reluctant, from resigned to at times downright 
incredulous. While we cannot give an exhaustive 
review of these disparate perspectives, a few examples 
may illustrate the breadths and disparities of opinions.
One part of police forces clearly embraces social 
media. For instance, in British police forces such as the 
Greater Manchester Police community police officers 
are regularly commenting on their current activities on 
Twitter to their local communities, while the Finnish 
police in Helsinki have officers exclusively dedicated 
to ‘virtual community policing’. Here, reaching out 
with social media has become part of the normal daily 
duty of many officers. Other forces focus primarily on 
investigative purposes such as soliciting help from 
citizens for missing people or collecting electronic 
evidence of crimes.
Another group takes a more cautious stance, 
considering it more appropriate to ‘think more about 
the risk than about the opportunities’ to ensure that 
social media use does not lead to negative results for 
police operations or the police image. This is driven by 
the realisation that engaging on social media can have 
severe, unanticipated consequences. In December 
2010, for instance, a Dutch chief of police was put on 
non-active duty after infelicitous remarks on Twitter 
during a running investigation (5). An often-repeated 
question during conversations in this latter group 
addresses the access to and ownership of own data on 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, etc.: why would you trust 
public companies (such as Twitter and Facebook) with 
your data? Others warned to ‘be careful not to over-
rate social media, as the image of the uniformed police 
cannot only be solved online’.
(3) http://peppersprayingcop.tumblr.com/.
(4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UC_Davis_pepper-spray_incident.
(5) http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2010/12/28/politiechef-op-non-ac-
tief-na-tweede-ongelukkige-twitterbericht/.
Overall, we found that there is a broad spectrum of 
attitudes and approaches to social media (for a more 
in-depth review of current social media practices see 
Denef, Kaptein, Bayerl, & Ramirez, 2012). And even police 
forces that use social media extensively are aware of 
their risks with respect to overstepping boundaries, 
the legality of publishing information, how to resource 
the services, the need to monitor the mood on the 
networks, and when and how to engage the public.
Yet, despite the differences in outlooks, it seems there 
is consensus amongst European police forces that 
ignoring social media is not an option either.
One of our aims in COMPOSITE is to give voice to the 
disparate opinions and perspectives in Europe — 
providing a forum to learn about and better understand 
these disparate views. This is important, as despite 
the need for close cooperation, what police forces in 
one country consider normal practice is often alien to 
police forces in another country. This is clearly also the 
case in dealing with social media.
The influence of culture on many aspects of our 
social or organisational life is widely acknowledged 
as a fact (Hofstede, 1980; Jacobs, Horton & Bayerl, 
this book). The intensity of cultural influences on our 
behaviour across various situations and depends 
on the interaction between objects and people. 
Leadership or communication is surrounded by a rich 
cultural context, and even products such as furniture 
or food can be classified depending on the richness 
of the cultural context surrounding them. Technology 
in contrast is often cited as an example of a so-called 
culture-free product. In this contribution we question 
the assumption — also shared by many consultants — 
that the use of technology is actually culture-free. To 
better understand the disparate attitudes towards 
social media in European police forces and their 
underlying reasons, we conducted a study to obtain 
a clearer picture of the current social media usage and 
the degree of general acceptance within European 
police forces.
In this chapter we report results from this study.
297
Ignoring, tolerating or embracing? Social media use in European police forces 
Findings on the use and acceptance of 
social media in European police forces
Our study was conducted in the form of an online 
survey, which started in May 2012. The recruitment of 
participants was done through CEPOL contacts in each 
country, who were asked to distribute the information 
about the survey and the corresponding link to their 
national police forces.
In detail we looked into the following aspects:
 § the extent to which individuals would be/are willing 
to use social media (i.e. general acceptance);
 § the extent to which social media is perceived as 
useful (a) for their police force and (b) for police 
officers;
 § the purposes for which social media use is deemed 
acceptable (based on the categories used in the 
2011 IACP social media survey);
 § the extent of fit between social media use and 
(a) an individual’s tasks, (b) the values of the 
police organisation (organisational fit) and (c) the 
professional values of police officers (professional fit).
To differentiate between disparate groups within police 
forces we also requested the following information:
 § country;
 § primary task (community policing, crime investi-
gations, emergency services, intake and service, 
administrative function, IT development/support, 
other);
 § individual usage (no use, private-use only, work-
related use only, private and work-related use);
 § usage at agency level (yes, no, I don’t know);
 § gender;
 § age group (< 20, 21-35, 36-50, 51-65, > 65);
 § rank (open question).
All questions were asked in English. Answers had to be 
provided on a seven-point scale from 1: very low/not at 
all to 7: very high/very much. On average it took about 
10 minutes to complete the survey (median: 8 minutes).
General information about participants
To date, 352 people have completed the survey (8 
March 2013). We received reactions from 22 countries, 
although this number may be higher as 41.2 % of 
participants chose not to answer the question. 
81.2 % of the reactions for which information was 
provided stemmed from six countries: Greece, Cyprus, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and United Kingdom 
(Table 1). The majority of participants were male 
(73.4 %) and between 36 and 50 years old (51.0 % of 
the sample), 42.3 % were between 21-35 and 6.7 % 
between 51-60 years old. The biggest group worked in 
crime investigations (approx. 30 %) followed by ‘other 
functions’ (26.4 %) and community policing (13.0 %). 
The details on the distribution across primary functions 
can be found in Figure 1.
Emergency help 
Crime investigations 
Community policing 
Intake and service 
IT development/support 
Administrative function 
Other 
10.5
29.3
13.07.5
10.0
26.4
2.9
Figure 1: 
Primary 
functions of 
participants
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Table 1 
Number of participants per country
Frequency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Poland 62 30.0 30.0
Slovenia 37 17.9 47.8
Cyprus 19 9.2 57.0
Netherlands 19 9.2 66.2
Greece 17 8.2 74.4
United Kingdom 14 6.8 81.2
Belgium 7 3.4 84.5
Romania 7 3.4 87.9
Estonia 5 2.4 90.3
France 4 1.9 92.3
Hungary 3 1.4 93.7
Denmark 2 1.0 94.7
Portugal 2 1.0 95.7
Bulgaria 1 0.5 96.1
Germany 1 0.5 96.6
Ireland 1 0.5 97.1
Italy 1 0.5 97.6
Lithuania 1 0.5 98.1
Slovakia 1 0.5 98.6
Spain 1 0.5 99.0
Sweden 1 0.5 99.5
Other 1 0.5 100.0
[Not provided] 145
Total 352
Extent of social media use by officers and forces
Police officers’ experience with social media was very 
high. Only 6.5 % of individuals indicated that they 
had no experience. The remaining 93.5 % already had 
used them or were currently using them (cp. Table 2). 
The usage, however, was mostly for private purposes 
(38.6 %) or in a combination of private and work 
(48.7 %). Only 6.1 % used social media exclusively for 
work. This suggests that police officers still encounter 
social media primarily in the context of their home, 
supporting the view that social media currently 
remains primarily a medium of the personal sphere.
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Table 2: 
Current social media use by police officers and police forces
Social media use by individual officers Usage frequency by individual officers
Yes, private use only 38.7 87.4 % private
usage
Several times a day 32.9
50.8 % frequent usersYes, work and private use 48.7 Once a day 17.9
Yes, work-related use only 6.1 2-3 times a week 15.7
No 6.5 Once a week 15.4 33.6 % Infrequent
usersOnce a month or less 18.2
Type of social media services used by individual officers Usage frequency by police forces
Social networks (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn) 45.7 Yes 68.9
Microblogs (e.g., Twitter) 27.4 No 21.5
Video/photo sharing (e.g., YouTube) 26.7 I don’t know 9.6
Blogs 15.4
Other 6.7
Still, if officers used social media for their work, half of 
them (50.8 %) did so at least once a day (frequent users). 
A third were infrequent users (33.6 %) accessing social 
media only once a week or less. Work-related usage of 
social media primarily focused on social networking 
sites such as Facebook followed by microblogs and 
video/photo sharing, often in combination.
Asked whether their police force currently used social 
media, 68.9 % reported that it did, while 21.5 % reported 
that their police force did not. Interestingly, nearly 10 % 
of officers were uncertain as to whether or not their 
police force currently used social media.
Perceived usefulness and acceptance
As part of the survey we asked officers to what degree 
they accept social media use (general acceptance), 
how useful they consider social media for their own 
organisation and for the individual police officer as well 
as the degree of fit between social media use and their 
tasks, their police force and the values of the police 
profession.
As can be seen in Figure 2, overall attitudes towards 
social media were positive: average values were above 
the neutral point in all six aspects. Nonetheless, we found 
systematic differences in attitudes for specific groups.
4.54 
4.67 
4.68 
4.89 
5.12 
5.49 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fit with police profession
Fit with police force
Fit with own task
Usefulness for officers
Usefulness for police forces
General acceptance
Neutral Very low Very high 
Figure 2: Evaluation of social media (all participants)
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Primary function in the police: Comparing all 
functional groups, the general acceptance of social 
media, perceived usefulness for force and profession, 
and the perceived fit with one’s own tasks, force and 
profession were similar across groups.
Comparing only the ‘main’ operational functions (i.e., 
emergency help, crime investigations and community 
policing), however, showed that officers in these 
three areas did have somewhat disparate attitudes 
towards social media — at least in how ‘fitting’ they 
considered social media for their tasks, profession 
and organisation. Across all three aspects, community 
police officers were (significantly or at least marginally) 
more positive about social media than officers in crime 
investigations:
 § Fit with their own tasks: mean values 5.37 versus 
4.72; F(2,1)=2.78, p=.07;
 § Fit with the values of the police profession: mean 
values 5.32 versus 4.45; F(2,1)=4.06, p<.05;
 § Fit with the values of my organisation: mean values 
5.28 versus 4.52; F(2,1)=2.94, p<.05.
The answers of officers in emergency help lay between 
the two groups.
Impact of experience and exposure: Direct experience 
also played an important role in shaping attitudes 
towards social media. Officers with a high level of 
personal experience were significantly more positive 
than officers with less usage (general acceptance: 
F(3,1)=11.12, p<.001). More specifically, officers who used 
social media for work as well as private purposes were 
significantly more positive in all aspects compared to 
non-users and private-only users (pairwise comparison, 
p<.001). In the same regard, frequent users were 
significantly more positive than infrequent users (general 
acceptance: F(4, 1)=8.13, p<.001).
Similarly, officers in police forces that use social media 
were also more positive with respect to perceived 
usefulness (force: t(272)=2.39, p<.05; profession: 
t(263)=2.81, p<.05) and fit than officers in forces that 
did not use social media (task fit: t(268)=2.81, <.01; force: 
t(266)=3.61, p<.001; profession: t(270)=3.56, p<.001). 
Being exposed to social media in the work environment 
thus seems important in creating positive attitudes. The 
more frequent the usage, the more positive attitudes 
seem to become. Moreover, work-related usage seems 
crucial in creating positive attitudes, whereas private 
usage alone is insufficient.
Differences across countries: Because of the low 
number of reactions from most countries, we only 
reviewed usefulness, fit and acceptance in the following 
six countries: Greece, Cyprus, Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovenia and United Kingdom. In all six countries, 
officers rated social media positively. However, 
members of the Dutch police seemed to view them 
the most favourably, while ratings by participants 
from Poland were close to neutral on most aspects 
(cp. Figure 3).
Impact of demographics: Age and gender did not 
influence attitudes towards social media.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Usefulness
force
Usefulness
profession
Fit with
task 
Fit with 
force 
Fit with
profession
General
acceptance
Netherlands 
Cyprus 
Slovenia 
United Kingdom 
Poland 
Greece 
Figure 3: Comparison of social media attitudes across countries (only countries with sufficient data)
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What shapes perceptions of usefulness and 
acceptance?
General acceptance of social media is a good predictor 
for its actual usage by individual officers. Therefore, 
we were also interested in the factors influencing how 
strongly individuals accept social media.
We found three factors, which impacted general 
acceptance: (1) how useful social media is considered 
for the force; (2) how useful it is considered for the 
police profession; (3) the extent to which it supports 
their own tasks. Usefulness for the police force was, in 
turn, impacted by usefulness for the profession and to 
a lesser extent by perceived fit with one’s own force. 
Usefulness for the profession was impacted in equal 
degree by usefulness for the force and fit with the own 
task (cp. Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Factors that influence general acceptance and perceptions of usefulness
For which activities are social media considered 
useful?
We further asked participants to indicate for which 
of eleven activities they considered social media to 
be useful. Interestingly, none of the activities were 
considered inappropriate. In fact, nine of the eleven 
purposes received clearly positive ratings (5.4 to 5.7 
on a 7-point scale). Only the use of social media for 
recruitment and in-service training were considered less 
positively (cp. Figure 5).
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4.47 
4.85 
5.42 
5.52 
5.57 
5.57 
5.58 
5.59 
5.69 
5.69 
5.69 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In-service training
Recruitment
Soliciting tips from public
Crime investigations
Intelligence
Listening/monitoring
Community outreach
Crime prevention activities
Notifying public of crime problems
Public relations
Notifying public of disaster-related issues
Neutral Very low Very high 
Figure 5: Evaluation of social media (all participants)
Some participants added further areas, for which social 
media might be useful. The open answers addressed 
three aspects: (1) extensions to community policing, (2) 
crowd-based use, and (3) police-internal purposes. 
A fourth category mentioned additional services such 
as lost and found and identification of the current crime 
status. Box 1 shows the list of open answers received.
Box 1: Answers for additional uses of social media
1. Extensions to community policing
a. Fast and simple contact with people you 
normally don’t reach
b. Good to build trust and break down 
barriers
c. Identify as a police officer in the city
d. Increase confidence
e. Online community policing — being close 
to citizens also on a digital level
f. Reaching (groups) of young people to 
connect with
2. Crowd-based use
a. Crowd control
b. Social media in events
3. Police-internal purposes
a. Reaching out to colleagues
b. Creating a network
c. Internal communication inside the police 
service
d. Knowledge sharing
e. Comparison of data
4. Others
a. Identify crime status
b. Lost and found
c. Advertising and promotion
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Intriguing about this list is that activities focused on 
community-policing were mentioned more frequently 
than other potential purposes. A possible explanation 
may be that community police officers were generally 
more positive than other groups in their perception of 
the different activities.
In Figure 6 we compare the five largest functional 
groups. The black lines indicate a significant difference 
in the ratings between functional groups with 
respect to their perception of purposes. While the 
significant difference for community outreach between 
community police officers versus crime investigators 
may not come as a surprise, community police 
officers were also significantly more positive about 
the value of social media for crime prevention activities 
and for notifying the public of crime problems. This is 
another sign of the fact that participants in crime 
investigations were generally more hesitant towards 
social media compared to participants in community 
policing. Further differences emerged in the activities 
the four functional groups considered the most 
useful: Members of emergency services as well as 
administrative staff saw the most value in notifications 
of crime problems, criminal investigators in the use for 
crime investigations, community police officers in the 
community outreach function, while participants in the 
‘other’ category considered public relations as the most 
valuable purpose.
These differences showcase the considerable versatility 
of social media, when it comes to their potential uses. 
Police officers in Europe are obviously well aware of the 
disparate roles that social media can play for police. 
However, these differences also demonstrate that each 
group tends to develop unique opinions of how, when 
and for what to use social media — or not. We cannot 
say whether this also causes conflicts, e.g., between 
services or policing and administrative staff, but the 
potential certainly exists.
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Figure 6: Comparing acceptable purposes for the five largest functional groups in the sample (black lines indicate activities with 
statistically significant differences among groups)
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A comparison of countries also yielded considerable 
disparities in the perceptions of social media’s purposes. 
Figure 7 compares the ratings for the same eleven 
purposes across six countries (other countries yielded 
an insufficient number of answers for a comparison). 
Already at a first glance, two types of answer patterns 
become visible. In the first group, ratings are highly 
differentiated. Participants from the United Kingdom, 
for instance, rated notifications for disaster-related issues 
close to the maximum of the scale (m = 6.5), while 
in-service training received a mere 3.6 average rating. 
Greece demonstrates a similar spread from 6.3 for 
disaster-related notifications to 3.4 for recruitment. In 
contrast, Cyprus and Poland show little variation across 
purposes indicating a more generalised positive or 
negative attitude towards social media.
Neutral 
Not useful
Very useful
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Cyprus Greece Netherlands Poland Slovenia United Kingdom 
Crime investigations 
Listening/monitoring 
Intelligence 
Soliciting tips from the public 
Notifying public of crime problems 
Notifying of disaster-related issues 
Crime prevention activities 
Community outreach 
Public relations 
In-service training 
Recruitment 
Figure 7: Comparing purposes across countries (only countries with sufficient numbers of participants)
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Why is a look at acceptance relevant? 
Practical considerations for the 
implementation and use of social media
Findings from our study may serve police forces in two 
ways:
1. By raising awareness for potential issues when using 
social media across functions or countries
2. By providing ideas on how to ease the imple-
mentation of social media.
Police forces generally agree that social media is a trend 
that cannot be ignored. The question is what motivates 
police officers to use social media, if they are not already 
doing so? And what can police forces do about it?
Use of new technologies can of course be coerced, 
but this often leads to lower satisfaction with the 
system, resistance, work-arounds or even sabotage 
(e.g, Kleingeld, Tuijl, & Algera, 2004; Jian, 2007). Creating 
acceptance is thus undoubtedly a much better 
strategy. Acceptance of new technologies refers here 
to ‘the demonstrable willingness within a user group 
to employ information technology for the tasks it is 
designed to support’ (Dillon & Morris, 1996). As such 
it is a precursor to the adoption and continuous use of 
new technologies.
The predominant assumption is that acceptance is 
driven by either instrumentality or political concerns 
(e.g., Davis, 1989; Lapointe & Rivard, 2005): Is the 
technology easy to use? Does the implementation 
threaten my current position within my organisation or 
vis-à-vis my colleagues or supervisors?
These aspects remain important in determining 
whether individuals adopt new technologies. Yet, 
our study demonstrates that there may be additional 
considerations when trying to understand differences 
in reactions to social media. The fact that primary 
functions had disparate views on whether and for what 
purposes social media should be used is a clear sign 
that the type of job and surroundings shape officers 
attitudes towards new tools. The same is true for the 
country differences we observed as well as the impact 
of personal experience and exposure to social media in 
one’s own police force.
Our findings indicate that how people understand 
their work and their organisation matters, affecting 
their acceptance of new technologies such as social 
media. How then can police forces increase acceptance 
of social media?
One answer lies in the antecedents for acceptance 
identified in this study: fit between the values of the 
police force and the profession as well as fit with 
their own tasks emerged as important factors for 
the perceived usefulness of social media. Perceived 
usefulness for their own police force and profession 
emerged in turn as important factors influencing 
general acceptance. New technology is thus accepted 
if it is in line with existing practices and cultures — and 
resisted if it is in conflict. One of the more obvious 
examples in this context may be that social media 
for soliciting information from the public is probably 
harder to implement if police officers fail to see the 
value of integrating the public in police work.
Translated into practical terms, this means that a clear 
link needs to be laid between the affordances of social 
media and the core values, norms and tasks of the 
organisation and the individual police officer.
Concerns or resistance in this process should thus be 
taken as a sign that important personal values, beliefs 
or ingrained practices are threatened (instead of 
interpreting them as a generalised negative attitude 
towards change that needs to be overcome at all costs).
Considerable variation existed among officers from 
different countries and with different primary tasks 
on the most acceptable purposes. This observation 
suggests that officers in different countries and/or 
primary tasks perceive disparate benefits from social 
media usage. Underlying these differences in views are 
disparate expectations and motivations on where, how 
and why to use social media (e.g., in which contexts and 
in which ways). Such disparate attitudes towards social 
media can be the basis for disagreement and frictions: 
should social media be used at all? And if so, for what 
purposes should it be used? Given the differences 
in attitudes across primary functions and countries 
such tension can emerge between individual officers, 
between internationally cooperating police forces, but 
also between officers and a police force, which wishes 
to implement social media. To prevent such friction, 
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police forces should thus obtain a clear view on possible 
disparities in expectations prior to implementation 
and subsequently aim for alignment in purposes, 
expectations and usage motivations up-front.
Interesting in this context is the relevance of experience 
and exposure. Our study suggests a clear trend: the 
more exposure and experience, the more positive 
the attitudes. Working in a police force that already 
uses social media seems to help, as is having personal 
experience. Interestingly, however, the exclusively 
private usage (e.g. a private Facebook profile or Twitter 
account) without work-related experiences yielded 
less positive attitudes than if officers used social media 
directly for their work. This suggests that a strategy of 
‘tell-and-sell’ may not be enough to convince officers 
with a more negative attitude. Instead a ‘try-and-
learn’ approach may be needed that allows officers 
to become familiar with social media on the job. In 
this context, the most resistance to the use of social 
media may be expected from people with little or no 
experience.
Limitations of the study
Our overall findings indicated that European police 
officers were generally positive about social media. 
Unclear is in how far this positive picture is a ‘true 
reflection’ of attitudes towards social media across 
Europe. It is highly likely that this positive attitude is 
a reflection of the group of officers, who answered our 
call for participation. Most of them already used social 
media and many of them did so frequently. Attitudes in 
non-users and infrequent users were considerably less 
positive, which suggests that across Europe opinion 
may still be more divided than appears from this first 
overview. Given the large proportion of users in our 
sample, our findings thus paint very probably a more 
positive picture of social media attitudes than would 
be obtained from a more balanced sample.
Moreover, while function and country comparisons 
yield interesting patterns, caution should be taken 
against over-interpreting the differences. The numbers 
in the groups are very small and can therefore not 
be considered representative of a whole country or 
functional group. Also, unfortunately, the current 
sample is too small to test interactions of variables such 
as contrasting attitudes of primary function across 
countries or the impact of experience across age and 
gender groups.
Open questions to address
Our study is a first step in understanding the broader 
issue of social media in European police forces 
providing a first view into differences in attitudes 
towards social media across Europe. It also addresses 
the question of what shapes the acceptance of social 
media in individual officers. Yet, social media use by 
police forces is a complex topic — and this study is 
obviously only a starting point.
Addressing the limitations mentioned above, certainly 
a broader sample of countries and more participation 
from individual countries is needed to obtain a more 
systematic and balanced picture of attitudes and 
usage practices. Such a broader sample should then 
also include non-users to provide insights into reasons 
for non-adoption.
Despite cautioning against over-interpretation the 
observed differences in attitudes among countries 
and functional groups, the fact that disparate patterns 
emerged is nonetheless worth further consideration. 
Why do such differences emerge? What are the 
consequences for collaborations across functions 
or countries? And how can differences be identified 
and reconciled? Similar questions arise with respect 
to the disparate purposes, for instance: why do some 
purposes seem more acceptable than others and what 
drives the differences in acceptable purposes amongst 
groups?
Investigating specific purposes in more detail 
would certainly yield important insights to these 
questions. Moving beyond general attitudes into 
more focused investigations, for instance, targeting 
crisis management, community engagement or 
recruitment would further elucidate the respective 
merits and problems of social media applications. 
A focused case study into Twitter use during the UK 
riots in August 2011 unearthed interesting findings 
on disparate communication strategies by two British 
police forces (Denef, Bayerl, & Kaptein, 2013). Yet, as 
this study focused solely on the UK, it remains unclear 
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whether the same strategies would also lead to similar 
results in other situations and countries.
Moreover, social media constitutes a very broad 
family of diverse applications from microblogs (e.g. 
Twitter) and social networks (such as Facebook, 
Google+, LinkedIn) to file, picture and interest sharing 
(e.g. YouTube, flickr, Pinterest), applications to locate 
friends, colleagues and employees (e.g. foursquare) 
to those facilitating ever more social interactions such 
as MingleBird. In asking for usefulness and fit of social 
media we did not differentiate between these disparate 
types of applications and services. Given the specific 
features as well as systematic variations in user groups 
across services, it seems important to consider them 
individually in more detail. Future investigations should 
thus take a closer look into the respective merits and 
limitations of disparate social media services for police.
Relatedly, the increasing number of specialised police 
applications, for instance for crisis management or 
public participation in investigations, also needs to be 
addressed. While they provide more tailored services to 
crisis responders and the public, these new additions 
raise the question of how to integrate them into the 
existing (social and traditional) media landscape. This 
is especially relevant as users tend to remain with the 
services with which they are familiar with (Manso & 
Manso, 2013).
Our study was concerned exclusively with the internal 
view of police with their own social media use. Yet, the 
adoption of new technologies can also greatly impact 
the perception of police from the outside (Neyround 
& Disley, 2008). Especially, if new technologies are 
not deployed carefully, public perceptions of police 
legitimacy may be damaged. Public reactions to social 
media use by police are a largely uninvestigated issue, 
but are needed to understand when and in what way 
the use of existing or the development of new social 
media services may be useful.
Overall, the topic of social media remains an exciting as 
well as challenging one. Clearly further investigations 
are needed to obtain a better understanding of the 
respective benefits and drawbacks of social media for 
European police forces. However, we hope that our 
findings in this study are a first step in addressing some 
of the challenges that police forces in Europe face in 
working with social media.
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Introduction
The last ten years have seen significant progress in 
Europe in our understanding of the nature of police 
science and its role in the development of police policy 
and practice. Much of this progress has been driven 
forward by the CEPOL Research and Science Working 
Group through its annual conference, programme of 
seminars and landmark publications, including Hanak 
and Hofinger’s (2006) overview of police science and 
research in the European Union and Jaschke et al. 
(2007) Perspectives of Police Science in Europe. The latter 
is particularly significant because of the ways in which 
it draws together the threads of the different contexts 
and traditions of police science within Europe to arrive 
at a broad definition of the field as ‘the scientific study 
of the police as an institution and policing as a process’ (p. 
23). As Jaschke et al. cogently argue, police science has 
a vital role not only within society, by providing critical 
insight into and reflection on what constitutes good 
policing in democratic contexts, but also within police 
education and training by helping to stimulate the 
intellectual development, critical thinking and problem-
solving skills of those who work in police organisations. 
As these authors also acknowledge, however, there are 
important challenges in the future development of 
police science within Europe. Some of these challenges 
lie at an institutional level regarding the location and 
independence of police science. ‘When police science 
is seen as science which has to follow only the interests 
of politicians in charge of the police or of police officers 
(applied research)’, they warn, ‘the development of 
a European approach to police science will hardly be 
possible because … of their political, national and 
professional (economic) interests’ (p. 11). There are 
also important methodological challenges around the 
nature of comparative police research within Europe and 
the balance to be struck between country-based case 
studies and the development of survey instruments 
that can be used at a pan-European level. There are also 
important challenges in terms of sustaining a broad 
research agenda within police science. For Jaschke et al., 
the key question, which must lie at the heart of police 
science, is: ‘what is good policing in [a] democratic 
society?’ (p. 67) - a view strongly endorsed by Peter 
Manning (2011) in his monograph Democratic Policing 
in a Changing World. As Manning notes, however, the 
agenda of police science is in danger of being hijacked 
by those who would limit its use to studies of ‘policing 
as crime control’:
‘Because the research enterprise has increasingly 
propounded the notion that crime control is the 
essence of policing … and seized on the idea that 
policing is not just based on several sciences or 
disciplines but is itself a science … it has narrowed 
the vision of the police studies field to what can be 
measured and manipulated rather than any political, 
moral, or value-based explicitly democratic position’ 
(Manning, 2011: 107).
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For Manning then there are concerns that policing 
studies are ‘too much about the police and too little 
about the context or culture of policing, including its 
legitimacy [and its] grounding in democratic values…’
Against this background, I want to explore two further 
challenges for the future development of police 
science in Europe. The first challenge concerns the 
need to become ‘smarter’ in terms of making research 
evidence ‘part of the conversation’ about police policy 
and practice. This challenge emerges from the paradox 
that police science is viewed by some as a ‘successful 
failure’: ‘successful’ in the sense that the production of 
knowledge about policing in Europe and elsewhere 
has never been greater; but a ‘failure’ in the sense 
that many claim that the application of knowledge to 
improve police policy and practice remains limited. 
The second challenge to be explored in this chapter 
is around the importance of sustaining a degree 
of pluralism within police science. Rather than just 
thinking about police science in narrowly instrumental 
terms, in which research is expected to have a direct 
impact on the actions of front-line practitioners, 
we need to embrace the different uses of research 
(from instrumental to conceptual), the different types 
of interventions that researchers make into public 
discourse about policing, and the different institutions 
that exist within a European context to promote the 
development and use of police research.
Setting the context: paradoxes and 
paradigms
In their reflections on the condition of contemporary 
criminology, Loader and Sparks (2011) highlight 
a paradox of ‘successful failure’ (p. 11). On the one hand, 
criminology as an academic discipline is expanding, 
with more students, larger conferences and bigger 
professional associations. Yet, on the other hand, criminal 
justice policy in western societies remains relatively 
uninformed by criminological research findings and 
the demand for evidence to inform policy is still weak. 
A similar paradox appears to be true of police science. 
There has been a significant expansion in policing 
research in recent years in Europe, North America 
and Australia yet many would claim that the impact 
of research evidence on policing policy and practice 
remains limited. Researchers in the United States, for 
example, have struck a consistently pessimistic note 
over the last fifteen years regarding the integration of 
research-based knowledge into routine police practice. 
Bayley (1998) writing in the late 1990s observed that 
‘research may not have made as significant, or at least as 
coherent, an impression on policing as scholars like to 
think’; five years later Goldstein (2003) noted that ‘there 
is no discernible, sustained and consistent effort within 
policing to make the basic premise that “knowledge 
informs practice” a routine part of policing’; and more 
recently Lum et al. (2012) acknowledged that ‘the notion 
that science should matter is often trumped by the 
reality that public opinion, political will or consensus-
based opinions about best practices are what should 
underpin and drive police practices’. It is, of course, 
important to acknowledge that even if the impact of 
research evidence on policing policy and practice has 
been limited, this does not mean that police science 
should be viewed as a ‘failure’. Police science should 
not simply be evaluated in narrow instrumental terms 
but also by its broader attempts to understand and 
explain the nature of policing. Nevertheless, many of 
those engaged in research on, for or with the police are 
motivated by what Loader and Sparks term a ‘reformist 
impulse’ and therefore want their research to be taken 
seriously in the world of policy and practice.
In attempting to make sense of limited impact of research 
evidence on police policy and practice (and of what can 
be done about it), there have been different diagnoses 
of the problem. Bradley and Nixon (2009) characterised 
the problem as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ in which police 
and academics are unsympathetic to the concerns of 
the others and construct an imaginary conversation, of 
which a short extract is reproduced here:
Academic:  Why do the police ignore research 
findings?
Police:  Why don’t researchers produce usable 
knowledge?
Academic:  Why do the police always reject any study 
that is critical of what they do?
Police:  Why do researchers always show the 
police in a bad light?
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Academic:  Why don’t police officers even read 
research reports?
Police:  Why can’t researchers write in plain 
English?
More recently, however, there is growing evidence 
of innovative activity to establish a ‘dialogue of the 
listening’ as exemplified in several innovative police-
academic collaborations that have been documented 
in special issues of the journals Policing: A Journal of 
Policy and Practice (Murji, 2010) and Police Practice 
and Research: an International Journal (Johnston and 
Shearing, 2009, Cordner and White, 2010, and Fyfe, 
2012). In particular there is evidence of several ‘fully 
collaborative’ partnerships (Bradley and Nixon, 2009) 
being established which encourage long-term 
relationships between practitioners and researchers 
and can take one of three forms: (1) individual 
researchers working directly with police agencies; 
(2) an academic unit within a single university 
working with police agencies; (3) collaborations of 
researchers across academic institutions working 
directly with police agencies (see Engel & Henderson, 
2013). Of these three approaches, it is the third 
type involving structured collaborations that span 
multiple universities and police agencies that Engel 
and Henderson contend ‘will be the most effective 
at advancing evidence-based practices in policing 
agencies’, an approach they suggest ‘is best exemplified 
by the Scottish Institute for Policing Research … 
a research consortium made up of the Scottish police 
service and 12 Scottish universities’ (p. 13; see also 
Fyfe & Wilson, 2012).
In another important intervention in the debate 
about the limited impact of police research on policy 
and practice, Weisburd and Neyroud (2011) argue 
that despite progress in terms of the production of 
knowledge about policing, ‘there is still a fundamental 
disconnect between science and policing’. Policing 
innovations are, they contend, rarely science-based, 
relatively few countries in Europe place a high value 
on police science; and that science is still viewed as 
a luxury rather than a necessity by the police (contrast 
with medicine and public health). For Weisburd and 
Neyroud there are important structural reasons why 
this disconnect between evidence and practice 
persists:
‘The police operate in a reality in which decisions must 
be made quickly. And issues of finance and efficiency 
can be as important as effectiveness. But academic 
policing research generally ignores these aspects of 
the police world, often delivering results long after they 
have relevance, and many times focusing on issues 
that police managers have little interest in’ (p. 5).
Against this background they outline a proposal for 
a new paradigm that changes the relationship between 
science and policing, a paradigm that demands:
 § the police adopt and advance evidence-based 
policy;
 § universities become active participants in the world 
of police practice;
 § a shift in the ownership of police science from 
universities to police agencies which would facilitate 
the implementation of evidence-based approaches 
and change the relationship between research and 
practice.
Within a European context, Knutson (2010) has 
given support to such an approach, arguing that 
‘police must improve their ability to analyse data, 
and be more knowledgeable of what works… this 
cannot happen without the police having a research 
capability of their own’ (p.134). Sherman too has 
strongly endorsed the arguments of Weisburd and 
Neyroud, arguing that evidence-based policing is 
needed not simply to improve public safety but also 
to enhance police legitimacy. In his 2011 Benjamin 
Franklin Medal Lecture on ‘Professional Policing and 
Liberal Democracy’, Sherman (2011) makes the case 
that ‘police legitimacy may be established not just on 
the basis of effectiveness under the rule of law, but 
on demonstrated police mastery of a complex body 
of knowledge generated by scientific methods of 
testing and analysis’.
The contributions by Weisburd, Neyroud and 
Sherman have generated an important debate about 
the relationship between police science and police 
practice (see Sparrow 2011 and also Moore, 1995). 
In a direct response to Weisburd and Neyroud’s call 
for a new paradigm for police science, for example, 
Sparrow (2011) has argued that the model of police 
science that has tended to inform evidence-based 
policing focuses on too narrow a range of social 
research methods given the way that it privileges 
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randomised trials and marginalises other approaches 
to advancing knowledge. Sparrow therefore has 
concerns that the relationship between police 
and academia suggested by some proponents 
of evidence-based policing is ‘unstable and 
unsustainable’ (p.7). Drawing on the work of Moore, 
he argues that the suggestion that ‘science should 
guide and govern policing’ adopts ‘too narrow a view 
of what constitutes knowledge valuable enough 
in confronting public problems, too rigid an idea of 
where and how useful knowledge accumulates in 
society, and too unrealistic a view of how knowledge 
might best be diffused and deployed in aid of both 
immediate action and continued learning’ (Moore, 
1995, pp. 302-303).
These debates about police-academic collaborations 
and the relationship between police science and 
evidence-based policing are clearly important. 
In particular, they act as a timely reminder of the 
challenges involved in forging links between evidence 
and practice and that police science (like the broader 
field of criminology) is itself an internally diverse 
field marked by pluralism in terms of theoretical 
assumptions and methodological approaches (see too 
Loader and Sparks, 2011, pp. 18-19). In the remainder of 
this chapter I want to explore these two points further.
The challenge of knowledge exchange: 
developing strategies for making police 
science ‘part of the conversation’ about 
policy and practice
There is a growing body of literature examining the 
challenges of using research evidence to inform policy-
making across the public sector (see Nutley, Walter and 
Davies, 2007; Cartwright and Hardie, 2012). A central 
concern of these contributions is to better understand 
the processes that that facilitate ‘the transfer of research-
based knowledge out from academic circles in search 
of research impact’ so that research evidence can be 
used to improve policy and practice in public services 
(Davies et al., 2008) In particular, the term ‘knowledge 
exchange’ is now increasingly being deployed to focus 
attention on the complex processes involved in the 
interaction between practitioner-based knowledge 
and research-based knowledge. As part of this interest 
in knowledge exchange across different areas of social 
policy, there is now a much better understanding of 
the barriers that limit the use of research in policy-
making. According to Nutley, Walter and Davies (2007), 
these barriers include:
 § research outcomes that are messy, ambiguous and 
contradictory and therefore frustrating for policy-
makers that simply want to know ‘what works’;
 § a lack of autonomy to implement findings from 
research;
 § a lack of support for research-based change;
 § local cultural resistance to research and its use;
 § a lack of incentives or rewards for academic 
researchers engaging in dissemination activities.
All these barriers are of considerable relevance to 
understanding the constraints that impact on integration 
of research evidence into policing yet to date there has 
been only limited engagement by researchers and 
practitioners with these broad issues. Bullock and Tilley 
(2009), for example, highlight how within policing there 
is often disagreement about what counts as evidence 
of effective practice, issues about the accessibility of 
evidence to practitioners and organisational constraints 
in terms of a lack of support for practitioners to engage 
with research that might be seen as a threat to professional 
expertise. Similarly, Lum et al. (2012) highlight a range 
of issues that hinder receptivity to research in policing. 
These include an organisational culture and system 
of promotions that focus on ‘rewarding knowledge 
of procedures and reactivity [and so] help strengthen 
barriers to using research that promotes proactivity and 
problem solving’ (p. 65).
In attempting to overcome some of these barriers, 
the literature on evidence-based policy highlights 
several different mechanisms, which together can help 
support effective research use (Nutley, Walter & Davies, 
2007, p.132). These include:
 § Dissemination: presenting research in formats 
tailored to their target audience;
 § Interaction: developing stronger links between 
researcher, policy and practice communities
 § Social influence: relying on influential others, such 
as experts and peers, to inform individuals about 
research and persuade them of its value
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 § Facilitation: enabling the use of research through 
technical, financial, organisational and emotional 
support
 § Incentives and reinforcement: using rewards and 
other forms of control to reinforce.
Within police science there has been considerable 
progress in recent years in some of these areas. In 
terms of more effective dissemination strategies, 
for example, there is the work being led by Cynthia 
Lum and colleagues in the United States around the 
Matrix Demonstration Project (MDP) (Lum, et al., 2012). 
The MDP is centred on an innovative knowledge 
translation tool, the Evidence-Based Policing Matrix, 
which brings together a large body of police-related 
crime prevention research that has been evaluated 
as at least ‘moderately rigorous’. By mapping these 
studies using a three-dimensional visualisation process, 
police are in a better position to access the key findings 
from a large body of research and use this knowledge 
to guide interventions to deal with specific problems. 
Within the MDP, the aim is to ensure that the matrix 
becomes institutionalised within everyday police 
activities so that, following Weisburd and Neyroud 
(2011), the police take ownership of how to use findings 
from existing research (Lum, et al., 2012, p. 21). In terms 
of improved interaction between researcher, policy 
and practice communities there are also a range of 
initiatives which exemplify innovative approaches in 
this field, including the establishment of Universities 
Police Science Institute (UPSI) in Cardiff (Innes, 2010) 
and the Scottish Institute for Policing Research 
(SIPR) (Fyfe and Wilson, 2012). Both these initiatives 
challenge the simplistic assumption that interaction 
merely involves research evidence being packaged 
into knowledge ‘products’ by heroic figures and that 
these products are then transferred to recipients who 
will be capable of consuming them. Rather UPSI and 
SIPR have created institutionalised arrangements 
in which chief police officers and senior academics 
regularly meet to discuss the research needs of the 
police service and opportunities for collaboration. SIPR 
in particular exemplifies the call made by Weisburd 
and Neyroud (2011, p. 15) for a ‘shared academic-
practitioner infrastructure’ in which there is regular 
and routine engagement around the nature and value 
of the research evidence base for policing, helping to 
secure a culture of engagement and a commitment to 
the co-production of research between the police and 
academic communities (Fyfe and Wilson, 2012).
The challenge of pluralism and 
police science: embracing different 
interventions in the public sphere
This focus on the challenges of knowledge exchange 
clearly highlights the need for a plurality of approaches 
in order to achieve the effective integration of research 
evidence into discussions about police policy and 
practice. This commitment to pluralism, however, 
also needs to extend to how we think about the 
different uses of police research, the different types 
of intervention that researchers make into public 
discourse about policing, and the different institutions 
that exist within a European context to promote the 
development and use of police research. The need for 
a pluralistic approach should not, of course, be taken as 
self-evident. As Loader and Spark’s (2011) recent analysis 
of the condition of contemporary criminology has 
highlighted, there are concerns that pluralism in terms 
of criminological thinking has been constructed as 
a ‘problem’ and that some in the field have attempted 
to solve this problem either by seeking a ‘divorce’ 
from criminology (as in the case of crime science) or 
by a ‘takeover’ (as in the case of some advocates of 
experimental criminology). I want to argue that such 
responses to pluralism are unhelpful and that police 
science can benefit from a dialogue between those 
with different approaches to intervening in public 
discourses about policing and between the different 
(but overlapping) memberships of institutions that exist 
to promote and develop police research within Europe.
A diversity of research interventions in the public 
sphere
In thinking about the relationships between research, 
policy and practice attention typically focuses on 
a largely instrumental view of research use in which 
research is expected to have a direct impact on the 
actions of front-line practitioners or local/national 
policy-makers. Within the context of police science, 
such an approach is exemplified by the use of research 
to support hotspots policing where analysis of crime 
pattern data or calls for police assistance provides the 
basis for targeted patrols to specific micro-locations, 
such as street corners or housing blocks. Research 
evidence might also help police to determine what 
strategy to adopt in these locations, such as such 
as short-term, high-visibility patrols or enforcement 
activity, or longer-term problem-solving approaches. 
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This image of research use, however, lies at one 
extreme of a continuum which also encompasses, at 
the other extreme, more conceptual uses of research 
as part of an ‘enlightenment model’ where the role of 
research is to help shape the ways both problems and 
their solutions are framed (Nutley, Walter and Davies, 
2007). This can then lead to fundamental shifts in the 
prevailing policy paradigm as new ideas gradually seep 
into policy-making processes. Examples of research 
used in this way might include recent approaches to 
tackling gang violence. Findings from a number of 
international studies provide strong evidence that in 
reducing gang and youth violence police involvement 
in terms of enforcement and deterrence will only be 
effective if viewed as one element in a much broader 
approach that also requires early intervention from 
social work and education professionals to identify 
children at risk of turning to violence later in life, and 
with health workers in Accident and Emergency 
departments to help identify young people who have 
been the victims of gang violence. Within the policy 
community, research has therefore contributed to 
a reframing of the problem of and solutions to tackling 
gang violence from one of tougher law-enforcement 
activity to a multi-agency approach involving police, 
education, social work and public health (see for 
example, HM Government, 2011).
These different forms of research use also underline 
the way in which within the police science community 
there is a rich diversity of types of engagement with 
the public sphere and intervention in public and 
political debate about policing. This is a point cogently 
argued with respect to criminology by Loader and 
Sparks (2011) who have sketched out a typology of 
what different styles of criminological intervention 
in the public sphere currently look like, ranging from 
the ‘scientific expert’ to the ‘lonely prophet’. Taking 
their typology and mapping it onto police science, the 
following different forms of intervention in the public 
sphere can be identified with individual examples:
 § The scientific expert views the task of police science to 
produce, valid, reliable and useful knowledge about 
‘what works’; the public role of police science is to 
use knowledge to challenge myths and to make 
decision-making more rational and evidence-based. 
Example: Larry Sherman’s work on evidence-based 
policing and experimental criminology.
 § The policy advisor focuses on the value of police 
science in terms of its proximity to tackling problems 
but also to recognise the importance of protecting 
the autonomy and independence of research. 
Example: Nick Tilley’s work on crime prevention and 
community safety carried out in partnership with 
the UK Home Office and police forces.
 § The observer turned player is where a researcher moves 
from academia to work within police agencies in 
order to better make the link between research and 
practice’ and ‘getting one’s hands dirty’. Example: 
Betsy Stanko who moved from academia first into 
government and then into the Metropolitan Police 
Service as head of Evidence and Performance.
 § The social movement theorist/activist is concerned 
about the close relationship between researcher 
and government/police agencies and argues for the 
need to retain a degree of distance and autonomy. 
The aim of their work is to raise problems for 
government not to solve problems for government 
and so it is more focused on developing a critical 
agenda. Example: Sophie Body-Gendrot and her 
work on social control, fear and insecurity and the 
policing of youth disorder in cities
 § The lonely prophet views police science as being 
hampered by its proximity to government/police 
agencies and its small-scale empirical focus and lack 
of theoretical ambition. Example: Jock Young’s work 
on policing, exclusion and disorder in late modernity.
While these different positions do to some degree 
over-simplify a more complex landscape, they also 
highlight the ways in which among those engaged 
in policing research, there are very different styles 
of intervention in public discourses about policing 
aimed at different audiences, employing different 
methodological approaches, and underpinned by 
different philosophical and political commitments.
Conclusions: the dynamic landscape of 
policing and police science in Europe
This paper began with the paradox that police science 
might be regarded (like criminology more generally) 
as a ‘successful failure’. Within a European context, 
there is strong evidence to dispute such a claim. There 
are a growing number of national and European 
organisations supporting not only the development 
of policing research but also facilitating processes of 
knowledge exchange and knowledge integration. 
The CEPOL Research and Science Working Group, 
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for example, has mapped over 100 police, policing 
or public security-related research institutes in EU 
Member States and associated countries. In addition, 
2008 saw the establishment of the Policing Working 
Group of the European Society of Criminology (ESC) 
with the specific aims of facilitating the networking 
of scholars and practitioners interested in the study 
of police organisations and policing, developing 
lines of communication and cooperation between 
nationally based research centres with policing-
related interest, and acting as a hub through which 
scholars, practitioners and the policy community can 
collaborate through the development of comparative 
research programmes, knowledge transfer events and 
joint continuing professional development initiatives. 
The working group has already had an impact by raising 
the profile of policing research at the European Society 
of Criminology annual conferences and organising pre-
conference events that have resulted in engagement 
with practitioners and publications about policing at 
a European level (see for example,) Another important 
addition to the European policing research landscape 
came in 2009 with the formation of EPIC (European 
Police Institutes Collaboration) which brings together 
researchers and practitioners from several northern 
and western European countries (including Belgium, 
Finland, England, Netherlands, Norway, Scotland 
and Sweden) based in police academies/colleges 
and universities. Uniting the membership of EPIC is 
a commitment to working collaboratively with the 
police and conducting comparative empirical research. 
To date, EPIC has focused its work on a number of 
thematic areas including the challenges of policing 
multi-ethnic neighbourhoods, the different trajectories 
of police reform in Europe and a comparative analysis 
of police recruitment and careers.
The presence of these different European institutions — 
the CEPOL Research and Science Working Group, the 
European Society of Criminology Policing Working 
Group, and EPIC — all committed to supporting the 
development of policing research but with different 
identities, different but over-lapping memberships, 
and intervening in the public discourse about policing 
in different ways, is indicative of the strength and 
dynamism of police science in Europe today. This 
is important given the rapidly changing context of 
policing. The impact of austerity measures in many 
European countries means that not only are many 
police institutions undergoing radical change but also 
the wider social and political environment in which the 
police operate is changing too. Against a background 
of public spending cuts, police forces in many 
countries are being restructured, often leading to the 
creation of more centralised organisations designed to 
be more efficient as well as more effective in tacking 
changing patterns of criminality (Fyfe, Terpstra and 
Tops, 2013). However, these changes raise important 
questions about future relationships between police 
and citizens, particularly if greater centralisation 
leads to more remote bureaucracies and a decline in 
democratic accountability. At the same time, the police 
are having to confront the consequences of austerity 
measures as people take to the streets in large crowds 
in many European cities to express their frustration at 
political responses to the financial crisis. Recessionary 
pressures are also likely to impact on criminality, 
typically in the form of rising levels of property crime 
and inter-personal violence. In this situation, the big 
challenge for police science is to find a way of helping 
inform police decision-making at a time when the heat 
of popular pressure and short-term political demands 
will be considerable. Now more than ever the police 
need a knowledge base for good professional practice 
that can help inform a vision of ‘good policing’ in 
democratic societies that promotes better public 
security, a reduction in crime and the protection of 
liberty and human rights. In short, the challenge for 
police science in Europe now is to be at the core of 
‘civilising security practice’ (Loader & Walker 2007).
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